INDOCHINA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
September 3, 2010
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 17, 1974
Content Type: 
MISC
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8.pdf930.59 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527- YV~k`i1~11V1.11fJ1V -2t'l'alsdtlla tl,'L J 1V1V&3 xva:w,+:.rJ..AA Time and Place ,10:1O.4. M. Suhject Znclochi:na ' rticiuants: Chairman State 10:48. a. M. WV'hite. Hot e Situation. Room henry A.. Xissinger Winston Lord Montague Stearns George Vest Robert .ingersoll Amb. Graham Martin JCS. 'Gen. George S. Brown LTG 3 ohn. W. Pauly IA ' William Colby Theodore Shackiey NSC Richard Kennedy __ `I . ,13icJ ar&Srz sex . ?Defexise. William Clements Robert:.Ellsworth R/A Thomas J kigley JCS review completed William Stearman James Barnum NSA, State, USAF reviews completed MORI/CDF Pages 1-6 per C03233261 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Xc DS a L No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 July .1-7. 1974 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 OP I. f.-"' 3 .. -- _. ecrctar ICis:inBill (Mr. Colby), do you want to give us a briefing? SMr. Colby briefed from the attached text. Secry Share what view? 1ViL Celt: NV('re not sure whether the Khmer Communists share Siha auk's but directly vic-'s th:at.he is interested in talking With the U. U.S. , only after we withdraw.our support to Phnom Penh. ecrrtai riasizaer: They certainly don't vtant to tall`. to us after they withdraw. Mr. CQ~1iy continued to brief. _ (referring to the statement in the ecretax Kissinger: Do any go north? `elann-:liat-some-d4, 00() North Vietnamese troops have infiltrated to the south in the last 10 months.) ,olb : Some have gone North, but a very limited number. We don't Mme. figure, but believe it to be very few` have an accurate continued to brief) Secretary- I issin cr: slaw many casualities did they suffer ia-layeaa x. Colb We estimate about 40, 000 --mostly North Vietnamese. The Mr. Y South Vietnamese lost somewhere between 11, 000 and 12, 000. Secretor Kissinn err: That compares i o what when the war ? was going on, u're talking about dead or c 180, 000 casualties? Yo Mr Co1bv- Dead. ecretar 1Ci.ssin er: Thenatotal of 100, 000 casualties would not be unreasonable. Mr. Colby- That's right. I ,think is you factor in the estimated number of wounded you could get to that figure. Then the are suffering, quite an attrition rate. 5c c~r~f :f isine:r: Y Mr. Colby- That's right, and they have accomplished nothing. ec_ Kissifger: Seems to me they are worse off today Than they we're; in 1963. Mr. Colby: I would says about the same- maybe they are a bit worse of. , r? -%G! ,,; ,~ , No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 r OP 8F,G[ I'.T/SENSITIVI XGDS , No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 Secretary Kissin*e.r: What do you think it would take them to push it (South Vietnam) over, an additional 100, GOD men? Mr. Colby: I think it is a real question as this point whether they can push South Vietnam over at all. Secretary Kissinger- What do you think, Graham (Amb. Martin)? Arnb. Martin: I don't think they could. Mr. Colby*: I really doubt that they could push it over. True, South Vietnam would lose a lot of men, but I think they could hold. They might take the northern corps area. Secretary Kissinger: Did you say they would inflict heavy losses? Mr. Colby: Terrible. (finishdd briefing) Secretary Kissinger: The principle purpose of this meeting is to review the Indochina situation. I want to reiterate that our basic policy is to preserve South Vietnam's independence and integrity. I appreciate that everyone here is in agreement with proceeding along that line. What we do in South Vietnam is an example of our entire foreign policy. If we fail there, we fail everywhere. So. basically I would like everybody to lean forward, to encourage Graham (Amb. Martin) and to help in what he need- to get the job done. Mr. Clements: I think we all agree on that, Henry. Our big problem, though, is on the Hill. We are really between a rock and a .hard place on the money situation. Secretary Kissinger: I know that. This is-not intended as criticism of what you all are doing. I understand your problems and appreciate your :efforts. I will do everything I can on the Hill- -I think everybody here will. Mr. Clements: It's just this Hill thing. If we could get what we want, we'll be in good shape. Secretairy Kissinger I know. Can you get a carrier around to Yankee Station if the situation heats up? Gen. Brown- Yes, we could. Secretary I:issin. er: How much time would it take? 'iO.1 .SECIII T/ ;Ii,NSI'I.'IVI' XGI)S No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 Gen. Brown: Four to five days. Secretary Kissinger: Well, Graham (Arnb. Martin) can give us a sign if he thinks a military move would be useful. Ainb. Martin: If we can get the level of military assistance that we enjoyed last year and better communication between here and out there, I think we will be in good shape. I think the lack of communication is our real problem. Mr. Clements: The real problem came up last year when we oVerspent. Secretary F issiLiger: I don't know all the details, but my point, and I'm' speaking for the President when I say this, is that we're serious about our effort in South Vietnam. Any testifying I can do, let me know, I'll be glad to do it. Any support any of you need let me know, you'll get it. -.-MK. C.lements_: A.s_I look`at it,--when we're-working on~this_funding- we have to establish some priorities. It looks to me like there is no. question but what we will have to drop/dL8'411ehc'i'~i't know what it will be, but the F5Es are certainly not on top of the list. .Amb. Martin: The psychological impact.... . Ce .... -0,-ux point is that C the funding situation is as -dire as you paint it, it becomes a question of the F5Es or some other type of expendables. Amb. Martin: I understand your problem. We would just like to be in on the beginning of this thing so that we can give you some guidance. Secretary Kissinger: Did they ever get the TOW missiles? Gen. Brown: Yes they did. Mr. Colby A related question is the signal Hanoi would receive as a result of a sharp dravidown of personnel in Thailand. We're looking at the various options in a paper we will have over to you later. Mr. Stearns: What's this? Mr. Colby: In relation to NSDM 249. M -r.- .Stearns: Oh. Secretary Kissinger: Bill (1\1r. Clernents) has been sneaking forces out of "I'Tl:~il~4iic1 like c~ ra-Ay over the past several months. I'm not in favor of a rapid drawdown. What is our schedule? Si:C; f:1:'i'2'-C:sial` s 1-ta-vo redL:a:.eCI ?~::1; a.~.~ nu i' 1ar.'".l I ;:ta. acuica;i ai: ca last. a' 1. ro o, ICCS, the sour- delegations are: -still' ea~~a ~'.O Indonea.i.c.r 3 and w a xr;wzi ors Zia t~W.. 6. .. Iv by the o st4ructi'onis4 tC.ctlc3 OA o,P c REP T No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 0 but Jat;a t fce15 t:a t I: an's into- fecl.-i'v*,w .v53 t ''' a. a'r :i,3 4.C.tC}3:2e~ . U c:. ~a ~.I;ta .~'..? rd~{:0 T..~ Ii-;.ATx, l"ar:v h3.i14?.S'..Cl. they. niig h?t~ ...-...-?.'2:-:`---4.1.~R+3~.i.=-4'.tw~~ d"-?tivr- - -~- f..s-...__."S-~?.-..w: ?,t~.7 ~~ t~+~t~. ld .~.~ L'da~r+.1??Cwt:..L a N~t~'..~. ~,?w ~_-~: ICCa uSefu1, but do not wex it :o become _..?. .~.' 4?t...yi., vc- e n o u,cja i to a t7 ~~1 mt i t`r J_ '~ ? . C~:. eaS G C 4u'1 1Tar c.C.t143 :..7? :. Cam! ? ':` y a =o continuing to block th Cfl.,m is- on; :w OP Xatxo1YS, z-4nci have refused addi.- Me~...41~t1~ CQ% wr+?.w.iu4-?.j0- ,. to its bud g-.? L rlv^?. ~,y r": ile i us cr,;roxl. ~.n t, r? ;~~ l'a rrI'll aJ.r a i,=na 4harr-, are no r..r:a.gm3 of rkttarmal. po 1..ti- aal J ... CwVL w . :~ $ '~:: ::L'... ~:i>:1? tar:a 'and -,,::tty Polca h ve xagional sites. L.1% v dn 4+~-,'M Cr' ~ ~o .4 ?L! A Cr.4^14{1 Serving no us - ul. pax ,ose. r+: i ?%CX u a:::,I.r~~i :.CC?==?Lr v::~JC.i'~",.:.C ~~?OV.3w:,:^.u~ w 't~,C~ C ~' 04 a Kt. ? t~ 0 ' tai 1,cilif co1Zitior will prob- .--y ?:.y organize o;tc e it jr, :satins f7.4:1 +'-.1 icu Top ;r,ct~.~~r o Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 do trot to'.,. be ...PIQ' Im ,.rg all No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 4j(f out of p.ar;ty ate- t t qatting t,' Local tjon4; 1M/~ +. ~.y ~? C .. Y'.~ ?l 1. . 1 j o c ndidatcs wo)i a ma!" pactf i cata.QC pros r.:.ma continue m?11 ?z good pro-irass.- :~ end' 'd Zy r, a a jon^h? ta. 2. have. s-~,-tt-~,.ed,ts retzc~eea. a,,nce 4ha end of 1972, 4E:1~ c av` r s~: ham vZovi cd tew ho.;.es. for over onM million . of 1 tS C a3'c".C:il:a s r.G~+}i:e.; .ar,e-so w bright Spot= ev-,n in. ',-h South Vi tnart's m0 %- seZ:.ou2 .; t r. ..y ? r seem, ` to be level, ~.X"~C."J /firclr(?i.- 0.: ., a% -.ouch they ha`ta ri san .by 30 parcen t "hiz y=_.Wtr on top of last. year's pc'rce t. `,~ :.: t3U h r"e?.` O r~ an . c.\ G hi ecorlai:t-. CS min-'s- .y to ~liJ\t.. w twrSV o 0.Vw.-:?t.gdi aid. and `.;W~J. o I and 530 1ca:ie:.s Off ti .e coast- have li-Ou h.. "n add t?icir1al -Ovei.lla. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-527-5-3-8 part icinZ-tioa' C~.J `~:.+ilt.~.?~t }???.lt harass m tn4; gcvo:-m?-...