OUR STRATEGY TOWARD EGYPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-23-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/19: LOC-HAK-541-23-1-4
MEMORANTICIM
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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INFORMATION
August 14, 1972
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ? -.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: NSA review HENRY A. KISSINGER
completed
SUBJECT: Our Strategy Towards Egypt
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
On my earlier memorandum on the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviets (Tab A)
you noted the reports that the Egyptians do not want to wait until the
November elections for the US to seize this "new opportunity. " 25X1
As you know. in late July the Egyptians approached us
However, we made clear that we would not accept preconditions. Our
approach in these talks would be as follows: In all the previously
successful negotiations conducted at the Presidential level, we did not
go into detailed substantive negotiation until we had already achieved a
preliminary understanding on the direction and general principles that
the outcome would follow. In this case we insisted to the Egyptians that
we talk initially about what was realistically achievable. This was the
essence of the matter and the only justification for the direct involvement
of the President.
We have received many reports that Sadat does not want to wait until
November. But we have offered him preliminary talks by late September,
and we cannot conduct these talks under any groundrules other than the
above. The alternative of military action will be suicidal for him. The
Israelis plan to behave scrupulously and give him no pretext for such
action.
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MEMORANDUM
THE THESID.MT
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATXON
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July 25, 1972
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:. Developments in Cairo and Reflections
It is still too early to know exactly how profound a change in the
Egyptian-Soviet relationship will evolve from this week's important
developments. However, the following hypothesis may be worth
stating as a basis for testing in the light of further developments:
Sadat has been under increasing pressure in Cairo because of
frustration over lack of movement toward an Egyptian-Israeli
settlement and domestic stagnation. The US-USSR summit
coupled with general lack of Soviet support for a military solution
brought home to him that a settlement on Egyptian terms was not
a top priority issue for Moscow. He decided to take a bold step
that would respond to domestic nationalistic sentiment, cause
Moscow to think harder about Cairo's problems and introduce change
into the "frozen" situation, perhaps encouraging the US to see a
new opportunity. Given earlier indications that he expects no real
movement involving the US until November, he may generally have
wanted a dramatic change to carry, through the next six months or
have hoped even to produce some movement. This, of course, is
speculation. The main developments in the last twenty-four hours
are below: 25X1
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
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TOP SECRET /CODEWORD - 3
--Egypt's main objective remains the return of its territory
lost in 1967. President Nasser brought in the Soviet military
advisory program in 1970 as the only possible response to
Israeli deep penetration air attacks on Egypt. The air defense
system built as a result remains with enough Egyptian personnel
to be capable of increasing the cost to Israel of any renewed
attack. Despite that gain, the Soviet military advisory program
was costing Egypt money, was criticized within Egypt and most
important of all was not contributing to the main goal of
recovering the lost territory. The program had become a
liability and was no longer serving Egyptian interest.
tiara Foreign Minister Ghaleb asked the head of our Interests
Section for answers on how the US intends to proceed on five issues:
"proximity" talks on an interim settlement; further US-Soviet dis-
cussions; Four Power talks; the reactivation of Jarring as mentioned
in the Moscow communique; and how the US views the overall context.
At the same time,' Ambassador Bush has been approached by the
Egyptian representative to the UN urging that the five permanent
members of the Security Council support the reactivation of the
Jarring mission.
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
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TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
I shall be discussing with you separately the matter of developing a
reply to the Egyptians and a strategy for the next six months.
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/19: LOC-HAK-541-23-1-4