COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-4-1-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1971
• Content Type: SNIE

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Communist China's Reactions
to Developments in Laos
TOP SECRET
MORI/CDF
C01086354 pages 1-19
TOP SECRET
18 February 1971 25X1
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NOTE
This is the estimate. No further dissemination will be made.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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THIS. ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense,
and the NSA.
CONCURRING:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
ABSTAINING:
The Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18 February 1971
SUBJECT: SNIE 13-10-71: COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS
IN LAOS
THE ESTIMATE
Chinese Response Thus Far
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1. Peking trailed both Hanoi and Moscow in reacting to recent
developments in southern Laos. The Chinese did not speculate publicly
on the possibility of cross-border operations into Laos until 2 February
when they began to cite press commentary from Hanoi, which had begun
some days earlier. Since then Peking has issued a number of authorita-
tive commentaries as well as several Foreign Ministry statements. At
.first, these pronouncements dwelt on the same themes: the US is expand-
ing the war in Indochina; the people of Indochina will certainly surmount
the new challenge; and China will continue to provide "powerful backing
and support." More recently, Peking has strengthened its rhetoric,
claiming that the allied move into Laos is "a menace to China" and that
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it "definitely poses a grave threat to China." The latter statements
are an escalation of the rhetoric that followed Cambodia last spring,
and suggest that Peking now takes a more serious view of the situ-
ation in Indochina.
2. Large rallies have been held in Peking and Shanghai to
condemn allied actions in Laos, a pattern that will no doubt be
repeated throughout the country. Nevertheless, all authoritative
comment on the situation in Indochina since the beginning of the
month has placed Chinese assurances of assistance in terms of rear
base support.
3. It is reasonable to assume that Peking and Hanoi have been
consulting on the present situation, but there is no evidence of a
high-level conference. Rumors of important Chinese -- e.g., Chou
En-lai and Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng -- attending communist
strategy sessions in Hanoi in late January and early February appear
to be unfounded. A Vietnamese negotiator, however, has been in
Peking recently to sign a supplemental agreement on military and
economic aid to North Vietnam.
S -2
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4. No unusual military movements -- either on the ground or in
the air -- have been detected in South China
It could, however,
presage an expansion of the Chinese roadbuilding activity.' The
recent discovery of heavier anti-aircraft guns -- with associated fire
control radar -- in the area of the roadbuilding can not be related
to developments in southern Laos,
Chinese options and Probable Courses of Action
5. Peking has viewed the war in Indochina as a test of Mao's
theory of "people's war" and has consistently advised the communists
in Indochina to prepare for a long and costly struggle and to persist
in self-reliant and protracted warfare. Peking doubtless believes
victory in such an effort would enhance its claims for ideological
This judgment is based primarily on information derived from
no photography is available to confirm this.
This roadbuilding activity is discussed in the Annex.
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pre-eminence over the Soviet Union and would strengthen China's
political influence in Asia. On the other hand, Peking has had to
consider the possibility that an adverse turn in the war could lead
to a security threat on China's southern border.
6. While Peking has advocated "people's war" for the Indochinese
it has given no indication of intent to use Chinese troops or to risk
an accidental confrontation with the US. The involvement of Chinese
forces in the struggle thus far has been limited to construction and
anti-aircraft detachments in northern North Vietnam during the bombing
and currently in northwestern Laos. China has built roads from its
own territory into northwestern Laos, and now, has some 14,000 to
18,000 troops there in engineering, anti-aircraft artillery, and
security. This activity can serve several purposes. Roadbuilding to
the east facilitates North Vietnamese access to northwestern Laos for
support of Pathet Lao operations. The extension of the road south and
west in the direction of Pak Beng also poses the threat of a greater
communist presence in the Thai border region and this threat might be
exploited to deter a greater Thai role in Laos. And, of course, the
road system provides China itself with direct access to northwestern
Laos.
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7. Peking would naturally be concerned about the effect a
successful interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail could have on the
capability of the NVA/VC to carry on the struggle in the South. At
this early point, Peking's most sanguine estimate is probably that
Hanoi can counter the South Vietnamese move and through pressure in
Laos and South Vietnam, can force an early withdrawal. In their
worst case estimate of the consequences of operations generally
limited to the Tchepone area, the Chinese will have considered the
possibility that Hanoi's supply lines could be disrupted so severely
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is
that the overall communist position in South Vietnam would suffer
serious deterioration.
8. In an effort to forestall this latter situation, there are
a number of things that Peking might do short of direct involvement
of its own combat forces. It would, of course, seek to persuade
Hanoi to persevere in the struggle, and. it would promise additional
materiel support to encourage Hanoi in this course. Peking could
also offer to re-introduce logistic personnel into North Vietnam.
9. Beyond these measures the Chinese may see small risks and
considerable advantage in certain steps -- accompanied. by shrill
propaganda closely coordinated with Hanoi's military efforts and
threats -- that convey menace but which do not commit them to serious
action. The purpose would be to raise the threat of Chinese
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intervention and thus to encourage an abortive end to current Allied
operations in southern Laos and, in any event, to create such apprehension
particularly in the US, as to inhibit any future initiatives of a similar
nature.
10. Among the measures that the Chinese might take to give credence
to their threats would be to move troops about in South China or to make
a show of stepping up construction of the new road to the Mekong -- a
project they probably intend to move ahead with anyway. They might also
send reconnaissance patrols beyond the present area of road construction
toward the Thai border. This latter move would have the particular
objective of causing Bangkok to pull back from its involvement in Laos.
11. Another move open to the Chinese would be to introduce advisory
personnel into combat areas and to let their presence become known. They
might feel that the advertised presence of such advisors could raise the
spectre of Chinese intervention as in Korea, without in fact involving
much real risk. (Chinese observers have visited COSVN in the past but so
far reports of Chinese advisors in combat situations in Cambodia and Laos
have not been confirmed.)
12. Finally, if it were prepared to go still further Peking could
send troops into the Plain of Jars area or even into southern Laos. But
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?
this would be unlikely unless US troops or ARVN forces backed by
US air power, having destroyed communist forces around Tchepone,
should move northward with the apparent intent of carrying the war
into North Vietnam or northern Laos. In this event the Chinese
would feel that their own security interests were directly threatened.
13. Short of these circumstances, such a radical shift in
Chinese policy seems most unlikely. In northern Laos there is pres-
ently no real threat to Chinese or North Vietnamese interests. Even
should Vang Pao and US air power inflict heavy blows on the communist
forces around the Plain of Jars in the next few months, Laotian forces
would not be in a position to threaten vital Chinese or North Vietnamese
interests. Thus, we doubt that the Chinese would choose at this point to
take the risks involved by moving to claim a larger role in northern. Laos.
14.. As for southern Laos, there are practical difficulties in
developing an effective Chinese military presence there. Chinese
troops would suffer the same relative disadvantages in fire power
and mobility as the more readily available North Vietnamese. They
would also have the same logistical problems that confront the NVA.
Beyond considerations of this sort, however, lie the larger risks and
complications of direct involvement with the US.
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15. It is possible, of course, that the South Vietnamese incursion
into southern Laos would arouse such a sense' of desperation in Hanoi as
to produce a request for participation of Chinese combat forces. All
the evidence we have, however, extending over a good many years, indi-
cates that the North Vietnamese would be exceedingly reluctant to call
for such assistance, unless they saw that the security of their own
country and regime were in grave peril. Short of a direct threat of
this kind we do not believe that the North Vietnamese would invite the
Chinese in.
16. In sum, China's most likely course of action in response to
recent events in Laos is to pu~licly and privately encourage Hanoi to
persist in its protracted struggle; to raise the level of threat in its
propaganda; and to increase its flow of arms and equipment to allay what-
ever reluctance Hanoi may have about continuing the conflict. At this
stage of the Allied incursion into Laos, Peking probably sees the US
and its allies still bogged down in a war that offers no graceful exit.
If Hanoi maintains its will to resist, the Chinese will probably. see no
need to change their basic approach. And even if North Vietnam felt com-
pelled to shift to a less aggressive posture or to seek a negotiated
settlement, Peking would have little leverage to prevent such a move.
_g
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Any effort by Peking to coerce the Hanoi leadership would almost
certainly be resisted. It is more likely that Peking would follow
Hanoi's lead,and should an Indochina-wide conference develop, the
Chinese would probably insist on participating.
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ANNEX
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CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN LAOS
The Chinese Communist Presence
1. The Chinese military presence in northwestern Laos has
expanded slowly from a single engineer regiment in late 1968 to a
current force of some 14,000-18,000 troops. As the roadbuilding
progressed, additional construction and anti-aircraft personnel
were brought in to maintain and defend the road system.
2. At the end of the last dry season in June 1970, Chinese
strength there was estimated at 10,000-14,000 troops. Since then,
these military forces have increased slowly as Peking undertook
new road construction once the rainy season ended. More anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) troops were deployed along the road system,
and an additional engineer regiment was identified. Furthermore,
analysis indicated that the Chinese
engineer regiments in Laos have five subordinate battalions instead
of the normal three. As a result, the estimated military strength
has been increased by 4,000 troops.
augmentation continues.
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TOP SECRETI ANNEX
3. The bulk of the existing force consists of a division-level
engineer unit of some 10,000-13,000 troops organized into at least
five regiments. Some 4,000-5,000 anti-aircraft personnel also are
present to defend the construction force. The engineer unit, deployed
to Laos from North Vietnam in late 1968, was subsequently augmented
with additional engineer, support, anti-aircraft, and security units.
It apparently functions as a task force command authority for the
road construction program and maintains communications with the Kunming
Military Region Headquarters through a subordinate command.
4. Logistical support for the roadbuilding program in
northwestern Laos is channeled from Kunming through rear service sup-
port units in Ssu-mao and Meng-tzu. Prior to extending their road
construction program into Laos in late 1968, the Chinese built a sys-
tem of all-weather roads from these two support bases to the Yunnan
border area as part of an over-all program, an indication that it is
long term in nature.
5. The Chinese units in northwestern Laos have been careful
to avoid any ground conflict with Laotian Government forces. North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao units have been used to clear government
troops from the area prior to the initiation of road construction.
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TOP SECRET ANNEX
The Chinese anti-aircraft and security forces have been active in
their defensive role, however. AAA units have not hesitated to fire
on the occasional Lao aircraft that have attacked the road or on any
aircraft that happened to fly over the road.
6. The Chinese AAA inventory now includes over 150 anti-aircraft
guns -- 37 mm and 57 mm and possibly a few 85 mm/100 mm -- and about
the same number of smaller caliber automatic weapons. The weapons are
deployed along much of the Chinese-built road network in northwest Laos,
with major concentrations at Muong Sai, Muong La, and Muong Houn. The
heavier pieces generally protect strategic bridges, large barracks areas,
and storage installations. The smaller pieces are more widely scattered
to defend the road construction units. Moreover, the use of improved
radar tracking procedures, seen since 10 January, enables Chinese AAA
forces in Laos to function more effectively in an area defense role.
These forces were assumed previously to be functioning in a point
defense role protecting individual construction elements.
The Road Construction Program
7. Since the Chinese began the major road construction program
in northwestern Laos in late 1968, they have built over 160 miles of
two-lane, graveled roads with permanent bridges at large water crossings.
The system runs south from the Yunnan border to the village of Muong Sai,
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NORTHERN LAOS: Communist Chinese Road Construction
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TOP SECRET ANNEX
where it splits into two routes: one turns northeast toward Route 19
and the North Vietnamese border, and the other leads southwest toward
the Mekong River and Thailand.
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8.. The road toward North Vietnam was completed at the end of 1970.
A bridge still is needed across the Nam Ou River at Muong Khoua, however.
There is no evidence that the Chinese intend soon to build the large
bridge necessary to span this waterway, but on the basis of their past
road construction activity, it is likely that one will be constructed
eventually. An engineer regiment recently moved into the Muong Khoua area.
9. There are signs that Chinese engineers in northern Laos may be
preparing to resume construction of Route 46 toward the Mekong.
Photography of early January indicates an increased buildup Just north of
Muong Houn, the present terminus of the road. Construction camps are being
enlarged, new AAA sites are being constructed, and some radar-directed AAA
weapons are in place. So far this dry season, Chinese roadbuilders have
concentrated on finishing Route 45, which runs northeast from Muong Sai
to Muong Khoua, and improving the surface to Route 46 between Muong Sai
and Muong Houn. Both projects are almost completed.
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TOP SECRET ANNEX
10. If the Chinese extend Route 46 as far as Pak Beng, it would
have a significant psychological impact on the Thais. The Nam Beng
valley has been used in the past as a Communist infiltration route
into Thailand, and a road would facilitate the shipment of supplies
to the Thai insurgents.
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