YOUR MEMO OF 18 MAY CONCERNING THE RESCUE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW ASKED FOR ANY OBSERVATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS WHICH I BELIEVE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPROVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-539-1-5-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 23, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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'WE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGIIPCE t Is ' w
WASHINGTON, Cr. C. MN
cy of/(,cys
23 MAY 1975
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Your memo of 18 May concerning the rescue of the SS
Mayaguez and its crew asked for any observations or suggestions
which I believe might contribute to the improvement of the ability
of the National Security Council machinery -- of which the intelli-
gence community is a part -- to deal effectively with crisis situations.
Attached to this letter is a paper which examines some of this
machinery and suggests several ways to help clarify its procedures
and correct its problems.
The Washington intelligence community consists of a. number
of inter-connected and interdependent organizations. During fast-
breaking crises, the ability of all parts of this structure to function
almost automatically is what is likely to determine the quality of
support to you. To make sure that we can indeed function in this way,
we seek constantly to improve both systems and procedures. There
is always more to do, and the human aspects of the problem in
particular need constant attention. But I believe the basic system is
essentially sound, even though fine tuning and some repairs will
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always be required.
Specifically, concerning the Mayaguez incident, it is noteworthy
that the equipment, the technical systems, and the procedures which
link the various warning, communications, and command responsibilities
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SENSITIVE INTEILIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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apparently functioned quite well. The fewIldisconnects? in the
overall system which we have identified seem to have been the con-
sequence of human errors. Much the same can be said, I think,
about problems encountered in past crises as well.
Not all the actions and decisions which occurred at the outset
of-the Mayaguez crisis in the various intelligence and operations
centers conformed to established procedures. As a result, we are
reemphasizing the need for adherence to existing procedures which
seek to ensure effective intra- and interagency communications. We
are also actively searching for ways to help to improve the Govern-
ment's procedures for the initiation, coordination, and transmission
of notices and special warnings to mariners -- procedures which
were not at all clear during the Mayaguez incident.
We have, I think, the ability to cope with two crises in two
geographically separated areas, e.g., the mid-March Vietnam/
Cambodia and Arab/Israeli concerns. But the Mayaguez incident
occurred in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Vietnam and
Cambodia and thus in effect tested our ability to contend with two
major crises simultaneously in one compartment of our responsibilities
(Southeast Asia). This tended to overload the human part of the system.
This overload, in turn, posed problems for the intelligence community
and other components of the Government as well.
On one subject of personal interest to you, Mr. President, I
would like to undertake a special responsibility. I will henceforth
confirm specifically that the White House Situation Room will inform
you of a matter I think should be called immediately to your attention.
I will ensure the same with respect to the.other National Security
Council members. This will undoubtedly be redundant in most cases,
but I believe it a necessary step to ensure against future delay.
I welcome this opportunity to make these observations to you. I
hope that our concentration on applying the lessons learned from the
Mayaguez incident and other recent crises will enable us to perform the
preventive maintenance needed to assure the highest standards of
performance.
MININIMIII.=M1/11.111.11/11011MMININMIMIII
Respectfully,
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SUMMARY
IOW
1. The review of intelligence warning and alerting procedures
and crisis management practices incident to the Mayaguez affair con-
firms that the basic and key ingredients of U. S. National Security
Council machinery and intelligence community support functioned as
they are supposed to. Events in the Gulf of Thailand in the period
immediately preceding the seizure of the Mayaguez were noted by the
intelligence community. However, these events did not seem at the
" time to be of sufficient intensity or of sufficiently clear significance
to trigger the established alert and warning mechanisms. It is also
true that the very early time of day the first reports of the attack on
the Mayaguez were received, together with the fragmentary nature of
the initial messages, contributed to a minor delay in the notification
of principals. But this initial delay was quickly overcome, and the
intelligence support machinery then moved into high gear and remained
there throughout the crisis.
BACKGROUND
Z. Detailed and comprehensive reports on the intelligence
community's actions vis-a-vis the Mayaguez affair have already been
provided in response to item (b) of the President's memorandum of
18 May. This paper addresses item (c) of that memorandum: "Any
observations or suggestions which you consider would contribute to
improvement of the ability of the National Security Council machinery
to deal effectively with crisis situations."
3. The National Security Council machinery consists of the
staffs and organizations supporting the NSC members and, of course,
includes the military and intelligence advisers to the NSC. Through
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in his role as Chairman of
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), those elements of the
Government responsible for the ,collection, analysis, and production
of foreign intelligence are brought into coordinated support of the NSC
structure. The principal elements of this foreign intelligence community
are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the State Department
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the coordinating and
management structure of the Office of the DCI. There are several other
components of this basic structure, such as the intelligence organizations
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which make major contributions to
the overall effort.
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4. Closely associated with the operations of the foreign intelligence
community, and integrated into the communications and warning pro-
cedures of the community, are the White House Situation Room, the
State Department Operations Center, and the elements of the 3-3 of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Military Command Center (NMCC).
The 24-hour centers of the seven organizations listed above ? CIA, DIA,
NSA, State INR, NMCC, State Operations Center, and the White House
Situation Room ? are the primary centers in Washington operating in
full-time, direct support of the National Security Council. There are
as many as 22 additional centers (each manned on a 24-hour basis) in
various governmental organizations throughout the Washington, D. C.
area which could, and Sometimes do, contribute to the support of the NSC.
Outside the Washington area there are scores of 24-hour centers, primarily
in the worldwide military command structure, which also can and do
support the National Command Authorities through the 3-3 organization of
the JCS which sits, in the NMCC.
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5. The total of all these intelligence and warning operations -- in
Washington, throughout the United States, and worldwide -- make up
what some refer to as the "National Nervous System." This is always
active and can be stimulated to Warn of or respond to any "crisis"
situation.
.CRITIC MESSAGES
6. Key elements in the flow of information to and through the intelli-
gence community are (a) the United States Critical Communications
(CRITICOM) system, and (b) the CRITIC messages that are relayed
through CRITICOM -- at highest precedence -- to the principal Washington
intelligence centers*.
*The purpose of a CRITIC message is to inform the highest authorities
of the Government within 10 minutes of any event in the world which seems
to seriously threaten U. S. interests or indicates an impending attack on
the?U. S. or its forces. The system stipulates that other events of major
concern to the U. S. are to be conveyed to the highest Government
authorities within20 inlitmtes. The system can transmit messages from
anywhere in the world to Washington and disseminate them to the principal
intelligence centers here and overseas within these stipulated times.
The system has been in use for many years, is upgraded continually, and
is tested regularly to ensure that it functions within specifications.
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7. The CRITIC message alerting the Washington area to the
Mayaguez seizure was received by this means The U. S. Embassy
in Jakarta originated the initial message
messages were received in Washington between 0512 and 0626 EDT
on 12 May and all were delivered to all CRITIC alert centers within
minutes of their receipt.
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8. At this point human judgment came into play. The time of
day the first report on the Mayaguez was received (0512 EDT) and the
fragmentary nature of that message led watch officers to pause briefly
before notifying their principals. While the results of this minor
delay in informing senior level officials can now be seen as incon-
sequential, there do seem to have been errors of judgment in the
initial handling of the CRITIC.
INTERNETTING
9. As a result of warning deficiencies identified after the 1973
Middle East War, the DCI, through the Intelligence Community Staff,
designed and implemented an internetting capability for the principal
Washington area intelligence and operations centers. Known as the
National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network (NOIWON),
this system provides for simultaneous and secure conferencing arriong
the seven key centers, CIA, DIA, NSA, State INR, State Operations
Center, J-3 NMCC and the White House Situation Room. In addition
to providing for the exchange of evaluation among watch officers, the
net also permits any one center to advise the others of actions taken.
NOIWON procedures specifically require that any center which notifies
the Government official for which it is responsible should immediately
inform the other centers of this fact. NOIWON was never activated
and was not utilized during the early morning of 12 May; all concerned
now agree that it should have been.
ANALYSIS AND WARNING
10. Imthe ea-rly zlays of May, the focus of that part of the intelli-
gence community interested in Southeast Asia was on the recent fall
of Cambodia, the activities and policies of the communists in Vietnam,
and various developments in Laos. The intelligence operations officers,
analysts, and managers (both in the field and in Washington) simply
failed to alert NSC policy levels of yet another critical event in
Indochina.
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MP iut
11. Thus, as information on Cambodian naval actions in the
Gulf of Thailand became known during early May, there was little
awareness that an ominous pattern might be forming here. \
Much of the Cambodian activity seemed concerned with
local rivalries directed against Vietnamese refugees. The instances
involving foreign merchant ships did not then appear to be serious,
and did not trigger any prior alerting action beyond some circulation
or repetition of the raw reports mentioned above. There was no warning
notice to U. S. merchant shipping. It has since been established that
the Hydrographic Center of the Defense Mapping Agency, which has
responsibility for issuing Maritime Advisories, had no links to the
intelligence community and thus was not a recipient of information
concerning develdpments in the Gulf of Thailand.
12. When the Mayaguez was seized by the Cambodians, however,
he alerting mechanisms of the intelligence community worked well.
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correctly placed the first emergency
radio message from the ship into the CRITIC system. The automatic
features of the system thereafter ensured immediate delivery to
Washington and simultaneous dissemination to all intelligence and
operations centers within minutes, as stipulated.
SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS
13. Upon initiation of NSC actiori on 12 May to plan for rescue
of the Mayaguez, the intelligence community was already mobilized
to provide operational support, having been triggered by the early-
morning CRITIC and follow-up reports. Tactical reconnaissance flights
had been ordered, and all available resources were focusing on ways to
determine the location and status of the ship and crew, Cambodian
actions and intentions, and other pertinent information about enemy
forces and the area of operations. Intelligence support units were
activated and positioned to provide combat support in the form of photo
and visual reconnaissance
14. In support of the NSC, the NMCC and the intelligence community
elements in Washington provided a steady flow of written information,
briefings, and advice to decision-makers and operational planners.
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The flow of intelligence information to and from the various one ational
elements was both voluminous and timely.
The Defense Intelligence Agency supported both policy makers in
Washington and overseas operational commanders. The entire range
of resources available to the intelligence community was utilized in the
overall effort.
15. The -intelligence briefings provided the National Security
Council during the Mayaguez affair were of high quality and covered
the essential items bearing on the problem. These briefings alerted
the NSC to the salient aspects of the situation:and focused on the key
questions -- though they could not in all instances offer complete
answers. Early on, for example, they addressed the question of what
forces were available to the Cambodian Communists which could be
used against any U. S. effort to rescue the Mayaguez and its crew.
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16. During this period, the intelligence community also covered
the reactions of other countries to the Mayaguez affair. Much of the
information concerning this aspect of the problem came from normal
and well-established sources in the field./ /the Department of State
alerted their field elements to concentrate on reporting host 25X1
country reactions. While generally meeting needs, this reporting at 25X1
times inevitably lagged behind fast-breaking developments in the Gulf
of Thailand.
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
17. As with all such situations, there were activities and
procedures which performed well and worked as intended, and there
were other areas where weaknesses or shortcomings were detected
and where corrective action is indicated. Elements that worked
especially well include:
- The CRITICOM system, which 'delivered CRITIC
messages from remote areas to Washington in the prescribed time:
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- Intelligence research, analysis, and reporting in support
of the decision-making and operational planning processes at the
NSC and NMCC levels.
- Timely and secure communications between Washington,
D. C., .military intelligence centers and the headquarters of
operational commands overseas, including transmission of
reconnaissance photography from the operating area to Washington.
- The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system which
performed an invaluable service to the DCI and the NSC throughout
the crisis, largely through well-functioning intelligence community
coordination machinery established long before the crisis by the
NIO for South and Southeast Asia.
18. Potential problem areas which were brought into sharper
focus by this review of responsibilities and procedures are addressed
below:
- Inability to track and locate all U. S. merchant ships
at sea at any given time. Although this type of detailed information
is not necessary as a prerequisite to the issuance of a general
maritime warning, experience has shown that such information
often would have been desirable and useful. At present, no
single U. S. Government agency has the responsibility (or the
capability) for continuous monitoring or reporting on the positions
of U. S. civilian ships. The nature of commercial maritime
activity makes this a complex and monumental problem. The
Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Naval Operations
are actively seeking solutions to this problem.
- Inadequacies in existing procedures for developing,
coordinating, and issuing special warnings and notices to mariners.
The established mechanism works very well in all cases involving
warnings to mariners of purely navigational hazards. The system
works less well when political or military issues are involved --
as was the case with the Mayaguez. Part of the problem involves
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log
interagency coordination and the need for a timely flow of
information from intelligence elements to those in the Govern-
ment concerned with issuing maritime advisories. The
imperative for such advisories is often contained in sensitive
intelligence reports, but the warnings must be unclassified in
order -to reach all U. S. shipping through open broadcasts.
Although more work needs to be done to correct specific
deficiencies, progress is already being made. AU members
of the United States Intelligence Board, for example, now know
which offices and procedures are involved in the maritime
advisory process, and appropriate intelligence principals have
taken steps to insure closer links between their agencies and
the maritime affairs offices. Additionally, the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Director of Naval Intelligence are
jointly examining the issues and will develop procedures to
improve our ability to issue timely warnings to merchant vessels.
One possible alternative involves a much larger role for the
Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC).
- Complications in the exchange of policy, intelligence,
and operational information among the respective agencies
actively supporting the NSC. At times during the Mayaguez ,
affair, some agencies of the U. S. intelligence community were
not aware of policy options under consideration or the military
actions in progress. Some of those members of the community
who were privy to this information were prohibited from sharing
their knowledge by more senior officials in the policy and
operational elements of their respective organizations. This
resulted in some confusion and uncertainty within the intelligence
community and, for at least some brief periods, added a degree
of obliqueness to the information support that was provided.
A more open dialogue between the operational planners and the
intelligence community would have resulted in a more pertinent
intelligence contribution to the rescue operations. This is not
a new or unusual problem; it stems from the fact that planners
and force commanders sometimes do not appreciate the role
and potential contribution of intelligence, and are overly concerned
with protecting the secrecy of options being considered.
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IP lur aural
A related problem is the tendency, as time narrows
in a crisis, to emphasize vertical reporting at the expense of
lateral passage of information. The intelligence community for
its part will continue to refine operational procedures which will
accommodate the need for lateral communication not only in
normal situations but also in crisis periods.
Another matter of ,concern is the extensive use during
crises of non-record (telephone) communications to issue
directives and solicit information,. Too often the information so
exchanged remains known only to the callers and frequently
cannot be verified by others. This acts to inhibit effective
management and deserves continuing attention.
- The lack of a time-sensitive satellite imaging collection
system. Existing satellite systems which provide photographic
coverage of geographic areas of interest to the United States
are not sufficiently flexible to permit quick recovery of selected
film strips. The satellite presently in orbit passed over the
appropriate area in the Gulf of Thailand before
the Mayaguez seizure, but it was not programmed to photograph
that area. The satellitef s orbit did not permit access to the area
again It did then photograph the area; but the film
of this coverage will not be available for analysis until 7 June.
19. Our basic conclusion is that the intelligence community
directly supporting the National Security Council machinery is in the
main properly designed and organized to handle crises of major and
minor proportions. To be sure each new crisis brings with it some
new problems, reminders of old problems, and lessons for the future.
Recognizing this will help us to improve our performance in the future.
But the system as a whole is sound, and those in it fully understand the
mission to provide maximum support to the NSC.
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