THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS THAT PRESIDENT SADAT MAY SELECT A MILITARY OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19: LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5
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dehiontd to 4uppoat (torment deaiAion* an nation44
Aegivaty patZeg 04 1004ta4e.
THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS T4AT PRESIDENT SADA
MAY SELECT A MILITARY OPTION* I.
orm
Flans and Capabilities to Exercise M
This warning appraisal reviewed new
Planning for offensive operations; S
his armed forces to be fully prepare
end of March; the Soviet rearmament
military/ an Egyptian force assessme t; And the portents
of hostilities. This appraisal concluded that while
Sadat.preferred a political solution to the Middle East
crisis, he had taken the highlY:Pragluatic steps of rg-
arming the Egyptian armed forces and, preparing a deliber-
ate offensive plan-in the event dip omatic negotiations
failed.
it.
. MS FD) In spite of Political and economic
factors mitigate against Cairl choosing the war
-option at this times. there are conv4ncing military in-
dications that point to the increased possibility of
-. war. ...Thai( are indicators similar 4o. those observed
prier to October 1973 that reveal Egypt may be planning
a major military action onor about128 march. A. stra-
tegic exercise is scheduled to begin between the 27th
and the 29th and is to continue thrOugh at least 3 April.
This activity has the potential of 40eing?a cover for
either a large-scale offensive in, the Sinai or a more
limited operation against Israeli fitoilities -- such as
the Abu Rudeis oil fields -- on the Gulfof Suez.
(TSL iNFo) Since the coll pae of the step-by -
'step naget ating effort, the follow .ng indicators may
also reflect Sadat's decision to.im lement his offensive
contingency plan:
contki
) On 7 March 1975,
adat Develops
litary Option."
gyptian contingency
dat's order for
for war 'by the
f Egyptian
ued)
DIA review completed.'
Nr Cthiection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19: LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19: LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5
`? 11111 yr.
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25X1
014.111t
-
The strategic exercise "Abu, Budeis/Sucz -5" in-
Waving at least air force,,. navy, and commando
entities was initially to c?mmence at 220E on
27 March, but may have been postponed until 100Z
on the 29th. 1
ive firing by air defense And navy units is
cheduled for 27 and 2$ Alaech.
25X1
Air defense; ground, and n
in'incieased readiness pos
?
val.units were noted
ures after 21 Marcli.
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'.ggyPtiah IflLL
:orientation
:Pia;c4r4k, of P
D) The overall p ttern of recent '
ary actions since Sa at's ordered re-
f his forces is interpreted as an orderly.
epara4On for war thak is rapidly nearing
25X1 '
TOP SECRET
? .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02-/19 : LOC-HAK-541.-21-11-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19: LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5
11,
25X1
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19 : LOC-HAK-541-21-11-5