WSAG MEETING, THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-523-1-2-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 4, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24: LOC-HAK-523-1-2-7
c (3-411.-E-28;13
MEMORANDUM
NSS, Army, DOS, OSD, and DIA
review(s) completed
THE WHITE HOUSE
/SENSITIVE
W AS11 I 14 CITON
June 4, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge'Viiiiiiff
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting, Thursday, June 4, 1970
Items for discussion at this meeting include:
-- Proposed operations in South Laos and Northeast Cambodia.
-- The Green Triangle situation.
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? Provision of captured Communist arms to the Cambodians.
-- Indonesian military assistance to Cambodia.
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P SECRET sENsmyE
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2.
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3. Proposed Operations in South Laos and Northeast Thailand (Tab 4).
- Following the June 2 WSAG meeting State agreed to draft a cable '
to COMUSMACV to do a study covering guerrilla operations in
South Laos and Northeast Thailand. This has been done, in accordance
with changes proposed in the original draft made at the WSAG meeting.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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In addition, CIA has been tasked to do a study of significant
Chinese Communist reaction which could be taken into account
in modifying or redirecting military action.
There would appear to be no further questions needed on this issue
at this times unless others at the meeting should raise them.
4. The Green Triangle Situation.
? You agreed with others at the lune 2 WSAG meeting that Abrams'
judgment oxi the inadvisability of supporting Cambodian forces
in the Green Triangle area of Northeastern Cambodia. Instructions
were sent to Rives to pass this decision on in such a way as to
emphasize the positive aspects of what we were doing, e.g., providi
air support for Cambodian forces in this region through June 30,
and expressing sympathetic understanding of Lon NoPs position.
This was done in order to avoid any damage to Lon Nol's morale
or to-our relationship with him.
-- This matter was badly handled; the Defense Attache went to
Lon Nol on his own before our instructions arrived and passed
on Abrams' decision. Rives left this matter in the Defense Attache
hands on the grounds that the matter was best handled in military
channels. (See cable at Tab 4.)
? In the incoming cable at Tab 4, Phnom Penh wondered if considerati n
should not be given to the possible use of Cambodian bases in the
Green Triangle as forward areas from which the Cambodian Army
could possibly harass LOC's at some future date.
Questions which you may wish to address:
? Should Rives be told that matters involving crucial decisions
affecting the morale of Lon Nol should not be handled solely
in military channels ?
-- Should reconsideration be given to support for Cambodian forces
in the Green Triangle in order to permit operations to be staged
from this region against LOC's ?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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5.
-- You directed in the June 2 WSAG meeting that a study be prepared
on the total costs to the U.S. of all the support calls listed above.
This is now underway. It is presently anticipated that the study
will be completed by the middle of next week to cover total costs
in FY 71. No further questions appear necessary at this time
unless others should wish to raise them.
6. Provision of Captured Cornminist A.rms to the Cambodians.
-- Lon Nol has indicated that he wants us to take action on turning
over arms captured in the Communist caches to his forces. He
has offered to check the amounts recovered against Cambodian
lists to facilitate such a turn-over, and to see if we have missed
anything. (See cable from Phnom Penh at Tab 5.)
-- There seems to be some hint in this cable that the ARVN wants
merely to "share" the captured arms with the Cambodians rather
than to turn them all over.
You may wish to raise these questions:
-- What has been done, if anything," to transfer captured arms
to the Cambodians? Is there any way in which this matter
could be expedited? Would U.S. assistance be required?
-- Is there any reason why these arms should be "shared" with the
ARVN, rather than be turned over in toto to the Cambodians? '
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24: LOC-HAK-523-1-2-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24: LOC-HAK-523-1-2-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7. Indonesian Military Assistance to Cambodia.
The President has directed that we should encourage the
Indonesians to provide arms aid to Cambodia, and that we
should make up Indonesian arms stocks depleted by this exercise.
You passed on this directive to the WSAG members.
State has drafted a cable to Djakarta on converting Indonesian
ammunition manufacturing facilities (presumably the Arms
Factory at Bandung) to produce AK-47 ammunition for Cambodia.
(See Tab 6). This cable calls for a study of the feasibility
of such a conversion, and says that we will send one or two qualified
people from our side to discuss the technical aspects. It says also
that we would be willing to "help" meet the costs involved through
a mutually agreed offsetting arrangement. It stresses the urgency
of this matter.
Questions which you may wish to address:
-- Where do we stand on the matter of Indonesian arms aid to
Cambodia? Have the Indonesians made a firm proposal?
What would we need to make up in the way of replacements
for arms sent to Cambodia? How would we arrange to accomplish
this -- via our MAP to Indonesia, or through some other program?
Is the draft cable to Djakarta on production of AK-47 ammunition
agreeable? (This is a positive approach. We would suggest,
however, a minor change in the wording of the first sentence to
delete the words "how big and [b.ow expensive] a job conversion
would be" and substitute "what conversion would entail."
State appears to be unduly concerned about the expense, although
you mentioned at the June 2 WSAG meeting that the cost would
only be a little more than $3 million.)
Tran /54r-i-nrqr-rrv1.
-- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/24: LOC-HAK-523-1-2-7