INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF ETHIOPIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
August 16, 2010
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 16, 1974
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
?w .~
48
MEMORANDUM
55
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/NOFORN
URGENT INFORMATION
October 16, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
SUBJECT: Intelligence Assessment of Ethiopia
The intelligence assessment which you requested the CIA to make on
Ethiopia is at Tab A.
In summary, the conclusions of the assessment are:
(a) Internal Politics
-- Divisions within the ruling Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee (AFCC) will continue to be a check on the leadership of the
moderates, and no single leader is likely to emerge for at least the next
year.
-- However, policy should continue to be guided by pragmatism
rather than ideology.
-- The AFCC will give first priority to land reform as a means
of changing the feudal social order. It will give the government a larger
welfare and economic role, especially in efforts to alleviate the drought.
-- While the AFCC is committed to a "constitutional" government
(probably to be a Republic rather than a Monarchy), the military will be
loathe to give up power.
(b) Horn of Africa
-- The AFCC is intent on maintaining Ethiopia's present boundaries
despite separatist threats in Eritrea and in Somali-inhabited Ogaden Province.
Its motto is "Ethiopia First. "
- Even though Somalia has repeatedly insisted it does not intend
to take advantage of Ethiopia's internal upheavals, arms will have a high
priority for Ethiopia's new military rulers.
SECRET /NOFORN/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
Ip
Foreign Policy
--- The AFCC will continue to look to the U. S. as its major arms
supplier but also has sought supplemental assistance from the Soviet
Union. Moscow has so far been diffident in responding, for fear of
offending Somalia and limiting Soviet access to military facilities there.
-- The AFCC may seek the appearance of looser political ties
with the U. S. in favor of Third World solidarity.
The major threat to U.S. interests in the period ahead will be a takeover
of the government in Addis Ababa by the radical members of the AFCC.
If moderates on the Military Committee, by contrast, are able to keep the
upper hand, Ethiopia will probably maintain reasonably friendly ties with
the U. S. and seek continued U. S. economic and military assistance.
Attachment
Tab A: Assessment
SECRET/NOFORN
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
II
CENITR7 L I TELL IGnNC AGENCY
Diroctorate of Intolligs'nce
October 15, 1974
ri:~:ol%. t-ID ;
SUC.s2c'r; l thiopia-. The Unfinished Revolution
Introdl ction
OC7' No. 1.524/74
Ethiopia's creeping revolution-- no.,, some 8 months old--
h ,;:+ not wet unfolded to the point where we car. speak w th con-
i?I.Gva~w,: abovt thc, nature of the successor regime or the poli-
cies t:T.;t , W.;, 11 GventuZil1y take Shape. Thus war f a sin g l:w
leader has n .Wt taken stage center and c;ozi nateo the evolut.1oA;
eacti.ons within the military are still locked 3.r: strugg,.-=, to
capture ~cc?i+:1.and of the r cvc:1..ution that is largely being played
out 'away from public view.
DM.a... .rrol.lott., is thus new.::r.;aril.y an In-Lt a:im
on tivl:t::'v wi:! country st n w now and the direction it, will take
il- 1:1 *"I! i..s to CC G. .;;,a have divided the subject, - s.ote%what
lt,rr ;nvo thr .. r -~-~ ee pa`.i...is.. Part i
, I discusses. sdiscusses. 'discusses. t~21.Ot?? u, lS
:lt-4:"i1 ?.~ 1 a. r the relationship
ti. ~.. ..... ~C.3: r..i~ t-:3,t.
errant and land to d .
*?^ i reordering of economic !_priorities to give emphasis
to improving the lot of the less affluent. The GCS .::tit ..e
warts active go.-ernmen.l- encouragement of economic develop-
went and plc ns a larger direct economic role for the rov-
ernt::en t .
,.- A. cc fitment to the ostablishment of constitutional
yovi:r:c:a~: t.
-- K intenance of ]thiopia' s present boundaries, CC: ia' ivy;
":.i: intro iuct1.Q11 O ~. measure of political With
Ciec ntrali-
;.at or the cott_~;:yv's diverse ethnic and regional groups.
The r.ow leaders clearly N ;ill not tolerate separatism,
however.
SECREMA
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16 LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
Iierll-ors of the cooraina -J -
thcse gO'-- `' shad c~ c11an4;c:.
als+ differ on the Pace and n,a he
4:itilin and bet'd0erA
,_ of al lianceG , both
A i:QCi~~..%_I7~. S..y~ 4=ng O + CQ^1l C;:tB 'tl-e -bask 0
u"its {;;;.aenty. on the ComIai l.tee l . - '
carious tactio:ls. A basic division, i:u reV~L r
cler in a g? the group t;i4 tJ, essential? y lnodc ra le
a o i-
has s mate
h,.3 Ci;ll+i[ tad whiC En a +~ 7 y ,,,1 ndCd m:ma jority S'_"2PC:~rt wit
o't7gC:i:%I~rC::'a, 4,i11Gd1 s4 and a more rad call`y-inClillt:Ci rll2nC?rx-ty g=oL' ].
ti'1'o CC.,Ir itteu, i- .tY Y the
~ ~ ,,, ~
rct j o, regional worry .'??.a that
J.?W .fir` ?. /yi rn?:? ~ ~ ~1 M
lip: as a Ii1ilitarl,' cage. avid mighi. try to grab
e
j~.~.t~~I1 reajcn i:L:c+j~I.L'o by o~.:~17I1,.C Somal
x+tilw+lw'::r .:+~i f aw of So:~Ialj i rede:1 I : joz
:ras a ma
r `actor
Cc" ~~ ..~...~: t ccu~ in
.:+ 1, t::1ut: v11 US inc:r;C^aa ra~Iit Z;y
? S 4,::(: C ~:::: MS to to cOv,: the Purchase of arms I.1eu of
cas11 salt: s previously t In authorized.
r? will be on-the watch for signs that the p_Gpn
n
es s o. ? , :~s cep:. n pr in the UC% en 4d,
C:
a ii 4, :c:1'' L >' cy i C 4':, had dat c-L- for ted t --
4 L... ..?G. ct.:._a could GJl
-e?i?ie. a Sizable Uor!! 0I1 n'M dy
- in
~+ in
a+ . r r J. 1~ I:1Gil it .a hold it a4' ainst an o.i.. v
x
.tac!. and than ~~ :rvca~~~.a:I crow: cr--
t o :w..:
'
g
:
er
i
*-,
.
..
L
nat
on i d~??' to naatj.c p s w ., 3
4: V 0 t? +:f",Y V 1. , t h a IL S G. a. i
~-1 t; i? 1 move ag in s t the
G..' z. ~ 7 c zer!ous disorder "r
:.. 1..1 i O ]?
do
Y -04. zn 44:::L to m.-al a
~r4 + w rlua >:ar, a0::1aa.1. axe +4G:c:nt Sia:.
cd d to his ple
~ :.T 1 +-
::o
(J
4x .r .ir V, ~' u } 7
ra 1J C' J.Z ~w1 t1V to 1:~?Iitt~t'"110 .SI :. fi 1 s a -
.. ct aCtiv
~. C.C1^o$S i l: ~? .`'.trill C?i?.'.:::n
-
ti ~.haaan outright r: ack by the .L
i
f i~
o u a prc:~a.~Zy unify op I
le
y tl L" ,hiopL4 rJ:
i
, e coordinating t i ng co.-Un tt oo may hope to reach '
the S= o
a.) i s are on-'.,4r l I?'?: --'I'
agree to a ::uLL::.il thinning out of military unit a In the are'a
and cto yQJ:a::.'v u2_?C~; of a neut;.-al Zone alonC the
;;vti:t.~i?Cw 7 t ~. ~ ~ e
~~= +.t+ $ " Z rC a:, ! V....oy as buying ~ I- :~e . " e
r:,, r
ii,. r ..I ..,t!t.. ~ TL.
+i? +r: in less + Ic^..--miat to .o
bu.. e-4} search for more a1l" s would Continue.
cuT
fl~t
}
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7 I_
.I , +I I1 I 1 ..t l . t, I', .?41 , .I I
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2- 3-7
FO4o].C.,n Z 1ations
The :-,offices Coordinating Comnitte-e has thus far been
able to giv : relatively little attention to foreign relations,
old order a, ,Id i31.g g d
W__
ir. thf i- ht control of t:.~ revolutions 4ti'C SU:":'i1iSri, how-
eve-, that r.:i? ~.tary' use of tho. slogi n "Ethiopia F .rat"
r':p haa i zing
has : Gi ..f.Ow t31. C:. policy as well as C..1
the need for doa?ustic reforms.
just as 1:1-l re is conflict boti%,con raoderate and radical
military factions over the nature and pace of do.,,e.stic
t?.e think th..se differences spill over into the foreign policy
..z~3wc;. long as lm,odc:rates are dominant on the? coordin~a;.,.ing
tee, ` OF e:.: poet that it--and the prod o:;linc r.t? y civilian
cabinet Z-:ont.in for it----are likely to follow, these gu:idolin.:o
--- Pursue better relations with sympathetic _:egicnal
es tate r =+uch ac, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
to loo:: to the Saudis and
ir.a :x " 4a;,; and 4: i,0:1G;111 C aid. r11-.a Ethiopians will
~c:7:
be ,:11`l1."tAt~ e ~y Libya to establish closer ties
third-~-:orl:d solidarity more than c:id the
old nd 1oo 'en political ties with the tS ? a 3 the
new tries to distance iteielf from the Policies
Of Haile LAL lassie .
Contir:aa to look to the US as its Major arms supplier,
Ino3:e fob: 4;oc.-Anical. than reasons. Should t e
llli. r ,
US 4car\
Vay be C.=eC?:':s?G i::lrw::.:0 :::.Zfo to .r.',t:110pia lS n1eedS
the n Ethiopian rulers will look elsewhere.
"e ..,OW that the Ethiopians h 1ve already made ingfuir ies
to the Soviet U -ion about aid. i`;oscow has indicated a willing-
to thi i ' t +^.,r 1. t ' y.-
M?.li..a:.y ass,, ,,ls1.-a'eiiCGr
Scc'^ et of ,C:. ave been veryr taut c '.s' They have ri- ueoted
t:".--t studies of Ethiopian needs he provided and said
S. cvi`.:t.. would p:: o'v idi aid at levels "permitted by Soviet
e urce-S ." stems in part from rer.i,',C'~
t nee to Somalia and thereby Jeopardize Soviet access
co M-U, nary w,lcilit-io:i thore.
The fact. th.t the Soviets have not flatly turned down the
that Moscow thinks it can have it both wa'r;
in at Africa--o:a long as it does not give the Ethiopians too
much.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16 : LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7
is c.::1s ng iuor e military aid because it
belie yes arni dol .vor{ va to SO'.': ~ 1 have giver. L O(~c d.1.:zCio
e mi? : Wiz:: edge. TheM L%:lio?ia;- s are also trying to use hei:.
::cto gain leverage in dealings with the US
for :e; .1 tMry aid.
'?:G2 w o -17
the ruling Ixrled Forces Coo .,:din t.i:i CC ::--
;:,w t,:art to coiltintue to rely mainly on the US o
Soviet aid as su-)p1ementa.'L.
TL the E; Ionians become di s: ,1:is.f:iecl wit-,-h US military aid
,
is ey tics with cona.:lin iti t countries.
Some o:' th radicals within t no military committee are already
%or a turn in that direction.
25X1
w 4 _'.al, a art, and c1ViIir-an leaders `are hopeful that
d
and ~r ;n-?-in Ctc.iition to t e US--criil p?'.-.ovide
rr Z for a: 'iii:.r `}i.w. 1.1 .. ... ..:a w L~.?..w ~ c. ..s..3. i.i.1(.l I~~: ,a r...:.. y Q~.1V~4:: .,. ~
.. .'U . ~? ~.~ ._..~ti ..V i:, 4J~~id ~tiv~l1 . _..t.:~t:i:?l _ ti~+v~ .. u,+ j C~l~:'~L'.i . c
un ul:.1.l ~.e? .i. t. he military shou.LC:
4.o take -::2,h ac on against :Ic.."~le3 Seiassie, they are
to be even l sea reopon ive to .r tIliopian requests.
[.
4.?4. ?..e?-...:a ,.. 'C%f:.'a rate.Gr on the e i7.t:a1'V able .k..'" 1. CO^.=I':11,.ttC:[. are Jto
~~ vli is .t? l.2: .^_'rt: iol.~i". l~ro3 ably a' n ta- n :."l':tascn-
ties with the US and see'. Continued or inm: GaSed
c and miiitarv assistance.
A takeover by the 1 . Gz.',.G a Is,
:: ;1M C proha'-Iv lead ra 4 di y to a substantial decline in US
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/16: LOC-HAK-53-2-3-7