INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-537-5-12-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 18, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY C UN IL
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
K. Wayne Smith APO
SUBJECT: Intelligence Reorganization
FROM:
URGENT ACTION
June 18, 1971
The PFIAB has sent a copy of its report to the President on intelli-
gence reorganization to you and George Shultz. The report takes
into account the analysis and recommendations submitted earlier by
you and Shultz with the joint NSC/OMB study.
Jim Schlesinger and I have jointly prepared a self-explanatory memo
(Tab A) for the President laying out:
the PFIAB recommendations,
changes in the earlier NSC/OMB recornmendation.s necessitated
by the President's clear desire to avoid legislation but still
accomplish his objectives of improving efficiency in the use
of resources and improving the intelligence product,
the alternatives for his decision.
? I have had no opportunity to discuss this matter with you and. obtain
your views. Thus, the revised recommendations are based primarily
on what the analysis suggests, on my understanding of your desires,
and on Shultz's views. I would add several other points:
-- In my view it would be better to do nothing than adopt the
committee arrangement recommended by the PFIAB.
NSC review completed.
?TC7P-tEeR-E-T-4-B-YEMAN
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IIP--
TOP SECRET /BYEMAN
On the other hand, we probably no longer have this option
since Senator Ella.nder is prepared to cut $500 million
from the intelligence budget (largely from our most
productive intelligence activities) unless we do something
to preempt him.
At a minimum a National Security Council Intelligence
Committee and a revision of the National Security Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) are badly needed.
If the President approves the PFIAB recommendations or
the NSC/OMB recomxnenda,tions or even some combination,
at least a month of full-time work by someone will be needed
to prepare the necessary implementing directives and other
instructions to carry out the changes. I simply do not have
the time and no one on my staff has worked on this but me.
Schlesinger would be the ideal candidate for this task.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to the President at Tab A. Shultz has already
signed but he understands that you have not seen the memo and may
want changes made in it.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I NGTON
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Intelligence Reorganization
Your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has submitted a
report (Tab A) on the management and organization of the U.S. foreign
intelligence effort. The report takes into account the analysis and
reorganization proposals submitted early in the joint 0M33/NSC study.
hi terms of organization, the PFIAB unanimously recommends:
-- Making the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) the coordinating body
of the intelligence community and altering the composition of the Board
to give dominance to the users of intelligence rather than the collectors
and producers. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) would continue
to chair the USIB.
? Creating two new committees, an Intelligence Evaluation
Committee and an Intelligence Resource Committee, under the USIB,
each chaired by the DCI.
-- Establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(ASD/I) to coordinate the intelligence resources of the Department of
Defense.
? Relieving the DCI of his day-to-day management and administra-
tive functions in CIA and giving the Director of the National Security
?Agency increased authority over all government communications and
electronics intelligence.
In our memorandum of March 22 (Tab B), we made .three principal
recommendations on intelligence community reorganization to which
you tentatively agreed. Subsequently, you have given clear evidence
of a desire to avoid legislation on this issue. We have accordingly
altered our proposals to conform to that desire and to take into
account the recommendations of the PFIAB.
Our principal earlier recommendation was to strengthen the role of the
DCI by giving him the authority to plan, program, and review all intel-
ligence resources on a community-wide basis. To relieve the DCI of
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
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TOP SECRET /BYEMAN
his burdensome operational responsibilities and to assure his imparti-
ality, we also recommended that CIA be restructured through a
reorganization plan that would, in effect, create a new agency to conduct
collection and covert action operations. The objectives are attainable
without the creation of a new agency. The CIA could be restructured
so as to allow the DCI to give primary emphasis to community-wide
management and national intelligence productions. An illustrative
organizational chart for such a restructured CIA and revised USIB
committee structure is attached at Tab C.
We continue to believe that strong, continuing, and impartial leadership
requires the assignment of authority over community resources to a
single individual, not a committee or series of committees. This is a
fundamental requirement that no plan of reform should ignore.
Committee-type leadership, in the form of the USIB, has historically
failed to be effective. We are, therefore, skeptical that a simple
reorganization and strengthening of the USIB, as proposed by PF1AB,
will succeed in achieving your objectives.
Our additional recommendations at this time include:
-- Establishing a Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI), who would
be responsible for overall direction of all Defense intelligence resources
or making Defense intelligence one of the main responsibilities of the
second Deputy Secretary of Defense which you have already approved.
A strong intelligence focal point within DOD is essential to ensure the
responsiveness of Defense intelligence activities to the DCI. An ASD/I,
as proposed by the PFLAB, could not accomplish this.
-- Replacing the existing USIB with two committees, an Intelligence
Production Committee and an Intelligence Resources Committee. The
former in a sense replaces the current USIB which has primarily functioned
as a committee of producers. The new resource committee would be built
around the key relationships between the DCI and DDI (or Deputy Secretary
of Defense). Defense, which has 85% of the intelligence resources, must
be responsive to the DCI in rationalizing the use of resources. The com-
mittee membership and procedures should be designed to accomplish this,
? Revising the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCIDs) in order to ensure that the authorities and the jurisdictional
boundaries within the intelligence community are consistent with the
effective performance of the new structure.
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
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11,
_ TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
-- Creating a National Security Council Intelligence Committee
to ensure specification of consumer needs and responsiveness of
intelligence resource to those needs, through a continuing review and
evaluation of intelligence products. This committee, chaired by the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, should include
as members the DCI, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under
Secretary of State. (This proposal is similar to the one by the PF1AB
for an Intelligence Evaluation Committee but would be composed of a ,
membership closer to that proposed by the PFIAB for the restructured
USIB.)
The PFIAB proposal and our current proposal share many common
features, but also have significant differences. Both offer substantial
and somewhat parallel revisions of top level committee structure and
functions. The PFIAB proposal, however, confines itself to an improved
committee structure to support the agreed goal of enhanced DCI leader-
ship. We feel that this is insufficient. Restructuring the top level
committee structure, without changing the balance of power within the,
community in more direct and effective ways, could fail, to achieve the
goals you have set ? improved efficiency in the use of resources, and
improved intelligence product. Thus, our proposal moves much farther
in the direction of assigning responsibility for community planning,
programming, and budget preparation to the DCI.
You may prefer another option: to have us work with the PFIAB to
develop additional common ground. We have strong reason to believe
that the PFIAB would support a decision to restructure the CIA, short
of legislation. In addition, the PFIAB may endorse a stronger focal
point for authority within the DOD, if the DDI were proscribed from
dominating substantive intelligence production or interferring in the
detailed management of the national programs. (It is our belief that
the role of the DDI should be to assist the Directors of the NRO and the
NSA to marshall the resources to carry out their responsibilities.)
We do not know how the PFIAB would respond to pinning responsibility
for the community directly on the DCI rather than further experimenting
with a committee structure -- with all the compromising that that
implies -- but we would explore that issue, if you desire.
Two further points require emphasis. In our judgment, only through
restructuring of the community can a reduction of real resources
going to the community (as much as 15% or $750-800 -million) be
achieved -- without doing significant damage to the national intelligence
effort. This is a particularly acute problem at this time because
TOP SECRET /BYEMAN
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TOP SECRET /BYEMAN
Senator Ellender appears prepared to cut from the
budget and from our most productive intelli ence activities, including
overhead and SIGINT. We must be in a position to respond creatively
to such congressional action.
Secondly, the lowest priority activities are not in the national program
but in the Service programs (now in excess of $3 billion). To deal
effectively with unnecessary duplication and waste in these programs
requires strong overalldirection from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The Services and the JCS will object to any reduction of
their prerogatives over intelligence activities. Consequently, unless
you are prepared to override the anticipated objections of the Chiefs,
we would not recommend the proposed reorganization plan or a sub-
stantial reduction in resources for intelligence.
Your choices are:
(1) Approve the recommendations made by the
(2) Approve the revised recommendations we
have made.
(3) Approve some combination of the recom-
mendations to be worked out jointly by
OMB /NSC and the PFIAB.
Whatever your decision, we will prepare the necessary implementing
directives and other instructions to carry out the changes.
Henry A. Kissinger George P. Shultz
TOP SECRET/BYEMAN
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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