THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 20, 1973
• Content Type: NIE

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MORI C05406722
ino-Soviet Relation hip: The Military Aspects
(Supporting Analysis)
PIA review completed.]
DEPARTMZNT OF STA
2
OCT 1973
iNRI4?
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IS DO T IS SUBMITTED BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN1 BY THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations pai.ilcipated in the preparation of
?the document:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of Statefl and Defense, the NSA, an the AEC.
,Concurring;
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Dopartment of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager for National ecurity, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This document contains Information affecting ths national security of the United
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793, 794 and 708. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any
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Information in the designated control channels
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIOINCE SOURCES
tAiltwoos INVOLVED
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L.TS #k- /9-/2i2,/94
NIE 11-13-73
THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP:
THE MILITARY ASPECTS
TOP SECRET
(Supporting Analysis)
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CONTENTS
Page
I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
1
Background to the Buildup
1
The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the Border
3
Chinese Reactions
4
The Pattern of Military Interaction
5
The Cost of the Soviet Buildup
7
II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE POSTURE
8
Theater Forces
8
Strategic Attack Forces ?
15
Strategic Defense Forces
16
Naval Forces
16
III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR
17
Ground Forces
17
Air and Air Defense Forces
18
Strategic Attack Forces
19
Naval Forces
21
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IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES 21
The Adversaries' View of the Balance 21
Exercises and Contingency Planning 23
Comparative Military Capabilities 24
Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies 26
V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. 29
The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict 29
Future Force Relationships 31
ANNEXES
Page
ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET
BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 35
41
ANNEX C: SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST
CHINA 47
TABLES
Page
TABLE I: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUB-
MARINE ORDER OF BATTLE 16
TABLE II: COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY
OF THE BORDER 25
43
TABLE C-I: NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST 49
TABLE C-II: CONVENTIONAL ATTACK TARGET LIST 51
TABLE C-HI: CONVENTIONAL BOMB REQUIREMENTS AGAINST
TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES 52
TABLE C-IV: SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCE
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1
THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP:
THE MILITARY ASPECTS
I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-
SOVIET BORDER
Background to the Buildup
1. The victory of the Communists in China
encouraged Soviet leaders to believe for a
time that Soviet security in Asia had been
enhanced. But in the late 1950s and early
1960s China emerged as an increasingly con-
tentious rival of the USSR, disputing post-
Stalin Soviet views on revolutionary strategy
and relations with the West and supporting
anti-Soviet Communist parties. Tensions on the
border between the two powers grew after
1960, resulting in numerous minor incidents,
and in 1963 the issue of Chinese territorial
claims to large portions of the Soviet Far East
and Central Asia was publicly joined. (See
Figure 1.) By the mid-1960s the Soviets had
come to regard their hostile neighbor as some-
thing of a security threat as well as a political
and ideological adversary.
Annex A gives a chronology of political and mili-
tary milestones in the buildup.
2. Soviet concern over the border incidents
and the growing stridency of China's attacks
on Soviet policies led to responses on several
levels.
? In 1962 Khrushchev began to reor-
ganize and redeploy the 150,000-man KGB
Border Guards. By 1964, although the total
number of Border Guard districts had been
reduced from 11 to 7, the number opposite
China had been increased from 3 to 4. By
the fall of 1964 about one-half of the Border
Guard force had been stationed opposite
China.
? The Soviet military also showed in-
creasing concern. In 1962 the Far East Mili-
tary District (MD) conducted a field exer-
cise whose object was to repel a Chinese
invasion. In 1963 a Soviet General Staff
journal warned against Chinese strategy as
anti-Soviet, and in November a motorized
rifle regiment moved within the Turkestan
MD some 1,500 miles to the Dzhungarian
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Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Areas
and Sites of Clashes in 1969
Areas of "unequal treaties"
? Border incident (1969)
Figure 1
561942 9-73 CIA
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Gate. Shortly after mid-1964 an under-
strength division was moved from the Mos-
cow to the Far East MD.
3. But Khrushchev still did not expect a
large military buildup; in fact, his military
budget and manpower were still planned to
decline. Instead, he tried to resolve border
problems by negotiations. Sino-Soviet talks
took place in 1964 in Peking, but the Soviets
broke them off after becoming convinced that
Mao was more interested in keeping tension
alive and in branding the USSR as a modern-
day imperialist power than in settling border
disputes. This belief was no doubt strength-
ened by the first Chinese nuclear test
(CHIC-1) in October 1964, which signified
that the Chinese challenge was not only serious
and long term, but would increasingly involve
considerations of relative national power.
4. Khrushchev was ousted in the same
month, and the new Kremlin leadership took
steps to explore the possibility of reconcilia-
tion. Moscow avoided anti-Chinese polemics,
retreated from Khrushchev's demands for an
international Communist conference intended
to read China out of the movement, and
played down the theme of peaceful coexistence
with the West. Chou En-lai went to Moscow
in November 1964 and Kosygin saw Mao in
Peking in February 1965, but neither side was
prepared to compromise on basic political or
territorial issues. The principal result of these
face-to-face confrontations was to dispel any
Soviet hopes that the removal of Khrushchev
would be followed by some improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations.
25X1 The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the
Border
5, Although sources were
saying as early as January 1965 that Moscow
was talking about the need for additional
regular military forces to control the border,
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3
the basic Soviet decision to reinforce the
border area probably was made several
months later. The announcement in February
that Soviet forces had been reduced to
2,423,000?a target figure set by Khrushchev
in 1960?probably would not have been made
if the new Soviet leadership had already
decided to increase general purpose forces.
In the middle of the year, however, Soviet
leaders indicated publicly that defense ex-
penditures would be increased, and direct
communications between Moscow and Soviet
Border Guard units opposite Manchuria were
improved. In October 1965 Brezhnev justified
to Gomulka new Soviet deployments in Asia
by reviewing border incidents. In November
a Soviet Army corps headquarters was moved
from a point opposite Afghanistan to a point
opposite Sinkiang; the transfer implied that
a multidivision force would soon follow. In
subsequent months regular army units began
to move into the border area and to build
permanent garrisons. In January 1966 the So-
viets signed a treaty of mutual cooperation
with Mongolia, and within the year moved
a division into this client state.
6. The pattern of ground force deployment
which the Soviets adopted in the course of
their buildup since 1965 was largely deter-
mined by the geography of the area. The prox-
imity of the vital Trans-Siberian Railroad to
the border in the Far East MD and the nar-
rowness of the band of habitable Soviet ter-
ritory along the frontier required that the
buildup be concentrated in areas close to
the border so that the Soviets could stop
any Chinese attack and begin immediate of-
fensive operations aimed at pushing Chinese
forces out of reach of the railroad and back
into their own territory. Where possible, and
particularly to the west of Manchuria, divi-
sions have also been located in or near larger
cities where the principal reserves of tr,25X1
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manpower east of the Urals are to be found.
The large manpower and equipment levels
demanded by the length of the frontier ( over
6,800 miles, including the 2,650-mile Sino-
Mongolian sector) and the need to create
them without drawing down forces opposite
NATO or overloading the Soviet economy re-
quired that the buildup proceed deliberately.
Moreover, the immediate priority assigned to
getting an operational force in place required
that the buildup of support units be delayed
until the combat forces had reached a suitable
level.
7. The decision in 1965 to initiate the build-
up was clearly a major policy decision, in-
volving the collegial responsibility of the
entire Politburo. The buildup was an impor-
tant change in the Soviet military posture in
Asia, and it reversed Khrushchev's policy of
reducing the size of general purpose forces.
The military plans to implement the decision
were undoubtedly drawn up in the General
Staff by the "operators"?officers of the Main
Operations Directorate?responsible for the
Far East. Commanders of MDs along the
border probably requested reinforcements in
order to maintain border security, and both
Minister of Defense Malinovskiy and Chief
of the General Staff Zakharov probably took
an especially personal interest in these deci-
sions because of their experience in the Far
East in World War 11.2
Chinese Reactions
8. Although Peking became aware of the
Soviet buildup on the border soon after it
began in 1965, there was a lag of four years
Malinovskiy commanded the Transbaikal Front
in 1945, and Zakharov was his Chief of Staff. After
the war, Malinovskiy remained in the Far East as
commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East
until 1953 and as commander of the Far East MD
until 1955. 25X1
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before it launched specific countermeasures
The policymakers in Peking, who saw the
US as the main military threat in 1965, early
concluded that
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and
Soviet actions along China's northern borders.
The Chinese leaders were also at this time
preoccupied internally with the gathering
storm of the Cultural Revolution.
9. But by 1967 the radical policies of the
Cultural Revolution had spilled over into the
foreign arena. The Soviets, along with others,
suffered from China's revolutionary excesses:
Soviet diplomats were harassed in Peking;
Chinese in Moscow put on vociferous demon-
strations; and the Sino-Soviet border felt the
tensions of highly-charged Chinese emotions.
Within China, discord and violence suggested
that the country was drifting toward anarchy.
This violence reached its peak in 1967, how-
ever, and Peking thereafter began reasserting
its control.
10. In that year the Chinese moved five
divisions from the Shenyang Military Region
( MR ), opposite the USSR, to the central
region of China to help restore order. One
more division was moved in 1968, bringing
withdrawals to 75,000 men. In late 1969 and
early 1970 five armies ( about 165,000 men)
were moved from south and east China to
north central China. These forces were placed
on interior main rail lines along which they
could move back to the south or east as well
as north or west toward the Soviet and Mon-
golian borders.
11. The return to a more rational foreign
policy received its strongest impetus from the
dangerous confrontation with the Soviets that
erupted on the Ussuri River in early 1969.
With the example of the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia in mind, the Chinese also ap-
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parently realized that the factionalism and
confusion of the Cultural Revolution might
appear to the Soviets to create a unique op-
portunity for intervention. To reduce their
vulnerability, the Chinese accelerated the
phase-out of the Cultural Revolution, accepted
negotiations with the Soviets to cool border
tensions, and launched a "war preparations"
drive. By early 1970 Peking had laid the
groundwork for what was to become a major
reorientation of its foreign policy. Abandoning
the intense xenophobia and fanatic Maoism
characteristic of the Cultural Revolution,
Peking moved actively to develop diplomatic
ties with a wide range of countries, with
special attention to establishing relations with
the US. The results of this effort have been,
in Peking's view, gratifying. Moscow has been
impressed ( and worried) by Chinese suc-
cesses abroad and understands that Peking's
emergence from isolation surely complicates
and probably inhibits Soviet policy vis-a-vis
China. In any case, the Chinese are persuaded
that their international efforts, together with
their continuing defensive preparations, have
helped greatly to diminish the risk of hostil-
ities with the Soviets.
The Pattern of Military Interaction
12. The Soviet decision to build up its
forces opposite China was not a reaction to
an increased Chinese military threat along
the border. There had been no change in the
strength of the relatively meager Chinese
forces near the border, no particularly violent
encounter or marked rise in border incidents,
nor any other event obviously affecting So-
viet border security. The decision seemed
rather to be a result of more general consid-
erations, the principal ones being the deteri-
oration of political relations between the two
powers, continuing Chinese assertiveness along
the border, uncertainty regarding internal
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Chinese political developments, the failure of
the post-Khrushchev Soviet attempt at recon-
ciliation, and a growing concern over the
longer-range implications of Chinese strategic
weapon programs.
13. On the latter point, the Soviets were
certainly aware, following the successful deto-
nations of CHIC-1 in October 1964, and
CHIC-2 in May 1965, that the Chinese had
mastered the basic technology for producing
fission weapons. They probably were also in
a position to follow the development pro-
gram of the CSS-1, the Chinese MRBM, which
by mid-1965 had made sufficient progress to
promise an operational capability within a
year or two. The threat of even this limited
capability in the hands of the Chinese may
have been quite disturbing in Moscow, and the
Soviets may have considered it prudent to as-
sume that China would progress relatively
quickly to master the technology of thermo-
nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles.
One concern might have been that as China
developed a credible nuclear deterrent, it
would feel freer to meddle on the ground
along the border. Thus, from the Soviet point
of view, the troop buildup may have been
seen as necessary, not for the moment, but
for the future when a stronger, more assertive
China would emerge.
14. There was little specific interaction so
far as the overall ground force buildup was
concerned. The Soviet buildup generally re-
flected the implementation of a long-range
plan rather than one improvised or added to
from year to year. In retrospect at least, it can
be seen that the buildup was not pointed to-
ward maximizing readiness for an invasion at
some particular and early date. The Chinese
ground forces did not take specific steps to
counter the Soviet buildup. Even after 1969,
both sides seemed concerned primarily with
filling out general defenses throughout the
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6 TOP SECRET
border area, and neither side appeared to take
military steps in response to specific border
incidents or to troop deployments by the
other side.
15. The most important point of Sino-Soviet
interaction was probably the border violence
of 1969, especially the March encounters on
Damanskiy ( Chen-pao) Island in the Ussuri
River, in which regular army forces and ar-
tillery were used and dozens of Soviets and
hundreds of Chinese were killed. In all likeli-
hood the Soviets were genuinely surprised at
the Chinese ambush. The incident raised the
specter of heightened small-scale Chinese
provocations all along the border that could
become a bleeding sore tying down Soviet
manpower and resources for years. Soviet fears
of unpredictable, even irrational Chinese ac-
tions had been heightened by the Cultural
Revolution, and lacking any firm information
on the upheavals in China, the Soviets had
no way to gauge where Peking's bizarre be-
havior might lead. Those Soviets who ex-
pected the worst had considerable evidence
to support their fears.
16. In the months following this fighting,
threats and rumors of a Soviet invasion of
China and of air or missile strikes against
China's nuclear weapons facilities were reach-
ing Peking through numerous channels, and
the Kremlin simultaneously urged the resump-
tion of talks. These threats were clearly more
credible than Khrushchev's earlier warnings;
they were more numerous, definite, and
varied; the Soviets had by that time tactical
as well as strategic nuclear forces available;
and Soviet willingness to use military force
had been demonstrated convincingly in Czech-
oslovakia the preceding year as well as on
the Ussuri and in Sinkiang.
17. The Chinese, in turn, were alarmed at
the scale of the Soviet retaliation and at the
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subsequent war threats. They seemed con
vinced that they faced a real and possibly
imminent threat from the Soviets and tonc
military and diplomatic steps to strengthen
themselves. Chou En-lai finally received
Kosygin in Peking in September and agreed
to quiet the border and to hold talks. Both
sides since then have restrained their action3
on the border. The Chinese have not resorted
to attacking Soviet units on disputed terri-
tory, and the Soviets have permitted the re-
turn of a Chinese presence to some areas (in-
cluding Damanskiy Island).
18. One possible example of specific inter-
action has taken place in the Soviet missile
forces. Shortly after the deployment of the
CSS-1 in 1966, and continuing for the next
four years, the Soviets deactivated all theit
MRBM and IRBM sites in the Soviet Far
East within range of a Chinese missile at-
tack
Moreover, the Soviets have since 1968 bull
two early warning radars whose sector of cov-
erage includes all of China. Chinese missile
deployment also shows concern, though no
preoccupation, with targets across the border.
The deployment patterns of the Chinese mis-
sile forces show a desire to be able to attack
potential targets all around the periphery o:
China, not just toward the north. A major
area of deployment, in fact, is in the east cen-
tral part of China, from which IRBMs can
attack the USSR as well as US bases on the
eastern and southern periphery of China. In
addition, what looks like a phased-array early
warning radar is under construction north
west of Peking. It is oriented toward Soviet
missile bases, but will probably not be in
effective operation for several years.
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19. There has been very little discernible
Sino-Soviet interaction with respect to the
air attack and air defense forces since 1965.
Soviet frontal aviation forces along the border
have increased from about 200 to some 1,150
aircraft, but opposing Chinese fighter strength
( tactical and air defense) has grown from
less than 850 to about 1,600, more slowly than
the growth from some 950 to some 2,300 in
the rest of China. Although the Chinese stra-
tegic bomber force has increased from 2 to
60 medium bombers, Soviet national air de-
fenses near the border have improved at about
the same rate as air defenses in the western
USSR and show no change in emphasis to-
ward the Chinese. Aside from a concentra-
tion around Peking, which would be expected
in any case, Chinese air defenses appear to
defend centers of population in the south as
heavily as those in the north.
The Cost of the Soviet Buildup
20. By 1965 Soviet Border Guards and
ground, air, and strategic defense forces along
the China border were costing about 0.6 bil-
lion rubles a year ( the equivalent of about
$2.5 billion). By 1970 expenditures for these
forces had grown to some 1.5 billion rubles
( about $5.7 billion )\
Annex B discusses the problems, methodology,
25X1 and caveats in estimating costs of Soviet forces op-
posing China. The Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, and the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy, wish to empha-
size the caveats in the Annex which describe serious
obstacles and uncertainties in developing reliable
figures. Until these are overcome, they believe that
conclusions reached in Annex B must be viewed
with considerable reservation. 25X1 SECRET 561940 9-73 CIA
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Thus, Soviet expenditures in 1970 to counter
the Chinese threat were close to 2.0 billion
rubles ( $7.0 billion). The annual costs have
declined slightly since then as the rate of
buildup has slowed. ( See Figure 2.) Expendi-
tures for forces on the Chinese border in 1965
accounted for about 3 percent of total Soviet
defense spending; by 1972 they had risen to
about 7 percent. Another way to gauge out-
lays for the border forces is to say that they
are now at about the same level as for all the
Soviet general purpose naval forces. Over the
eight years 1965-1972, the cumulative cost to
the USSR of those forces now concerned with
the China threat has been the equivalent of
about $40 billion.4 The incremental cost, over
Costs were not included for command and con -
trol, logistics, and support elements at the military
district level and above, or for Soviet naval forces
in the Far East.
Figure 2
Estimated Costs of Soviet Forces
Primarily Oriented to Defense Against China
Billions of 1970 rubles
1971 /972
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what they would have cost if the 1965 level
of expenditure had continued, has been the
equivalent of about $20 billion.
II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE
POSTURE
Theater Forces
21. Deployment. There are 43 Soviet com-
bat divisions whose deployment indicates that
they would be used in the early stages of any
major conflict with China. ( See Figure 3.)
Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near
the Sina-Soviet border, Included in this total
are 18-19 divisions in the Far East MD, 10
divisions in the Transbaikal MD, 7 divisions
in the Central Asian MD, 2 divisions in Mon-
golia, and the airborne division in the Turke-
stan MD.5 The remaining five divisions are
located as much as 700 miles from the border
in the Siberian MD, but are undoubtedly in-
cluded in Soviet contingency plans for com-
mitment against China. Most of the border
divisions are organized into 8 armies or corps,
which are controlled by the headquarters of
the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian
MDs. Two additional divisions ( not including
CIA and DIA agree on the total of 38 divisions
near the border. The DIA total includes an airborne
division in the Turkestan MD which CIA does not
view as being oriented primarily toward China. On
the other hand, the CIA total of 19 divisions in the
Far East MD includes a motorized rifle division
25X1 (MRD) at Varfolomeyevka which DIA does not
count because it has not reached certain specified
combat capability criteria.
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the division at Varfolomeyevka, whose stat s
is in doubt) may exist in the Far East M
since there are as many as 10 regiments whic
have not been associated with a particul
division.
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22. In addition to the ground combat unit
an air army, a signal brigade, and a Scaleboar
brigade are located in each of the Far Eas
Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Tiles
units are of a type that would, in wartime, b
associated with a front?a Soviet wartime o
ganization that controls a number of groun
armies and one or more air armies. Up to fiv
fronts could be created in the border are
after extensive mobilization and reinforcemen
23. At least 10 specialized units?calle
"fortified areas" by the Soviets?have been d
ployed in the Far East and Transbaikal MD
These are roughly the size of an infantry bat
talion reinforced with tanks, antitank gun
and multiple rocket launchers and are locate
near prepared positions which they woul
occupy if an enemy attack were expecte
They are designed to block avenues of ap
proach, to screen the concentration of force
to their rear, and to canalize enemy attacks
When Soviet forces have passed through the
on the offensive, they would presumably ful
fill their normal roles in support of the at
tack. Such units are known to exist also alon
the Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran.
24. Troop Strength and Equipment. Th
estimated total troop strength of Soviet groun
forces near the border is 360,000. Some 240,00
are assigned to the 38 divisions near the bor
der, while the remaining personnel are dis
tributed in non-divisional support units an
headquarters. Another 30,000 troops, of whic
some 20,000 are assigned to five MRDs lo
cated in the Siberian MD, are available fo
commitment to the immediate border area
There are some 8,000-8,600 tanks in the divi
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USSR
There are 43 Soviet combat divisions whose deployment indicates that they
would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. Of these, some
38 divisions are stationed near the border. The other five divisions are located in
the Siberian MD. The total strength of the entire force, including nondivisional
units and headquarters, is estimated at 390,000, of which some 360,000 are
located in the area near the border. In addition, there are 7 to 8 combat divisions
and several nonclivisional support units located in other parts of Soviet Asia which
could be used to reinforce the border?a total force of some 46,000 men (27,000
in the Turkestan MD and 19,000 on Sakhalin Island and the Kamchatka Penin-
sula). The forces in the remote areas of the Far East Mn, however, are not likely
to be used in the event of hostilities with China because of Soviet concern with
maintaining the defense of these areas. The forces in Turkestan, on the other
hand, may be used against China in the absence of a threat from Afghanistan or
Iran. The total number of air defense aircraft is about 450. There are also some
50,000-55,000 border guards in the immediate border area.
Motorized rifle division
Tank division
Airborne division
Air base housing tactical
or air defense units
Helicopter unit
Helicopter assault ti25X1 rnent
Scaleboard site
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Figure 3
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71.
Air base housing tactical
or air defense units
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Airborne division
?.I. Helicopter unit
Helicopter assault type regiment
Scaleboard site
China
Infantry division
-711ii Armor division
y Cavalry division
Border defense/internal security division
Airbase housing tactical or
air defense units
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All figures tabulated on the map are rounded to two significant digits except
in cases where they were sufficiently small to make any variance significant_
Manpower figures on both sides include only the ground forces, and exclude
noncombat personnel such as those at maintenance and training installations as
well as personnel in paramilitary armed formations such as the Chinese militia.
Figures for Soviet equipment represent an estimate of the gross inventories by
type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat
maneuver units, fortified area units, storage (exclusive of aircraft), army schools,
and border guard units. CIA and DIA have reached common estimates except as
indicated by figures appearing in parentheses, which represent DIA estimates.
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sions near the border and another 2,500 in
border guard units, fortified area units,
schools, and storage.6 These divisions have a
total strength of some 2,650 howitzers and 950
antitank guns. Included in these figures are
about 200 howitzers and some 400 antitank
guns which have augmented the normal tube
complement of about one-fourth of the 90
or so motorized rifle regiments near the bor-
der. Non-divisional artillery support has been
concentrated in the Far East MD, where there
are 5 artillery divisions containing approxi-
mately 500 artillery pieces. In the Transbaikal
MD, a 72-tube division has been formed, and
another is forming. Two 72-tube divisions have
been newly identified in the Central Asian
MD?one near the border and one some 1,000
miles northwest of the border area. There are
another 500 guns either in fortified area units
or in storage in areas near the border. The
five divisions in the Siberian MD are esti-
mated to have 9004,000 tanks and 350 howit-
zers, while there are another 200 field ar-
tillery pieces in storage. The forces oriented
toward China have serious shortages of ar-
mored personnel carriers ( APCs ); only nine
motorized rifle and tank divisions have all
of their APCs. Should the Soviets mobilize,
they would have to rely heavily on cargo
trucks to carry personnel. The use of cargo
trucks to offset APC shortages in line divi-
sions would probably slow down rates of ad-
vance. This would also require some departure
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11
from Soviet offensive doctrine, which dictat,..
that troops will fight from APCs until forc,2_ 5X1
to dismount by the tactical situation.
25. Each motorized rifle and tank division
'there are 2, possibly 3, in the ar East MU,
1 in the Transbaikal MD, and possibly two
more forming?one additional brigade in the
Transbaikal MD and another in the Central
Asian MD. There is also a Scud brigade lo-
cated in the Siberian MD. A mobile Scale-
board SS-12 brigade with 12 launchers is lo-
cated in each of the Far East, Transbaikal,
and Central Asian MDs. There is also one
obsolescent Shaddock cruise missile unit with
four launchers located in the Far East MD.
26. In addition to the forces described
above, there are 7 or 8 more combat divisions
in Soviet Asia which could be sent to rein-
force the border: 4-5 in the Turkestan MD,
and 3 in remote areas of the Far East MD
( 2 on Sakhalin Island and 1 on the Kam-
chatka Peninsula). Non-divisional reinforce-
ments available include a Scud brigade and
a 108-tube artillery division in the Turkestan
MD and a corps headquarters, a Scud bri-
gade, and two 54-tube artillery brigades on
Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The forces on Sak-
halin and Kamchatka, however, are not
likely to be used in the event of hostilities
with China, at least initially, because of So-
viet concern with maintaining the defense of
these areas; the divisions in Turkestan, on the
other hand, might be used against China in
the absence of a threat from Iran or Af-
ghanistan.
27. Readiness and Mobilization. The dis-
tinct slowdown in the rate at which cor-1-
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divisions have begun to appear in the border
area suggests that the Soviets may be close
to being satisfied with the number of divisions
now formed. ( See Figure 4. )7 Nonetheless, the
I There is a difference of view as to when the
buildup peaked out and the slowdown began. CIA
adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date
of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions
only when certain levels of combat strength have
been achieved. As a consequence of this difference
in methodology, CIA dates the beginning of the slow-
down from 1969-1970; where as DIA dates it in
1971-1972.
Soviets have continued to strengthen several of
the divisions already in place and have added
several non-divisional support units. As of mid-
1973, however, only some 25 of the 43 combat
divisions near the border and in the Siberian
MD were considered available for commitment
within three to five days. The remaining divi-
sions would require a more extensive mobiliza-
tion of both equipment and personnel. Before
the Soviets could conduct a large-scale offen-
sive with forces now in place, they would
have to fill out understrength divisional and
non-divisional units.
Figure 4
Soviet Divisions Opposite Chino
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*CIA and DIA have different methods for counting Soviet divisions near the
border. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date of arrival of
leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat
strength have been achieved. CIA considers these divisions near the border
to be the primary Soviet force opposite China.
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28. To meet the requirements for mobilizing
units in the four border MDs and in Mon-
golia, about 375,000 additional men and
85,000 major items of equipment would be
required. There are probably an adequate
number of trained reservists under 35 years
of age to meet the requirements for staffing
units in the Siberian and Central Asian MDs,
but older reservists up to 50 years of age
would have to be used in addition to fill out
the units in the Transbaikal and Far East
MDs. The required items of equipment, a
high proportion of which are general purpose
trucks, would be mobilized from existing
stocks and the civilian economy. In the four
MDs considered, 22 avtokolonnas ( truck
parks whose vehicles are used in the civilian
economy but driven by reservists and main-
tained according to military standards) have
been identified.
29. Logistics. The Trans-Siberian Railroad
is the only surface route capable of provid-
ing logistic support to the Soviet Far East.
It can transport reinforcements to the border
area at a maximum rate of two divisions per
day if supplies for combat do not also have
to be transported. The capacity of the high-
way network is extremely limited, and road
movement for large-scale military operations
would be restricted to deployment to or from
railheads. Probably for this reason, the So-
viets have stockpiled large amounts of am-
munition and fuel with their forces now in
place along the border. There are some 250
known major military depots which provide
ammunition and fuel support. They contain
sufficient stocks to support a major Soviet
offensive into northeast China and to support
operations in west China.
30. Nuclear Warhead Storage. Prior to 1989,
there was nuclear weapons storage at only
one airfield near the Sino-Soviet border at
which tactical aviation was based. Now eight
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13
more tactical airfields along the border have
storage sites completed or under construction.
Seven of the eight provide at least three times
the usual amount of bunkered storage space.
This suggests that these sites are intended to
supply nuclear weapons to more than one tac-
tical unit and, therefore, that the airfields
might be used as staging bases. ( It is con-
ceivable that these airfield storage sites also
could be used to store tactical missile war-
heads.)
31. Prior to 1970, five tactical SSM support
facilities along the Sino-Soviet border had nu-
clear warhead storage available. At present
what appears to be a new type of warhead
storage facility, providing up to three times as
much storage space as the earlier facilities, is
under construction at one of these five as well
as at three more tactical SSM support facili-
ties in the border area. They, like the airfield
sites, probably are intended to supply more
than just local units.
32, Military Air Transport. There are about
105 medium transports (An-12/CUB) of So-
viet Military Transport Aviation positioned
where they could readily support operations
on the border (60 in the Far East MD and 45
in the Turkestan MD). In addition, there are
some 635 medium transport and 19 heavy
transports ( An-22/ COCK) based in the west-
ern USSR which would be available, should
the need arise, to provide logistic support or
to support airborne operations.
33. Assuming one round trip per day for
available aircraft, the Soviets could afrlift, dur-
ing an unopposed operation in good Weather,
approximately 6,750 tons of supplies daily to
a radius of about 1,250 miles or to a range of
2,500 miles. Soviet planning apparently allows
for the use of as few as approximately 350
medium transports in the initial airdrop of an
airborne division to a radius of at least26(^1
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14 TOP SECRET
miles. A minimum of 150 sorties would be re-
quired to airland the division's combat and
service support elements and much of the divi-
sion's supplies after the airhead is secured.
One hundred seventy-five sorties are required
for the follow-up phase, while 30 to 60 sorties
are needed for daily resupply. A regiment size
airdrop operation would require approximately
140 medium transport sorties for the assault,
45 for the follow-up units, and 13 for daily
resupply. In a ferrying operation in which all
elements of an airborne division are airlanded,
about 430 medium transports would be re-
quired to lift this force all at the same time.
34. Heliborne Capability. In 1965, there
was only one helicopter regiment in the bor-
der area. There are now six helicopter regi-
ments containing about 380 (275 medium and
105 heavy) helicopters.8 They are capable of
performing general purpose airlift and heli-
borne operations. The total simultaneous lift
capability of all six regiments is estimated
at 2,000 men and equipment with mortar and
howitzer support.
35. Since 1969, the Soviets have collocated
two of their larger helicopter regiments with
two regiment size infantry units at Mag-
clagachi ( Far East MD) and Mogocha (Trans-
baikal MD). These infantry units are the only
known combat units along a 500-mile stretch
of the border and apparently have been
tailored specifically for helicopter assault op-
erations.9 While the more obvious purpose of
There are another 100 helicopters in various head-
quarters and support units.
The ground force units appear to be equipped
with only air-transportable equipment and lack the
tanks and APCs normally found in a motorized rifle
regiment. These units most likely would perform a
quick reaction mission, such as protecting the Trans-
Siberian Railroad where it passes through mountains
close to the border from the threat of Chinese ground
interdiction. 25X1
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these arrangements is to provide maximum
mobility in a lightly defended area, they may
presage the formation of large air assault units
having up to 100 helicopters and several
thousand troops.
36. Border Guards. There are an estimated
50,000 to 55,000 border guards positioned in
the immediate border area. The Soviets, in
response to the serious border incidents of
1969, reinforced Border Guard posts in more
sensitive border areas with small maneuver
elements equipped with tanks and APCs. Some
of the maneuver elements are equipped with
the T-62 tank, and the BMP personnel carrier,
equipment as modern as that found in many
regular units. At several locations along the
border, a motorized rifle regiment has been
positioned near a Border Guard headquarters,
presumably to provide prompt reinforcement.
37. Tactical Air Support. Before 1965, the
only tactical air strength in the border region
was a small air army, with less than 200 air-
craft, located in the Soviet Far East. By the
end of 1969, the Soviets had three air armies
( in the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central
Asian MDs) with some 700 aircraft in the
border region. The three air armies now have
about 1,150 aircraft including 500 fighters,
400 fighter-bombers, 50 light bombers, and
200 reconnaissance planes. Since 1970, the
force has been modernized with 180 late-
model Mig-21s. Almost 200 airfields with long
runways are located within 300 miles of the
border and in Mongolia. Of the 162 airfields
within the USSR, 74 have hard-surface run-
ways ( either concrete or asphalt) and the
remainder are temporary ( e.g., graded earth).
38. The mobilization and redeployment of
air units along the border would be rapid.
Units could be combat-ready at dispersal
fields within 1 to 2 days of a decision to
mobilize. Aircraft immediately available to re-
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inforce units along the border probably would
come from the Turkestan MD, where there
are 133 planes, including 80 fighters, 37 fighter-
bombers, and 16 reconnaissance aircraft. Some
aircraft from flyable storage or training schools
could be available as attrition fillers within
4 to 5 days.
39. Approximately 600,000 metric tons of
fuel are available at home bases and other
major airfields along the border and in Mon-
golia. This is enough for 18 days of air opera-
tions. Some 500,000 tons of fuel located at
storage depots would permit operations to
continue for an additional 16 days. Approxi-
mately 150,000 tons of ammunition are avail-
able both on and off base. This would be suffi-
cient for approximately 75 days of combat.
Seven air force depots, 5 in the Far East MD
and 1 each in the Turkestan and Transbaikal
MDs, distribute air technical supplies to the
air forces.
Strategic Attack Forces
Lio
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. The Soviets could, nevertheless, use a
few of their Pacific-based Y-class SSBNs
against targets in China without seriously25x
weakening their deterrent posture against
the US.
43. The Soviets have in their Far East
Bomber Corps about 132 Tu-16 ( Badger )
medium bombers and 84 Tu-95 ( Bear ) and
M-Type ( Bison) heavy bombers, including
tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, hon25x
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16 TOP SECRET
based in the MDs adjoining China and Mon-
golia. A few medium bombers might be tar-
geted against Alaska and western Canada, but
it is unlikely that any would be directed
against US targets farther south because of
their limited radius of action. They could, of
course, be used against US facilities in the
Pacific area near the USSR. Most Chinese
targets could be attacked by medium bombers
flying from their bases in the Far East, and
Soviet heavy bombers could hit any target in
China. In the event of war with China the
Far East Bomber Corps could be reinforced
in a matter of hours by some of the 530
medium and 80 heavy bombers based in the
west.
Strategic Defense Forces
44. The continuous improvement in the So-
viet national air defense forces along the Sino-
Soviet border over the period of the buildup
has been on par with the strengthening, dur-
ing the same period, of air defenses through-
out the rest of the USSR and in Eastern Eu-
rope. It does not indicate any extraordinary
concern with the Chinese air threat. There
have been qualitative improvements in inter-
ceptor forces along the border?at about the
same rate as in the west?although the total
number of interceptors has declined to around
450 aircraft. With the exception of the south-
ern portion of the Prirnorskiy Kray, inter-
ceptor strength continues to be below that of
other land border areas of the USSR. Thirty-
three SA-3 battalions and 12 SA-5 complexes
have been deployed near specific target areas
currently defended by 128 SA-2 battalions.
Deployment of the SA-2 began in 1960, and
the SA-3s and SA-5s appeared later. The total
of current operational surface-to-air ( SA-2,
SA-3, and SA-5) sites and complexes within
300 miles of the border now exceeds 170. In
addition there are '00 operational sites
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and complexes in regions east of the Urals
which provide defense of selected locations
outside the 300-mile zone. These sites are
augmented by tactical SAM units assigned to
military units in the area. Since 1966 there
has been a general improvement of air defense
radar and communications systems.
Naval Forces
45. Mission and Order of Battte. The Soviet
Pacific Fleet has about 80 general purpose
submarines, over 50 surface combatants of
escort size and larger, as well as a naval air
force of about 290 combat aircraft. ( See
Table I for operational order of battle.) The
primary mission of this fleet is defense against
TABLE I
SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND
SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE
MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS
Missile Cruisers
3
Cruisers
3
Missile Destroyers
8
Destroyers
13
Destroyer Escorts
26
TOTAL
53
SUBMARINES
Cruise Missile Nuclear
15
Cruise Missile Diesel
6
Attack Nuclear
9
Attack Diesel
52
TOTAL
82
MINOR COMBATANTS
317
AUXILIARIES
201
NAVAL AVIATION
Medium Bomber/Air-to-Surface
Missile
In-
cluding Tankers
118
Medium Bomber/Reconnaissance
28
Heavy Reconnaissance
21
ASW Fixed-Wing
56
ASW Helicopter
69
TOTAL
292
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the US. In the event of war with China, the
extent to which the Pacific Fleet would be
committed would largely depend on the So-
viet perception of the attitude of the US to-
ward the war, and particularly the posture and
activity of the US Navy in the Pacific.
46. In a war with China, the Pacific Fleet
would, in any event, defend the sea approaches
to the Soviet Far East, and if the US appeared
to take a hands-off posture, the fleet might
undertake operations off the Chinese coast.
These could include interdiction of Chinese
sea lines of communication, bombardment of
selected targets, and support to any Soviet
ground forces operating along the coast or the
25X1 Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Soviet Navy
would have little incentive to attack the Chi-
nese naval forces in their home waters,
ugmente y some 35
attac su marines an 20 major conventional
combatants expected to be normally available,
these units give the Soviets a first-rate capa-
bility to undertake such operations. The So-
viets also have a good capability for offensive
mine-laying using non-missile surface combat-
ants, submarines, some missile-equipped ships,
and possibly some Badger aircraft configured
for this role. The conduct of large-scale mine
warfare would limit the availability of the
units concerned for other roles. Defense of the
coasts is a primary mission of the guided-
missile boats of the Osa Class, the coastal
escorts and submarine chasers augmented by
medium-range diesel submarines, the mari-
time border guard, and the Coastal Missile Ar-
tillery Troops. Soviet naval aviation, in addi-
tion to antiship strikes, can perform long-
range reconnaissance, free-fall bombing, mine
laying, antisubmarine warfare missions, and
signal intelligence collection.
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III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE
USSR
Ground Forces
48. About 1,300,000 combat and 100,000
service troops of the some 3,200,000 Chinese
ground forces are now deployed in the four
MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia
( Shen-yang, Peking, Lan-chou, Sinkiang).
Most of this strength?slightly over one mil-
lion men?is in the east, in the Shen-yang and
Peking MRs. Almost all these forces are de-
ployed well back from the border, most of
them 300 to 500 miles from the closest points
on the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. In re-
cent years, the Chinese have established
heavily fortified areas in the first good defensi-
ble terrain below the border, particularly
north of Peking. At the same time, the Chi-
nese have been developing lightly-manned po-
sitions closer to the border. This latter action
suggests that Peking may gradually move its
first lines of defense forward over the next
several years.
49. Within the four MRs the combat forces
are deployed as follows ( see Figure 3,
page 9):
a. The Peking MR has 530,000 troops, of
whom 80,000 are in Inner Mongolia. The
balance are within 100 to 200 miles of posi-
tions from which they could defend against
a Soviet advance through Inner Mongolia
toward Peking.
b. The Shen-yang MR has some 420,000
troops, a decline of some 75,000 troops since
1964. The bulk of these troops are concen-
trated in garrisons in the southern half of
the region.
c. The Lan-chou MR has 240,000 troops,
most of whom are strung out along almost
700 miles of rail line from Sian to a P?12 5X1
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about 150 miles southwest of the missile test
rangehead at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. The bulk
of these forces could move along these and
connecting rail lines into the two good inva-
sion routes in this region?the Yellow and
0-chi-na river valleys.
d. The Sinkiang MR has some 100,000
troops; about 40,000 of these are deployed
around Urumchi. The remaining forces are
so widely dispersed that reinforcement of
the troops near Urumchi would be difficult.
50. Considering the reduced threat to other
areas of China, Peking might feel free to move
reinforcements to the four MRs opposite the
USSR from the pool of 1.8 million troops sta-
tioned in the seven other Chinese MRs. The
size and destination of the movement would
depend on the Chinese perception of the
threat. There is no information available on
Chinese contingency plans. Transportation of
these forces would be a major problem; most
would have to move long distances over rail
lines which are vulnerable to interdiction at
numerous points.
51. The most significant realignment of Chi-
nese forces since the mid-1950s occurred in
late 1969 and 1970, when five armies (165,000
men) moved from south and east China to
north and central China. These repositioned
armies are now near main rail lines along
which they can more readily move in any di-
rection?either toward the Soviet and Mon-
golian borders or toward the south and east.
Two of the armies moved to the Peking MR
from the east, and one from the south to the
Lan-chou MR. The other two moved from the
south to central China.
52. Chinese ground forces have been re-
ceiving a fairly steady flow of equipment since
1969. This has upgraded their firepower and
mobility. The most -=-----'ficant improvements
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have been in tanks and artillery. The ground
forces have also shared in the general im-
provements and modernization of command
and control communications. There seems to
be no marked priority for forces nearer the
border regions in the modernization program,
although there is evidence of a slight favor-
ing of units in these areas. In any event,
China's ground forces remain basically an in-
fantry force and are distinctly inferior to So-
viet forces in terms of modern equipment.
Air and Air Defense Forces
53. The Chinese air defense system is so de-
ployed as to provide a point defense of key
urban and industrial areas, military installa-
tions, and advanced weapons complexes. Al-
though this system has undergone si nificant
u. radin over the ? ast few ears
Although air defense equipment will continue
to increase in quantity and improve in ca-
pability, it will take a number of years for
China to complete the modernization and
training programs necessary to develop a co-
ordinated air defense system capable of ef-
fectively defending against a large-scale at-
tack by aircraft employing the latest equip-
ment and technology.
54. China has about 4,300 tactical fighters,
light bombers, and air defense aircraft. Of
these, 440 tactical and 1,400 air defense air-
craft are deployed in the four northern MRs
opposite the USSR. Most of these aircraft are
deployed well away from the border. More
than half of the fighters and one-third of the
bombers in the northern regions are deployed
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in the Shen-yang MR in northeast China. The
Chinese thus concede air superiority to the So-
viets over most or all of the border areas,
recognizing that their inventory of aircraft,
mostly obsolescent, would be at a disadvan-
tage if matched against Soviet aircraft close
to or over Soviet territory.
55. The Chinese have deployed at least 57
SAM battalions, principally around Peking, a
few other cities, and the most important ad-
vanced weapons complexes. Aside from this
thin deployment,
56. Although the evidence is inconclusive,
it is possible that the Chinese are developing
a modified version of the CSA-1. If so, this
missile might be expected to have an increased
range, a better low-altitude capability, and
improved electronic counter countermeasures
performance. Although the northern portions
of China had priority in deployment of early
warning radars in 1971-1972, ground control
intercept coverage is still spotty and below
the capabilities of the system in the east. The
air units in the border areas have received no
significant preferential treatment; they appear
to receive normal allocations of new aircraft
production.
Strategic Attack Forces
57. Prior to 1966, China had no strategic
strike capability against the USSR. They began
to develop such a capability in 1966 with the
deployment of the CSS-1. This missile, with
a range of about 600 nr--255-(--ild strike Soviet
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19
targets only in the southern part of the Far
East MD and in the extreme eastern portion
of Mongolia from identified areas of deploy-
ment. (See Figure 5.) Deployment of this
missile continued through the late 1960s and
apparently ceased in 1971-1972.
became operational in
1971. This missile could strike military targets
in virtually the entire Sino-Soviet border area
and many urban industrial targets in Siberia.
Current deployment is estimated at 25-40
launchers and continues. In late 1968, China
began production of copies of the Soviet Tu-
16 medium bomber. About 60 of these aircraft
have been deployed to date. Sometime within
Alp npv+ fr,17.7 xrparc nnrciblv pariv ac 1W74.
, it could reach well into
the western USSR, possibly to Moscow and
beyond.
58. The deployment pattern of these stra-
tegic forces provides a capability to strike
around the entire eri.? hery of China.
The Tu-16 bomber
con a so reac t ese targets. Thus, despite
the obvious Chinese concern with the Soviet
threat, the overall deployment of strategic
strike forces has shown no markedly anti-
Soviet bias.
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59. The Chinese have shown that they con-
sider survivability to be the key to their stra-
tegic missile deployment. From the beginning
of CSS-1 deployment in 1966, some units have
been deployed in the semimobile mode. In
this mode, equipment normally is kept some
miles away from launch sites that have mi-4-
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Approximate Coverage of China's Strategic Weapon Systems
Figu e 5
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561943 9-73 CIA
(5403013)
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mum improvements, and the ites have few
readil reco nizable f
60. Although the Chinese have deployed
their small strategic missile force primarily to
attain a strategic deterrent, there are indica-
tions that they contemplate contingencies in
which they could employ such missiles tacti-
cally, against targets in their own territory if
necessary. Deployment to date suggests that
these weapons could be used against choke
points along invasion routes into northeast
China or against hostile staging areas in Mon-
golia. If a Soviet invasion made rapid and sub-
stantial progress, this option might be con-
sidered as a means of forcing withdrawal with-
out striking targets on Soviet territory. It is
probable however, that, the Chinese would
adhere to their no-first-use policy even in
these circumstances rather than provide the
Soviets with justification for use of their over-
whelmingly superior nuclear attack forces.
Naval Forces
61. Although Chinese naval forces include
about 60 submarines, 6 guided missile de-
stroyers, 1 destroyer, 5 guided missile de-
stroyer escorts, and 5 destroyer escorts, most
of their combat strength consists of vessels
designed for coastal defense. These forces are
not likely to venture far beyond coastal waters.
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21
On the other hand, their capabilities to carry
out assigned missions are sufficiently impres-
sive to discourage attacks by Soviet naval
vessels in areas where Chinese fleets are
strongest. This would be particularly true in
the Pohai ( Gulf of Chili), which is protected
by the North Sea Fleet, containing some 275
combat vessels, including about 28 subma-
rines, 6 major surface vessels, and 45 guided
missile patrol boats.
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IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES
The Adversaries' View of the Balance
62. Soviet intelligence resources are better
than those of the Chinese.
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63.
The Chinese, possibly for propa-
ganda purposes, have claimed publicly that
the Soviets massed nnP million troops on the
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border after the serious border fighting in
1969. They also expressed fear of an immi-
nent Soviet nuclear attack. However, a recent
Chinese assessment of the Soviet border force
is closer to the US estimate, and since early
1972, Chinese fears of an imminent Soviet at-
tack?ground or nuclear?appear to have
diminished. (It is too early to tell whether
Chou En-lai's speech at the Tenth Party Con-
gress in late August 1973 marks renewed con-
cern over a possible Soviet attack.)
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64. The Soviet force now appears to have
capabilities in excess of those required to repel
any force that the Chinese could send against
the USSR in the next few years. But this
assessment may not give sufficient weight to
such key factors as the degree to which the
Soviets are determined to maintain the integ-
rity of the border, Soviet concern about the
vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
and Soviet evaluations of the combat capa-
bilities of the Chinese forces. Finally, it does
not weigh the value the Soviets place on the
deterrent effect of the forces they have in
place. For example, the Soviets probably con-
sider their investment well worth the cost if
they attribute China's restrained conduct
along the border since 1969 to the Soviet
military capabilities demonstrated on Daman-
skiy Island.
65. Peking elected not to confront the So-
viet forces directly along the border; instead
the Chinese have been building fortified areas
in good defensive terrain well back from the
border, thus compensating in part at least for
the greater mobility and firepower of the So-
viet forces. To compensate for their strategic
inferiority they have been constructing under-
ground facilities and dispersing and hardening
their strategic missile forces. Although both
sides are skilled in the use of psychological
warfare and have used all available techniques
to influence the outside world and each other
during the dispute, all evidence indicates that
each side holds the other in high regard as a
military opponent. They have observed each
other's military forces closely, and they are
both familiar with the possible theaters of mili-
tary operations. The military effort both have
made is prima facie evidence that each side
realizes it is engaged in a deadly earnest con-
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Exercises and Contingency Planning
66.
23
67
Peking's mili---
tary posture in the north, however, is entii25X1
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24 TOP SECRET
defensive. Thus far, construction of fortified
areas in good defensive terrain athwart in-
vasion routes has indicated a preoccupation
with defense of Peking. Such areas also have
appeared along three major routes through
mountains bordering the western edge of the
Manchurian Plain, but defensive developments
do not yet reflect a clearly defined plan for
protecting this heavily industrialized area.
Thus, Peking's present plan may be to fight
only a delaying action in northern and central
Manchuria in the face of a determined So-
viet invasion. But over the longer term more
fortifications may be constructed and troops
may be moved into positions from which they
could more readily react to defend the plains
area.
Comparative Military Capabilities
68. Assessing the capabilities of the forces
we have described is complicated to some ex-
tent by our imperfect knowledge of the various
objective and subjective factors usually used
to judge combat readiness. Their performance
against each other would also depend on the
specific circumstances under which combat
operations were initiated. Both sides have been
conditioned to expect provocative acts from
the other and are prepared to retaliate. It is
uncertain, however, whether these conditioned
responses would be adequate to sustain the
morale of the troops through a difficult cam-
paign if the causes of the war were vague or
ambiguous. The problem of maintaining mo-
rale would become particularly acute for an
invading force in any case because it would
probably be met by the traditional resistance
with which both sides have met foreign in-
vaders. Any assessment of how the two forces
would perform against the other must, there-
fore, begin by recognizing that intangibles
such as morale can greatly strengthen resist-
ance, even against a technologically superior
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69. The forces which the two sides have de-
ployed along the border reflect different stra-
tegies, Soviet superiority in military tech-
nology and production, and the exigencies of
geography. The Soviets, in order to accomplish
the missions of border defense and deterrence
in the Far East MD, where the Chinese threat
is potentially the most serious, have been
building a modern combined arms force posi-
tioned farther forward than would be the case
under less restrictive geographic conditions.
( See Figure 3, page 9.) The relatively nar-
row band of habitable land provided by the
Amur-Ussuri river system provides the right
of way for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the
locale for most of the important population
and industrial centers in the Far East, and
the location of most of the Soviet garrisons.
On the Chinese side the absence of vital
centers near the border permits the Chinese
to deploy well back from the border and to
avoid being rapidly overrun by the highly
mobile Soviet forces.
70. Because of the asymmetries in the two
force postures, relative troop strengths do not
indicate the Soviet military superiority in the
immediate border area. Soviet ground troop
strength near the border is around 360,000
troops, of which some 240,000 are assigned
to 38 divisions. Although the Chinese now
have 1,400,000 ground troops and 1,800 com-
bat aircraft in the four MRs bordering the
USSR and Mongolia, few major units are near
the border and at least half of these troops
are deployed some 300-500 miles from the
closest border points. The Soviet superiority
in equipment in the vicinity of the border,
illustrated in Table II, is magnified by Soviet
technological superiority in most major items
of equipment. For example, the Chinese
Type 59 medium tank is based on the Soviet
T 54 A, which first appeared in the Soviet
inventory in the 1949-1951 period. The cur-
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER
TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT
TANKS
ARTTLLERY
MULTIPLE
ROCKETS
LAUNCHERS
USSR"
Far East MD
400
5,300(4,800)
2,200(2,100)
370(380)
Transbaikal MD
350
3,200(3,100)
870
200(220)
Soviet Forces, Mongolia
150
530(550)
130
36(54)
Central Asian MD
250
2,000
730(800)
130
Siberian MD
0
1,000(910)
550
100
TOTAL
1,150
12,030(11,360)
4,480(4,450)
836(884)
TACTICAL
NUCLEAR
LAUNCHERS
94
57
8
40
21
220
0
? Soviet and Chinese strategic air defense equipment in the border region is not included
in this chart because of differences in missions, equipment, and organizations. Mission, in-
ventory, and capability of these forces are discussed in paragraphs 44, 54, 55, and 56.
" The figures for Soviet equipment in this Table represent an estimate of the gross inven-
tories by type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat maneuver
units, fortified area units, ground forces storage, army schools, and border guard units. CIA
and DIA have reached common estimates except as indicated by figures appearing in paren-
theses, which represent DIA estimates. All differences have been influenced by order of battle
variances between agencies. The tank inventory estimates, however, have been most affected
by differences in methodology (see footnote to paragraph 24, page 11). All figures have been
rounded to two significant digits except in cases where they were sufficiently small to make
any variance significant.
rent Soviet tank inventory consists largely
of improved second and third generation suc-
cessors to this model. The Chinese Air Force
continues to consist largely of Mig-15/ 17s,
Mig-19s, and IL-28s, models now considered
obsolescent by the Soviet forces. The deploy-
ment of F-9s is adding firepower, versatility,
and range to the ground attack force, but the
Soviet force remains far superior owing to its
Mig-21 (some of which are the latest models)
and Mig-17 fighters and its Su-7 and Su-17
fighter-bombers. A similar disparity exists in
the relative antiaircraft defense posture, heli-
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25
copter and transport aviation capability, com-
mand and control systems, and other combat
and combat service support capabilities. The
Chinese have no mobile nuclear delivery sys-
tems similar to the Soviet FROG, Scud, and
Scaleboard. The Soviet force is also better
trained than the Chinese force.
71. Soviet divisions along the border are
designed for mobile warfare. They have a
relatively high ratio of tanks to infantry and
possess great firepower, but are supported by
a logistics structure at division level which
would experience considerable difficulty in
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TCIP SFCRFT
supporting a prolonged period of rapidly mov-
ing intensive combat. The Soviet capability
to conduct prolonged combat operations would
depend upon the mobilization of non-divisional
logistic resources at front and army level,
where the bulk of Soviet logistic support is
found. The ratio of tank to motorized rifle
divisions in the border areas ( 1:6 ), lower
than that in Central Europe ( 1:1), probably
represents a Soviet concession to the terrain
and opposition they expect to encounter in
China. The motorized rifle regiments of sev-
eral Soviet divisions have been augmented
with additional 100 mm field or antitank guns
and 122 mm howitzers. The 100 mm guns may
be intended for use in a direct fire role to
neutralize emplaced weapons. The additional
pieces improve the capabilities of the regi-
ments to act independently. These minor dif-
ferences in organization between Soviet forces
in Asia and those in Central Europe provide
insufficient basis, however, to assume that
they are designed to fight under different
tactical doctrines. Their organization, equip-
ment, and training exercises have produced
a force designed to halt any likely Chinese
attack and rapidly shift to the offensive.
72. Given limitations in the Soviet logistic
structure, the nature of the Chinese defenses,
and the desirability of executing any campaign
with stunning rapidity, Soviet planners would
undoubtedly weigh the relative merits of con-
ventional versus nuclear weapons in reducing
Chinese defenses. Although the Soviets claim
that the conventional firepower in current
divisions is at least 31 times greater than that
of World War 11 divisions, the use of this
firepower, plus that of Soviet frontal aviation,
could still result in a campaign of unaccept-
ably long duration. Various Soviet spokesmen
have declared that in the event of a full-scale
conflict in the area all available means would
be used, presumabl2j1 ding nuclear weap-
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Ons. These assertions have generally been
made while hypothesizing a clear Chinese
provocation, which would provide the Soviets
with the rationale to use any weapons avail-
able in their own defense. Nevertheless, the
Soviets would have to measure the political
disadvantages of their first use of nuclear
weapons and the possibility that the Chinese
would retaliate in kind either against the in-
vading Soviet troops or by escalating the con-
flict with a strike on Soviet cities in the Far
East. Under the current Chinese leadership
it is unlikely that the Chinese will provide
the Soviets with the kind of provocation that
would clearly justify a major military response.
However, if the Soviets, for whatever reason,
found it necessary to initiate a major military
operation against China, the use of nuclear
weapons in the interest of bringing the cam-
paign to a quick conclusion might have many
advocates regardless of the negative political
consequences and the risks of Chinese re-
taliation.
Capabilities for Various Military
Contingencies
73. Border Clashes. Since 1969 both the in-
tensity and number of border clashes have
declined. Considering the emotional overtones
both sides have attached to the issue and the
potential for local conflicts, the reduction in
the number of incidents reflects strong central
control from both Moscow and Peking. No
significant military capability is necessary to
cause a border incident, and since there is
likely to be bad blood between local units,
the possibility that an incident could become
a border clash is always present. Of the two
sides, the Soviets have the most highly de-
veloped capability to react and to control the
level of intensity of such a clash. Even the
local Soviet Border Guard Headquarters in
some areas have tanks and APCs nearby to
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support them in meeting any Chinese incur-
sion. Additional reinforcements are available
from within the Border Guard district. The
regular forces in the border, some of which
could be heliborne to the conflict area, would
be called in for situations beyond the capa-
bilities of the Border Guard. Soviet rules of
engagement in force along the border appear
to have been given careful consideration, and
any decision to move beyond these rules and
escalate the clash probably would be made
in Moscow, where local passions would be
but one of the numerous elements which
would be considered before an escalatory
step would be taken. Given Soviet capabilities
in the border areas, Soviet reactions to border
probes could be quite powerful, but they
would be consistent with the broader consider-
ations of Soviet foreign policy objectives.
74. The Chinese would appear to have
little incentive to resume provocative actions
on the border, although they have a wide
range of options available, including sabotage
of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Soviets
demonstrated their capabilities and determina-
tion at Darnanskiy Island in 1969, and the
Chinese are aware that the Soviet forces could
retaliate at a higher intensity if sufficiently
provoked. Any attempt to interrupt operations
of the railroad would be considered extremely
provocative by the Soviets and would require
a Soviet punitive action in response.
75. Punitive Actions. The objectives of these
operations would be to disrupt, punish, and
humiliate a regional command by a strike or
raid on a limited objective such as a head-
quarters or other installation. For example,
if the Chinese were to interfere with the func-
tioning of the railroad, Soviet forces might
retaliate with a raid on the major headquarters
which they believed had planned and exe-
cuted the Chinese operation. If it was decided
not to cross the border2-5-xliation could be
27
executed by either artillery or tactical aircraft.
In a more serious retaliation, a combined air-
ground operation could be mounted. In either
case the Chinese ability to defend in the im-
mediate border area would be limited. Again,
any decision to retaliate heavily would be
made in Moscow and would be calculated to
refresh Chinese awareness of Soviet capa-
bilities. It would also be calculated to meet
the needs of current Soviet foreign policy.
76. Major Conventional Campaign. In the
current situation the circumstances under
which a major conventional campaign would
be launched can be conceived only in terms
of an operation initiated by the Soviet forces.
Various reasons why the Soviets would under-
take such an operation can be postulated, but
considering the risks such a step would in-
volve, only a direct threat to the security of
the Soviet Far East would seem likely to
trigger such a Soviet reaction. A major con-
sideration in the planning of a Soviet opera-
tion would be the possibility of becoming in-
volved in a protracted war. In an effort to
cope with this possibility, Soviet planners
would recommend significant reinforcement
of their forces in place. Additional forces
would increase the impetus of the initial at-
tack and would be necessary to protect lines
of communication and to provide protection
to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The require-
ment for protection of lines of communica-
tion and rear areas would grow as the Soviet
forces penetrated more deeply into Manchuria
and China itself. The scale of reinforcement
required to execute a limited operation in-
tended to seize northern Sinkiang and create
a 200-mile buffer in Manchuria for the Trans-
Siberian Railroad has been calculated by DIA
at some 37 divisions. This reinforcement would
bring the strength of the invasion force to
80 divisions, about 70 of which would face
northeastern China. Soviet planners wol,-z;
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probably calculate that they could reach as
far as Peking with such a force, but they
would need a much larger force built up
through extensive mobilization to seize and
hold Peking.
77. The initial phases of any major Soviet
ground campaign could be expected to give
the appearance of success as the Soviet forces
overwhelmed the Chinese forces on the border
and proceeded into China. Soviet air inter-
diction would slow and disrupt Chinese at-
tempts to move PLA forces to meet the Soviet
thrusts. The Soviet drive would begin to slow,
however, as the first Chinese fixed defenses
were encountered and as Chinese local forces
began operations in the Soviet rear. Delays
and Chinese successes could confront the
Soviets with the choice of a protracted con-
ventional war or escalation to the use of
nuclear weapons.
78. Any Soviet decision to use nuclear
weapons would be made at the highest po-
litical level and would include such limita-
tions as the political leadership deemed neces-
sary. These limitations could require that
tactical nuclear weapons be used only against
Chinese defensive positions delaying the
Soviet advance. If it were believed that the
Chinese would not accept such an escalation
without also resorting to nuclear weapons or
if the Chinese were detected preparing to
use them, the Soviets probably would plan
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weapons and facilities.
79. \
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
The Likelihood of Major Military
Conflict
82. Whatever prospects it may once have
had for long-term "fraternal comradeship,"
the Sino-Soviet relationship has now plainly
evolved into a stark confrontation of adver-
saries, The key source of contention between
the two countries is no longer, as it was dur-
ing the early 1980s, primarily a dispute over
China's relationship with the Soviet Union
and its proper role within the socialist com-
munity. The dispute has now expanded into a
fundamental clash of conflicting national in-
terests and ambitions, in which each side per-
ceives its physical security as well as its inter-
national position to be threatened by the
other.
83. The recent intensification in the ex-
change of recrimination, a en tion, and insult
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29
between Moscow and Peking demonstrates
the continuing tension and hostility in Sino-
Soviet relations. A key question is whether this
situation will persist, change toward a more
controlled competition, or change toward the
extremes of genuine rapprochement or war.
84. In view of Soviet military superiority
generally, and in the border area itself, it is
extremely unlikely that China would deliber-
ately attack Soviet forces across the border.
Chinese regular troops in the four northern
MRs opposite the USSR are positioned well
back from the border, and Chinese military
activities in the border area, apart from
strictly limited probes at particular points in-
tended to support Chinese border claims,
have been clearly defensive in nature. A lim-
ited Chinese military action in Soviet terri-
tory, such as an attempt to interdict the Trans-
Siberian Railroad at some point close to the
border or to raid a Soviet Border Guard head-
quarters, would seem out of the question in
the absence of some prior Soviet military ac-
tion. Even a return to aggressive Chinese
patrolling in the disputed border areas is un-
likely because of the evident Soviet capacity
and willingness to respond at a more powerful
level. In both domestic and foreign policies
since 1969 the Chinese have shown that they
take the Soviet threat seriously. They have
adopted publicly the posture of a threatened
state, and while they have not changed their
basic negotiating positions or territorial claims
because of the Soviet threat, they have re-
strained their actions along the border.
85. The possibility exists, of course, that a
border incident, no matter how it began, could
escalate toward a major military conflict. But
this seems unlikely in light of the desire of
both sides to restrict fighting?the Soviets be-
cause they wish to avoid a drawn-out series of
border clashes, and the Chinese because
do not want to provide a pretext for Sow-
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30 TOP SECRET
military action. The Soviets should be able to
control the level of violence in any border en-
counter because of their capacity to contain
locally any Chinese offensive actions, and So-
viet rules of engagement in force along the
border appear to have been given careful con-
sideration. Any decision to retaliate heavily
would almost certainly be made in Moscow.
Such action could be quite powerful?for ex-
ample, heavy artillery barrages?without in-
volving Soviet troops in ground actions on
Chinese territory and could probably be car-
ried out without creating grave complications
for Soviet foreign policy generally.
86. Soviet punitive actions at a higher
level?raids across the border by ground
troops?are improbable without some Chinese
provocation more serious than the original
ambush on Damanskiy Island in 1969. Neither
the Chinese nor the Soviets wish to risk the
momentum of their policies of detente and
improved relations with the US by presenting
to the world an image of unreasonableness or
bellicosity. Both powers would also be aware
that preoccupation with a military struggle
between them might weaken their influence
elsewhere. If a conflict were to break out in
the border area, arising perhaps from a flare-
up of border tension or a miscalculation in
either capital, it would probably be limited
to non-nuclear operations close to the border.
87. A major Soviet ground attack against
China?whether a response to Chinese actions
at lower levels of conflict or an attempt to
take advantage of political turmoil within
China?seems unlikely. Even more unlikely
would be a deliberate undertaking aimed at
the conquest of China. As noted above, the
Soviets probably judge that they would have
to reinforce their ground forces substantially
even in order to move into and hold border
areas in Sinkiang or northern China, and
would undoubted1y25X1 "? ye it necessary to
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undertake an extensive mobilization in order
to take and hold Peking. In either case Mos-
cow might foresee getting bogged down in
a protracted and costly struggle and being
confronted eventually with a choice between
withdrawal or the use of nuclear weapons in
an effort to force a decisive end to the con-
flict. The latter action, even if it were suc-
cessful, could have many and far reaching
adverse repercussions damaging to the USSR's
position in the world.
88. In weighing the possible use of nuclear
weapons against China, Moscow would have
to give foremost consideration to the growing
Chinese nuclear strike capability. It is possible
that the Soviets have already considered
taking deliberate action against that capa-
bility?apart from any ground action--
because it is the most dramatic and poten-
tially effective military aspect of the Chinese
challenge to the USSR as the dominant power
in Asia. But the Soviets probably believe they
have not targeted all Chinese strategic offen-
sive forces, and their apprehensions probably
incline them toward worst-case assumptions.
( See paragraph 81, page 29.) Consequently,
they now face the probability, which has been
acknowledged in a Leningrad lecture, that
several of China's surviving missiles could
destroy military targets or cities in Soviet Asia
even after a Soviet first strike. The deterrent
effect of the Chinese strategic attack capa-
bility will, be enhanced significantly in the
next 2-3 years when an inventory of missiles
capable of reaching targets in the western
part of the USSR probably will become
operational.
89. The Soviet leadership could, of course,
simply disregard the possibility of Chinese re-
taliation and proceed with an attack on the
assumption that the Chinese would follow
the rational course and refrain from retaliat-
ing with their few remaining missiles?an
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act of pure vengeance which would only
guarantee that they would sustain even greater
damage in retribution. The Soviets could
scarcely count on such Chinese restraint, how-
ever, and would be unlikely to jeopardize
major cities unless they came to believe that
inaction carried greater risks than proceeding
with the attack. To date the manifold uncer-
tainties and risks in any military action against
China have clearly outweighed any possible
advantages, and the growth of the Chinese
deterrent will continue to increase the risks.
90. The military risks are not the only con-
siderations which deter a major Soviet attack
on China, whether by nuclear strike or on
the ground. The Soviets would have to weigh
carefully the significant international reper-
cussions that would flow from any major
Soviet campaign against China?even a
limited ground invasion. So long as the Soviets
were militarily involved with China, they
would be concerned about possible ways that
other powers, especially the US, might seek
to take advantage of their reduced influence
in other areas of the world. They would also
have to consider the likelihood that the US
would perceive a new aggressiveness or in-
stability in Soviet policy and alter its policies
toward the USSR, perhaps even taking steps
to improve its strategic weapons program. The
Soviets would also surely be concerned that
their first use of nuclear weapons, even if
militarily successful, might fundamentally alter
world opinion against the USSR.
91. In addition to the new problems that
would be raised, important existing Soviet
policies would be jeopardized. Moscow's gen-
eral policy of detente with the West, and
most importantly its effort to foster economic
ties, especially with advanced Western coun-
tries, would be imperiled. The Soviet attempt
to portray the USSR as a force for peace and
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31
a protector of the poor, the weak, and the
non-white would be undermined, especially
in the Third World. Chinese hostility toward
the Soviets would intensify and greatly lessen
whatever chances may exist of a post-Mao or
post-Brezhnev reconciliation between Peking
and Moscow.
92. While Moscow is prepared to punish
the Chinese at any point on the frontier where
they might act forcibly to assert territorial
claims, the main Soviet policy to counter
China is centered on diplomatic efforts and
on activities within the Communist movement,
A major attack on China, especially one in-
volving nuclear weapons, would involve not
only accepting serious new risks, but also
rejecting an established policy that has quieted
the border with China and, in other parts of
the world, promises political and economic
benefits.
Future Force Relationships
93. Just as the prospective general rela-
tionship between the USSR and China is one
of continuing confrontation and contest, but
with no major military conflict, so the pros-
pective force relationship is one in which each
side maintains its forces opposite the other,
but at a level which does not disrupt or distort
its total military commitments. Planned Soviet
divisional deployments along the Sino-Soviet
border appear to be close to being realized.
There is thus little prospect that future border
requirements will impinge noticeably on force
requirements in Europe and mutual force re-
duction talks. The continued buildup of sup-
port forces will also be undertaken with little
effect on forces opposite NATO. The growing
flexibility of Soviet strategic attack forces per-
mits the Soviets to target China more com-
pletely while at the same time increasing their
capability against Europe and America. While
no extensive modification of equipment ---
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organization is foreseen, it is likely that there
will be some limited tailoring of the forces
along the Sino-Soviet frontier to provide a
quicker reaction over longer distances. The
co-location of two regiment size ground
force units with two helicopter units may be
a case in point.
94. To the present time, the guiding strategy
of the Chinese military leadership has been
to maintain China's capability to defend
against attacks from all directions, and not
to give preferential treatment to defense
against possible attack from the north to the
detriment of China's defense posture else-
where. This approach was appropriate in a
time when US forces were still fighting in
Vietnam and were stationed in force on pe-
ninsulas and islands on the eastern periphery
of China. Now that US forces are withdraw-
ing from Southeast Asia, it is possible that
the issue will again arise as to whether the
limited Chinese forces and resources should
be concentrated to a greater degree against
the USSR. To date there is no evidence that
a basic reorientation of Chinese forces is under
way, and any rapid large-scale shift seems
unlikely, in part because of Chinese concern
not to alarm the Soviets unduly. It would be
expressed in preferential deployment of mis-
siles, aircraft, and ground troops in northern
China, and perhaps in increasing the capa-
bilities of the Northern Fleet in relation to
those of the Eastern and Southern Fleets.
Until such developments occur, Chinese
leaders must be considered to have given a
negative answer to the question of whether
China should reorient its defenses from a gen-
eral capability to defend against attack from
all directions to a preference for defense
against attack from the north. This decision
is consistent with the more realistic view of
Soviet strength on the border noted above
(see paragraph 63, page 22).
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95. In view of the limited specific inter-
action discernible in the evolution of the
Sino-Soviet military confrontation, the mod-
ernization of both the Soviet and the Chinese
forces will continue to be determined by the
general pace of research and development and
weapons production throughout the respective
forces, rather than by special considerations
related to the border standoff. Thus, Soviet
force modernization will continue largely in
response to Warsaw Pact and intercontinental
requirements. In fact, the resources devoted
to defenses against China as a share of the
total Soviet defense effort are likely to decline
in the near future as the force levels planned
against China are reached.
96. Peking can likewise be expected to press
ahead with its longstanding program to mod-
ernize its armed forces as a part of its general
effort to establish China's status as a great
power. It is also likely that, in contrast to the
largely politically-inspired surges and slow-
downs in Chinese weapons development and
production in the past, future Chinese weapons
development and production will take place
within the framework of a more balanced
economy; in this sense also, the creation of a
strong China?not a specifically anti-Soviet
effort?will be the touchstone of the growth
of the armed forces.
97. It is possible, of course, that if Sino-
Soviet tensions grow in the future, each side
will build its forces into a yet more formidable
posture. If the Soviets intended to develop
a force along the border designed for major
ground actions against China, they would
probably begin by setting up a structure for
a five-front force and possibly a theater head-
quarters. A Chinese reaction to increased ten-
sion and evidence of a further Soviet buildup
would probably take the form of an increased
effort to strengthen China's northern defenses.
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Chinese ground forces, if they were to be
prepared to undertake offensive operations
away from their bases, would need enlarged
logistics support, training in joint operations,
and a much greater supply of tanks, artillery,
and ground-support aircraft. Although Chinese
forces will improve over the next few years,
there is little chance that the improvement
would be so great as to support a capability
to undertake operations against the USSR.
98. Heightened tension would also have an
influence on the strategic weapons postures of
the two powers. It might cause the USSR to
be more reluctant to sign an offensive arms
agreement with the US; it would certainly
make the USSR more determined to negotiate
an agreement that would permit it to keep
what it regarded as an adequate deterrent
against both China and the US. In the event
of an agreement limiting ICBMs and inter-
continental bombers, there would be greater
Soviet incentive to develop and deploy larger
numbers of weapon systems oriented toward
China. As for the Chinese, heightened tensions
would probably cause them, among other
things, to push the deployment of their region-
al deterrent more rapidly, to improve their air
defenses, and to establish underground shelters
and defenses in even greater numbers. Chi-
nese technological deficiencies and high de-
velopment costs appear to preclude a success-
ful effort to develop an ABM in the next
decade, although ballistic missile early warn-
ing radars would probably be deployed.
99. In a situation of lessened tension, it is
possible that the USSR would reduce its forces
along the border, though probably not to the
levels existing before 1965. But even in a con-
dition of general detente the maintenance of
current force levels at lower levels of readiness
would be more likely than any substantial
reductions in those force levels. The Soviets,
having made a substantial investment in equip-
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33
ment and facilities in Soviet Asia, would prob-
ably be inclined to allow unit personnel
strength levels to decline, rather than to close
bases and remove equipment.
100. Whatever the force development poli-
cies followed over the next several years,
however, the relative strengths of the opposing
forces will change but slowly. The Chinese
have much further to go in developing modern
armed forces, and they can therefore make
more rapid and noticeable improvements. But
the Soviet research and development and in-
dustrial base is so much greater that, despite
any Chinese advances, the USSR will retain
its substantial advantages.
101. As Soviet forces are already at higher
levels of capability and readiness, it will be
difficult for them to make a substantial in-
crease in relative strength vis-a-vis the Chi-
nese forces. The Chinese, on the other hand,
will achieve increased effectiveness for their
forces from relatively modest additions to the
low levels of equipment now on hand and
from increased levels of training. The addi-
tion of a battalion of tanks to a division, for
instance, would only add some 10-15 percent
to the Soviet divisions, but would double the
tank inventory of a Chinese division. The Chi-
nese division would thus grow in capability
relative to the Soviet division, but would still
have only about one-fourth as many tanks.
The relative changes in the Chinese posture
will not be sufficient to embolden the Chi-
nese and cause them to consider offensive op-
erations, but they will increase the deterrent
capability of the Chinese forces in Soviet eyes.
102. During the period of the 1970s, the
Soviet Union will also remain far ahead of
China in the strategic balance. Soviet stra-
tegic attack forces are growing in flexibility
and capability against China. The new Back-
fire bomber will be able to cover all of Ch125x
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34 TOP SECRET
unrefueled from Far East bases, an option not
open to the Badger.r'
103, These increases in Soviet weapons will
add to an already overwhelming strategic
capability, but will not make for any ap-
preciable change in the balance. Our pro-
jections of Chinese missile forces, however,
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indicate that China will be able in the late
1970s to cover several hundred Soviet targets.
Soviet projections almost certainly "worst
case" this development. Relatively speaking,
therefore, the small growth in the Chinese
retaliatory capability will carry more signifi-
cance in the strategic relationship between
the two countries than the more extensive
Soviet growth.
104. Force developments on the border and
in the strategic forces thus indicate that the
optimal time has passed for the Soviets to
use military force to disarm China or to coerce
Peking, and that likely future Chinese force
developments will further reduce Soviet mili-
tary options vis-?is China,
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ANNEX A
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973
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Chronology of the Buildup on the Sino-Soviet Border and Related Events, 1964-1973
Kheunbthev remeved.
Political events
a En Lot ed Moscow.
tie *0014104g.
Ostratatra occurred twat
Date
Oct 1964
?Nev 1964
Feb 1$65,,.._,.
Mar 1965
May 1965
Nov 1966
Late 1965_
End 1985____
Ittatda usebhcty 0400d 1r saiit in Coin psillist Maveine t.
..Mongolian Treaty 0
Assistance 0400d-
,
,Saatirts' eatt 414000., trailed 00?
t00 00040400C $00400001.
401tirral'000'Mutbin hego'h in Chin?
Military events
Chide eXpledid first a vide.
Soviets have 14-13 divisions near the border, 3 divisions in the
Siberian MD, and less than 200 tactical aircraft in the area.*
;Mounted troop strength at 2.,423,006,
Mutual _Jan 1966
Jan-Fab 1960
Summer 1968
Late 1986_
1966-1967_
End 1966_
1987_
End 1967_
Chinese esptade second nuelear deVice,
Soviet corps PeaddearterO Moved "fropi,PoiShant,Oel te,?!irtite kta
Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border
to 15.
'L its!" Chinese MR
Soviet corps headquarters,, moved Irons Odessa,..10,to
Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border
to 18-21.
deoetivoted
c%:?4165:strSicti44.tt nbiki;010,,, in Western USSR on theetledseor
with target- sectors covering China.
'Three Soviet SeatiPaSkill'bitaidedePtcyeiet, aloe
Soviet divisions added 'during year increased strength near the border
1968 to 22-27.
Chinese 00001:00100,100 0f P00,1,_,0,..T;LI.0,416
Construction began in western
R en I
? sectors')'.$0,000,00",000!*?:01`
corps10001000 moved Irons
began construction at two
mt
ern
,
End 1088 Soviet divisions added during year increased border strength to 25-3
Mar 1969_, ,.',?Mater'Sion-Seetit,Cieetree?eteerrediee,tbehon-pa lln
,010',10,0t)00' .00i3
"
corps eafQva
'
'0'00'0*, Orz,00114,
?May 1969
Jun 1969
Aug 1969
*The number of Soviet divisions listed in this chronology is sometimes expressed by two
figures. The first represents DIA 's holdings; 'bp CIA s. Differences in the two
agencies' holdings are explained in the footn25)(1 egraph 27.
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561944 (LEFT) 9-73 C
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Oct 1969
1999
37
, ?
End 1909 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the horde
Late 1969-
to 27-34. Divisions in the Siberian MD increased from 3 to 4.
Early 1970 1110, ArniiPe?',0101D,000014D1 8n4eti$tervehirta to
der deactivated.
I)) pa** trans
1970
End 1970*
Mar-Apr 1971
Sept 1971
1871
End 1971
Mar 1972
Nov-Dec 1972
Dec 1972
1972
End 1972
Jan 1973
Mar 1973
Aug 1973
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Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near border
to 33-36.
Soviet divisions near the border totaled 36-37.
tnt, South,
By end of year, 38 divisions were in place on the border and five
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561 944 (RIGHT) 9-73 CIF
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ANNEX B
COSTS OF SOVIET FORCES OPPOSING CHINA
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ANNEX C
SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA
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SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA
This Annex, while included in this Estimate for
convenience, is not part of the Estimate in the
sense that it has been coordinated within and
agreed to by the Intelligence Community. Rather,
this Annex has been developed by DIA and
informally reviewed by military planners of the
Joint Staff, in direct response to an NSC staff
request for a professional US military planners'
appraisal of how Soviet General Staff planners
might plan hypothetical Soviet military actions
against China. Within the Intelligence Com-
munity as a whole there are divergent views as
to the manner in which these scenarios might be
planned by the Soviet General Staff and with
respect to some of the details of the factual
data utilized. The coordinated Estimate itself
provides a full discussion of the likelihood of
Soviet military action against China.
I. INTRODUCTION
I. A DIA study prepared in support of this
Estimate presents hypothetical planning cri-
teria for two strategic strikes and two con-
ventional ground campaigns the Soviet Union
might consider undertaking against China.
The strategic strikes are described in Part II
of this Annex, and the ground campaigns in
Part HI. Each presents a military judgment
of Soviet force capabilities based on estimates
of the strengths, dispositions, and system capa-
bilities of Soviet and Chinese forces, as well
as on data regarding lines of communications,
terrain, and climate factors.
2. From the Soviet viewpoint, the hypothe-
sized attacks on Chinese nuclear capabilities
would be technically feasible, although fraught
with serious military and 25 X TInlitical costs and
1
25X147
risks. Operations envisaged with the objective
of destroying Chinese nuclear capabilities are
often popularly labeled "surgical," implying
that the perceived threat can be easily elimi-
nated by a small and carefully measured ap-
plication of strategic striking power which
would cause little or no collateral damage to
China's non-nuclear resources and promise
virtual assurance that the Soviets would sustain
no damage in return. As the following por-
trayal indicates, however, the Soviet leader-
ship would have to consider employing sub-
stantial nuclear power and would face major
uncertainties and risks in contemplating such
a strike. Infliction of such destruction and
acceptance of such risks could only be justified
by a Soviet perception of a clear and im-
mediate Chinese threat to Soviet national
security.
3. The hypothesized Soviet ground cam-
paigns depict limited-objective attacks into
Sinkiang and Manchuria which could ( and
probably would) be executed simultaneously.
In these operations the Soviet objectives are
in lightly defended regions distant from the
main concentrations of Peoples' Liberation
Army ( PLA) forces. In this scenario, the So-
viet forces would be expected to seize their
objectives quickly and hold them without dif-
ficulty while the Kremlin leadership nego-
tiated the terms of Soviet withdrawal.
4. More ambitious attacks into northeastern
China would offer more complex problems
for the Soviets both politically and militarily.
If, for example, the Soviet forces attempted
to seize territory south of the Chita-Ha-erh-
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pin-Vladivostok rail line or the central valley
south to the Liaotung Gulf, the Chinese would
probably react by sending forces into Man-
churia from the south, and a prolonged, large-
scale conflict could result. The Soviets would
require extensive mobilization and a heavy
augmentation of the forces now near the
border. If the Soviets planned to move be-
yond Peking deeper into China, a far more
formidable task would face them, They would
have to undertake full mobilization and would
perhaps require an initial force on the order
of 200 divisions in the area before beginning
such a campaign. The Soviet planner would
have to assume massive and determined armed
Chinese conventional and unconventional re-
sistance in addition to the problems of ad-
ministering any occupied territory. Similar
problems could also develop from the limited
incursions described in Part III. The Soviets
would probably only undertake them under
circumstances in which they perceived a direct
threat to their national interests or in which
the internal political situation in China was
favorable to such action.
II. STRIKES AGAINST CHINESE
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
5. This section outlines the planning con-
siderations and requirements for two hypo-
thetical Soviet strategic strikes against China?
one nuclear and the other conventional. The
nuclear strike is designed to destroy the Chi-
nese nuclear retaliatory capability and to set
the Chinese capacity to produce nuclear
weapons back 5 to 8 years. The conventional
strike is limited to critical nuclear research
and industrial facilities and is designed to set
the Chinese nuclear weapons production ca-
pacity back 3 to 6 years. Bomber and missile
design and production facilities are not tar-
geted in either strike,
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A. Nuclear Strike
6. The hypothetical nuclear strike is di-
rected against all known deployed nuclear-
capable Chinese offensive systems and se-
lected Chinese nuclear weapons production
and research facilities. To maximize the pene-
tration capability of the Soviet bomber force,
the strike would ideally be initiated at night
when the performance capability of the Chi-
nese air defense system would be reduced,
Launch orders would be transmitted simul-
taneously to the SRF complexes, LRA bases,
and naval forces directly involved. Other
strategic attack units would be directed to
assume a condition of high readiness, as would
units of the national PV0, and those ground
forces which might be employed in a war
with China would begin mobilization if they
had not done so already.
7. Targets.
Chinese targets are categorized as time-
urgent or non-time-urgent based on their po-
tential for launching retaliatory strikes at the
Soviet Union ( See Table C-I ). The time-
urgent category includes deployed MRBMs
and IRBMs ( some of which are assumed to be
located at training and R&D facilities) and
nuclear-capable medium and light bombers.
The non-time-urgent category includes
Also in this category are re-
search and production facilities of the Chinese
nuclear program such as fissionable materials
production installations, weapons fabrication
plants, and weapons development facilities.
Bomber dispersal bases, some missile R&D
positions, and missile launch positions from
which a strike against the USSR could not
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TABLE C-1
NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST
AIMING
TIME-URGENT TARGETS Poimrs
MRBM Launch Sites ? 2
IRBM Launch Sites 27
Bomber Bases " 12
R&D Launch Sites 6
Missile Command and Control Facilities e 12
NON-TME-URGENT TARGETS
MRBM Launch Sites z
MRBM/IRBM/ICBM Caves and Silos
Missile Support
MRBM/Space R&D Launch Sites
Bomber Dispersal Fields
Nuclear Materials and Weapons Facilities
Nuclear Submarine Base
TOTAL TARGETS
59
1
141
20
6
11
18
1
198
257
Target data are based on information as of May
1973.
25X1 MRBM identified and deployed within striking
range of Soviet population centers.
"Includes Chinese airfields within range of the
USSR at which Badgers and Beagles have been
identified.
Excluding Peking.
MRBMs not within range of USSR targets.
ICBM launch facilities are still under construction.
IRBM launch positions under construction are con-
sidered as within the destruction radius of weapons
targeted at their associated caves.
be launched ( either because they are under
construction or out of range) are included in
this category. Non-time-urgent targets gen-
erally are those which either represent a ca-
pability to inflict delayed retributive harm
to the Soviet Union or comprise the indus-
trial and research sectors of the Chinese nu-
clear program. They would come under at-
tack at a more measured pace.
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8. Target Vulnerability.
2455(1
All known targe s
are vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack,
though varying weapon size or accuracy is re-
quired to achieve minimum overpressures on
different structures. Nuclear weapons research
and production facilities and unprotected mis-
siles standing at launch sites are more vulner-
able to nuclear strikes and do not demand
either the yield or the accuracy necessary to
destroy targets such a
These are less vulnerable and would require
either greater yield or more accurate weapons
delivery
Vulnerability in all
cases is base on a p armed optimum height
of burst ( air burst) to insure most efficient
use of weapons.
9. Overall Kill-probability (Pk) Require-
ments. In the following calculations, no non-
technical ( i.e., political or diplomatic) re-
straints are imposed on the attack forces the
Soviets could employ, and each target in the
postulated strike is subjected to an attack of
sufficient destructive magnitude to provide
a high probability of overall success.
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these criteria requires allocation of more than
one weapon against some aiming points. 25x1
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10. Alternative Soviet Strike Force Packages.
Various strikes with different targeting con-
cepts and force mixes were simulated by
computerized wargarning with the Arsenal
Exchange models. The results of the simula-
tions were similar; each strike illustrated
that the Soviets could destroy the Chinese
targets and still retain a massive strategic
capability. Three Soviet forces mixes were
made available to the computer in three
different simulations: ( a) a large arsenal of
Soviet land-based missiles and bombers:12
(b) the same arsenal minus the SS-9; and (c)
a limited force of 250 SS-11s, 10 SS-5s, and
193 bombers, which may be near what the
Soviets have deployed in large part with
Chinese targets in mind. Forces employed
by the computer, using common damage cri-
teria, against Chinese targets varied from 198
missiles (123 SS-9s) and 127 bombers to 128
missiles (118 S5-11s and 10 SS-Ss) and 192
bombers in different simulations. Results, in
terms of worst-case
11. In a separate simulation the limited
force of 190 SS-11 Mod 1, 60 SS-11 Mod 3,
10 SS-5, and 193 LRA bombers were all used
to obtain an estimate of damage potential
and possible residual Chinese retaliatory ca-
" This arsenal includes all strategic attack forces
except SLBMs on submarines of the Soviet Northern
Fleet, MRBMs and IRBMs deployed out of range of
Chinese targets, and most strategic bombers in the
European USSR. 25X1
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pability. In this simulation the worst-case sta-
tistical probability of Soviet lives lost was 1.1
million in cities east of the Urals.
12. In the various scenarios, the residual
Soviet land-based missile forces included be-
tween 1,250 and 1,385 ICBMs. The Soviet
ballistic missile submarine force would remain
virtually intact. Many of the aircraft used
in the attack should have returned, and more
than 650 LRA aircraft based in the western
USSR and more than 340 naval aviation
bombers in all fleet areas would also be
available.
and the over-
whelming magnitude of their own retaliatory
forces, the Soviets would calculate the chances
of a Chinese retaliatory strike as slight, whether
leadership-directed or on the initiative of an
individual bomber or missile crew.
14. Chinese Fatalities from Nuclear Bursts.
An estimate of the likely number of Chinese
fatalities which would be directly caused by
a Soviet disarming strike is difficult to estab-
lish with confidence because of several fac-
tors which tend to complicate the analysis:
( c ) the geographic setting of each
target can alter the damage done by any
given weapon; and ( d) exact data on the
population around each target are difficult
to obtain. A DOD computer-model casualty
projection has been made, however, using
the best available data for population density
in the various target areas.
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number is this low relative to the overall
Chinese population because most missiles and
airfields are well removed from populated
areas and the actual number of target areas is
low.
as
15. Fallout. If all weapons were detonated
in-
crease that wou .e ess t an t e natural
regional variation that occur among inhabited
areas of the world. On the other hand, if
malfunctions occurred and some weapons det-
onated on the surface, fall-out would be a
problem in some areas
, it no allowance
is made for civil defense. There could also
25X1 be some danger to the Soviet and other popu-
lations in the Far East. This latter damage
could be reduced by alternate selection of
weapons or delivery systems, but the most
critical variable is weather. Summer wind
patterns would minimize the danger to the
Soviet population.
B. Conventional Strike
16. In a hypothetical conventional operation,
the Soviets would attack a restricted target
list of nuclear-related facilities. The Chinese
nuclear strike capability would remain fully
intact and available for retaliation if the
Chinese were to choose to implement that
option, at the risk of devastating Soviet nu-
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TABLE C-II
25X1
51
clear retaliation. The primary object of the
attack would be to set back the Chinese nu-
clear program for three to six years by attack-
ing key elements of China's fissionable ma-
terials production and weapons fabrication
facilities. The number of targets to be struck
would be limited by the large numbers of
bombs needed to achieve sufficient damage
to each target. ( Table C-II gives the postulated
conventional strike target list.)
17. The conventional attack, like the nu-
clear strike, would begin at night when the
effectiveness of th
The attack would require an intensive effort
by these aircraft, dropping about 32,000 tons
of bombs in seven days, depending upon com-
bat losses, success in achieving damage, and
the number of aircraft available to replace
losses sustained in combat. ( Table C-III indi-
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TABLE C-III
CONVENTIONAL BOMB
REQUIREMENTS AGAINST TYPICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES
Bomn
TARGET TONNAGEb
1,700
3,800
4,200
8,400
?
750
1,450
" Require gom tonnages are compute to achieve
a sufficiently severe damage level to critical elements
of the target to achieve their complete reconstruction.
cates specific bomb requirements for repre-
sentative Chinese nuclear weapons production
and R&D facilities.) If this attack were per-
formed in conjunction with a land campaign,
Probable Soviet Front Axes of Advance
25X1
no LRA or SNA bomber sorties would be
available to support the ground forces until the
strike was completed.
III. GROUND CAMPAIGNS
A. Setting
18. By capturing and holding territory in
Sinkiang, the Soviets might plan to embarrass
the present Maoist leadership, enhance latent
factionalism within the Chinese Communist
Party, and undermine the confidence of the
people in the regime's ability to protect the
nation's territorial integrity. Simultaneously,
the Soviets would conduct limited military
operations in Manchuria in order to compli-
cate the Chinese military response in Sinkiang,
to apply additional pressure against Peking,
and to create a buffer for important facili-
ties in the Far East. ( See Figure C-1. )
19. While mobilizing the forces they would
use against China, the Soviets would keep
in place their ground and tactical air forces
in Eastern Europe and the Western MDs.
Figure C-1
561938 8-73 CIA
25X1
Front designations are arbitrary,
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They would, however, redeploy ground and
air forces from elsewhere in the USSR for the
campaigns against China.
20. Sinkiang. The Soviets could undertake
military operations in northern Sinkiang with
a high assurance of success. The Central
Asian MD provides a suitable staging area
for supporting sustained operations in Sin-
kiang. The Chinese, on the other hand, lack
the necessary transportation facilities to sup-
port large-scale conventional operations in the
region. The area to be attacked is lightly
defended by regular forces. The Chinese
would not be able to prevent the Soviets
from initially establishing ground and air
superiority.
21. Manchuria. The Soviets would time their
attack into Manchuria to coincide with their
invasion of Sinkiang. Their advance into Man-
churia could proceed with relative ease up to
300 kilometers in some locations, stopping
short of the heavily populated and industrial-
ized Manchurian Plain. It would be accompa-
nied by extensive air action throughout Man-
churia. The Soviets could threaten to use
nuclear weapons if the Chinese did not ac-
quiesce to their demands and in order to
deter them from undertaking a massive
counterattack.
22. Soviet combat operations in Manchuria
would require large-scale commitment of
ground and air forces. Despite the lack of
initial resistance by organized regular forces,
attacking elements would be subjected to
continuing harassment by border defense and
paramilitary forces familiar with the terrain
and trained in guerrilla warfare. The Soviets
would also be under some threat of eventual
attack by the more than 20 Chinese line
divisions in Manchuria as well as by other
forces that could be brought in from the
south. 25X1
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53
B. Soviet Mobilization and
Reinforcement
23. The Soviets would need to mobilize the
required forces before initiating even these
limited combat operations against China. Vari-
ous deception measures would be instituted
to conceal the scope and objective of the in-
tended operations. But the Chinese would
almost certainly become aware that some
form of mobilization and readying of Soviet
forces was underway opposite their border
prior to the attack. It has been assumed that
the Soviets would initiate major operations
before the mobilization was complete in order
to reduce warning time and consequent Chi-
nese defensive measures.
24. Railroads would be the major means of
transporting ground forces to their designated
deployment locations. The capacity of the So-
viet highway networks in the border area is
extremely limited, and the road movement
for large-scale military operations would be
restricted primarily to deployment to or from
railroads.
25. The Soviets would build up their forces
in Mongolia, although no initial operations
would be launched from this area. The two
existing rail lines would be employed to move
forces into Mongolia. Movement to deploy-
ment areas would be via the primitive high-
way network and cross-country. There is also
an extensive network of unimproved airfields
in Mongolia adjacent to the eastern border
area opposite China, which would be em-
ployed to augment logistic support of the
forces assembled in this area.
26. The Soviets would form five fronts to
conduct this projected ground and air cam-
paign against China. Soviet forces facing the
northeastern part of China would consist of
four fronts probably headquartered in Us-
suriysk, Belogorsk, Chita, and Ulaanbar2'5---x
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The fifth front, which we have called the
Central Asian, would be established opposite
Sinkiang. The total force that would be built
up opposite China would consist of 80 line
divisions,14 up to 2,000 fixed-wing combat air-
craft," and some 500 helicopters. Forty-three
of those divisions, including the airborne di-
vision at Fergana in the Turkestan MD, are
now located in the general Sino-Soviet border
area. The additional 37 divisions would be
mobilized and transported to the area. An
additional tactical air army, from the Turke-
stan MD, would supplement the approximately
1,150 Frontal Aviation ( FA ) combat aircraft
now available to support ground operations.
An eastward shift of some air units from the
Moscow, Transcaucasus, Kiev, or Odessa MDs
would be accomplished to fill the void left in
Turkestan and to provide readily available
reserves. Sufficient LRA bombers are presently
deployed opposite China to support the ground
campaign. All Military Transport Aviation
( VTA ) transports would be available to sup-
port the campaign.
27. Twenty-two divisions could be mo-
bilized and in place by M+7, 39 by M+14,
and 49 by M+21, at which time hostilities
are postulated to begin. Corps, army, and
front headquarters, as well as support units,
would not all be filled out by D-Day. The
entire five-front force of 80 divisions could
be in place by M+36. Local ammunition and
petroleum, oil, and lubricants stocks in excess
of the combat requirements set forth in the
scenario are now available in Soviet Asia.
The sequence of mobilization and reinforce-
ment would be as shown in Table C-IV:
This total does not include two additional di-
visions which may exist in the Far East MD, or the
two divisions on Sakhalin and the one on Kamchatka,
which remain in place under this scenario.
This would include elements of Frontal Aviation,
LRA, SNA, and Aviatior25X1 Defense (APV0).
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TABLE C-IV
SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND
REINFORCEMENT
READY DIVISIONS
UNIT (M+21) (D-DAY)
Far Eastern Theater
READY DIVISIONS
(M+36)
Ussuriysk Front
13
13
Belogorsk Front
8
14
Chita Front
8
17
Ulaanbataar Front . .
9
16
Theater Reserve
2
8
Central Asian Front
8
8
Front Reserve
1
4
TOTAL
49
80
C. Chinese Reaction
28. Upon detecting the Soviet preparations,
Peking would initiate action to improve
China's defensive posture in the northern
MRs. PLA forces there would be alerted,
and those units lacking personnel and major
items of equipment would be filled out where
possible. Concurrently, additional land and
air forces would be moved northward to pro-
tect Peking and the industrial areas in Man-
churia.
29. Within a week or so, the Chinese could
deploy as many as six additional armies
to the Peking MR. The movement of sizable
forces to reinforce Manchuria would probably
not occur unless the Chinese were confident
that the Soviets did not intend to attack
Peking. Within two weeks, five more armies
could be redeployed into the eastern portion
of the Lan-chou MR to reinforce the two
armies currently there. One or two of these
armies could be moved farther westward to
defend the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test
Center and the western end of the Kansu cor-
ridor. These forces could be supported by the
armored and infantry divisions currently de-
ployed in the corridor south of Shuang-ch'eng-
tzu. Because of the sensitivity of this area
and the threat of Soviet attack out of Mon-
golia, it is unlikely that any of these Chinese
forces would be moved into western Sinkiang.
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D. Seasonal Environmental
Considerations
30. Climatic conditions and their effect on
the terrain in the major avenues of approach
are outlined in Figure C-2. Weather plays an
important role in Soviet timing. Winter would
be the optimal season for launching attacks
simultaneously on Sinkiang and Manchuria.
Fall would also be suitable for operations in
both areas, but heavy rains in Manchuria in
summer and melting snows in spring in both
locations, cause heavy runoff, and some flood-
ing which would adversely affect off-road mo-
bility. 25X1
E. Operations in Sinkiang
31. Soviet forces designated for commit-
ment in Sinkiang would consist of one com-
bined-arms army, two separate corps, a re-
serve of four divisions, and one reinforced tac-
tical air army. These forces, together with
their necessary combat and service support
units, would comprise the Central Asian Front,
with headquarters in Alma Ata. The Central
Asian Front would operate under the control
of the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, which
would also allocate an airborne division to the
front reserve and about 600 medium transport
aircraft.
32. On D-Day ( M +21 ) the Soviet forces
of the Central Asian Front would attack into
Sinkiang. The ground effort would have Urum-
chi, Kuldja ( I-ning ), and Kashgar as its initial
objectives. Soviet air strikes in support of this
effort would seek to neutralize the Chinese
air defenses and attain air superiority for sub-
sequent FA, LRA, and VTA operations as
needed. Extensive air reconnaissance support
would also be provided.
33. Urumchi. The combined-arms army
( three motorized rifle divisions and one tank
division), supported by two regiments of FA
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55
25X1
fighters and LRA bombers, would advance
eastward in two columns on D-Day with the
objective of capturing Ururnchi by D + 6.
( See Map, page 52.) Initial Chinese resistance
would be light. Heavier resistance would be
expected around Urumchi from the nearl
40,000 Chinese troops in the area
sou eas o irumc 1.
an many of the ta-ki_
34. After capturing Urumchi, the Soviet
forces would turn to the elimination of major
Chinese resistance along the Urumchi-Turfan
road and the capture of the lightly defended
city of Turfan. They would then attack south-
westward toward Wu-shih-ta-la to seize the
airfields there and at nearby Ku-erh-lo. Two
reinforced regiments of the Fergana airborne
division could be dropped in support of this
operation to help overcome a Chinese force
of about 5,000 combat support and service
troops.
35. In the meantime a motorized rifle di-
vision ( MRD ), supported by two fighter
bomber regiments, helicopters, and Cub trans-
ports would be moving toward Ha-mi against
light resistance. The seizure of the airfield
there would be completed by D+9 or D+10.
From Ha-mi the Soviets would be able to
maintain air superiority over Sinkiang and
continue air interdiction of the main rail line
from the east.
36. Valley. A separate corps of two
MRDs would operate in the I-1i Valley around
Kuldja ( I-ning) against
located there. This separate
force would seek to secure the valley and to
conduct operations against any Chinese troops
---)erating out of the surrounding mountaim25xi
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Seasonal Influence of Environmental Conditions Upon Cross-Border Movement
25X1
Figure C-2
Environmental Conditions
Seasonal Environmental Conditions Affecting Offroad Cross-Border Movement
Sectors 1 ? 3
Ground conditions best in winter with autumn
next best. Dust or sandstorms common throughout
year in Sectors 1 and 2; in late winter and spring in
Sector 3. Severe winter temperatures usual in
mountains and high summer temperatures common
in basins within Sectors 1 and 2. Principal year-
round problem in Sector 3 is shortage of reliable
water supply; high summer temperatures important
restraint in Sector 3 because of deficient water
supply for operation of mechanized equipment.
Local flooding after rains in Sector 3 during July
and August. Mountain passes occasionally blocked
by drifting snow in Sector 1; occasional blizzards in
Sector 2.
25X1
561937 8-73 CIA
Sectors 4 ? 7
Ground conditions best in winter, although at
times extreme cold may pose problems. Improved
offroad movement in autumn follows summer high
water period. Offroad movement in Sectors 5, 6,
and 7 hampered by extensive marshlands, numer-
ous streams, and areas of miry soils from spring
thaw to late autumn freezeup. Bypass often diffi-
cult in Sector 4 for periods of several days to a
week around large areas of miry ground during
spring freeze-and-thaw and flooded areas during
summer high water. Shortage of reliable water
supply a problem in western part of Sector 4. Snow
drifts may occasionally slow movement in Sectors
4, 5, and 6; strong winds may hamper winter move-
ment in Sector 4,
CONFIDENTIAL
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37. Kashgar. Another corps of two Soviet
MRDs would proceed from the border south
of Naryn in the USSR on D-Day. Its mission
would be to seize Kashgar, the principal
Chinese city in western Sinkiang. The city
is defended by only
totaling
about 4,000 men, and could probably be
captured by D+2. Air supp'ort would include
reconnaissance and strikes on Chinese de-
fenses around Kashgar and 40 Cub sorties
per day beginning on D+1.
38. The seizure of Kashgar would permit
preparations for subsequent operations along
Route 3 south of the Tien Shan Mountains
in the direction of Wu-shih-ta-la with the
objective of destroying the
the only east-west route in the area.
F. Operations in Manchuria
39. In this hypothetical scenario, the So-
viets would penetrate Manchuria at several
points along the border between Vladivostok
and Mongolia. Their forces in the Far East
would comprise a Far Eastern Theater of
Military Operations consisting of four fronts:
the Ulaanbaatar Front, the Chita Front, the
Belogorsk Front, and the Ussuriysk Front.
In addition there would be eight divisions
allocated to theater reserve. These four fronts
would be fully mobilized by M +36. D-Day
for the operation would be M + 21, at which
time some 40 divisions could be available
for commitment. Some nine of these divisions,
in the Ulaanbaatar Front, would move to posi-
tions near the Chinese border, but would
remain in place ready to undertake operations
only if needed.
40. Air support for combat operations in
Manchuria would be provided by more than
900 FA aircraft from the Far East and Trans-
baikal MDs and Mongolia. These include
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57
about 200 Fishbed, 250 Fresco, and 100 Fitter
B aircraft. About 75 Beagle light bombers and
175 reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike
aircraft make up the rest of the force. These
units would operate from home and dispersal
bases in the USSR and Mongolia.
41. Up to 80 medium bombers of the LRA
would be immediately available to strike im-
portant targets which required heavy tonnages
or were beyond the range of FA. APVO has
about 900 fighters to protect the rear area.
Naval Aviation could commit up to 115 Badg-
ers for support.
42. Deploying from assembly areas near
Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, and Ussuriysk, the
Ussuriysk Front, supported by counterair and
interdiction operations of the 12th Tactical 25X1
Air Army and LRA bomber sorties, would
seize the Chinese cities of Tu-men, Mu-tan-
chiang, Chia-mu-ssu, and Nan-cha, all of which
are located on the Chinese rail line paralleling
the border. This front would be fully mobi-
lized by D-Day, and would consist of 13 di-
visions organized into three combined-arms
armies.
43. The Belogorsk Front would consist of
three combined-arms armies totaling 14 di-
visions by M+38. On D-Day ( M+21), some
eight divisions would be committed with some
support from the interdiction and counterair
operations of the Ussuriysk Front. The pri-
mary offensive thrust would be from Blago-
veshchensk and have the mission of seizing the
railroad towns of Pei-an, Nen-chiang, and
0-lun-chun-tzu-chih-chi. Only limited direct
air support would be assigned to these forces;
it would be provided primarily by reconnais-
sance and light bomber support from Kom-
somolsk. Thirty Cub sorties per day could be
allocated for resupply.
44. The Chita Front could be organized into
three combined-arms armies totaling 21gX
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visions by M + 36. On D-Day some eight
divisions could advance southeastward along
the Trans-Manchurian Railroad, seizing the
towns of Man-chou-li, Hailar, Ku-tu-lu-erh,
and I-tu-Il-ho.
45. The Ulaanbaatar Front with nine di-
visions would deploy to the Sino-Mongolian
border, but would not undertake ground op-
erations into China unless required. By M +36,
this front would build up to 16 divisions com-
prising two combined-arms armies and one
tank army. FA forces of the front would
operate from bases in Mongolia and the Trans-
baikal MD. Extensive reconnaissance support
could be provided, and 30 Cub sorties would
be available for resupply of critical items.
46. The planned ground operations in Man-
churia would be virtually complete by D+3,
although air interdiction, counterair opera-
tions, and reconnaissance would continue.
After seizing their objectives, Soviet forces
would have advanced to points at varying
depths from the border up to 300 kilometers.
They would then consolidate positions from
which they could continue the march to Chi-
chi-ha-erh, Ha-erh-pin, and other objectives,
if desired at a later time.
G. Naval Operations
47. The Soviet Pacific Fleet would have
little difficulty in establishing supremacy over
Chinese naval forces in the Far East. However,
the nature of the planned conflict is such
that naval operations would play little active
part.
48. In conjunction with the ground and air
mobilization and reinforcement preparations,
Soviet naval forces would deploy under the
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guise of normal exercise activity. Combatants
and the necessary logistics support forces
would establish early-warning stations, sub-
marine barriers, and defensive patrols along
strategic approaches to the Soviet mainland
south of the Kamchatka Peninsula, along the
Kurile chain, and in the La Perouse, Tsugaru,
and Tsushima Straits.
H. Post-Operation Situation
49. Upon completion of offensive operations
in Sinkiang and Manchuria, the Soviets would
consolidate their positions. The Chinese would
have enormous difficulty mounting a counter-
offensive powerful enough to dislodge the
multidivision Soviet force in Sinkiang, which
can be readily reinforced and resupplied from
the USSR. The Soviets would probably under-
take to complete the railroad line from
Druzhba to Urumchi. The nearest sizable
Chinese reinforcements are over 1,000 kilo-
meters away, and attempts to move them into
western Sinkiang would be subject to disrup-
tion by air strikes on the single available
railroad line. However, the Soviets probably
would face extensive guerrilla warfare in th
area.
50. Soviet forces in Manchuria would or
ganize defenses, conduct operations to elm
nate remaining Chinese resistance in their rear
and prepare to launch additional attacks to
ward the south if these become necessary
If the Chinese buildup in Manchuria becam
too menacing the Soviets might threaten th
use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the
would hold out the prospect of withdrawa
from Manchuria in return for substantial Chi
nese concessions on longstanding issues.
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
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e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air
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Trecauty
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2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be !os-
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