TUESDAY MORNING STAFF MEETING, AUGUST 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-532-6-2-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 4, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
August 4, 1970
TOP `"r""i\'''' JBT
.hJ i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis
ON-FILE TREASURY
RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
SUBJECT: Tuesday Morning Staff Meeting, August 4
Aid Message
Mr. Bergsten asked if Dr. Kissinger could approve August 10, 11
or 12 for sending the Aid message to the Hill, or if we should wait
until after September 8.
Mr. Kissinger replied that he did not like the draft message -- that
it was not crisp enough -- and that he had made several comments on
the draft which he was returning to Bergsten. He said that the argu-
ments in the security portion did not mention the Nixon Doctrine.
Mr. Bergsten replied that there wexe two paragraphs on the Doctrine --
referred to in the draft as the Guam statement.
Mr. Kissinger complained about the "driveling recommendations" at
the beginning of the message, saying you had to wade through 20 recom-
mendations before getting to the meat of the message.
Mr. Bergsten explained that Bill Safire had been under instruction to.
pull out any new ideas and put them at, the beginning of the message.
Mr. Kissinger said the order of items was wrong and we should at
least put the most important first.
Mr. Bergsten agreed to revise the draft. He stressed the importance
of getting the message up to the Congress before the recess.
Mr. Kissinger remarked that he did not think State would go along with
the message and that we would have to let them scream.
Mr. Bergsten asked how long -- a week or a month?
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Mr. Kissinger asked that the draft be redone today. He noted that we
have not yet received the President's decisions on the four issues. He
asked Bergsten to look at his notes on the draft and talk to him.
Mr. Bergsten noted that Treasury was a big winner on the shift to
multilateralism.and that this should overshadow their losing on other
smaller issues.
Trade Meeting
Mr. Bergsten asked Mr. Kissinger to attend a meeting on trade problems.
Mr. Kissinger agreed to do so tomorrow.
Middle East Initiative
Mr. Saunders said he thought Mr. Kissinger was up to date on the Middle
East initiative.
Mr. Kissinger asked when it had been decided that Secretary Rogers was
to go to the UN. He had no objection, but he didn't wish the President
to be surprised.
Mr. Saunders said he was surprised Mr. Kissinger had not known of the
plan and had assumed it had been discussed in California when the Secre-
tary was there. He had become aware of the plan when Joe Sisco had'
sent the Secretary's proposed statement to the President last Friday,
and had mentioned it in a briefing item. He said the reason for the trip
was that Jarring had not shown the greatest energy or imagination in his
earlier efforts and we wished to provide him with strong encouragement
at the outset. We also wished to provide U Thant with a stimulant to
keep Jarring moving, pointing out that his mandate was somewhat
different this time and required a more active role.
Mr. Kissinger asked that State provide a report on what Secretary Rogers
had said in New York.
-Heroin Task Force
Mr. Saunders said a working group had been meeting to prepare-.for a
meeting of the Heroin Task Force next week. He noted Ambassador
Handley was back on consultation. He said, since we had not achieved
our objective of getting Turkey to plow under their fall crop, we had to
decide whether to change our objective to a more realistic one or to go
along with Treasury to try to achieve their somewhat unrealistic objectives.
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Mr. Kissinger noted it was too late for the fall crop.
Mr. Saunders said we could try to achieve elimination of the crop or
could concentrate on stricter controls and try for elimination of crops
at an early date. He noted that there was some talk about using
sanctions against the Turks.
Mr. Kissinger said that was impossible.
Mr. Saunders agreed it was impossible but, for that reason, it was
important for Kissinger to engage himself when the paper was ready
for consideration by the Task Force. He noted that the working group
would have a fairly decent paper.
Mr. Kissinger asked if Moynihan was the problem.
Mr. Saunders replied that it was mainly Treasury.
Defense Budget Problem
Dr. Lynn said he had another budget problem coming into the DPRC
which he wished to discuss with Dr. Kissinger.
Mr. McCloy and the UNDC
Mr. Wright said we needed to move on the question of John McCloy and
the UNDC.
Mr. Kissinger said he would talk to Flanigan.
Rhodesia; South Africa
Mr. Wright also asked if we could have a decision on the NSDM on
Rhodesia today.
Mr. Kissinger told Wright he had returned the South Africa memorandum
to him for shortening.
Heads of State at UNGA
Mr Wright said that Secretary Rogers would not be making recommenda-
tions on the President's seeing Heads of State and Government who come
to the UNGA. He would forward a memorandum today or tomorrow
discussing the problem but had decided not to make recommendations.
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State had indicated that one of the reasons was the uncertainty as to
whether Kosygin was coming. Wright assumed Status action was on
the basis of some discussion with the President.
Mr. Kissinger asked why they could not prepare for two contingencies
either Kosygin comes or he doesn't come. If Kosygin comes, the
President will probably see him and will probably wish to meet with
him separately. If he does see him separately, this is all the more
reason why he should see the others. He told Wright to tell State that
if they do not present the President with the options, we will.
Mr. Wright said he had so indicated to State.
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