INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS AT HELSINKI (SALT VII)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-4-11-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 23, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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s?L ? V4 I COPY 6
jUS P i i i :S_
March 23, 1972
TOP SE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The' Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII)
Attached are the new SALT instructions. Because of the substance
of these instructions, including some fallback positions, the President
has emphasized that every precaution should be taken to keep dissemin-
ation of these instructions on a very restricted basis. Individuals should
have a compelling "need to know" before being allowed to read any
particular provision, much less the full document.
MORI PER
C03336185
Alexander M: Haig,
Major General, U. ? Z A
Deputy Assistant t46 the ,ire sident
for National Security Affairs
State Dept. review
completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
J J
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WASHINGTON
March 23, 1972
TOP SECRET INODIS /SALT
National Security Decision Memorandum 158
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII)
After considering the discussions and recommendations of the
National Sr.curity Council, I have decided on the United States
position for presentation at Helsinki (SALT VII).
Offensive Limitations
1. The Delegation should initially concentrate its efforts on
reaching an agreement on offensive limitations. The Delegation must
make it clear that our final decision on ABMs will be heavily influenced
by the scope of the Interim Agreement.
2. Accordingly, the Delegation will continue to press for the
inclusion of limits on SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement. The
Delegation should propose, at the outset, that the SLBM freeze date
start on the date of signature of the Interim Agreement (rather than
July 31, 1971).
3. At a time he deems appropriate, the Chairman of the Delegation
should propose that the ICBM launcher construction freeze also start
on the date of the signature of the Interim Agreement. In this connection,
the proposal that MLBM launchers be limited to those externally completed
by December 31, 1971, should be withdrawn.
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4. It is important that the two countries agree, either in the
Interim Agreement or in an interpretive statement, that launchers for
older, heavy ICBMs (Titans, SS-7s, SS-8s) cannot be converted to
accept Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). Regarding other
limits on the conversion of launchers to accept MLBMs, the Delegation
should propose (a) moving the depth-and-diameter constraint to an agreed
interpretive statement, and (b) redefining heavy strategic ballistic
missiles as those of a size greater than the SS-l1. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the Delegation may, if he deems it necessary,. drop the
proposal for agreement on the depth-and-diameter constraint through
an agreed interpretive statement and introduce a unilateral statement
that the U. S. would consider changes in silo depth or diameter as
indicators of possible non-compliance with the MLBM limitation.
5. The Delegation should continue efforts to get limitations on
land-mobile ICBM launchers and soft-pad ICBM launchers included in
the Interim Agreement. In either or both cases, the Chairman of the
Delegation may, at his discretion, propose agreed interpretive statements
on such limitations in place of specific provisions in the Interim Agreement.
6. See Annex A for instructions regarding the general definition
of ICBMs and limits on test and training launchers.
7. The .Delegation should strongly reaffirm our position regarding
duration and withdrawal. (See paragraph 4, NSDM 145.) The period now
unspecified in the special withdrawal provision proposed by the U. S.
should be five years. After further negotiation, the Delegation may
recommend alternative positions for Presidential decision; while the terms
for continuing the agreement might vary (e. g. , fixed duration with automatic
renewal or extension by mutual agreement), the minimum duration of the
interim agreement, unless replaced by a more complete follow-on
agreement, must be five years.
Defensive Limitations
8. Our formal position on the number of ABM sites and ABM launchers/
interceptors remains unch:-,nged.
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9. The Chairman of the Delegation is directed to explore privately
with the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation the proposal that, if the
Soviets agree to include SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement, the
U. S. will consider changes in our ABM position. He should suggest that
the U. S. would be prepared to negotiate an agreement which would take
account of the Soviet interest in ICBM defense. If the Soviets show
interest in this proposition and press for a more precise statement, the
Chairman of the U. S. Delegation is authorized to reply that the U. S.
would accept a two-for-two ABM arrangement with 200.ABM launchers/
interceptors. (No more than 100 ABM launchers /interceptors are allowed
at any one site.) Each country would have the right to either (a) NCA
defense plus defense of one ICBM field, or (b) defense of two ICBM fields.
The location of the ICBM fields would be subject to the geographical
limitations in our present proposal. Moreover, there would be a right to
change the location subject to agreed procedures. (These procedures need
not be agreed upon prior to any change in location of a deployment area. )
10. If the Soviets indicate they will accept the inclusion of SLBM
launchers in the Interim Agreement, then the Chairman of the Delegation
is authorized to make a formal proposal of the two-for-two ABM sites.
11. If, however, the Soviets continue to reject the inclusion of
SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement after the first three weeks
in Helsinki, then the Delegation should make recommendations for
Presidential decision regarding the inclusion of SLBMs and ABM levels.
12. For ABM defense of the national capital, the Chairman of the
Delegation is authorized to accept, at his discretion, the 150 kilometer
radius proposed by the Soviets. On the other hand, the Delegation should
initially hold to our present proposed limit of four Modern ABM Radar
Complexes. If he deems it necessary, the Chairman of the Delegation may
propose six MARCs.
13. For ABM defense of ICBM fields, the Delegation should press
to get Soviet acceptance of the principle of Modern ABM Radar Complexes
(MARCs). The Delegation should initially hold to the limit of four MARCs
for two ICBM fields. The Delegation should indicate that there is flexibility
in our position on the number of MARCs. If he deems it necessary,
the Chairman of the D.,?i.gation should propose, at his discretion,
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up to six MARCs for each ICBM field. (In the case of paragraphs 11
where one country chooses NCA defense and one ICBM defense site,
the number of allowed MARCs for each ICBM field would be one-half
the number for the two ICBM fields. )
14. Should the formal proposal in paragraph 10 be made and should
the Soviets continue to resist the principle of MARCs for ICBM defense,
the Chairman of the Delegation should explore how agreement might
alternatively be reached with the Soviets on a combination of qualitative
and quantitative ABM radar limits. Specifically, with an exception for
the four Safeguard radars at our two ICBM defense sites, ABM radars
for ICBM defense should not be larger than 106 watt-metefs squared.
In conjunction with this, the number of ABM radars for ICBM defense
sites should be limited so-that each party would be assured that neither
side would undertake extensive deployments of these radars (1. e. , beyond the
number which would provide adequate support to the agreed level of ABM
launchers /interceptors).
15. The Delegation should continue for now to press for strict
limits on Other Large Phased Array Radars (i. e., our "mutual agreement"
proposal or the proposal offered to the Soviets on January 26, 1972).
16. The Delegation should reaffirm the importance of our provision
regarding withdrawal in case the follow-on negotiations fail (i. e. , our
proposed addition to Article XV of the Joint Draft Text). The period now
unspecified in the provisions should be five years. I am prepared to omit
this provision. However, before authorizing the Delegation to do so, I ask
that the Delegation forward for my approval as soon as possible a scenario
whereby the U. S. could affirm that failure to replace the Interim Agree -
ment with more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms could
jeopardize our supreme interests and, if so, would constitute a basis for
withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
17. The Chairman of the Delegation should, at a time which he
deems appropriate, make a statement along the lines that: If the USSR
were to undertake a concerted program which substantially increased the
threat to the survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces, the U. S.
would consider this to jeopardize our supreme interests. Consequently,
this could be a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
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Other Issues
18. At Annex A is guidance on other issues relating to the joint
Draft Texts and associated interpretive statements.
19. The Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to inform the
Chairman of the Soviet Delegation that, subject to satisfactory resolution
of the issues covered by paragraph 18 above and of the issues reflected
in the bracketed portions of the Joint Draft Texts, the unbracketed portions
of the Joint Draft Texts would be acceptable to the U. S.
20. We must be particularly careful to avoid leaks during the next
few weeks since the negotiations have entered an especially sensitive
stage. To this end, all substantive statements on SALT are to be cleared
through the White House.
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ANNEX A TO NSDM 158
1. On the general definition of ICBMs, the Delegation should continue
efforts to get our present proposal accepted or can propose an alternative
definition similar to: "ICBMs are any land-based strategic ballistic
missiles capable of ranges in excess of the distance between the eastern-
most part of the U. S. and the nearest part of the USSR, including those
deployed for possible use at lesser ranges. "
2. Either formulation which the Delegation has proposed for test and
training launchers would be acceptable. In this connection, the Delegation
should inform the Soviets that the U. S. would view as inconsistent with
the Interim Agreement a significant increase in the proportion of test and
training launchers for- MLBMs.
3. With regard to each of the issues examined in the Interagency Paper
"Issues Arising from Agreed Language in the Joint Draft Texts and from
Associated Interpretive Statements, " dated March 6, 1972, the following
guidance applies.
a. ABM Treaty, Article I, 2 (Territorial Defense). This should
be retained in its present form.
b. ABM Treaty, Article IV (Test Ranges). The Delegation should
make clear that the 15 launchers is an aggregate limit -- e. g. , by changing
the language in the second sentence of Article IV. Moreover, the Delegation
should seek an understanding on what are the current test ranges.
c. AB'M Treaty, Article V, I (Mobile ADM components). The
Delegation should make it clear to the Soviets that this provision applies
to all A13M -components (viz., launchers, interceptors, radars, and
other devices capable of substituting for them) which are not fixed land-
based. The Delegation should seek to revise Article V, 1, along the
following lines: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy
Al3M systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based. " If the Soviets raise the issue, the
Delegation should state that the revised provision does not apply to such
devices as satellites providing early warning by detection of missile
launch.
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d. ABM Treaty, Article VI (a,b) (Test in an ABM mode). At
an appropriate time, the Delegation should provide the Soviet Delegation
with qualitative examples, such as those listed in the interagency paper,
"Testing in an ABM Mode, " to clarify our interpretation of that phrase.
e. ABM Treaty, Article VI (b) (Deployment of ballistic missile
early-warning radars). Final acceptance of this provision should be
deferred until the issue of OLPARs is resolved.
f. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Multiple Warhead ABMs.
The Delegation should seek Soviet agreement to thca U. S. interpretation
presented on January 28, 1972.
g. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Defense of Early-Warnir
Radars. The Delegation need make no further statement on the subject.
h. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Technology of Early-
Warning Radars. The Delegation need make no further statement.
i. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Selective Direct
Observation (SDO). The Delegation should not make the earlier proposed
statement on SDO.
j. ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, Interpretive Statement on
Verification. The Delegation should not make the proposed statement on
operation of national means of verification.
k. Interim Agreement, Interpretive Statement on Test and Training
Launchers. See paragraph 2 above.
1. Documentation of Interpretations of SALT Agreements. The
Delegation should propose that agreed interpretations or understandings
relating to the Agreements should be documented in an agreed summary
record, available for public use, to be initialled by the Chairmen of the
Delegations or their designees.
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