NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-26-4-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 15, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
December 15, 1975
THE PRESIDENT
BRENT SCOWCROFT ll~b
NATO Ministerial Meeting
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The Secretary asks that I pass you the following report:
I attended the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels on De-
cember 11 and 12. It was among the more useful such meet-
ings we have had in recent years. The opening session was
devoted to defense standardization. We reached a compromise
with the French under which an ad hoc committee of NATO's
Atlantic Council will be established on a six months trial
basis, with the French as members, to work on increased inter-
operability of equipment. The French agreed that the ap-
propriate bodies of the NATO Atlantic Council would, at the
same time, consider the broader issues related to standardiza-
tion. In restricted sessions of the meeting, we discussed
East-West relations -- including detente, Western communism,
CSCE follow-up and MBFR. The British and Germans reconsider-
ed their reservations to'tabling option III at the end of
the present session of the MBFR talks. It was agreed to table
option III in its entirety on December 16. On Angola, I
emphasized the distinction between indigenous Marxist in-
clinations and communist governments imposed by the USSR. I
'pointed out that as a result of Soviet intervention, the MPIJ
had been transferred from the weakest of the three factions
in Angola into the strongest. If unchallenged, we would
thus face a situation in which the Soviets had, in effect,
imposed a communist government on.an African country. The
German, Italian, and British foreign ministers said they
shared my concern. In my informal talks with ministers and
in backgrounding the press, I emphasized the highly negative
impact communist entry into Western Europeans' governments
would have on American opinion, and our ability to sustain
our defense committment to Europe. While in Brussels I had
conversations with both the Greek and Turkish foreign min-
isters. I was able in my discussions with the Greek foreign
minister to persuade him of the necessity to be flexible on
procedures for resuming the Cyprus talks. The Greeks had
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been quite concerned that the Turks were continually adding
new conditions and particularly now wish to have representa-
tive,s of Greece and Turkey present in the intercommunal talks.
I told him that I agreed it would not be wise to have them
in the formal talks but that perhaps a compromise could be
reached on including experts in subcommittees of the Cyprus
talks. With the Turkish foreign minister I had a conver-
sation which began with the usual long description of all
the difficulties, most of which they feel were caused by the
Greeks. After he got this out of his system, I was able to
nudge him in the direction of the compromise I had earlier
discussed with the Greeks and this indeed seemed to be the
position on which they have now agreed to go to Secretary
General Wa.ldheim and request that he reconvene the talks. We
are now hopefully over the procedural hurdle but we will cer-
tainly have to use our influence to keep these talks moving
toward a successful conclusion. My impression is that the
issues are not insuperable and that indeed both parties
would like to see an early solution. I also met for two
hours privately with the foreign ministers of Britain, Ger-
many, and France. This was a continuation of the two re-
stricted meetings we had had in New York in September on the
most sensitive issues such as the southern flank of Europe.
This time we began with an extended discussion of how to
deal with the Western European communist parties. There was
general agreement that these parties could not be allowed
into power. The acid test was not whether they were willing
to come into power by democratic means, but whether they would
ever allow themselves to be voted out of power by democratic
means -- which was less likely. The ministers shared the
view that we should continue to force these parties to demon-
-strate their independence from Moscow but that we must resist
their entry into power in any case because their ascendancy
would clearly weaken public support for defense and for the
alliance. I went into more detail on our policy in Angola.
The ministers concurred in my analysis that a principal de-
terminant of Soviet action had been the calculation that the
U.S. would not react. They hoped the U.S. could do more,
hopefully without leaving fingerprints. They showed an en-
couraging willingness to work diplomatically on the African
and North African countries with whom they had close ties, to
shore up resistance to the Soviet power play. The final
topic was Yugoslavia. General Haig joined us and discussed
the military contingencies as he saw them in the event of
Soviet pressures such as an attack on Yugoslavia. Haig made a
superb presentation, setting out rather grim choices for the
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West, but the ministers were grateful that he showed concrete-
ly what the military -- and political -- issues would be. It
was agreed that the political directors would study Haig's
scenarios closely, and that Haig would further refine his
analysis of the military aspects. These meetings have become
progressively more candid and more productive, constituting
in many ways a real breakthrough toward greater allied co-
hesion on the most critical and sensitive issues. I also
had private meetings with my German and Italian colleagues be-
fore leaving Brussels.
In London I participated in our European chiefs of mission
conference. I met with 30 of. our European ambassadors, brief-
ing them and exchanging views on our concept of detente, long
term relations with the Soviet Union, and our policy toward
Western European communist parties. I had a small lunch and
private meeting with Callaghan Saturday. We had a good talk
on the Middle East, Angola, and defense issues. I cautioned
him not to expect any bold initiatives from the U.S. on Middle 25X1
Eastern issues in 1976, and made clear that our attitude toward
the Palestinians would depend on their position on Israel. T__~
Callaghan said that my earlier expression of
concern over impending UK defense budget cuts had had a favor-
able impact on cabinet discussions. Although pressure for cuts
remains strong, they will, he said, probably not be disasterous.
British import controls would also, he assured me, be quite
modest. Callaghan suggested that the UK, U.S., and FRG de-
fense, and foreign ministers get together to discuss nuclear
and conventional defense doctrine. This is a proposal I
think we should pursue, as it offers a unique opportunity not
only to increase understanding of mutual defense issues and
options, but also to give our major allies a heightened sense
of participation in, and responsibility for their own se-
curity. This in turn will increase their willingness to main-
tain a responsible level of defense spending. Finally, I
had a very good talk with the Iranian minister of finance
this morning in London. We made substantial progress on the
project we have been discussing with the Iranians and I will
want to brief you more fully on that after I return. Warm
regards.
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/19: LOC-HAK-541-26-4-8