SAFEGUARD REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-3-4-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 8, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/03/05: LOC-HAK-533-3-4-2
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THE WHITE HOUSE
.WASHINGTON
February 8, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum. 97
TO: The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Safeguard Review
nsc/nss, DOS, OSD
Reviews Completed
As a result of the review of the Safeguard program conducted by the
National Security Council I have decided, on the following Safeguard
Program subject to Congressional authorization where required:
1. Continue construction at the sites at Grand Forks, North
Dakota and Malmstrom, Montana.
2. Commence (in 1971) the construction already authorized for
the site at Whiteman, Missouri.
3. Begin (in 1972) advance preparation on the National Command
Authority defense at Washington, D. C. or construction on the site
at Warren, Wyoming. I will decide between these alternatives based
upon a review of developments in SALT.
To insure a clear and coherent presentation of my decision in
connection with the budget I direct that an interagency coordinating
committee be formed under the direction of a representative of the
Secretary of Defense with membership composed of representatives
from appropriate agencies and appropriate elements of the Executive
Office of the President.
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U. S. Delegation
to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
-P +ECIIETe
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MEMORANDUM
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THE :W. HITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON-
'R Sz aT 11AS SE 7
ACTION
February 3, 19.71
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A., Kissinger k
SUBJECT: Safeguard
Review
Your decision is now needed on the options for proceeding with
the Safeguard Program which were outlined in the NSC meeting
on Wednesday, January 27.
While Safeguard funds are included in budget documents in only
the most general ways, it is important. to obtain a decision and
formulate our rationale prior to the appearance-of Secretaries.
Laird and Rogers before Congress to defend the budgets.
The Options discussed at the. NSC Meeting were
Caption 1:
Continue., construction on the.existing two sites and begin
construction already authorized for Whiteman. Additionally
request authorization for construction at the Warren site and
for- advance preparation for. Washington, D. Co
This is the program..proposed by Secretary Laird.
Option 2:
Continue construction at the existing two sites and begin
construction already authorized for Whiteman. Additionally,
request authorization either for construction at the Warren site
or for advance preparation for .the NCA defense at Washington,
D. C., depending upon progress at SALT.
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This program is supported by Director Shultz and would probably
be acceptable to Secretary Laird. This option appears close to x'
understanding of Secretary Rogers' position.
Lion 3:
Continue construction at the existing two sites and begin, construction
already authorized for Whiteman. Additionally, request authorization
for advance preparation for the NCA defense at Washington, D. C. Do not
request construction authorization for Warren.
There are no open advocates for this program, although Ambassador
Smith would probably prefer, for negotiating reasons, this program to
Option 1 or Option 2.
Lion 4:
Continue only minimal construction on the two existing sites but
defer the authorized construction at Whiteman. Additionally, request
authorization for advance preparation for the NCA defense at Washington,.
D. C. Do not request construction authorization for Warren.
This program is proposed by Ambassador Smith and would probably
be acceptable to Secretary Rogers.
It is generally agreed that we should request authorization for
advance preparation for the NCA defense. This should enable us, if we
make'the proper effort, to determine whether we can get Congressional
support for NCA and relates our Safeguard proposal to our SALT position.
As discussed in the NSC meeting, the decision as to the amount of
construction undertaken turns principally on judgments concerning
Congressional attitudes and Soviet reactions to our moves during SALT.
The arguments concerning negotiations are summarized as follows:
-- On one hand, it is argued that the Soviets may be concerned
about the irreversibility and expandability of our Safeguard program,
that they may have given a signal of restraint in the slowdown of SS-9
deployments, and that we should return a strong signal by slowing our
ABM program.
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-- On the other hand, it is argued that if the Soviets
are concerned about irreversibility, they should be more inclined
to negotiate at Vienna, that the SS-9 slowdown is not unambiguous,
and that if we slow our ABM program without specific progress in
SALT, they are encouraged not to reach an agreement.
The arguments concerning Congressional reaction are
summarized as follows :
-? On one hand, it is argued that the less we ask for in
Safeguard the less opposition we are likely to get in the Congress.
Moreover, the opposition is likely to use the apparent SS-9 slowdown
and the Soviet ABM-only proposal as arguments to defeat our proposals.
If our proposal is defeated in Congress, we will have lost, rather than
maintained, leverage in SALT.
-- On the other hand, it is argued that slowing Safeguard
now will encourage even more opposition and that we would be
unlikely to ever revive any ABM even in the absence of a SALT
agreement. Moreover, asking for a reduced level of construction
denies our "bargaining chip" arguments of last year unless we turn
to the ambiguous SS-9 events for justification, a questionable course,
unless we also get some constraint on Soviet offensive systems.
My Recommendation
On balance, I think the most prudent course is to approve
Option 2, which involves continuing construction at the two existing
sites; initiating construction at Whiteman; requesting authorization
either for construction at Warren or for advance preparation of the
NCAdefense at your discretion based on our progress in SALT.
This program would give an appropriate signal to the Soviets
and relates our Safeguard program to SALT without sacrificing the
impetus of the program or encouraging the Soviets to talk rather
than to negotiate.
We would face more opposition in the Congress with this
option than with Ambassador Smith's proposal. However, this is
unavoidable. The alternative would be to risk weakening our
principal bargaining card in SALT without getting limits 'on Soviet
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forces. One important aspect of proposing NCA or Warren is that it
gives you a rationale, should you feel it prudent to do so, to withdraw
the request for Warren before a Congressional vote, giving you
important flexibility in working with the Congress.
You will note that I have not mentioned Gerry Smith's proposal
for unilateral declaration stopping Safeguard as long as the Soviets stop
offensive deployments. I think this is an important option but it needs
more analysis and you can take that action at any time. I will send
you a separate memorandum concerning this matter.
Finally, I recommend you direct the establishment of an inter-
agency coordinating committee to prepare the legislation and rationale
for our Safeguard program. This is essential to insure the Government
speaks with a single voice on this issue.
Attached is a NSDM (Tab A) reflecting the above considerations.
If you approve, please sign the NSDM.
Approved; issue the NSDM
Disapproved; see me for guidance
Attachment
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/03/05: LOC-HAK-533-3-4-2