COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM SINCE THE PARIS AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-7-4-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 17, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence emorandum
Communist Militag and Economic Assistance to North Vietnam
Since The Paris Agreement Was Signed ,
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17 October 1973
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17 October 1973
Communist Military and Economic
Assistance to North Vietnam
Since the Paris Agreement
Was Signed
The Key Points
? There has been little direct evidence on military imports by North
Vietnam since the signing of the Paris Agreement on 27 January 1973,
or since our last memorandum on this subject
The key PRC/North Vietnam border crossing, where large amounts
of military hardware were seen before the cease-fire, has been photographed
less than a dozen times since January, and cloud cover has limited the
value of even this photography.
some indications of continuing military imports, but nothing that
would give us a feel for the overall level of such. imports.
? The sum of our evidence, however, indicates the North
Vietnamese have continued to receive military aid from both the PRC and
the USSR, although at a rate well below that received during 1972.
? The relevance of such a cutback to North Vietnam's immediate
military capabilities is probably minimal, since North Vietnam already has
an inventory of military equipment large enough to sustain a major offensive
for the duration of an entire dry season. Logistic activity in Indochina has
continued at a high level in recent months, and the North Vietnamese are
now preparing to move additional quantities of goods through the Laotian
Panhandle.
? Hanoi continues to receive firm assurances of economic assistance
from its Communist allies, including specific commitments from both the
USSR and China for 1974. Spurred by continued large overland deliveries,
Hanoi's total imports in 1973 may reach a new peak of 2.8 million metric
tons.
Note: This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
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Discussion
Military Aid
Direct Evidence
1. Since the Vietnam Settlement Agreement was signed on
27 January, our ability to estimate Soviet and Chinese military aid going
to North Vietnam has been impaired by the low level of
photo-reconnaissance over North Vietnam. We now have no photography
from manned overflights of North Vietnam,"
While photography has confirmed that the North Vietnamese
have received a steady inflow of Soviet and PRC imports throughout the
post-cease-fire period, the quality and infrequency of the photography have
made it impossible to identify any military equipment as having definitely
arrived since the Paris Agreement was signed. -
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We have received numerous
reports of North Vietnamese buying rice, petroleum, and other economic
goods in South Vietnam for their troops since the cease-fire, but have not -
seen any significant purchases of weapons and ammunition. Although the
North Vietnamese probably can buy some military equipment from
individual ARVN officers who are willing to traffic with the enemy, the
amounts involved will almost certainly be fairly small.
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Indirect Evidence: Logistic Activity Within Indochina
9. The brisk pace of NVA logistic activity within Indochina since
the cease-fire may be regarded as circumstantial evidence that Hanoi is
continuing to receive imports of military supplies, or at least is not unduly
concerned about drawing down its stocks within North Vietnam. At the
end of the last dry season, Hanoi moved thousands of tons of supplies
into South Vietnam and Laos from North Vietnam. Since July the North
Vietnamese have shipped more than 7,000 tons of ordnance into southern
Quang Binh Province just above the DMZ, including ammunition for
virtually every type of weapon in their arsenal. In recent weeks, moreover,
thousands of tons of unspecified material (a large part of which is
undoubtedly military supplies) have been shipped from Thanh Hoa in the
central Panhandle of North Vietnam to storage areas near Vinh and are
awaiting future delivery. Finally, extensive preparations have been made
by logistics units in the Laotian Panhandle indicating that large quantities
of supplies will be moved in the months ahead.
10. It is impossible to tie the pace of logistic activity directly to the
current level of military aid. The business-as-usual attitude of the North
Vietnamese strongly suggests, however, that the Communists are not
concerned about being resupplied. The North Vietnamese would be breaking
sharply with past precedent if they depleted their rear base areas without
being confident that their stocks would be replenished.
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13. On 8 June, China and North Vietnam signed a military and
economic aid pact for 1974, indicating that some military aid would
continue. More recently, on 5 October, a protocol to implement the 8 June
agreement on Chinese military equipment and materials in 1974 for North
Vietnam was signed in Peking. On the other hand, ther
of a milita aid act
Future Aid Deliveries
14. In any case, we believe that there has been a slackening of military
aid in recent months in one important area. With the halt in US air
operations over North Vietnam, Hanoi's requirement for surface-to-air
missiles and other types of air defense equipment has fallen to only a
fraction of its previous level. Since it seems likely that Hanoi replenished
its stocks early this year, after the intensive bombing which ended in
December 1972, there would be no need for further deliveries beyond this
unless the air war was resumed. Communist military assistance probably
will continue at least to the extent necessary to replace and maintain North
Vietnam's current inventories. In addition, because North Vietnam's
weapons production capability is limited to small arms and ammunition,
its sophisticated air defense equipment requires foreign assistance for spare
parts and probably for repairs and maintenance as well. The Soviets will
almost certainly have to provide continued training and reiplacement parts
for such sophisticated weaponry as the SA-3 missiles.
the Chinese, for their part, are still involved in the
maintenance of North Vietnamese radar installations, and they are likely
to continue such activity for some time to come.
Economic Aid
Total Imports
15. Hanoi's total imports of economic goods in 1973 may reach a
new high of 2.8 million tons, compared with a 1972 level of nearly 1.8
million tons and a pre-mining peak of about 2.4 million tons in 1971.
Seaborne imports will probably amount to 1.3 million tons in 1973 ? close
to the 1972 level but substantially below pre-mining tonnages. However,
overland imports could reach 1.5 million tons, more than offsetting any
shortfall in seaborne imports.
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17. Major commodities delivered thus far in 1973 continue to be food
petroleum and fertilizer
Nearly all of the seaborne petroleum has come from the USSR, which has
also supplied most of the fertilizer imports and about one-half of the food.
Compared to the same period in 1972, when seaborne shipping was
restricted by the mining, 1973 imports of food are higher
fertilizer is higher
but petro eum owerL apparently
because of overland deliveries via the China-North Vietnam pipeline system.
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Reconstruction
21. Much of the current imports represent commodities to maintain
consumption levels and rebuild war-damaged stocks. Some imports, however,
consist of machinery and equipment to support Hanoi's slow-moving
reconstruction efforts.
supplies are being provided to North Vietnam under the terms
of the 1973 aid agreements signed last winter.
22. In addition to commodity transactions and project aid, the
Communist countries are providing substantial amounts of technical
assistance for North Vietnam's reconstruction program under the terms of
the 1973 aid agreements.
Virtually all of North Vietnam's bomb-damaged industrial installations
appear on the project lists, and some new construction is occurring in
electric power, coal mining, fertilizer production, and geological prospecting.
23. Notwithstanding these efforts, the actual progress to date in
reconstruction has been limited. Electric power capacity is about two-thirds
of pre-bombing levels. In textiles, cement, and steel production, only a small
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fraction of capacity is back in service. Coal exports have been resumed
on a significant scale, but probably because of depressed demand in the
general economy. Greatly increased foreign aid will be required to complete
the reconstruction program. As this aid picks up, we can expect further
changes in the composition of North Vietnam's imports toward machinery
and equipment and away from commodities.
Aid Negotiations
24. In addition to its current aid receipts, Hanoi has already obtained
commitments from most of the Communist aid donors for assistance in
1974. North Vietnam has signed agreements calling for both military and
economic aid for 1974 with China, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Mongolia, and North Korea. Thus far, Moscow has announced an economic
aid pact for 1974 but none pertaining to military assistance, and no
agreements have yet been signed with Czechoslovakia or East Germany.
The North Vietnamese, however, are expected to obtain commitments at
least for economic aid from the two remaining East European aid donors.
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