TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM ON PRESIDENT'S READING PACKAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 18, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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7'OF AT ION
"Nc;ITEVE/CCrz,E March 18, 1970
(Only red Tab A coci,z,word,
mcm)LANurm Far HENRY A. KISS ?
E I\ OM: A. W. Mar shall
ELTILT C.T: Transmittal of memorandumPresident's reading
package
Attached (Tab A you will find a report ovaluating the process of
producing the President's morning intelligence reading package.
It contains an assessment of the current product (giving it good
marks and surfaces some problems and possible improvements.
I think we ought to discuss these. 1 have tried not to bother you so
far, but some of the problems and improvements may look different
from where you sit. My view, so far, has been how the process
looks from several levels below up to just below you.
Problems discussed are:
1. The current anomalous position of the CIA P7T..
".?.' ?
The general weakness of feedback and guidance in
the process for those providing inputs and preparing
portions of the package, both at LIA and in the NS(
staff.
Improvements suggested for consideration are:
C-hang.!s in the format of the ,,itt.tation Room product
and perhaps the total package in order to reduce the
President's r ,!aiiing load. f ome changes might be
part of a solution to the CIA P.:13 problem through
Its closer integration with the E'ituation loom product.
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Measures to 4rt rove feedback and guidance,
especially to the C staff.
Provision of a Limited number of secure, green
telephones for the NE,C. staff to improve their inter-
action with analysts in the intelligence community
and State and Defense lepartments.
4. A tentative proposal is surfaced for a radical change
is the way intelligence and other information mate-
rials are presented to you, and perhaps could be
presented to the President at a later tiat e. It is a
flexible on-line reading program, available on a TV
screen at all times, with controls allowing the
reader to pick subjects he wants to read at several
levels of detail. fuch a system could give you andior
the President more control over what you read and
ncroase feedback to the organisations supplying
inputs to the program. Your reactions are required.
A W Niar shall imfd
3/18/70
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NY ORMATION
TO II/SENSITIVE/COD OR
(Only red Tab A codeword)
EMOBANDUM FOE HENRY A. KISSINGEF
FROM: A. W. Marshall
18, 1970
SUBJZCT: Evaluation of the Process Leading to the President's
Morning Intelligence Beading Package
The purpose of this memorandum is (IH to present a general assess-
ment of the process that leads to the President's morning Weill
gence reading package, (2) to raise some problems for discussion,
and (3) to put forward some alternative solutions for consideration.
eral Assessment
After looking at the process of preparing the package for a couple
of months and interviewing most of the sources of the input, my
assessment is rather favorable. The final product, in particular
the memorandum prepared for your signature in the Situation Room,
is adequate. However, the product is more satisfactory than the
process leading to it.
In one of our earlier discussions you expressed some concern as
to whether the process worked in such & way as to pick up essen-
tially all available information. I feel I can reassure you on that
matter. The process leading to the package on the Presidential
desk each morning is fed by what is now the strongest and best
part of the U.S. intelligence community; that is, its current intel-
ligence activities. Over the last five or six years there has been
a strong development of the current intelligence effort, including
the installation of 24-hour-a-day operations centers in all
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Important elements of the community. This development has taken
place partly as an adaptation to the crisis atmosphere of the '60s,
the two Cuba crises, etc. Pressures for an information system
capable of staying on top of fast-breaking events were increased by
President Johnson's continuous demand for ul-to-date intelligence
an.d other information input. Thus, you are now tapping a very
vigorous, responsive, well established, government-wide activity
that surveys all of the collected material and funnels it up to the top
of the governmental bureaucracy and to the White House.
The part of the total package produced in the Situation Room
provides a unique product with its close blending of policy analysis
and intelligence. Analysts in the intelligence community are
Inhibited, both by U.S. intelligence doctrine and by their more
limited awareness of policy issues and Presidentia.I concerns, from
producing a similar product. Comparison of the substantive cover-
age of topics in the CIA POS and the Situation Boom product shows
this, although it is clear from other evidence that some parts of the
NSC staff include more policy analysis than others.. Hence, in some
geographic +areas there is probably more of a difference between the
CIA FOB and the Situation Room product that there is in other areas.
The involvement of the NSC staff in the preparation of the Situation
Room product is the proximate cause of this difference in the type
of analysis and comment. A survey undertaken by the people in the
Situation Room for me showed that during a selected period 60% of
the items came from the NSC staff, another 20% were prepared by
and Fazio sometimes with interaction with staff members, 25X1
and ZOT0 were reproductions of items from CIA, NSA, or DIA
publications.
In any case, the memorandum signed by you and prepared in the
Situation Room is a ZUCCOSS; it probably is the only part of the
package which the President regularly reads. Indeed, judging from
a survey of marginal jottings by the President, it may be the only
piece he ever reads. This should be gratifying to you. But this
situation can lead to unexpected and unwanted responsibilities and
problems. I want to discuss some of the problems I see.
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. The Current Anomalous Position f the CIA PCB
The success of the Situation Room product probably has driven the
CIA PDB out of the President's focus of attention. However, a
survey of the Situation Room product and the P1D15 shows that there
Is about one-third overlap in coverage in the two products. That is,
only about one-third of the items in the P1)13 are reported in the
Situation Room product. Thus, two-thirds of the items in the PDB
the President may never see. Probably they are of lesser impor-
tance to him since a lot of thought goes into the selection of the
one-third overlap for inclusion in the Situation Room product.
However, an ambiguous situation exists. The selection procedures
for inclusion in the Situation Room product may not be wholly
consistent with the widely shared suspicion that the President does
not ever read the CIA ?DB. If one really believes that the PDB is
not read, is one-third overlap too low Should one provide more
overlap, perhaps changing the format of the Situation Room product
to make this easier Does not the current level of overlap tend to
make the President feel it is safe not to read the CIA PDB, Should
steps be taken to shut off production of the Prz A great amount
of energy and talent goes into producing the PDB. (See Tab A for
a description of the process, written by Drexel Godfrey of CIA.)
It may now be largely wasted effort. How can it be saved or made
useful
This situation presents a. number of awkward problems. The CIA
is not likely to suggest stopping production of the PDB. CIA has a
major institutional stake in the PDB. It will not give it up easily.
Moreover, in a recent discussion with Jack Smith, he strongly
expressed his view that the CIA people consider themselves almost
as part of the President's staff. They have no other natural
superior. I told him I thought that view somewhat unrealistic in
organisational and bureaucratic terms. But nonetheless, it may
be the view of some of them and suggestive of their likely reluctance
to give up publication of the pr:B. Over time they are likely to find
out about the current situation if it persists. Their likely reaction
TOP SECRET/SENSITIV /CODEWORD
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is not clear. A possible CIA. response could be to continue publica-
tion, but to put in less effort and allow the quality to slip, hoping
to live through the current situation and later regain the position
the PDB had with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
However, you need to address this problem. What worries me is
that: (a) You may get in trouble with the President if post hoc an
Important item slipped by him because it was in the CIA PDS but
not the Situation Room product, especially if he has come to feel,
or has been encouraged to feel, that everything of importance to
him is included in the Situation Room product. (b) The PDB goes
to the SECDEF and Secretary of State, who may not be aware the
President seldom reads it. They may be almost entirely unaware
of the Situation Room product and its displacement of the P1)13.
This could lead to some misunderstandings.
I suggest we discuss some solutions or strategies for changing the
current situation. But I may be too concerned because of some
things in the situation I am not aware of.
One possible solution is a format for the total package which could
make the CIA PDB input an integral part. Another idea is that of
a President's brief divided in two parts -- one part to include items
like those currently supplied by the NSC staff, that is, items based
In part on intelligence inputs but including policy discussion and
other analysis; the second part to include a number of brief informs
tion items. There might be some reduction in the number of longer
analytic items supplied by the NSC staff and an increase in the
number of brief news items. If the format of the President's
reading package were changed in this direction, one could ask CIA
to provide the news item portion, overlap in coverage between the
two parts of the package being eliminated through daily discussion
between frazio and Godfrey.
Another alternative would be to leave the Situation Room product as
it is, but include at the end of it a reference to other news items
appearing in the PCB. At present, if the President does not even
open the PUB, there is no way of his being aware of what items it
includes that might be of interest to him.
TOP SECRET/ T WE /CODEWOR
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ice of Feedback and Guidance
As my investigation of the process of preparing the President's
morning intelligence brief proceeded, I became more and more
aware of a feedback and guidance problem. As the process now
operates, it does not produce much guidance and/or feedback for
those providing inputs. There are a number of factors that produce
this situation, and it varies in effect from one input source to
another. Several of the proposals made later in this report are
primarily motivated by my belief that some steps should be taken
to improve feedback and guidance. You and the President will be
better served if some progress can be made in this area.
Neither you nor the President can read all of the relevant informa-
tion available; others must sort, screen, and package the informa-
tion, The less feedback and guidance the "others" get, the less
assurance there is that you and the President get what is wanted
and needed. Today CIA writes a type of newspaper, the PDB,
hoping it is interesting and relevant. The Situation Room people
and the NSC staff collaborate to produce a memorandum for your
signature. They have more effective feedback and guidance than
CIA does, but almost uniformly feel they don't get enough to do as
good a Job as could be done. I feel there is a real problem here,
and it starts at your and the President's levels.
(Let me say my investigation of current sources of feedback and
guidance made it clear that the current NSC process produces a
good deal more feedback and guidance to the bureaucracy as to
what the important issues are than the prior arrangements. Most
people I talked to were quite pleased with the new MC process and
the NSW study process, for this reason.
I will deal with the feedback problem as it applies to the NSC staff,
below. Here / want to address the feedback and guidance problem
of those producing the PDB. They feel they do not get much direct
guidance or feedback they can use in the selection of their items.
Currently they deecribe the process used to pick items for the
PDB as follows;
TOP SECRET /S nTIVE /CODE
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(a) There are usually one or two obvious items in every
day's news (there is for these an overlap problem with
the Situation Room product that ma be settled in
phone conversations with
Good additional items are surprise developmente:
coups, deaths of important foreign governmental
people, etc.;
Continuing items known to be of interest: Vietnam.
the Middle East situation;
Soviet missile tests and new Soviet aircraft; usually
these are reports containing the results of completed
intelligence studies and, as such, are different from
the usual current intelligence content of the PDB;
Occasionally an item will be weeded out of the draft
PB late in the day on the basis of a call from
that it has already been sufficiently covered;
Some items are included with the conscious notion of
making a record (not being caught out later;
Drexel Godfrey makes a call to Al Haig perhaps once
every two weeks to get guidance on a specific item,
but doesn't want to wear out his welcome by calling
more frequently.
As you can see from the above, the selection process is leased mainly
on very general knowledge of what is of interest to the President.
It is derived in part from the participation in the NSC process of
people like Helms and Jack Smith, but to a large extent, I believe,
from a sense of what's timely Its judged from the New York Timet,
press, and wire service coverage. There is rather little specific
feedback within the process itself that comes directly from the
White House as to the President's interests and concerns.
What to do about this will depend on what you decide to do about the
PDB.
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7
3. Problems e axing the Situation Room Product
ck of Feedback. -- There is no way for most NSC staff
people preparing inputs to know whether the President reads their
items, whet his reaction was, how their inputs could be improved,
etc. Clearly the position of people on the NSC staff is better than
of those preparing the Pr-B. They get a lot of indirect signals about
what is of interest to the President and what you feel is of interest
to him. But the process of preparing the morning reading package
does not involve any direct feedback from the President. Occasion.
ally there are marginal comments. But a survey showed relatively
few Presidential comments; about one in six of the packages have
any marginal comments in them. Frequency of comment seems to
fluctuate considerably over time. In the sample period covered,
there was a clustering of the comments in a period of one week,
suggesting that for some reason the President was reading the
material more closely and/or was more disposed during that week
to make comments. Comments by several of the staff have indicated
that they are not sufficiently aware of the low frequency of the
Presidential comments. Some may feel they are being cut off from
a more plentiful supply of Presidential marginal notes and comments
that does not exist.
It's bard to say what to do about this general feedback problem.
Your style of work and that of the President. perhaps, are not
conducive to a lot of feedback. Moreover, most of the people who
work most actively with you and are in the best position to give
feedback to the NSC staff and Situation Room people are themselves
very busy. Others are reluctant to impose upon them. I know it is
hard for you to find time to provide feedback and guidance. The
staff meetings when you attended, everyone agrees, were very
fruitful. Even U held infrequently, they are worth considering again.
A totally different sort of solution is discussed below and in Tab C.
This involves a major shift in the way in which intelligence and other
news items are transmitted to you, and perhaps eventually, to the
President. It is something that could, perhaps, be available in
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about 18 months when the Situation Room addition is completed and
the new computer facilities are installed.
Need for Guidance to the MC Staff. Interviews I have had
with all of the major NSC staff contributors convince me that they
have not had enough guidance and general information about the
President's morning intelligence package. They may not have an
adequate framework within which to prepare their own materials. I
found that many of the NSC staff people do have a clear idea of what
is in the package, how the Situation Room product is related to the
CiA PDB, and what overlap exists between them. Several were
concerned that they did not know whether in covering an article or
an issue they were the only ones covering it for the day or whether
it was also in the PDB. I might add that probably they have made
no effort to find out. The most organized and active group supply-
ing input are informed on PDB content and use this information both
substantively and to avoid undue overlap. Most have no feeling for
what is read, whether the Situation Room product and/or the PDB.
(See Tab B for a summary of the interviews with NSC staff members.
In discussing how they went about preparing their input, one or two
expressed their concern that they felt they didn't have a good basis
for judging how important it was to prepare their items; that is,
whether they should spend a lot of effort or not very much. They
are reminded daily of the need for product, by phone calls from the
Situation Room; but some are left with an ambiguous sense of how
Important it really is.
One result of this situation is that there is great variability in the
amount of effort spent in different subparts of the NSC staff in
preparing input. Some groups are very well organized and think of
preparing the input as being an important part of their job. These
devote considerable time and energy throughout the day. One of
these is the Saundersilioskinson team that produce almost 501% of
the input currently received from the NSC staff. They have the
advantage, perhaps, of covering a very active and high interest
area, but they are perhaps the most systematically organized to
produce input. At the other extreme there are people who have not
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organized systematically at all and who pass in an item if they think
of it as being of interest. Theee tend to put much lees effort into
melding an item of information and policy analysis.
I believe that if there were more guidance to the staff concerning the
Importance of the Situation Room product, a little more information
conveyed about the total package, there might be more uniformity
of effort and an improved response by the staff. Such guidance could
be conveyed in a staff meeting or by a memo. After discussion with
you, I would be glad to draft such a memo.
'henget: in the Product, I have one change to suggest for
your consideration, the switch to a two-part format. Several people
questioned whether the total package was not becoming too big;
perhaps even the Situation Room product was too long and had too
many items involving policy discussion and analysis. You are in
the best situation to judge if the size of the package is now excessive,
even if the President only reads the Situation Room product. Might
not a changed format with fewer analytic items in one section an
a second section devoted to a number of short information items be
better Again you are in the best position to judge. I remind you
that such a change might be a part of a solution to the PDB problem.
Samples could be prepared of this alternative format by the Situation
Room people if you wish to see them.
Need for Secure Telephones. -- As you can see in Tab B,
several of the NSC staff check regularly with CIA and State repart-
ment contacts when preparing input to the Situation Room product.
This interaction would probably be more frequent and more inform-
ative if a limited number of secure telephones were available to the
NSC staff. Only Frank Chapin, not a contributor to the Situation
Room product. has such a phone. The other available secure phone
is in the Situation Room. Neither of these two phones is a real
alternative to having a few (8 to 12) secure phones in staff members'
offices.
A preliminary look at the cost and likely availability of thfeappro-
priate equipment suggests that obtaining a limited number of secure
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE /CODE WOR
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phones (soecalled green phones) turned up no major problems.
cost could be limited by having only two or three lines, a switch.
Lug system, and 8 to 12 phones. I recommend that this possibility
be looked into more thoroughly unless you feel there is some
reason why the staff should not have such phones. I believe it is
a good idea. Viscussion with sources of intelligence input can be
freer and more frequent. Some discussion undoubtedly now goes
on over unsecure phone lines that ought not to; the secure phones
would help to reduce this somewhat.
A More Radical ,:tiggestion for the Future. -- In the course
of my investigations I had a number of discussions with Charlie
Joyce about the many problems in supplying well selected intel-
ligence information to the President. Out of these developed a
proposal for a radical change in the way in which intelligence and
other information materials are presented to you, and perhaps
could be presented to the President at a later date. This proposed
change could significantly alter the whole process of preparing
the President's morning reading package; indeed, it might
eventually eliminate it altogether as a separate hard-copy item.
At present the cost and feasibility of the proposal are unevaluated,
but they are under study. Your reactions would be valuable; a lot
depends upon how you feel about the proposal. U you definitely
don't see yourself liking it, we rhould drop the idea.
Attached at Tab C are two memoranda that Charlie Joyce wrote
to sum up the results of our discussions. In summary, the notion
is that the use of available computer technology might allow the
development of a very flexible on-line reading program for you
and/or the President. The reading program would be avstilable on
a TV screen at all times, with controls allowing the reader to pick
subjects that he wants to read about, to start reading at a very
summary level, to select the areas in which he wants to read in
more detail, to stop reading any subject when he is satisfied, and
to move on to another. The system could automatically provide
feedback on what you and/or the President reads, and how much
attention is paid to particular subject areas in the reading program.
A button could also be supplied for the reader to indicate his desire
TOP SECRET /SENITIVE /CO W01;' D
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for more material, whether he liked the presentation or not. A
microphone could be supplied for dictation of comments and
critique.
The sesential objective of this system is to supply you and/or the
Prosident with a good deal more control over what you read, and
to supply feedback to the organiosations attempting to supply you
with information so they can do a batter job. The role of the
machinery Is simply to make this feedback more available, snore
effective. and *leo to allow you to have a richer, more flexible
reading program that you can easily roach by the manipulation of
a few buttons.
We would favor developing such a system for you, leaving it open
as to whether at a later stage the President is supplied with a
aimilar system. Experience with executives in business has
shown that their willingness to obtain information from TV
consoles and through machinery of one sort or another is highly
sensitive to their personal tistes. Sorns people want nothing to
do with such contraptions, others are quite willing to use them.
On the whole, the bilazice of experience has been that top-level
executives don't like gasleets. it would undoubtedly be very
chancy to try tbo thing directly on thd, President. it may be very
chancy trying it on you.
If this kind of a system pleased you, in the sense that you found
it useful and easy to live with, you might invite the President down
to see the information system you hid for yourself. lie could try
it in your office a.nci see how it worked. If he liked it, a duplicate
could be provided in his office.
I think you ought to givs co sidoration to this system and discuss
It fully, especially with Charlie Joyce, to see whether it 156ems
attractive enough to you to go forward with more detailed system
design. Let me say that our notion is that one should keep the
wine of the system and the complexity of the hardware limited. "kk
believe this need net be a big1 fancy system.
AWMar shall :sold
3/18/70
TO
&KAT SE:NEITIV.E; /CODE OP,f,',
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16 January 1970
MEMORANDUM.
SUBJECT: Production of the PDB
1. The President's Daily Brief is an all-source'
daily intelligence publication tailored specifically
to the needs of its principal reader. As a result of
efforts to achieve maximum comprehensiveness, flexi-
bility, and timeliness, it differs from other daily
publications such as the Black CIB in several noteworthy
respects:
--It makes use of sources too sensitive even for
the Black CIB;
--It is not formally coordinated in the intelligence
community (although every effort is of course made to
assure that its articles are not at variance with the
community's views);
--Its articles are produced by a small staff of
highly skilled writers rather than by the OCI desks, and
one of the PDB staffers keeps tab on each issue up to
the time of publication.
2. Specific criteria for PDB articles have always
been hard.to define, but they generally reflect what
we know and infer about the general interests of the
President, as well as what the writers and reviewers
(the D/OCI, the DDI, and the DCI) think should be brought
to his attention on a given day. They also reflect the
feedback we get directly from the ?NSC staff and from the
Director and others in frequent contact with the White
House.
3. The four-man PDB staff operates on a four-day
work cycle, with each staffer in turn seeing one issue
TCS No. 3769/70
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through the production process. The book which he and
the other staffer on duty put together during the day
is a blend of articles taken from the CIB; cullings from
other DDI publications; writeups of reports too sensitive
to be used elsewhere; responses to the requests of PDB
reviewers for coverage of a topic; and self-initiated
articles based on the voluminous traffic monitored by the
staff itself. The issue begins to take shape in the
early afternoon. The drafts are reviewed by the D/OCI
or DD/OCI, the DDI, and the DCI beginning at about 1600,
and are LDX'd to the White House for information at about
1800. The staffer who "owns" that day's issue comes back
in at 0100, updates the drafts and writes new articles
as necessary, and oversees the typing and printing of the
final version. This is sent at 0600 by courier to the
White House and other addressees outside CIA.
4. The following account traces in detail the
production process for one hypothetical issue of the
PDB. In order to illustrate the variety of ways PDB
articles come into being, the hypothetical process in-
volves more items and would-be items than would appear
on a typical day. Otherwise the model is fairly repre-
sentative.
5. The day's two writers arrive between 0830
and 0900, note any messages from the previous night's
writer (who went home at about 0700), field any questions
from the D/OCI on the morning's issue, and begin to work
on the morning's cable take. They start with the over-
night traffic left by the night man and then go through
the contents of the various PDB boxes in the Watch Office
There they find, in addition to a great deal of raw
traffic*, processed intelligence of various kinds
*The PDB staff receives advance copies of all State
Department cables coming to CIA, all diplomatic Comint,
all TDCSs as well as all of the operational DDP cables
that are released to the DDI, most of the military attache
traffic and a heavy dose of other military cables, and
copies of all items selected by the Watch Office or the
News Analysis Officer for the DCI. It also receives es-
pecially sensitive clandestine reports via the D/OCI,
and it has access to most of the NODIS traffic that comes
to the Agency.
-2-
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TOP SECRET
including the Watch Office Night Journal, the CIB,
the NSA Sigint Summary, uncoordinated "house organs"
issued by various OCI and DDI components, and formal
memoranda from all DDI substantive components. (On
Fridays the PDB staff also receives the Current Intel-
ligence Weekly, but this is rarely a fruitful source of
articles since weekly drafts are routinely made available
to the PDB during the week.)
6. By mid-morning the following topics have
appeared as candidates for PDB articles:
In addition, it quickly becomes apparent_that there
will probably be an article on the military
situation, and one staffer begins to accumulate bits and
pieces of press, comint, and embassy reporting for it.
7. At 1000 one of the writers attends Western
Hemisphere Division's regular morning meeting. There
he learns that pretty ordinary
boilerplate but that the division is writing a CIB
on the nossibility of increased urban terrorism in
The information on this topic is fairly exten-
sive and seems to need broader treatment; the division
therefore agrees to expand its CIB into an annex for
the PDB, to be published later in the week.
8. Similarly, at European Division's morning
meetin at 1030 the PDB writer learns that the report
was already being considered for the CIB.
e ivision offers to submit a paragraph of slightly
speculative interpretation for the PDB version of the
item.
9. At this point the D/OCI brings in a highly
sensitive clandestine cable on
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noting
that the Director wants
it covered in the
PDB.
OCI's
is asked
to provide some
25X1
comment
on the report.
10. At 1100 a PDB staffer sits in on the meeting
to block out the day's CIB. In addition
to items on
he
learns
that:
25X1
--OSR will do an item on
25X1
hripf will he
written
on the military
situation
in
25X1
--0ER will submit
an article on
25X1
--the latest
statistics
25X1
will be covered i?i
a Driem.
These articles, in addition
to the clandestine report
on
become
the prime candidates for PDB
25X1
treatment.
11. CIB drafts begin to come in shortly after lunch.
The PDB writers prune some articles of excess verbiage,
add a paragraph or two of interpretation to some, and
rewrite a few others to make the message more pointed.
(Some CIB articles, of course, are printed virtually
without change.) All changes of any substance are checked
out with the OCI desks. In addition, a sensitive clan-
destine report is received which cannot be
used in the CIB but which sheds useful light on the general
military situation. This is melded with the CIB draft.
12. At 1600 the drafts are submitted to the ID/OCI,
who provides substantive and editorial suggestions which
necessitate further rewriting and consultation with the
OCI desks. After these revisions, the drafts are retyped
and sent to the DDI and the DCI, who request still further
revisions. The drafts are then LDX'd to the White House
to give the NSC Staff advance notice of what will be in
the book in the morning. The PDB writers leave at about
1800. On this occasion the primary writer knows of two
assignments he will have when he comes back in:
--The DCI has asked that one paragraph in the
CIB be changed, and this will obviously have
o ?e reflected in the PDB as well;
--4-
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7,--A late cable has arrived from
reporting a conversation
on the subject
The D/OCI has asked for both
a CIB and a PDB ?article on the cable.
The White House Situation Room is informed that these
? changes and addition's will be forthcoming.
13. When the primary writer Comes back to work,
he scans the new traffic, doublechecks that there are no
discrepancies between the CIB and PDB drafts, updates the
article, and writes an article on
meeting. The White House Situation Room duty
officer has called in the meantime to suggest that the
article on be deleted, since the
President has been fully briefed on the topicp that item
is therefore pulled. The drafts are given to the typists
at 0330, are proofread at 0430, and are printed by 0530,
when the PDB writer checks them once again for typos
or errors in layout. The couriers leave at 0600, and the
writer remains until 0700 to answer any questions raised
by the White House.
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IP sr
TOP SECe ET iS NSITIV /CO EWO
SillellvIARIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH
NSC STAFF CONTRIBUTORS
In the course of my investigations I interviewed most of the major
NFU staff contributors to the Situation ?omit, part of the Presi-
dent's morning intelligence reading package. The question*
covered in each interview were:
1. How do you prepare your input to the Situation
Roorn's part of the President's morning intel-
ligence package Is anyone specially assigned
in your area to prepare these inputs
What are the major sources that you use in
preparing inputs
3. Whet interface do you have with (;LA, State, and
others in the course of your preparations What
feedback may this generate for them
4. What do you feel you get out of this effort Is it
only a chore:
S. What could be done to improve the process
What would lead to increased or better output in
your area
The following is a summary of five of the interviews:
Interview No.
This area had one person assigned the job of preparing inputs to
the daily brief. An effort was made to check views with State,
CIA. etc. This involved making 10 to IS calls a day. Those at
the interview agreed that there is a significant need for feedback
to the State/CIA. people if they are to focus their efforts better.
Major sources are State cables and then CIA TDCF reports. The
TOP T/ ,eF.WOFere
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TOP EiETfS.ENtITIVE/CODEWOR '
Z
major value that they found for themselves in the process was
that they can feed information to the President with some confidence
that be will in fact see it. By this mean* they can get him up on an
area they know they will be raising issues in a little later. These
people felt that the only justification for the effort to produce the
Situation Roam product is the policy focus that can be given to the
Items , Otherwise, they would be trying to compete with the whole
intelligence community to provide information, which they found
unlikely they could do.
interview
In this area the effort of preparing input is shared by several people,
but overall there was a much less organised effort than in the area
covered in Interview No, I. They waited until the end of the day and
then scurried around to see whist they had. On the whole, the one
person interviewed felt they did not have the time, given the press
of other duties, to prepare really thoughtful items. Most of the
analysis was not very adequate. They try to get newsworthy items,
but succeed in supplying very little analysis. Their items derive
mainly from State cables, t: IA TDCF 'a; the FBIS ticker is also of
some value. Occasionally they note a DIA item and suggest its
Inclusion to There is no attempt to feed in information 25X1
to get the President pumped up on a problem or issue. On the whole,
they do not involve themselves with phone calls to analysts out in
the agencies.
The interviewee finds the situation rather unsatisfactory, feels that
the system of preparing the Situation Room product ought to be
changed. As it is now, it is just a burden to him and a source of
some uneasiness. If the items really are going to the President, it
is important that they be good but, at present, priorities are unclear.
There has never been, to his recollection, a clear statement of the
Importance to be assigned to the preparation of items for the
Situation Room product. If a really good item is obtained, usually
it is put forward in a separate memo to the President and, hence,
this channel competes with the morning reading package.
TOP
ECRET /.S"
,NSITIVE/COI.D.EWOR
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If things go on much as they are, this person would prefer to have
a rough draft prepared by the Situation Loom people available at
4:30 p.m. At that time he and other staff members could review the
draft. He feels that there is a need of more contact with Henry
Kissinger to provide increased guidance concerning preparation of
the inputs. How important is the morning reading package 11 it
really is important, this interviewee thought it should be given much
more time than he succeeds in giving it.
terview No. 3
In this part of the NSC staff several people are involved in preparing
materials for the Situation Room product. The principal sources
are again the State cables, the CIA T I,CS reports. Very little
material comes from MA, principally some summary publications,
and occasionally a desk officer at State may call them with a
particular hot item. Before including an item they will usually
talk to CIA or to the desk officer to check the validity of the source,
the weight people in the agencies give to the particular item. They
may also check in the case of State to ascertain possible U.S.
actions already underway. Very occasionally, an NSA intercept is
used as & source of material.
Preparation of inputs is viewed mainly as a chore, with some posi-
tive side benefits. It keeps one on his toes and stimulates inter-
action with ,..tate and CIA. it is a vehicle used very occasionally
to bring issues before the President and Henry Kissinger. The
very occasional feedback via Presidential marginal notes is
welcomed, but it is very occasional. Improvement in the process
is to be sought in many directions. They would like more feedback,
if they could get it, as to interest in the items, how successful their
presentation WAS, etc.
They fee/ that the 5:30 deadline for submission of items is a bit too
early, would prefer it half-an-hour to an hour later. The meetings
once held to go over items for the Situation Poem product were not
very useful unless Henry Kissinger attended. Suggested again
TOP SECRET /SENtITIVE /(' 0 IDE
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TOP t';1::(ET/rENF,ITIVIr'c 012EWOI.'1
4-
there was need for more eedback on the appropriate length of items,
the style, and the format; more guidance as to how much is wanted
and what sorts of things are wanted.
interview No. 4
This person marked the daily take to indicate candidates for items
for inclusion. If he notes an issue in the morning, he will alert
and try to find out what may have gone in already on this 25X1
issue -- for example. in the e.LA PB. He watches through the day,
and in the latter part of the afternoon dictates his items. He may
check them out with some of the other n his section, but he
does in any case check again with ad Fazio to see what 25X1
they are covering, possibly in this . He also will alert
them for an evening watch for new material on the prospective
items. The sources are !,,tate cables more often than not. Second
are the TiTe:s. He usually checks the elB, the State diplomatic
briefs, flate incoming cables, the '1A daily to see what they have.
He points when he can, in the direction of good coverage 25X1
he has noted in some of the summer publications and tries to give
guidance as to additional points fox to include in anything 25X1
he may be writing. He checks back with .5:tette and CIA as to their
Interpretation of the items he is planning to include. When be
checks at CIA, he taps specific individuals whom he is acquainted
With. When he may not be able to prenare his own material that
ought to be briefed, he alerts and Fazio who then take 25X1
over.
In his view the preparation of the items is strictly a chore. Agrees
on possible use of items to prepare the President for issues one
foresees as being important later. Improvements in the process
are to be sought in the following directions: There is a need to be
more systematic regarding what goes in to the President. On days
with light traffic, be is concerned that fillers are used that may not
be of the same quality as the 1-z:tat of the material. This is a bad
practice. He feels that there ought to be a last-minute look in the
morning by the staff to catch bad filler. Could the hour of the
President's reading be changed to something like I Or00 a. m.
TCP
SENS
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
? IP
TOPSECP. VSENSITIVE /COD ,ViCk
He feels there is a need to know more of what is in the PrEsince.
after reading it, one mieht find useful emir:lents to add. One gets
a little bit of this from but the system doesn't work in 25X1
such a way as to make this as useful as it might he. If there was a
change to the 10;00 a.m.. deadline for the President's reading, one
could rvieve the Pe/13, as well as the Situation Room product, and
catch some of this and make comments.
He razed tome questions about the President'sreading habits. For
example, does he read both the Situationloorn-prepared product
and the PZ)13, or one or the other a he does not read all of the
items that are in the package, he felt that there ought to be a head.
line section or table of contents that would indicate to the President
what information items were included in the total package and where
he could find them.
Interviewo. 5
This staff member prepares ab
his area a good deal is done by
confine his items to things he thinks
three items a week. In
and L azio. He trios to
.ally important and doesn't
want to play a kind of intelligence game tied in closely with the morn-
ing head-Linea. :cources are mainly the embassy cables because of the
nature of Ms area and what he conceives to be the President's need
to know of various operational moves on our own side. The Ti.,cS
material is also used, although it often leads to a separate memo
outside of the morning reading package. He checks with desk people
at ftate or with people in ,DCI at (.1A.
in his view, preparation of these items is just a. service function,
something that is perfectly legitimate and part of the job. He
docsn't see any special value to him in the process. He feels the
system works well enough and has no special suggestions on how to
improve it.
He registers a complaint concerning the retslirement for the retyp-
ing of State cables sent to the .Prosident as a supporting Tab. This
is a lot of work, especially since some of the cables are seven and
TOP SE /EN TIV.
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SE,CF. ET /5.-7.EN,SiTIVE rEWOR.
- 6
eight pages long. fie raises the question as to "L oes the President
really road the Tabs, what is the payoff for retyping the cables
He felt that feedback in general was relatively adequate, especially
to the memos that he writes outside of the morning reading material.
He, as in the case of several others, had questions of how important
the morning reading material was. i:id the President really read it
V: hat, in fact, was included in the total r)isc latv Through his
questions he indicated that he had no good picture of the morning
package, what the President read, what overlap there was betweun
the C IA P :13 and the f-ituation L':oorrt product. He felt that more
information on this, more guidance, would be useful.
AWMarshallanfd
3/18/70
TOP als
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
J.V.L.ULKIA-JINCALII A-I 1.) W
111,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW MARSHALL
FROM: Charles Joyce ei
SUBJECT: Possible Technical Improvements in Handling
the President's Daily Brief
In our discussion yesterday, you mentioned the desirability of
getting feedback on what the President likes to read, as a means
for improving the selection of information for him.
We are also both aware of the problem of information overload.
Because the President can't read all of the relevant information
available to him, others must sort, screen and rewrite information
for the President. When these "others" operate in a vacuum, there
is no assurance that the President gets what he wants or needs. If
there were some way to give the President more control over the
screening process, the results would presumably be beneficial.
Putting it another way, today, people write "newspapers" for the
President hoping that they are interesting and relevant, and the
President must read these newspapers to stay on top of what is
going on. A desirable alternative, it would seem, would be a
"reading program" available to the President at all times, always
current, with controls allowing the President to:
(I) pick subjects he wants to read about,
(2) start reading at a very summary level,
(3) select the areas in which he wants to read
in more detail, and
(4) stop reading any subject when he is satisfied
and move on to another.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
IP IP
2
In addition to having such a "reading program" available, it would
be necessary to have a threshold function which should select those
bits of information which should be actively brought to the President's
attention rather than simply being available.
The foregoing describes a somewhat idealized goal, but one which
could be approached. There are some technological capabilities
which might be useful in approaching such a goal.
The information contained in the daily intelligence brief, and the
backup summaries, and the backups to the backups, etc., could be
stored in one of a variety of forths (microfilm, video tape, or
digitally) and made available through a TV-like viewer. The infor-
mation could be organized in some kind of hierarchy of detail, with
a subject list at the top, a summary for each subject, and references
to a more detailed discussion of the various points. The total infor-
mation available would be much greater than the President would
read; he would control the breadth and depth of his reading.
In addition to providing the reader with control, such a system
could easily provide feedback on what was read. With a simply
designed push button device, it could also provide feedback on
whether the reader was satisfied with what he read.
In short, use of such a system would provide significant degrees
of reader control and feedback, the missing ingredients in the
current way of doing business.
?To pursue this idea, two areas need to be investigated.
1. How to design the hardware so that the reading cap-
ability is as natural and responsive as possible,
subject to realism on costs. No one has ever
built a system to do this, and there may be some
technical problems.
2. How to organize the information into a controlled
reading program.
It would be very desirable to assess the utility of such a system
soon, because if people here get interested in it, it will have a
significant impact on the selection of hardware for the new Situation
Room.
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' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
IP
- 3 -
I can get the first area studied in any one of a variety of ways.
We need to talk more about how to do the second. Would you
want to try this? Would you want to have an outsider do it under
contx:act? Should we take an initial "cut" at the job' together and*
then see what further work is needed?
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
IP IP
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 13,
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW MARSHALL
FROM: Charles Joyce
SUBJECT:
Description of Proposed On-Line Briefing Capability
This is an attempt to summarize concisely the briefing capability
we talked about this morning.
Purpose
The purpose is to improve on present methods for Dr. Kissinger
and the President to keep abreast of current developments. These
improvements will come about by:
. Making the briefing stand out from other, business
by using special forms of presentation (TV-like).
? Providing continuous feedback to information screen-
ing staff on what has been read, whether the material
has been satisfactory, and whether more is desired.
Providing several levels of detail on a variety of
subjects, with easy control of subject and depth
by the reader.
(The value of feedback and control was discussed
in my nzemo of February 6.)
Phases
The capability would be introduced in two phases. In Phase I, the
principal reader would be Dr. Kissinger, with inputs controlled by
the Situation Room.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
IP IP
In Phase II, the President would be a reader, and Dr. Kissinger
would be involved in the selection of items for the President, in
addition to his own use of the system.
Phase I
A. How it looks to the reader.
In Phase I, Dr. Kissinger would have a TV-like screen in his
office. Whenever he is alone in the office, the screen would
display approximately ten short "headlines," considered by the
Situation Room to be the ten most significant current developments
which Kissinger should be aware of. Additional pages of headlines
would also be available on successive headline "pages." The reader
can page through the headline pages by pressing a button.
When the reader wants to find out about any headline, he indicates
which one (a variety of means for this are possible) and immediately
he gets a one "page" summary on the headline. (A page on the TV
tube would be equivalent to about a half of a typewritten page of text.)
After reading the page, the reader can push appropriate buttons to:
1. Ask for more information.
Z. Indicate satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the quality
of the writeup.
3. Select the item as a candidate for the President's
Daily Brief.
If the first action is taken and additional pages of information are
available in the system, the first additional page will be presented,
and suc6essive pages would be accessed by pressing a paging button.
After reading any amount of this information, the reader may stop,
and again take any one of the above three actions.
If the reader calls for more information after having read whatever
is available in the system on a given "headline," the request is
transmitted immediately to the Situation Room.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
1111 IP ?
Whenever any information has been called out on a given headline,
the headline is moved off the headline "pages" and moved to a
separate page containing all of today's "noted" headlines, grouped
by subject. These "subject" pages provide repeated access to
whatever has already been read, and provide a summary of develop-
ments throughout the day which may be used in reviewing material
for the President's Daily Brief.
The "headline" pages therefore contain only developments about
which the reader has not yet read even the one page summary.
The order in which the headlines appear is controlled by the
Situation Room in accordance with some judgment about priority.
As soon as any item is read, it is removed from the headline page
and other items are moved up.
B. How it looks to the Situ.ation Room.
The Situation Room staff would enter into the system items received
from the staff, and items developed by the Situation Room based on
messages, cables, intelligence reports, etc.
Items received from the staff should include a one "page" summary
and a more lengthy discussion as backup.
The Situation Room would write a one "page" summary of other
developments, and would enter into the system as backup lengthier
reference material selected from messages, wire services, intel-
ligence products or other sources.
As new information develops during the day, the Situation Room
would determine whether to remove or modify existing information
in the system or add new items. This determination would be made
?
with full knowledge of:
1. What has the reader already seen?
2. How much did he read about it?
3. Did he ask for more?
4. Was he satisfied with what he read?
a.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
. IIP
As the time approaches to prepare the President's Daily Brief,
items which have been identified during the day as "candidates"
can be reviewed and collated, possibly edited on-line, and printed
out for final review by Dr. Kissinger in hard copy form. (I pre-
sume he may want to make editorial changes and would not want to
enter these at a console.)
Technical questions.
The principal technical question is how to get departmental and
agency products and staff products into the system. There are
tradeciffs here between digital versus analog storage and display
modes which, in turn, have an impact on input methods. The
system should be designed so that the Situation Room does not
have to retype materials received from other sources in editorially
usable form.
Phase II
Once the capability is developed and shaken down for Dr. Kissinger,
consideration can be given to making information available for the
President in the same way. This poses new problems, namely:
1. The system would serve two customers who would
be in their offices at different times and would make
distinctive demands on the system.
2. Presumably, Dr. Kissinger would want to exert
? some degree of control on the selection and priority
ordering of items for the President.
One approach would be to follow the current daily cycle, with Dr.
Kissinger reviewing once per day the items to be made available
to the President.
It might be desirable to consider updating the President's reading
more frequently, but it is not clear whether Dr. Kissinger would
want to select individual items without reviewing what the President
has already seen and what is currently in the system for the Presi-
dent. If this were too burdensome, Dr. Kissinger would be faced
with the choice of relaxing his control over the selection of items
for the President or else sticking with a once-per-day update cycle.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1
? 11.
5
Feedback from the President could be enhanced by providing the
President with a handset or microphone, connected to a recorder,
into which he could dictate comments as he reads. The comments
could be transcribed in the Situation Room and entered into the
system for future reference, or fed back to Dr. Kissinger or the
staff in hard copy form.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/12/18: LOC-HAK-537-2-2-1