(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC review completed.
MORI/CDF C05099172 Pages 1-21
DIA review completed per C05099176 pages 22-35
Army review completed per C05099176 pages 22-35
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MEMORANDUM 11 111
DIA review completed
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Army review completed
TOP SECRET- -UMBRA?NOFORN
ACTION
June 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: R. C. Robinson
SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Intentions in Cambodia Prior
to April 28, 1970
The attached paper was prepared in response to your request for an
assessment of communist intentions in Cambodia prior to the initiation
of U.S. and allied operations into the sanctuaries on April 28, 1970.
From an analysis of captured enemy documents, it is abundantly clear
that detailed plans to foster a revolutionary movement and take control
of the country were in existence well before allied cross-border
operations began. Moreover, a review of communist military actions
prior to April 28 demonstrates clearly that enemy forces were rapidly
implementing these plans by that date.
COMUSMACV has reported that approximately 5.5 tons of enemy docu-
ments have been captured in Cambodia. These papers range in size
and complexity from simple personal letters to operational plans.
They reveal a consistent pattern of communist intentions and objectives
as follows:
-- To embark on a sweeping long-range program of subversion.
? To establish Cambodian front groups and local government
administrations.
-- To bolster the Khmer Rouge and foster unity between the
Vietnamese communists and the Cambodians.
-- To use VC/NVA military forces in accomplishing the above.
TOP SECRET- -UMBRA?NOFORN
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TOP SECRET- -UMBRA--NOFORN 2
Communist military operations prior to April 28 substantiated the fact
that their campaign was designed to secure base areas and lines of
communication, while simultaneously fomenting a popular uprising,
supported and controlled by the VC/NVA. A compilation of all-source
reporting by the end of April reveals the following pattern of enemy
operations;
? Reorientation of base area defenses on March 15 -- three days
prior to the ouster of Sihanouk.
-- Initiation of probes to the north and west into Cambodia,
accompanied by hard-line propaganda..
-- Launching of four attacks against Cambodian forces by March 29,
each in excess of three miles inside the Cambodian border.
?. Exerting of military pressure against Neak Luong and Chipou.
? Forcing the evacuation of border posts in Parrot's Beak prior
to April 10.
-- By April 16, embarking on a campaign to isolate Phnom Penh
and overthrow the Lou Nol government.
? At month's end, capturing the major towns of Snoui., Chhlong,
and Mimot; successfully interdicting the Kompong Som-Phnom Penh
railroad and all major roads linking Vietnam with Phnom Penh.
? And finally, the surfacing of their infrastructure in each region
as soon as it came under effective communist control.
RECOMMENDATION:
Sign the attached memo to the President, forwarding to him an eight-page
analysis which demonstrates the nature of communist intentions in
Cambodia prior to April 28. (The three attachments to the basic assessment
contain substantiating evidence, and have been summarized therein.)
TOP SECRET--UMBRA--NOFORN
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GP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET--UMBRA--NOFORN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Intentions in Cambodia Prior
to April 283 1970
The attached paper contains an assessment of communist intentions
in Cambodia prior to the initiation of U.S. and allied operations on
April 28. From an analysis of captured enemy documents, it is
abundantly clear that detailed plans to foster a revolutionary move-
ment and take control of the country were in existence well before
allied cross-border operations began. Moreover, a review of
communist military actions prior to April 28 demonstrates clearly
that enemy forces were rapidly implementing these plans by that date.
COMUSMACV has reported that approximately 5.5 tons of enemy
documents have been captured in Cambodia. These papers range
in size and complexity from simple personal letters to operational
plans. They reveal a consistent pattern of communist intentions
and objectives as follows:
-- To embark on a sweeping long-range program of subversion.
-- To establish Cambodian front groups and local government
administrations.
-- To bolster the Khmer Rouge and foster unity between the
Vietnamese communists and the Cambodians.
-- To use VC/NVA military forces in accomplishing the above.
TOP SECRET--UMBRA--NOFORN
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TOP SECRET--UMBRA--NOFORN - 2 -
Communist military operations prior to April 28 'substantiated the fact
that their campaign was designed to secure base areas and lines of
communication, while simultaneously fomenting a popular uprising,
supported and controlled by the VC/NVA. A compilation of all-source
reporting by the end of April reveals the following pattern of enemy
operations:
-- Reorientation of base area defenses on March 15 -- three days
prior to the ouster of Sihanouk.
-- Initiation of probes to the north and west into Cambodia,
accompanied by hard-line propaganda..
-- Launching of four attacks against Cambodian forces by March 29,
each in excess of three miles inside the Cambodian border.
? Exerting of military pressure against Neak Luang and Chipou.
? Forcing the evacuation of border posts in Parrot's Beak prior
to April 10.
-- By April 16, embarking on a campaign to isolate Phnom Penh
and overthrow the Lon Nol government.
-- At month's end, capturing the major towns of Snoul, Chhlong,
and Mimot; successfully interdicting the Kompong Som-Phnom Penh
railroad and all major roads linking Vietnam and Phnom Penh.
-- And finally, the surfacing of their infrastructure in each region
as soon as it came under effective communist control.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you read the attached eight-page assessment, reflecting the
? nature of communist intentions in Cambodia prior to April 28. (The
three enclosures to the basic paper contain substantiating evidence,
and have been summarized therein.)
TOP SECRET--UMBRA--NOFORN
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1,10 itylac-,-,Af&J IWt1LRW
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DIA INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL
Vietnamese Communist Intentions ?in
Cambodia Prior to 28 April 1970 (U)
1. (C) Summary - Cambodia has always occupied an important
place in Vietnamese Communist goals to gain control of
Southeast Asia. Historically, Cambodian territory was used
in support of enemy aims in the Republic of Vietnam; in
recent years, however, the Communists have taken direct
action against the Cambodian Government itself. Documents
captured in Cambodia make it abundantly clear that the
Vietnamese Communists had detailed plans to take control
5;f the country well before Allied operations began. More-
pver, a review of Communist actions prior to 28 April shows
that enemy forces were rapidly implementing these plans.
2. (S/NFD) Introduction
a. Cambodia has always occupied an important place in
Vietnamese Communist goals to gain hegemony over Southeast
Asia. By whatever their name -- Viet Cong, Viet Minh, or
Khmer Rouge -- enemy troops and officials have been present
in Cambodia since the end of World War II. They had been
primarily oriented toward supporting Hanoi's military and
subversive operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Since
1967, however, they have been increasingly anti-Cambodian.
b. Communist base areas along the Vietnamese-Cambodian
border -- 14 at last count -- have supported the infiltra-
tion of personnel and supplies south from the Lao Panhandle
to the Republic of Vietnam, contained medical facilities
and supply depots, and been used as sanctuaries by elements
of COSVN (the supreme Communist headquarters for enemy
forces in the Republic of Vietnam) and by regimental-size
units to rest, refit, and resupply. Also, with the con-
nivance of corrupt Cambodian military and political officials
and merchants, including Chief-of-State Prince Sihanouk,
Approved by:
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A ; jr" ko,611L,..aNzzia 'WA ktnel IVY fit IA=4 ?ruritiuN DISSEM
military equipment delivered to Kompong Som (Sihanoukville)
by Communist ships found its way to Cambodian military
depots and thence to Communist forces -- some 3,200 tons
from January 1969 to January 1970. An estimated 15,000
tons of rice were delivered to enemy elements in Vietnamese
border areas in 1969 by smugglers and as a result of "trade
agreements" between the COSVN-subordinate National Front
for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the Sihanouk govern-
ment. In effect, the Communists had carved out strips of
territory along the Vietnamese border from the Lao-Cambodian-
South Vietnamese border where they held sway and had secured
the cooperation of key government personalities in receiving
unitions and foodstuffs to supplement the flow through Laos.
c. Hanoi's long-range goal of controlling the whole
of Indochina must have been the most-compelling reason for
the emergence of the Khmer Rouge insurgency. Active in-
surgency began in 1967. By 1970 it had developed into a
country-wide movement with an estimated armed strength of
at least 3,000. Khmer Rouge troops -- many equipped with
modern Communist small-arms -- were operating in company-
size formations and with a sophistication that made outside
command-and-control a sine qua non.
3. (TSU/NFD) Communist Intentions Toward Cambodia
a. Communist intentions toward Cambodia prior to Allied
operations in Cambodia were made abundantly clear in documents
(enclosure 1) captured by Allied forces in that country; all
were dated before-Allied operations began except one which
was undated. MACV characterizes these documents as "minor"
-- they are mainly directives, memoranda, notebooks,
circulars, lesson plans, and letters -- but notes that in
their entirety they present a clear picture of Communist
aims. The few synopses of these documents received by
this Agency uphold this judgment. Unless otherwise
indicated, the substance of MACV's comments and assessment
follows:
-- The ouster of Prince Sihanouk on 18 March
caused the enemy to become very concerned about carrying out,
in accordance with his timetable, his objectives in the
Republic of Vietnam. In order to insure continued use of
their sanctuaries, the Vietnamese Communists recognized the
V-7.21
1 ? '41x11
2
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" LniViirMIA NO MEM DISSFM
necessity of intensifying their military/political
activities in order to replace Lon Nol with the more
sympathetic Sihanouk, or at least to seize control of
that part of Cambodia east of the Mekong and prevent the
new government from bringing pressure against the
sanctuaries. (DIA Comment: This MACV judgment is
buttressed by a 27 March message from COSVN headquarters
to subordinate elements containing a detailed policy
statement on Cambodia. The COSVN message discounted the
possibility of direct US intervention in Cambodia and out-
lined the following goals:
(l) Maintaining a holding posture at the border;
(2) Defending caches and leadership agencies;
(3) Cultivating and supporting Cambodian insurgency,
in part by exterminating tyrannical individuals and units;
and
(4) Forming a united "Indochina Front" to provide
tight coordination among the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian
"revolutions." Also, the concurrent consultations between
North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho and Party
First Secretary Le Duan and their Soviet and Chinese counter-
parts suggests that Hanoi was bringing Moscow and Peking up
to date on its intentions toward the new government in Phnom
Penh.)
b. The documentary evidence of Hanoi's aggressive
intentions falls into three general categories.
-- The establishment of Cambodian Front groups,
local government administrations, and the bolstering of the
Khmer Rouge;
-- The role of VC/NVA military forces in these
tasks; and
-- The fostering of friendship between the
Vietnamese (Communists) and Cambodians.
c. Summaries of documents referring to the first
category follow:
3
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-- A six-page guide (undated), believed to have
been drafted by the COSVN-subordinated South Vietnam
Liberation Agency (SVNLA) and captured near Snoul, contained
a plan for the organization of the "National United Front
of Cambodia" at hamlet and village level. It explained
that the Front would replace the Lon Nol government and
serve as the leading organ of those supporting Sihanouk
and in the development of friendship and solidarity with
the SVNLA and the "Liberation Army.d Specific tasks
mentioned were the overthrow of Lon Nol, improved Khmer-
Vietnamese solidarity against the US, the organization of
various elements of the population into associated
liberation elements (e.g., youth, women, and the elderly),
and strengthening the Khmer Rouge. The structure and com-
position of the hamlet and village committees and the pro-
Communist-pro-Sihanouk qualifications of their leaders
were also specified. (DIA Comment: Synopses of undated
documents captured in Svey Rieng Province on 3 May and in
Kompong Cham on the 2d discuss this subject in the same
light as well as the formation of action teams to assist
the Cambodian "friends." These additional discoveries
suggest that the plan had been prepared well before Allied
operations in Cambodia and had been widely disseminated.
-- A document dated I May captured in the Fishhook,
where the Headquarters, SVNLA, was located, contained a
summary of political actions by an unidentified subordinate
during the period 11-30 April. Phase One (1l-12 April)
concerned the political reorientation of cadre and troops;
Phase Two (12-30 April), the "activation" of Cambodian
guerrilla forces and an infrastructure. The over-all goal
was to have Khmer Rouge administrations in five of 12
villages covered by the report.
-- A 27 March directive captured near Snoul that
was prepared by the SVNLA Military Affairs Party Committee
outlined ways to contact Cambodian. military officers to
convince them to support Sihanouk. The role of the
Vietnamese Communists in this regard was evident in the
statement that "... It should also be pointed out ... that
we are ready to provide them with every assistance, in-
cluding cadre and armed forces."
?
4
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-- An NVA soldier's notebook captured near the
Cambodian border in Tay Ninh Province contained an 18 April
entry to the effect that he was one of those assigned to
activate guerrillas and help in the formation and training
of liberation organizations in Kompong Cham Province.
-- A 19 April review of enemy political activity
found in Kompong Cham Province summarizes a meeting of the
COSVN base area security committee. It noted the possibility
of using the Mekong as a line of communication and the good
progress that had been achieved thus far.
d. The prime role of VC/NVA military forces in the
Cambodian "liberation" (Category Two) was spelled out in the
following documents:
-- A very detailed notebook compiled by the
Signal Office, Military Staff Department, Headquarters,
SVNIA, found in the Mimot area contained an 18 April entry
stating that VC/NVA cadre would head local force companies
composed of Cambodian combatants. Also, signal battalions
would be organized for the use of the "revolutionary
movement" in all provinces and military regions. A
reference to an unspecified directive noted that the immediate
VC/NVA task in 1970 was to support the Khmer Rouge, consolidate
base areas, and complete preparations for combat against
Cambodian troops. (DIA Comment: Correlation of the fore-
going MACV reference with a recently received synopsis
indicates that 30 signal battalions were to be activated
and that every district would have one local force company;
at least one provincial unit would be directly subordinate
to the SVNLA. A 26 April entry reported the activation of
a 135-man local force company in an unspecified district,
including 12 cadre drawn from Doan 75, possibly the SVNIA
Artillery Headquarters._
-- Two other notebooks captured in Kratie Province
spell out the mission of the 141st NVA Regiment in Cambodia,
i.e., destroy loyal government forces, hold occupied areas
until they are transferred to the Khmer Rouge, and coordinate
attacks with the formation of the infrastructure. NVA troops
were said to be helping the Khmer people develop a socialist
(Communist) country and while doing so create advantageous
conditions for the liberation of the Republic of Vietnam.
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I'Lg111 L9 Win tiVR, No DISSEM
e. Documents relating to the fostering of friendship
between the Vietnamese Communists and Cambodians (Category
Three) mainly refer to a Headquarters, SVNLA, 10-point code
of conduct governing the behavior of NVA soldiers toward
the Cambodian population. Found in several documents, the
code specifies the correct attitude toward monks, religious
institutions, and women. The necessity of paying for all
damage and compensating for all food was also mentioned. One
document captured in the Mimot area cautioned against reveal-
ing the presence of the SVNIA in Cambodia; documents were
not to be carried and the use of Vietnamese was prohibited
in the presence of prisoners.
f. The foregoing clear evidence of aggressive VC/NVA
A.ntentions toward the Phnom Penh government lends credence
to Cambodian claims of the seizure of incriminating documents
in the Viet Cong Provisional Revolutionary Government and
North Vietnamese embassies in Phnom Penh in mid-March. A
reliable clandestine source has reported that documents
taken from the North Vietnamese Embassy during the 11 March
anti-Communist demonstrations in Phnom Penh, revealed the
existence of a plan for the annexation of Cambodia to Vietnam.
The three important points were:
-- The necessity for propaganda to show that the
Sihanouk government (Sihanouk not ousted until 18 March) was
even then under American control;
-- Surveillance and reporting on the Cambodian
army; and
-- Cambodian ttneutralityIt worked in Communist favor
"for the moment."
-- Another reliable clandestine source has reported
documents found in the ruins of the PRG Embassy indicated a
coup attempt was planned for 29 March to "eliminate rightists
in the Lon Nol government." According to Matak, Sihanouk
himself was a target for liquidation.
4. (S/NFD) Other Documentary Evidence
a. The foregoing assessment of documents does not, of
course, include the vital importance the Communists place on
Cambodia to support their war effort in the Republic of
, Tr7-7-1 #734,
VIZ VA. 1
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NO-FOREIGN DISSFm
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Vietnam. The screening process of the more than five tons
of documents captured so far has provided additional proof
of the Communist reliance on that country as a logistics
and infiltration corridor, and for sanctuaries for units and
command-and-control elements. It is little wonder then why
the Vietnamese Communists felt compelled to take such direct
action against the new government in Phnom Penh.
b. That the Vietnamese Communists had formulated and
embarked upon a bold course in Cambodia before Allied
operations began in late April is borne out by a review of
events in that country over the preceding six months or so.
-- As early as December 1969, three of Sihanouk's
key supporters resigned from the government in an effort
to end its anti-Sihanouk orientation.
-- In January 1970, Sihanouk left Cambodia for
his annual sojourn in France. Even the Prince was willing
to concede at that time that the VC/NVA presence in his
country had jeopardized its independence.
-- In mid-March, the governthent whipped up anti-
Communist demonstrations in various parts of the country,
including the sacking of the PRG and North Vietnamese
embassies, and demanded that the VC/NVA remove their forces
from Cambodia by dawn on the 15th. By the 18th, negotiations
for the latter had broken dawn and Sihanouk had been ousted.
-- In the wake of the ultimatum to remove their
forces, the VC/NVA began digging in and consolidating their
positions in the border areas and let it known that they
had no intention of leaving; Hanoi and the PRG suspended
relations with Phnom Penh on 27 March.
5. (TSU/NFD) VC/NVA Military Actions
a. A compilation of all-source reporting by the end of
April (enclosure 3) indicated that the VC/NVA or their
Cambodian Communist allies had launched numerous ground
attacks and attacks by fire on the Mekong River traffic.
Communist forces in excess of 100 troops were regularly reported
to be operating against Cambodian elements.
b. By 10 April, the Cambodians had been forced to
evacuate border posts in the Parrot's Beak; by the 16th, it
1 )P
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hzTo U kV hipmiN uisSEM
T.71) 4 r
was apparent that the Communists were not only securing
and protecting their base areas but had embarked on a
campaign to isolate Phnom Penh and overthrow the Lon Nol
government. At month's end, the Communists had captured
major population centers in the northeast as part of their
campaign to gain control of the Mekong. They were also
well on their way to cutting off the capital from the rest
of the country, especially to the south toward the Vietnam
border and southwest toward the major seaport of Kompong
Som. The infrastructure surfaced in these regions almost as
soon as they came under effective Communist control.
c. Hanoi's guiding hand was evident in such developments
as Le Duan's 21 April speech in Moscow on the need for
united Communist action in Indochina and Politburo member
Truong Chinh's announcement from Hanoi on the same day that
a united Indochina Front had been formed. Within the week,
Sihanouk had announced the formation of his government in exile.
6. (C) Conclusions
a. Hanoi's determination to control all of Indochina
has made+Cambodia a prime target of the Vietnamese Communists.
b. Well before their fall-out with the Phnom Penh
government, the Communists had embarked on a sweeping long-
range subversive program against it, including dealing with
corrupt officials and the sponsorship of insurgency.
c. Captured documents show that with Sihanouk's ouster
on 18 March, the Vietnamese Communists felt compelled to
abandon their heretofore largely sub rosa campaign in favor
of direct action.
d. Communist military successes prior to 28 April made
it clear that this campaign was designed to secure base areas
and lines of communication while simultaneously setting the
stage for the return of Sihanouk under the guise of a popular
uprising that was nevertheless controlled by the VC/VVA.
3 Enclosures
1. MACV Msg MAC 7583,
DTG 041130 Jun (CM))
2. DIA Appraisal - Significance
of Enemy Documents Captured
in Cambodia (S/FD)
3. DIA Appraisal - VC Offensive
Activity Directed Against
Cambodia, 18 Mar-28 Apr 70 (TSCW
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/17. LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/17: LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7
.4. .
- A
DIA APPRAISAL
VIET CONG OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST CAMBODIA
18 MARCH - 28 APRIL 1970
1. .(U) Background
-- This. appraisal contains a compendium of significant VC/NVA
aggressive actions in Cambodia from the fall of Prince Sihanouk on 18 .
March to the initiation of Allied operations in that country on 28 April.
2. (TSU) Discussion
-- Following the 18 March ouster of Prince. Sihanouk, the Vietnamese
Communists redirected their strategic plans in relation to Cambodia.
-- Three days previously, on the 15th, they had reoriented their
base area defenses against Cambodia, in response to Prime Minister Lou
Nol's 12 March ultimatum to leave Cambodian territory. Probes north and
west into Cambodia and issuance of hard-line propaganda to the effect
that they were not going to leave, further indicated that the Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese were intent on consolidating and protecting their base
areas.
-- Meanwhile, on 23 March, Sihanouk broadcast from Peking that
he was forming a Government of National Union. Negotiations concerning
the continued use of Cambodia by the VC/NVA broke down, culminating in the
suspension of diplomatic relations by the Communists on 27 March. Con-
currently, short-lived Communist-inspired pro-Sihanouk demonstrations
that erupted in eastern Cambodia were promptly quashed by Cambodian troops.
By the 29th, Communist forces had launched four attacks against Cambodian
forces, each in excess of three miles inside the Cambodian border. Immediate
objectives appeared to be the towns of Neak Luong and Chipou.
APPROVED BY:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/17: LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/17 : LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7
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-- Increasing military pressure by the Communists forced the
Cambodians to evacuate border posts in Svay Rieng Province by 10 April.
By the 16th, it had become apparent that the Communists were executing a
Plan that went beyond securing and extending their base areas. In addition
to striking into Cambodia's interior, the Communists -conducted political
meetings among the populace, provided arms for those willing to accept
them, and liquidated some who were unsympathetic to the Communist cause.
By.the end of April, the Communiats:had eapturect.the major
towns of SnOul,'Chhlong, and Mimot; successfully interdicted the ROiapong
Rom:- Phnom Penh railroad and all major roads linking Vietnam with 'Phnom
Penh.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/17: LOC-HAK-537-2-6-7