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September 20, 1973
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o Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5- , MORI C05406722 ino-Soviet Relation hip: The Military Aspects (Supporting Analysis) PIA review completed.] DEPARTMZNT OF STA 2 OCT 1973 iNRI4? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 jection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 IS DO T IS SUBMITTED BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN1 BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD. The following intelligence organizations pai.ilcipated in the preparation of ?the document: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments of Statefl and Defense, the NSA, an the AEC. ,Concurring; The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence The Director of Intelligence and Research, Dopartment of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, National Security Agency The Assistant General Manager for National ecurity, Atomic Energy Commission The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury Abstaining: The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. WARNING This document contains Information affecting ths national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage lair's, U.S. Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 708. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest Of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the dettfiment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrilnated and authorized to receive Information in the designated control channels WARNING NOTICE INTELLIOINCE SOURCES tAiltwoos INVOLVED No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5- ? Or No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 L.TS #k- /9-/2i2,/94 NIE 11-13-73 THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS TOP SECRET (Supporting Analysis) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET CONTENTS Page I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER 1 Background to the Buildup 1 The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the Border 3 Chinese Reactions 4 The Pattern of Military Interaction 5 The Cost of the Soviet Buildup 7 II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE POSTURE 8 Theater Forces 8 Strategic Attack Forces ? 15 Strategic Defense Forces 16 Naval Forces 16 III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR 17 Ground Forces 17 Air and Air Defense Forces 18 Strategic Attack Forces 19 Naval Forces 21 25X1 TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET Page IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES 21 The Adversaries' View of the Balance 21 Exercises and Contingency Planning 23 Comparative Military Capabilities 24 Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies 26 V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. 29 The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict 29 Future Force Relationships 31 ANNEXES Page ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 35 41 ANNEX C: SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA 47 TABLES Page TABLE I: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUB- MARINE ORDER OF BATTLE 16 TABLE II: COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER 25 43 TABLE C-I: NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST 49 TABLE C-II: CONVENTIONAL ATTACK TARGET LIST 51 TABLE C-HI: CONVENTIONAL BOMB REQUIREMENTS AGAINST TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES 52 TABLE C-IV: SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCE 25X1 MENT 54 TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 _TC1P__SECRE11 1 THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO- SOVIET BORDER Background to the Buildup 1. The victory of the Communists in China encouraged Soviet leaders to believe for a time that Soviet security in Asia had been enhanced. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s China emerged as an increasingly con- tentious rival of the USSR, disputing post- Stalin Soviet views on revolutionary strategy and relations with the West and supporting anti-Soviet Communist parties. Tensions on the border between the two powers grew after 1960, resulting in numerous minor incidents, and in 1963 the issue of Chinese territorial claims to large portions of the Soviet Far East and Central Asia was publicly joined. (See Figure 1.) By the mid-1960s the Soviets had come to regard their hostile neighbor as some- thing of a security threat as well as a political and ideological adversary. Annex A gives a chronology of political and mili- tary milestones in the buildup. 2. Soviet concern over the border incidents and the growing stridency of China's attacks on Soviet policies led to responses on several levels. ? In 1962 Khrushchev began to reor- ganize and redeploy the 150,000-man KGB Border Guards. By 1964, although the total number of Border Guard districts had been reduced from 11 to 7, the number opposite China had been increased from 3 to 4. By the fall of 1964 about one-half of the Border Guard force had been stationed opposite China. ? The Soviet military also showed in- creasing concern. In 1962 the Far East Mili- tary District (MD) conducted a field exer- cise whose object was to repel a Chinese invasion. In 1963 a Soviet General Staff journal warned against Chinese strategy as anti-Soviet, and in November a motorized rifle regiment moved within the Turkestan MD some 1,500 miles to the Dzhungarian 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRETL No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 2 TOP SECRET/ Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Areas and Sites of Clashes in 1969 Areas of "unequal treaties" ? Border incident (1969) Figure 1 561942 9-73 CIA TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ? a 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET Gate. Shortly after mid-1964 an under- strength division was moved from the Mos- cow to the Far East MD. 3. But Khrushchev still did not expect a large military buildup; in fact, his military budget and manpower were still planned to decline. Instead, he tried to resolve border problems by negotiations. Sino-Soviet talks took place in 1964 in Peking, but the Soviets broke them off after becoming convinced that Mao was more interested in keeping tension alive and in branding the USSR as a modern- day imperialist power than in settling border disputes. This belief was no doubt strength- ened by the first Chinese nuclear test (CHIC-1) in October 1964, which signified that the Chinese challenge was not only serious and long term, but would increasingly involve considerations of relative national power. 4. Khrushchev was ousted in the same month, and the new Kremlin leadership took steps to explore the possibility of reconcilia- tion. Moscow avoided anti-Chinese polemics, retreated from Khrushchev's demands for an international Communist conference intended to read China out of the movement, and played down the theme of peaceful coexistence with the West. Chou En-lai went to Moscow in November 1964 and Kosygin saw Mao in Peking in February 1965, but neither side was prepared to compromise on basic political or territorial issues. The principal result of these face-to-face confrontations was to dispel any Soviet hopes that the removal of Khrushchev would be followed by some improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. 25X1 The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the Border 5, Although sources were saying as early as January 1965 that Moscow was talking about the need for additional regular military forces to control the border, TOP SECRET 25X1 3 the basic Soviet decision to reinforce the border area probably was made several months later. The announcement in February that Soviet forces had been reduced to 2,423,000?a target figure set by Khrushchev in 1960?probably would not have been made if the new Soviet leadership had already decided to increase general purpose forces. In the middle of the year, however, Soviet leaders indicated publicly that defense ex- penditures would be increased, and direct communications between Moscow and Soviet Border Guard units opposite Manchuria were improved. In October 1965 Brezhnev justified to Gomulka new Soviet deployments in Asia by reviewing border incidents. In November a Soviet Army corps headquarters was moved from a point opposite Afghanistan to a point opposite Sinkiang; the transfer implied that a multidivision force would soon follow. In subsequent months regular army units began to move into the border area and to build permanent garrisons. In January 1966 the So- viets signed a treaty of mutual cooperation with Mongolia, and within the year moved a division into this client state. 6. The pattern of ground force deployment which the Soviets adopted in the course of their buildup since 1965 was largely deter- mined by the geography of the area. The prox- imity of the vital Trans-Siberian Railroad to the border in the Far East MD and the nar- rowness of the band of habitable Soviet ter- ritory along the frontier required that the buildup be concentrated in areas close to the border so that the Soviets could stop any Chinese attack and begin immediate of- fensive operations aimed at pushing Chinese forces out of reach of the railroad and back into their own territory. Where possible, and particularly to the west of Manchuria, divi- sions have also been located in or near larger cities where the principal reserves of tr,25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 1 TOP SECRET manpower east of the Urals are to be found. The large manpower and equipment levels demanded by the length of the frontier ( over 6,800 miles, including the 2,650-mile Sino- Mongolian sector) and the need to create them without drawing down forces opposite NATO or overloading the Soviet economy re- quired that the buildup proceed deliberately. Moreover, the immediate priority assigned to getting an operational force in place required that the buildup of support units be delayed until the combat forces had reached a suitable level. 7. The decision in 1965 to initiate the build- up was clearly a major policy decision, in- volving the collegial responsibility of the entire Politburo. The buildup was an impor- tant change in the Soviet military posture in Asia, and it reversed Khrushchev's policy of reducing the size of general purpose forces. The military plans to implement the decision were undoubtedly drawn up in the General Staff by the "operators"?officers of the Main Operations Directorate?responsible for the Far East. Commanders of MDs along the border probably requested reinforcements in order to maintain border security, and both Minister of Defense Malinovskiy and Chief of the General Staff Zakharov probably took an especially personal interest in these deci- sions because of their experience in the Far East in World War 11.2 Chinese Reactions 8. Although Peking became aware of the Soviet buildup on the border soon after it began in 1965, there was a lag of four years Malinovskiy commanded the Transbaikal Front in 1945, and Zakharov was his Chief of Staff. After the war, Malinovskiy remained in the Far East as commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East until 1953 and as commander of the Far East MD until 1955. 25X1 TOP SECRET before it launched specific countermeasures The policymakers in Peking, who saw the US as the main military threat in 1965, early concluded that 25X1 and Soviet actions along China's northern borders. The Chinese leaders were also at this time preoccupied internally with the gathering storm of the Cultural Revolution. 9. But by 1967 the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution had spilled over into the foreign arena. The Soviets, along with others, suffered from China's revolutionary excesses: Soviet diplomats were harassed in Peking; Chinese in Moscow put on vociferous demon- strations; and the Sino-Soviet border felt the tensions of highly-charged Chinese emotions. Within China, discord and violence suggested that the country was drifting toward anarchy. This violence reached its peak in 1967, how- ever, and Peking thereafter began reasserting its control. 10. In that year the Chinese moved five divisions from the Shenyang Military Region ( MR ), opposite the USSR, to the central region of China to help restore order. One more division was moved in 1968, bringing withdrawals to 75,000 men. In late 1969 and early 1970 five armies ( about 165,000 men) were moved from south and east China to north central China. These forces were placed on interior main rail lines along which they could move back to the south or east as well as north or west toward the Soviet and Mon- golian borders. 11. The return to a more rational foreign policy received its strongest impetus from the dangerous confrontation with the Soviets that erupted on the Ussuri River in early 1969. With the example of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in mind, the Chinese also ap- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ? ? 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 - TOP SECRET parently realized that the factionalism and confusion of the Cultural Revolution might appear to the Soviets to create a unique op- portunity for intervention. To reduce their vulnerability, the Chinese accelerated the phase-out of the Cultural Revolution, accepted negotiations with the Soviets to cool border tensions, and launched a "war preparations" drive. By early 1970 Peking had laid the groundwork for what was to become a major reorientation of its foreign policy. Abandoning the intense xenophobia and fanatic Maoism characteristic of the Cultural Revolution, Peking moved actively to develop diplomatic ties with a wide range of countries, with special attention to establishing relations with the US. The results of this effort have been, in Peking's view, gratifying. Moscow has been impressed ( and worried) by Chinese suc- cesses abroad and understands that Peking's emergence from isolation surely complicates and probably inhibits Soviet policy vis-a-vis China. In any case, the Chinese are persuaded that their international efforts, together with their continuing defensive preparations, have helped greatly to diminish the risk of hostil- ities with the Soviets. The Pattern of Military Interaction 12. The Soviet decision to build up its forces opposite China was not a reaction to an increased Chinese military threat along the border. There had been no change in the strength of the relatively meager Chinese forces near the border, no particularly violent encounter or marked rise in border incidents, nor any other event obviously affecting So- viet border security. The decision seemed rather to be a result of more general consid- erations, the principal ones being the deteri- oration of political relations between the two powers, continuing Chinese assertiveness along the border, uncertainty regarding internal 25X1 TOP SECRE 5 Chinese political developments, the failure of the post-Khrushchev Soviet attempt at recon- ciliation, and a growing concern over the longer-range implications of Chinese strategic weapon programs. 13. On the latter point, the Soviets were certainly aware, following the successful deto- nations of CHIC-1 in October 1964, and CHIC-2 in May 1965, that the Chinese had mastered the basic technology for producing fission weapons. They probably were also in a position to follow the development pro- gram of the CSS-1, the Chinese MRBM, which by mid-1965 had made sufficient progress to promise an operational capability within a year or two. The threat of even this limited capability in the hands of the Chinese may have been quite disturbing in Moscow, and the Soviets may have considered it prudent to as- sume that China would progress relatively quickly to master the technology of thermo- nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles. One concern might have been that as China developed a credible nuclear deterrent, it would feel freer to meddle on the ground along the border. Thus, from the Soviet point of view, the troop buildup may have been seen as necessary, not for the moment, but for the future when a stronger, more assertive China would emerge. 14. There was little specific interaction so far as the overall ground force buildup was concerned. The Soviet buildup generally re- flected the implementation of a long-range plan rather than one improvised or added to from year to year. In retrospect at least, it can be seen that the buildup was not pointed to- ward maximizing readiness for an invasion at some particular and early date. The Chinese ground forces did not take specific steps to counter the Soviet buildup. Even after 1969, both sides seemed concerned primarily with filling out general defenses throughout the No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 6 TOP SECRET border area, and neither side appeared to take military steps in response to specific border incidents or to troop deployments by the other side. 15. The most important point of Sino-Soviet interaction was probably the border violence of 1969, especially the March encounters on Damanskiy ( Chen-pao) Island in the Ussuri River, in which regular army forces and ar- tillery were used and dozens of Soviets and hundreds of Chinese were killed. In all likeli- hood the Soviets were genuinely surprised at the Chinese ambush. The incident raised the specter of heightened small-scale Chinese provocations all along the border that could become a bleeding sore tying down Soviet manpower and resources for years. Soviet fears of unpredictable, even irrational Chinese ac- tions had been heightened by the Cultural Revolution, and lacking any firm information on the upheavals in China, the Soviets had no way to gauge where Peking's bizarre be- havior might lead. Those Soviets who ex- pected the worst had considerable evidence to support their fears. 16. In the months following this fighting, threats and rumors of a Soviet invasion of China and of air or missile strikes against China's nuclear weapons facilities were reach- ing Peking through numerous channels, and the Kremlin simultaneously urged the resump- tion of talks. These threats were clearly more credible than Khrushchev's earlier warnings; they were more numerous, definite, and varied; the Soviets had by that time tactical as well as strategic nuclear forces available; and Soviet willingness to use military force had been demonstrated convincingly in Czech- oslovakia the preceding year as well as on the Ussuri and in Sinkiang. 17. The Chinese, in turn, were alarmed at the scale of the Soviet retaliation and at the 25X1 TOP SECRET subsequent war threats. They seemed con vinced that they faced a real and possibly imminent threat from the Soviets and tonc military and diplomatic steps to strengthen themselves. Chou En-lai finally received Kosygin in Peking in September and agreed to quiet the border and to hold talks. Both sides since then have restrained their action3 on the border. The Chinese have not resorted to attacking Soviet units on disputed terri- tory, and the Soviets have permitted the re- turn of a Chinese presence to some areas (in- cluding Damanskiy Island). 18. One possible example of specific inter- action has taken place in the Soviet missile forces. Shortly after the deployment of the CSS-1 in 1966, and continuing for the next four years, the Soviets deactivated all theit MRBM and IRBM sites in the Soviet Far East within range of a Chinese missile at- tack Moreover, the Soviets have since 1968 bull two early warning radars whose sector of cov- erage includes all of China. Chinese missile deployment also shows concern, though no preoccupation, with targets across the border. The deployment patterns of the Chinese mis- sile forces show a desire to be able to attack potential targets all around the periphery o: China, not just toward the north. A major area of deployment, in fact, is in the east cen- tral part of China, from which IRBMs can attack the USSR as well as US bases on the eastern and southern periphery of China. In addition, what looks like a phased-array early warning radar is under construction north west of Peking. It is oriented toward Soviet missile bases, but will probably not be in effective operation for several years. 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET 19. There has been very little discernible Sino-Soviet interaction with respect to the air attack and air defense forces since 1965. Soviet frontal aviation forces along the border have increased from about 200 to some 1,150 aircraft, but opposing Chinese fighter strength ( tactical and air defense) has grown from less than 850 to about 1,600, more slowly than the growth from some 950 to some 2,300 in the rest of China. Although the Chinese stra- tegic bomber force has increased from 2 to 60 medium bombers, Soviet national air de- fenses near the border have improved at about the same rate as air defenses in the western USSR and show no change in emphasis to- ward the Chinese. Aside from a concentra- tion around Peking, which would be expected in any case, Chinese air defenses appear to defend centers of population in the south as heavily as those in the north. The Cost of the Soviet Buildup 20. By 1965 Soviet Border Guards and ground, air, and strategic defense forces along the China border were costing about 0.6 bil- lion rubles a year ( the equivalent of about $2.5 billion). By 1970 expenditures for these forces had grown to some 1.5 billion rubles ( about $5.7 billion )\ Annex B discusses the problems, methodology, 25X1 and caveats in estimating costs of Soviet forces op- posing China. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, wish to empha- size the caveats in the Annex which describe serious obstacles and uncertainties in developing reliable figures. Until these are overcome, they believe that conclusions reached in Annex B must be viewed with considerable reservation. 25X1 SECRET 561940 9-73 CIA TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 7 25X1 Thus, Soviet expenditures in 1970 to counter the Chinese threat were close to 2.0 billion rubles ( $7.0 billion). The annual costs have declined slightly since then as the rate of buildup has slowed. ( See Figure 2.) Expendi- tures for forces on the Chinese border in 1965 accounted for about 3 percent of total Soviet defense spending; by 1972 they had risen to about 7 percent. Another way to gauge out- lays for the border forces is to say that they are now at about the same level as for all the Soviet general purpose naval forces. Over the eight years 1965-1972, the cumulative cost to the USSR of those forces now concerned with the China threat has been the equivalent of about $40 billion.4 The incremental cost, over Costs were not included for command and con - trol, logistics, and support elements at the military district level and above, or for Soviet naval forces in the Far East. Figure 2 Estimated Costs of Soviet Forces Primarily Oriented to Defense Against China Billions of 1970 rubles 1971 /972 25X1 25X1 8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TC)P SFCRFT what they would have cost if the 1965 level of expenditure had continued, has been the equivalent of about $20 billion. II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE POSTURE Theater Forces 21. Deployment. There are 43 Soviet com- bat divisions whose deployment indicates that they would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. ( See Figure 3.) Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near the Sina-Soviet border, Included in this total are 18-19 divisions in the Far East MD, 10 divisions in the Transbaikal MD, 7 divisions in the Central Asian MD, 2 divisions in Mon- golia, and the airborne division in the Turke- stan MD.5 The remaining five divisions are located as much as 700 miles from the border in the Siberian MD, but are undoubtedly in- cluded in Soviet contingency plans for com- mitment against China. Most of the border divisions are organized into 8 armies or corps, which are controlled by the headquarters of the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Two additional divisions ( not including CIA and DIA agree on the total of 38 divisions near the border. The DIA total includes an airborne division in the Turkestan MD which CIA does not view as being oriented primarily toward China. On the other hand, the CIA total of 19 divisions in the Far East MD includes a motorized rifle division 25X1 (MRD) at Varfolomeyevka which DIA does not count because it has not reached certain specified combat capability criteria. 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET the division at Varfolomeyevka, whose stat s is in doubt) may exist in the Far East M since there are as many as 10 regiments whic have not been associated with a particul division. .1 22. In addition to the ground combat unit an air army, a signal brigade, and a Scaleboar brigade are located in each of the Far Eas Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Tiles units are of a type that would, in wartime, b associated with a front?a Soviet wartime o ganization that controls a number of groun armies and one or more air armies. Up to fiv fronts could be created in the border are after extensive mobilization and reinforcemen 23. At least 10 specialized units?calle "fortified areas" by the Soviets?have been d ployed in the Far East and Transbaikal MD These are roughly the size of an infantry bat talion reinforced with tanks, antitank gun and multiple rocket launchers and are locate near prepared positions which they woul occupy if an enemy attack were expecte They are designed to block avenues of ap proach, to screen the concentration of force to their rear, and to canalize enemy attacks When Soviet forces have passed through the on the offensive, they would presumably ful fill their normal roles in support of the at tack. Such units are known to exist also alon the Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran. 24. Troop Strength and Equipment. Th estimated total troop strength of Soviet groun forces near the border is 360,000. Some 240,00 are assigned to the 38 divisions near the bor der, while the remaining personnel are dis tributed in non-divisional support units an headquarters. Another 30,000 troops, of whic some 20,000 are assigned to five MRDs lo cated in the Siberian MD, are available fo commitment to the immediate border area There are some 8,000-8,600 tanks in the divi 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 USSR There are 43 Soviet combat divisions whose deployment indicates that they would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near the border. The other five divisions are located in the Siberian MD. The total strength of the entire force, including nondivisional units and headquarters, is estimated at 390,000, of which some 360,000 are located in the area near the border. In addition, there are 7 to 8 combat divisions and several nonclivisional support units located in other parts of Soviet Asia which could be used to reinforce the border?a total force of some 46,000 men (27,000 in the Turkestan MD and 19,000 on Sakhalin Island and the Kamchatka Penin- sula). The forces in the remote areas of the Far East Mn, however, are not likely to be used in the event of hostilities with China because of Soviet concern with maintaining the defense of these areas. The forces in Turkestan, on the other hand, may be used against China in the absence of a threat from Afghanistan or Iran. The total number of air defense aircraft is about 450. There are also some 50,000-55,000 border guards in the immediate border area. Motorized rifle division Tank division Airborne division Air base housing tactical or air defense units Helicopter unit Helicopter assault ti25X1 rnent Scaleboard site No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 Figure 3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 71. Air base housing tactical or air defense units Tankd No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 Airborne division ?.I. Helicopter unit Helicopter assault type regiment Scaleboard site China Infantry division -711ii Armor division y Cavalry division Border defense/internal security division Airbase housing tactical or air defense units 25X1 All figures tabulated on the map are rounded to two significant digits except in cases where they were sufficiently small to make any variance significant_ Manpower figures on both sides include only the ground forces, and exclude noncombat personnel such as those at maintenance and training installations as well as personnel in paramilitary armed formations such as the Chinese militia. Figures for Soviet equipment represent an estimate of the gross inventories by type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat maneuver units, fortified area units, storage (exclusive of aircraft), army schools, and border guard units. CIA and DIA have reached common estimates except as indicated by figures appearing in parentheses, which represent DIA estimates. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 i6x1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET sions near the border and another 2,500 in border guard units, fortified area units, schools, and storage.6 These divisions have a total strength of some 2,650 howitzers and 950 antitank guns. Included in these figures are about 200 howitzers and some 400 antitank guns which have augmented the normal tube complement of about one-fourth of the 90 or so motorized rifle regiments near the bor- der. Non-divisional artillery support has been concentrated in the Far East MD, where there are 5 artillery divisions containing approxi- mately 500 artillery pieces. In the Transbaikal MD, a 72-tube division has been formed, and another is forming. Two 72-tube divisions have been newly identified in the Central Asian MD?one near the border and one some 1,000 miles northwest of the border area. There are another 500 guns either in fortified area units or in storage in areas near the border. The five divisions in the Siberian MD are esti- mated to have 9004,000 tanks and 350 howit- zers, while there are another 200 field ar- tillery pieces in storage. The forces oriented toward China have serious shortages of ar- mored personnel carriers ( APCs ); only nine motorized rifle and tank divisions have all of their APCs. Should the Soviets mobilize, they would have to rely heavily on cargo trucks to carry personnel. The use of cargo trucks to offset APC shortages in line divi- sions would probably slow down rates of ad- vance. This would also require some departure 25X1 TOP SECRET 11 from Soviet offensive doctrine, which dictat,.. that troops will fight from APCs until forc,2_ 5X1 to dismount by the tactical situation. 25. Each motorized rifle and tank division 'there are 2, possibly 3, in the ar East MU, 1 in the Transbaikal MD, and possibly two more forming?one additional brigade in the Transbaikal MD and another in the Central Asian MD. There is also a Scud brigade lo- cated in the Siberian MD. A mobile Scale- board SS-12 brigade with 12 launchers is lo- cated in each of the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. There is also one obsolescent Shaddock cruise missile unit with four launchers located in the Far East MD. 26. In addition to the forces described above, there are 7 or 8 more combat divisions in Soviet Asia which could be sent to rein- force the border: 4-5 in the Turkestan MD, and 3 in remote areas of the Far East MD ( 2 on Sakhalin Island and 1 on the Kam- chatka Peninsula). Non-divisional reinforce- ments available include a Scud brigade and a 108-tube artillery division in the Turkestan MD and a corps headquarters, a Scud bri- gade, and two 54-tube artillery brigades on Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The forces on Sak- halin and Kamchatka, however, are not likely to be used in the event of hostilities with China, at least initially, because of So- viet concern with maintaining the defense of these areas; the divisions in Turkestan, on the other hand, might be used against China in the absence of a threat from Iran or Af- ghanistan. 27. Readiness and Mobilization. The dis- tinct slowdown in the rate at which cor-1- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 12 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-521:5-8 TOP SECRET divisions have begun to appear in the border area suggests that the Soviets may be close to being satisfied with the number of divisions now formed. ( See Figure 4. )7 Nonetheless, the I There is a difference of view as to when the buildup peaked out and the slowdown began. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat strength have been achieved. As a consequence of this difference in methodology, CIA dates the beginning of the slow- down from 1969-1970; where as DIA dates it in 1971-1972. Soviets have continued to strengthen several of the divisions already in place and have added several non-divisional support units. As of mid- 1973, however, only some 25 of the 43 combat divisions near the border and in the Siberian MD were considered available for commitment within three to five days. The remaining divi- sions would require a more extensive mobiliza- tion of both equipment and personnel. Before the Soviets could conduct a large-scale offen- sive with forces now in place, they would have to fill out understrength divisional and non-divisional units. Figure 4 Soviet Divisions Opposite Chino TOP SEC T *CIA and DIA have different methods for counting Soviet divisions near the border. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat strength have been achieved. CIA considers these divisions near the border to be the primary Soviet force opposite China. 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 * a ? 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 (1 TOP SECRE 28. To meet the requirements for mobilizing units in the four border MDs and in Mon- golia, about 375,000 additional men and 85,000 major items of equipment would be required. There are probably an adequate number of trained reservists under 35 years of age to meet the requirements for staffing units in the Siberian and Central Asian MDs, but older reservists up to 50 years of age would have to be used in addition to fill out the units in the Transbaikal and Far East MDs. The required items of equipment, a high proportion of which are general purpose trucks, would be mobilized from existing stocks and the civilian economy. In the four MDs considered, 22 avtokolonnas ( truck parks whose vehicles are used in the civilian economy but driven by reservists and main- tained according to military standards) have been identified. 29. Logistics. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is the only surface route capable of provid- ing logistic support to the Soviet Far East. It can transport reinforcements to the border area at a maximum rate of two divisions per day if supplies for combat do not also have to be transported. The capacity of the high- way network is extremely limited, and road movement for large-scale military operations would be restricted to deployment to or from railheads. Probably for this reason, the So- viets have stockpiled large amounts of am- munition and fuel with their forces now in place along the border. There are some 250 known major military depots which provide ammunition and fuel support. They contain sufficient stocks to support a major Soviet offensive into northeast China and to support operations in west China. 30. Nuclear Warhead Storage. Prior to 1989, there was nuclear weapons storage at only one airfield near the Sino-Soviet border at which tactical aviation was based. Now eight 25X1 13 more tactical airfields along the border have storage sites completed or under construction. Seven of the eight provide at least three times the usual amount of bunkered storage space. This suggests that these sites are intended to supply nuclear weapons to more than one tac- tical unit and, therefore, that the airfields might be used as staging bases. ( It is con- ceivable that these airfield storage sites also could be used to store tactical missile war- heads.) 31. Prior to 1970, five tactical SSM support facilities along the Sino-Soviet border had nu- clear warhead storage available. At present what appears to be a new type of warhead storage facility, providing up to three times as much storage space as the earlier facilities, is under construction at one of these five as well as at three more tactical SSM support facili- ties in the border area. They, like the airfield sites, probably are intended to supply more than just local units. 32, Military Air Transport. There are about 105 medium transports (An-12/CUB) of So- viet Military Transport Aviation positioned where they could readily support operations on the border (60 in the Far East MD and 45 in the Turkestan MD). In addition, there are some 635 medium transport and 19 heavy transports ( An-22/ COCK) based in the west- ern USSR which would be available, should the need arise, to provide logistic support or to support airborne operations. 33. Assuming one round trip per day for available aircraft, the Soviets could afrlift, dur- ing an unopposed operation in good Weather, approximately 6,750 tons of supplies daily to a radius of about 1,250 miles or to a range of 2,500 miles. Soviet planning apparently allows for the use of as few as approximately 350 medium transports in the initial airdrop of an airborne division to a radius of at least26(^1 TOP SECRE" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 5x1 14 TOP SECRET miles. A minimum of 150 sorties would be re- quired to airland the division's combat and service support elements and much of the divi- sion's supplies after the airhead is secured. One hundred seventy-five sorties are required for the follow-up phase, while 30 to 60 sorties are needed for daily resupply. A regiment size airdrop operation would require approximately 140 medium transport sorties for the assault, 45 for the follow-up units, and 13 for daily resupply. In a ferrying operation in which all elements of an airborne division are airlanded, about 430 medium transports would be re- quired to lift this force all at the same time. 34. Heliborne Capability. In 1965, there was only one helicopter regiment in the bor- der area. There are now six helicopter regi- ments containing about 380 (275 medium and 105 heavy) helicopters.8 They are capable of performing general purpose airlift and heli- borne operations. The total simultaneous lift capability of all six regiments is estimated at 2,000 men and equipment with mortar and howitzer support. 35. Since 1969, the Soviets have collocated two of their larger helicopter regiments with two regiment size infantry units at Mag- clagachi ( Far East MD) and Mogocha (Trans- baikal MD). These infantry units are the only known combat units along a 500-mile stretch of the border and apparently have been tailored specifically for helicopter assault op- erations.9 While the more obvious purpose of There are another 100 helicopters in various head- quarters and support units. The ground force units appear to be equipped with only air-transportable equipment and lack the tanks and APCs normally found in a motorized rifle regiment. These units most likely would perform a quick reaction mission, such as protecting the Trans- Siberian Railroad where it passes through mountains close to the border from the threat of Chinese ground interdiction. 25X1 TOP SECRET these arrangements is to provide maximum mobility in a lightly defended area, they may presage the formation of large air assault units having up to 100 helicopters and several thousand troops. 36. Border Guards. There are an estimated 50,000 to 55,000 border guards positioned in the immediate border area. The Soviets, in response to the serious border incidents of 1969, reinforced Border Guard posts in more sensitive border areas with small maneuver elements equipped with tanks and APCs. Some of the maneuver elements are equipped with the T-62 tank, and the BMP personnel carrier, equipment as modern as that found in many regular units. At several locations along the border, a motorized rifle regiment has been positioned near a Border Guard headquarters, presumably to provide prompt reinforcement. 37. Tactical Air Support. Before 1965, the only tactical air strength in the border region was a small air army, with less than 200 air- craft, located in the Soviet Far East. By the end of 1969, the Soviets had three air armies ( in the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs) with some 700 aircraft in the border region. The three air armies now have about 1,150 aircraft including 500 fighters, 400 fighter-bombers, 50 light bombers, and 200 reconnaissance planes. Since 1970, the force has been modernized with 180 late- model Mig-21s. Almost 200 airfields with long runways are located within 300 miles of the border and in Mongolia. Of the 162 airfields within the USSR, 74 have hard-surface run- ways ( either concrete or asphalt) and the remainder are temporary ( e.g., graded earth). 38. The mobilization and redeployment of air units along the border would be rapid. Units could be combat-ready at dispersal fields within 1 to 2 days of a decision to mobilize. Aircraft immediately available to re- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ? 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 1 TOP SECRET inforce units along the border probably would come from the Turkestan MD, where there are 133 planes, including 80 fighters, 37 fighter- bombers, and 16 reconnaissance aircraft. Some aircraft from flyable storage or training schools could be available as attrition fillers within 4 to 5 days. 39. Approximately 600,000 metric tons of fuel are available at home bases and other major airfields along the border and in Mon- golia. This is enough for 18 days of air opera- tions. Some 500,000 tons of fuel located at storage depots would permit operations to continue for an additional 16 days. Approxi- mately 150,000 tons of ammunition are avail- able both on and off base. This would be suffi- cient for approximately 75 days of combat. Seven air force depots, 5 in the Far East MD and 1 each in the Turkestan and Transbaikal MDs, distribute air technical supplies to the air forces. Strategic Attack Forces Lio 25X1 gx1 . The Soviets could, nevertheless, use a few of their Pacific-based Y-class SSBNs against targets in China without seriously25x weakening their deterrent posture against the US. 43. The Soviets have in their Far East Bomber Corps about 132 Tu-16 ( Badger ) medium bombers and 84 Tu-95 ( Bear ) and M-Type ( Bison) heavy bombers, including tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, hon25x TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 16 TOP SECRET based in the MDs adjoining China and Mon- golia. A few medium bombers might be tar- geted against Alaska and western Canada, but it is unlikely that any would be directed against US targets farther south because of their limited radius of action. They could, of course, be used against US facilities in the Pacific area near the USSR. Most Chinese targets could be attacked by medium bombers flying from their bases in the Far East, and Soviet heavy bombers could hit any target in China. In the event of war with China the Far East Bomber Corps could be reinforced in a matter of hours by some of the 530 medium and 80 heavy bombers based in the west. Strategic Defense Forces 44. The continuous improvement in the So- viet national air defense forces along the Sino- Soviet border over the period of the buildup has been on par with the strengthening, dur- ing the same period, of air defenses through- out the rest of the USSR and in Eastern Eu- rope. It does not indicate any extraordinary concern with the Chinese air threat. There have been qualitative improvements in inter- ceptor forces along the border?at about the same rate as in the west?although the total number of interceptors has declined to around 450 aircraft. With the exception of the south- ern portion of the Prirnorskiy Kray, inter- ceptor strength continues to be below that of other land border areas of the USSR. Thirty- three SA-3 battalions and 12 SA-5 complexes have been deployed near specific target areas currently defended by 128 SA-2 battalions. Deployment of the SA-2 began in 1960, and the SA-3s and SA-5s appeared later. The total of current operational surface-to-air ( SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5) sites and complexes within 300 miles of the border now exceeds 170. In addition there are '00 operational sites 25X1- TOP SECRET and complexes in regions east of the Urals which provide defense of selected locations outside the 300-mile zone. These sites are augmented by tactical SAM units assigned to military units in the area. Since 1966 there has been a general improvement of air defense radar and communications systems. Naval Forces 45. Mission and Order of Battte. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has about 80 general purpose submarines, over 50 surface combatants of escort size and larger, as well as a naval air force of about 290 combat aircraft. ( See Table I for operational order of battle.) The primary mission of this fleet is defense against TABLE I SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS Missile Cruisers 3 Cruisers 3 Missile Destroyers 8 Destroyers 13 Destroyer Escorts 26 TOTAL 53 SUBMARINES Cruise Missile Nuclear 15 Cruise Missile Diesel 6 Attack Nuclear 9 Attack Diesel 52 TOTAL 82 MINOR COMBATANTS 317 AUXILIARIES 201 NAVAL AVIATION Medium Bomber/Air-to-Surface Missile In- cluding Tankers 118 Medium Bomber/Reconnaissance 28 Heavy Reconnaissance 21 ASW Fixed-Wing 56 ASW Helicopter 69 TOTAL 292 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 2iX1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET the US. In the event of war with China, the extent to which the Pacific Fleet would be committed would largely depend on the So- viet perception of the attitude of the US to- ward the war, and particularly the posture and activity of the US Navy in the Pacific. 46. In a war with China, the Pacific Fleet would, in any event, defend the sea approaches to the Soviet Far East, and if the US appeared to take a hands-off posture, the fleet might undertake operations off the Chinese coast. These could include interdiction of Chinese sea lines of communication, bombardment of selected targets, and support to any Soviet ground forces operating along the coast or the 25X1 Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Soviet Navy would have little incentive to attack the Chi- nese naval forces in their home waters, ugmente y some 35 attac su marines an 20 major conventional combatants expected to be normally available, these units give the Soviets a first-rate capa- bility to undertake such operations. The So- viets also have a good capability for offensive mine-laying using non-missile surface combat- ants, submarines, some missile-equipped ships, and possibly some Badger aircraft configured for this role. The conduct of large-scale mine warfare would limit the availability of the units concerned for other roles. Defense of the coasts is a primary mission of the guided- missile boats of the Osa Class, the coastal escorts and submarine chasers augmented by medium-range diesel submarines, the mari- time border guard, and the Coastal Missile Ar- tillery Troops. Soviet naval aviation, in addi- tion to antiship strikes, can perform long- range reconnaissance, free-fall bombing, mine laying, antisubmarine warfare missions, and signal intelligence collection. 25X1 25X1 17 III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR Ground Forces 48. About 1,300,000 combat and 100,000 service troops of the some 3,200,000 Chinese ground forces are now deployed in the four MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia ( Shen-yang, Peking, Lan-chou, Sinkiang). Most of this strength?slightly over one mil- lion men?is in the east, in the Shen-yang and Peking MRs. Almost all these forces are de- ployed well back from the border, most of them 300 to 500 miles from the closest points on the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. In re- cent years, the Chinese have established heavily fortified areas in the first good defensi- ble terrain below the border, particularly north of Peking. At the same time, the Chi- nese have been developing lightly-manned po- sitions closer to the border. This latter action suggests that Peking may gradually move its first lines of defense forward over the next several years. 49. Within the four MRs the combat forces are deployed as follows ( see Figure 3, page 9): a. The Peking MR has 530,000 troops, of whom 80,000 are in Inner Mongolia. The balance are within 100 to 200 miles of posi- tions from which they could defend against a Soviet advance through Inner Mongolia toward Peking. b. The Shen-yang MR has some 420,000 troops, a decline of some 75,000 troops since 1964. The bulk of these troops are concen- trated in garrisons in the southern half of the region. c. The Lan-chou MR has 240,000 troops, most of whom are strung out along almost 700 miles of rail line from Sian to a P?12 5X1 TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 18 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET about 150 miles southwest of the missile test rangehead at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. The bulk of these forces could move along these and connecting rail lines into the two good inva- sion routes in this region?the Yellow and 0-chi-na river valleys. d. The Sinkiang MR has some 100,000 troops; about 40,000 of these are deployed around Urumchi. The remaining forces are so widely dispersed that reinforcement of the troops near Urumchi would be difficult. 50. Considering the reduced threat to other areas of China, Peking might feel free to move reinforcements to the four MRs opposite the USSR from the pool of 1.8 million troops sta- tioned in the seven other Chinese MRs. The size and destination of the movement would depend on the Chinese perception of the threat. There is no information available on Chinese contingency plans. Transportation of these forces would be a major problem; most would have to move long distances over rail lines which are vulnerable to interdiction at numerous points. 51. The most significant realignment of Chi- nese forces since the mid-1950s occurred in late 1969 and 1970, when five armies (165,000 men) moved from south and east China to north and central China. These repositioned armies are now near main rail lines along which they can more readily move in any di- rection?either toward the Soviet and Mon- golian borders or toward the south and east. Two of the armies moved to the Peking MR from the east, and one from the south to the Lan-chou MR. The other two moved from the south to central China. 52. Chinese ground forces have been re- ceiving a fairly steady flow of equipment since 1969. This has upgraded their firepower and mobility. The most -=-----'ficant improvements 25X1 TOP SECRET have been in tanks and artillery. The ground forces have also shared in the general im- provements and modernization of command and control communications. There seems to be no marked priority for forces nearer the border regions in the modernization program, although there is evidence of a slight favor- ing of units in these areas. In any event, China's ground forces remain basically an in- fantry force and are distinctly inferior to So- viet forces in terms of modern equipment. Air and Air Defense Forces 53. The Chinese air defense system is so de- ployed as to provide a point defense of key urban and industrial areas, military installa- tions, and advanced weapons complexes. Al- though this system has undergone si nificant u. radin over the ? ast few ears Although air defense equipment will continue to increase in quantity and improve in ca- pability, it will take a number of years for China to complete the modernization and training programs necessary to develop a co- ordinated air defense system capable of ef- fectively defending against a large-scale at- tack by aircraft employing the latest equip- ment and technology. 54. China has about 4,300 tactical fighters, light bombers, and air defense aircraft. Of these, 440 tactical and 1,400 air defense air- craft are deployed in the four northern MRs opposite the USSR. Most of these aircraft are deployed well away from the border. More than half of the fighters and one-third of the bombers in the northern regions are deployed 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 a 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-85xi TOP SECRET in the Shen-yang MR in northeast China. The Chinese thus concede air superiority to the So- viets over most or all of the border areas, recognizing that their inventory of aircraft, mostly obsolescent, would be at a disadvan- tage if matched against Soviet aircraft close to or over Soviet territory. 55. The Chinese have deployed at least 57 SAM battalions, principally around Peking, a few other cities, and the most important ad- vanced weapons complexes. Aside from this thin deployment, 56. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it is possible that the Chinese are developing a modified version of the CSA-1. If so, this missile might be expected to have an increased range, a better low-altitude capability, and improved electronic counter countermeasures performance. Although the northern portions of China had priority in deployment of early warning radars in 1971-1972, ground control intercept coverage is still spotty and below the capabilities of the system in the east. The air units in the border areas have received no significant preferential treatment; they appear to receive normal allocations of new aircraft production. Strategic Attack Forces 57. Prior to 1966, China had no strategic strike capability against the USSR. They began to develop such a capability in 1966 with the deployment of the CSS-1. This missile, with a range of about 600 nr--255-(--ild strike Soviet TOP SECRET 19 targets only in the southern part of the Far East MD and in the extreme eastern portion of Mongolia from identified areas of deploy- ment. (See Figure 5.) Deployment of this missile continued through the late 1960s and apparently ceased in 1971-1972. became operational in 1971. This missile could strike military targets in virtually the entire Sino-Soviet border area and many urban industrial targets in Siberia. Current deployment is estimated at 25-40 launchers and continues. In late 1968, China began production of copies of the Soviet Tu- 16 medium bomber. About 60 of these aircraft have been deployed to date. Sometime within Alp npv+ fr,17.7 xrparc nnrciblv pariv ac 1W74. , it could reach well into the western USSR, possibly to Moscow and beyond. 58. The deployment pattern of these stra- tegic forces provides a capability to strike around the entire eri.? hery of China. The Tu-16 bomber con a so reac t ese targets. Thus, despite the obvious Chinese concern with the Soviet threat, the overall deployment of strategic strike forces has shown no markedly anti- Soviet bias. 25X1 25X1 25X1 59. The Chinese have shown that they con- sider survivability to be the key to their stra- tegic missile deployment. From the beginning of CSS-1 deployment in 1966, some units have been deployed in the semimobile mode. In this mode, equipment normally is kept some miles away from launch sites that have mi-4- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 20 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET Approximate Coverage of China's Strategic Weapon Systems Figu e 5 25X1 561943 9-73 CIA (5403013) TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET mum improvements, and the ites have few readil reco nizable f 60. Although the Chinese have deployed their small strategic missile force primarily to attain a strategic deterrent, there are indica- tions that they contemplate contingencies in which they could employ such missiles tacti- cally, against targets in their own territory if necessary. Deployment to date suggests that these weapons could be used against choke points along invasion routes into northeast China or against hostile staging areas in Mon- golia. If a Soviet invasion made rapid and sub- stantial progress, this option might be con- sidered as a means of forcing withdrawal with- out striking targets on Soviet territory. It is probable however, that, the Chinese would adhere to their no-first-use policy even in these circumstances rather than provide the Soviets with justification for use of their over- whelmingly superior nuclear attack forces. Naval Forces 61. Although Chinese naval forces include about 60 submarines, 6 guided missile de- stroyers, 1 destroyer, 5 guided missile de- stroyer escorts, and 5 destroyer escorts, most of their combat strength consists of vessels designed for coastal defense. These forces are not likely to venture far beyond coastal waters. 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 21 On the other hand, their capabilities to carry out assigned missions are sufficiently impres- sive to discourage attacks by Soviet naval vessels in areas where Chinese fleets are strongest. This would be particularly true in the Pohai ( Gulf of Chili), which is protected by the North Sea Fleet, containing some 275 combat vessels, including about 28 subma- rines, 6 major surface vessels, and 45 guided missile patrol boats. 25X1 IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES The Adversaries' View of the Balance 62. Soviet intelligence resources are better than those of the Chinese. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 22 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET 25X1 63. The Chinese, possibly for propa- ganda purposes, have claimed publicly that the Soviets massed nnP million troops on the 25X1 TOP SECRET border after the serious border fighting in 1969. They also expressed fear of an immi- nent Soviet nuclear attack. However, a recent Chinese assessment of the Soviet border force is closer to the US estimate, and since early 1972, Chinese fears of an imminent Soviet at- tack?ground or nuclear?appear to have diminished. (It is too early to tell whether Chou En-lai's speech at the Tenth Party Con- gress in late August 1973 marks renewed con- cern over a possible Soviet attack.) 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET 64. The Soviet force now appears to have capabilities in excess of those required to repel any force that the Chinese could send against the USSR in the next few years. But this assessment may not give sufficient weight to such key factors as the degree to which the Soviets are determined to maintain the integ- rity of the border, Soviet concern about the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and Soviet evaluations of the combat capa- bilities of the Chinese forces. Finally, it does not weigh the value the Soviets place on the deterrent effect of the forces they have in place. For example, the Soviets probably con- sider their investment well worth the cost if they attribute China's restrained conduct along the border since 1969 to the Soviet military capabilities demonstrated on Daman- skiy Island. 65. Peking elected not to confront the So- viet forces directly along the border; instead the Chinese have been building fortified areas in good defensive terrain well back from the border, thus compensating in part at least for the greater mobility and firepower of the So- viet forces. To compensate for their strategic inferiority they have been constructing under- ground facilities and dispersing and hardening their strategic missile forces. Although both sides are skilled in the use of psychological warfare and have used all available techniques to influence the outside world and each other during the dispute, all evidence indicates that each side holds the other in high regard as a military opponent. They have observed each other's military forces closely, and they are both familiar with the possible theaters of mili- tary operations. The military effort both have made is prima facie evidence that each side realizes it is engaged in a deadly earnest con- test for power in the Far East25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Exercises and Contingency Planning 66. 23 67 Peking's mili--- tary posture in the north, however, is entii25X1 TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 24 TOP SECRET defensive. Thus far, construction of fortified areas in good defensive terrain athwart in- vasion routes has indicated a preoccupation with defense of Peking. Such areas also have appeared along three major routes through mountains bordering the western edge of the Manchurian Plain, but defensive developments do not yet reflect a clearly defined plan for protecting this heavily industrialized area. Thus, Peking's present plan may be to fight only a delaying action in northern and central Manchuria in the face of a determined So- viet invasion. But over the longer term more fortifications may be constructed and troops may be moved into positions from which they could more readily react to defend the plains area. Comparative Military Capabilities 68. Assessing the capabilities of the forces we have described is complicated to some ex- tent by our imperfect knowledge of the various objective and subjective factors usually used to judge combat readiness. Their performance against each other would also depend on the specific circumstances under which combat operations were initiated. Both sides have been conditioned to expect provocative acts from the other and are prepared to retaliate. It is uncertain, however, whether these conditioned responses would be adequate to sustain the morale of the troops through a difficult cam- paign if the causes of the war were vague or ambiguous. The problem of maintaining mo- rale would become particularly acute for an invading force in any case because it would probably be met by the traditional resistance with which both sides have met foreign in- vaders. Any assessment of how the two forces would perform against the other must, there- fore, begin by recognizing that intangibles such as morale can greatly strengthen resist- ance, even against a technologically superior force. 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 69. The forces which the two sides have de- ployed along the border reflect different stra- tegies, Soviet superiority in military tech- nology and production, and the exigencies of geography. The Soviets, in order to accomplish the missions of border defense and deterrence in the Far East MD, where the Chinese threat is potentially the most serious, have been building a modern combined arms force posi- tioned farther forward than would be the case under less restrictive geographic conditions. ( See Figure 3, page 9.) The relatively nar- row band of habitable land provided by the Amur-Ussuri river system provides the right of way for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the locale for most of the important population and industrial centers in the Far East, and the location of most of the Soviet garrisons. On the Chinese side the absence of vital centers near the border permits the Chinese to deploy well back from the border and to avoid being rapidly overrun by the highly mobile Soviet forces. 70. Because of the asymmetries in the two force postures, relative troop strengths do not indicate the Soviet military superiority in the immediate border area. Soviet ground troop strength near the border is around 360,000 troops, of which some 240,000 are assigned to 38 divisions. Although the Chinese now have 1,400,000 ground troops and 1,800 com- bat aircraft in the four MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia, few major units are near the border and at least half of these troops are deployed some 300-500 miles from the closest border points. The Soviet superiority in equipment in the vicinity of the border, illustrated in Table II, is magnified by Soviet technological superiority in most major items of equipment. For example, the Chinese Type 59 medium tank is based on the Soviet T 54 A, which first appeared in the Soviet inventory in the 1949-1951 period. The cur- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ' 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRE TABLE II COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER TACTICAL AIRCRAFT TANKS ARTTLLERY MULTIPLE ROCKETS LAUNCHERS USSR" Far East MD 400 5,300(4,800) 2,200(2,100) 370(380) Transbaikal MD 350 3,200(3,100) 870 200(220) Soviet Forces, Mongolia 150 530(550) 130 36(54) Central Asian MD 250 2,000 730(800) 130 Siberian MD 0 1,000(910) 550 100 TOTAL 1,150 12,030(11,360) 4,480(4,450) 836(884) TACTICAL NUCLEAR LAUNCHERS 94 57 8 40 21 220 0 ? Soviet and Chinese strategic air defense equipment in the border region is not included in this chart because of differences in missions, equipment, and organizations. Mission, in- ventory, and capability of these forces are discussed in paragraphs 44, 54, 55, and 56. " The figures for Soviet equipment in this Table represent an estimate of the gross inven- tories by type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat maneuver units, fortified area units, ground forces storage, army schools, and border guard units. CIA and DIA have reached common estimates except as indicated by figures appearing in paren- theses, which represent DIA estimates. All differences have been influenced by order of battle variances between agencies. The tank inventory estimates, however, have been most affected by differences in methodology (see footnote to paragraph 24, page 11). All figures have been rounded to two significant digits except in cases where they were sufficiently small to make any variance significant. rent Soviet tank inventory consists largely of improved second and third generation suc- cessors to this model. The Chinese Air Force continues to consist largely of Mig-15/ 17s, Mig-19s, and IL-28s, models now considered obsolescent by the Soviet forces. The deploy- ment of F-9s is adding firepower, versatility, and range to the ground attack force, but the Soviet force remains far superior owing to its Mig-21 (some of which are the latest models) and Mig-17 fighters and its Su-7 and Su-17 fighter-bombers. A similar disparity exists in the relative antiaircraft defense posture, heli- 25X1 25 copter and transport aviation capability, com- mand and control systems, and other combat and combat service support capabilities. The Chinese have no mobile nuclear delivery sys- tems similar to the Soviet FROG, Scud, and Scaleboard. The Soviet force is also better trained than the Chinese force. 71. Soviet divisions along the border are designed for mobile warfare. They have a relatively high ratio of tanks to infantry and possess great firepower, but are supported by a logistics structure at division level which would experience considerable difficulty in TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 26 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TCIP SFCRFT supporting a prolonged period of rapidly mov- ing intensive combat. The Soviet capability to conduct prolonged combat operations would depend upon the mobilization of non-divisional logistic resources at front and army level, where the bulk of Soviet logistic support is found. The ratio of tank to motorized rifle divisions in the border areas ( 1:6 ), lower than that in Central Europe ( 1:1), probably represents a Soviet concession to the terrain and opposition they expect to encounter in China. The motorized rifle regiments of sev- eral Soviet divisions have been augmented with additional 100 mm field or antitank guns and 122 mm howitzers. The 100 mm guns may be intended for use in a direct fire role to neutralize emplaced weapons. The additional pieces improve the capabilities of the regi- ments to act independently. These minor dif- ferences in organization between Soviet forces in Asia and those in Central Europe provide insufficient basis, however, to assume that they are designed to fight under different tactical doctrines. Their organization, equip- ment, and training exercises have produced a force designed to halt any likely Chinese attack and rapidly shift to the offensive. 72. Given limitations in the Soviet logistic structure, the nature of the Chinese defenses, and the desirability of executing any campaign with stunning rapidity, Soviet planners would undoubtedly weigh the relative merits of con- ventional versus nuclear weapons in reducing Chinese defenses. Although the Soviets claim that the conventional firepower in current divisions is at least 31 times greater than that of World War 11 divisions, the use of this firepower, plus that of Soviet frontal aviation, could still result in a campaign of unaccept- ably long duration. Various Soviet spokesmen have declared that in the event of a full-scale conflict in the area all available means would be used, presumabl2j1 ding nuclear weap- TOP SECRET Ons. These assertions have generally been made while hypothesizing a clear Chinese provocation, which would provide the Soviets with the rationale to use any weapons avail- able in their own defense. Nevertheless, the Soviets would have to measure the political disadvantages of their first use of nuclear weapons and the possibility that the Chinese would retaliate in kind either against the in- vading Soviet troops or by escalating the con- flict with a strike on Soviet cities in the Far East. Under the current Chinese leadership it is unlikely that the Chinese will provide the Soviets with the kind of provocation that would clearly justify a major military response. However, if the Soviets, for whatever reason, found it necessary to initiate a major military operation against China, the use of nuclear weapons in the interest of bringing the cam- paign to a quick conclusion might have many advocates regardless of the negative political consequences and the risks of Chinese re- taliation. Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies 73. Border Clashes. Since 1969 both the in- tensity and number of border clashes have declined. Considering the emotional overtones both sides have attached to the issue and the potential for local conflicts, the reduction in the number of incidents reflects strong central control from both Moscow and Peking. No significant military capability is necessary to cause a border incident, and since there is likely to be bad blood between local units, the possibility that an incident could become a border clash is always present. Of the two sides, the Soviets have the most highly de- veloped capability to react and to control the level of intensity of such a clash. Even the local Soviet Border Guard Headquarters in some areas have tanks and APCs nearby to 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 LOA I TOP SECRET support them in meeting any Chinese incur- sion. Additional reinforcements are available from within the Border Guard district. The regular forces in the border, some of which could be heliborne to the conflict area, would be called in for situations beyond the capa- bilities of the Border Guard. Soviet rules of engagement in force along the border appear to have been given careful consideration, and any decision to move beyond these rules and escalate the clash probably would be made in Moscow, where local passions would be but one of the numerous elements which would be considered before an escalatory step would be taken. Given Soviet capabilities in the border areas, Soviet reactions to border probes could be quite powerful, but they would be consistent with the broader consider- ations of Soviet foreign policy objectives. 74. The Chinese would appear to have little incentive to resume provocative actions on the border, although they have a wide range of options available, including sabotage of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Soviets demonstrated their capabilities and determina- tion at Darnanskiy Island in 1969, and the Chinese are aware that the Soviet forces could retaliate at a higher intensity if sufficiently provoked. Any attempt to interrupt operations of the railroad would be considered extremely provocative by the Soviets and would require a Soviet punitive action in response. 75. Punitive Actions. The objectives of these operations would be to disrupt, punish, and humiliate a regional command by a strike or raid on a limited objective such as a head- quarters or other installation. For example, if the Chinese were to interfere with the func- tioning of the railroad, Soviet forces might retaliate with a raid on the major headquarters which they believed had planned and exe- cuted the Chinese operation. If it was decided not to cross the border2-5-xliation could be 27 executed by either artillery or tactical aircraft. In a more serious retaliation, a combined air- ground operation could be mounted. In either case the Chinese ability to defend in the im- mediate border area would be limited. Again, any decision to retaliate heavily would be made in Moscow and would be calculated to refresh Chinese awareness of Soviet capa- bilities. It would also be calculated to meet the needs of current Soviet foreign policy. 76. Major Conventional Campaign. In the current situation the circumstances under which a major conventional campaign would be launched can be conceived only in terms of an operation initiated by the Soviet forces. Various reasons why the Soviets would under- take such an operation can be postulated, but considering the risks such a step would in- volve, only a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Far East would seem likely to trigger such a Soviet reaction. A major con- sideration in the planning of a Soviet opera- tion would be the possibility of becoming in- volved in a protracted war. In an effort to cope with this possibility, Soviet planners would recommend significant reinforcement of their forces in place. Additional forces would increase the impetus of the initial at- tack and would be necessary to protect lines of communication and to provide protection to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The require- ment for protection of lines of communica- tion and rear areas would grow as the Soviet forces penetrated more deeply into Manchuria and China itself. The scale of reinforcement required to execute a limited operation in- tended to seize northern Sinkiang and create a 200-mile buffer in Manchuria for the Trans- Siberian Railroad has been calculated by DIA at some 37 divisions. This reinforcement would bring the strength of the invasion force to 80 divisions, about 70 of which would face northeastern China. Soviet planners wol,-z; oX1 TOP SECRE1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8,A1 28 TOP SECRET probably calculate that they could reach as far as Peking with such a force, but they would need a much larger force built up through extensive mobilization to seize and hold Peking. 77. The initial phases of any major Soviet ground campaign could be expected to give the appearance of success as the Soviet forces overwhelmed the Chinese forces on the border and proceeded into China. Soviet air inter- diction would slow and disrupt Chinese at- tempts to move PLA forces to meet the Soviet thrusts. The Soviet drive would begin to slow, however, as the first Chinese fixed defenses were encountered and as Chinese local forces began operations in the Soviet rear. Delays and Chinese successes could confront the Soviets with the choice of a protracted con- ventional war or escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. 78. Any Soviet decision to use nuclear weapons would be made at the highest po- litical level and would include such limita- tions as the political leadership deemed neces- sary. These limitations could require that tactical nuclear weapons be used only against Chinese defensive positions delaying the Soviet advance. If it were believed that the Chinese would not accept such an escalation without also resorting to nuclear weapons or if the Chinese were detected preparing to use them, the Soviets probably would plan 25X1 a concurrent strike at the Chinese nuclear weapons and facilities. 79. \ TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ? 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECREI V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict 82. Whatever prospects it may once have had for long-term "fraternal comradeship," the Sino-Soviet relationship has now plainly evolved into a stark confrontation of adver- saries, The key source of contention between the two countries is no longer, as it was dur- ing the early 1980s, primarily a dispute over China's relationship with the Soviet Union and its proper role within the socialist com- munity. The dispute has now expanded into a fundamental clash of conflicting national in- terests and ambitions, in which each side per- ceives its physical security as well as its inter- national position to be threatened by the other. 83. The recent intensification in the ex- change of recrimination, a en tion, and insult 25X1 TOP SECRET 29 between Moscow and Peking demonstrates the continuing tension and hostility in Sino- Soviet relations. A key question is whether this situation will persist, change toward a more controlled competition, or change toward the extremes of genuine rapprochement or war. 84. In view of Soviet military superiority generally, and in the border area itself, it is extremely unlikely that China would deliber- ately attack Soviet forces across the border. Chinese regular troops in the four northern MRs opposite the USSR are positioned well back from the border, and Chinese military activities in the border area, apart from strictly limited probes at particular points in- tended to support Chinese border claims, have been clearly defensive in nature. A lim- ited Chinese military action in Soviet terri- tory, such as an attempt to interdict the Trans- Siberian Railroad at some point close to the border or to raid a Soviet Border Guard head- quarters, would seem out of the question in the absence of some prior Soviet military ac- tion. Even a return to aggressive Chinese patrolling in the disputed border areas is un- likely because of the evident Soviet capacity and willingness to respond at a more powerful level. In both domestic and foreign policies since 1969 the Chinese have shown that they take the Soviet threat seriously. They have adopted publicly the posture of a threatened state, and while they have not changed their basic negotiating positions or territorial claims because of the Soviet threat, they have re- strained their actions along the border. 85. The possibility exists, of course, that a border incident, no matter how it began, could escalate toward a major military conflict. But this seems unlikely in light of the desire of both sides to restrict fighting?the Soviets be- cause they wish to avoid a drawn-out series of border clashes, and the Chinese because do not want to provide a pretext for Sow- 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 30 TOP SECRET military action. The Soviets should be able to control the level of violence in any border en- counter because of their capacity to contain locally any Chinese offensive actions, and So- viet rules of engagement in force along the border appear to have been given careful con- sideration. Any decision to retaliate heavily would almost certainly be made in Moscow. Such action could be quite powerful?for ex- ample, heavy artillery barrages?without in- volving Soviet troops in ground actions on Chinese territory and could probably be car- ried out without creating grave complications for Soviet foreign policy generally. 86. Soviet punitive actions at a higher level?raids across the border by ground troops?are improbable without some Chinese provocation more serious than the original ambush on Damanskiy Island in 1969. Neither the Chinese nor the Soviets wish to risk the momentum of their policies of detente and improved relations with the US by presenting to the world an image of unreasonableness or bellicosity. Both powers would also be aware that preoccupation with a military struggle between them might weaken their influence elsewhere. If a conflict were to break out in the border area, arising perhaps from a flare- up of border tension or a miscalculation in either capital, it would probably be limited to non-nuclear operations close to the border. 87. A major Soviet ground attack against China?whether a response to Chinese actions at lower levels of conflict or an attempt to take advantage of political turmoil within China?seems unlikely. Even more unlikely would be a deliberate undertaking aimed at the conquest of China. As noted above, the Soviets probably judge that they would have to reinforce their ground forces substantially even in order to move into and hold border areas in Sinkiang or northern China, and would undoubted1y25X1 "? ye it necessary to TOP SECRET 25X1 undertake an extensive mobilization in order to take and hold Peking. In either case Mos- cow might foresee getting bogged down in a protracted and costly struggle and being confronted eventually with a choice between withdrawal or the use of nuclear weapons in an effort to force a decisive end to the con- flict. The latter action, even if it were suc- cessful, could have many and far reaching adverse repercussions damaging to the USSR's position in the world. 88. In weighing the possible use of nuclear weapons against China, Moscow would have to give foremost consideration to the growing Chinese nuclear strike capability. It is possible that the Soviets have already considered taking deliberate action against that capa- bility?apart from any ground action-- because it is the most dramatic and poten- tially effective military aspect of the Chinese challenge to the USSR as the dominant power in Asia. But the Soviets probably believe they have not targeted all Chinese strategic offen- sive forces, and their apprehensions probably incline them toward worst-case assumptions. ( See paragraph 81, page 29.) Consequently, they now face the probability, which has been acknowledged in a Leningrad lecture, that several of China's surviving missiles could destroy military targets or cities in Soviet Asia even after a Soviet first strike. The deterrent effect of the Chinese strategic attack capa- bility will, be enhanced significantly in the next 2-3 years when an inventory of missiles capable of reaching targets in the western part of the USSR probably will become operational. 89. The Soviet leadership could, of course, simply disregard the possibility of Chinese re- taliation and proceed with an attack on the assumption that the Chinese would follow the rational course and refrain from retaliat- ing with their few remaining missiles?an 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 2.5X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-15)(1 TOP SECRE1 act of pure vengeance which would only guarantee that they would sustain even greater damage in retribution. The Soviets could scarcely count on such Chinese restraint, how- ever, and would be unlikely to jeopardize major cities unless they came to believe that inaction carried greater risks than proceeding with the attack. To date the manifold uncer- tainties and risks in any military action against China have clearly outweighed any possible advantages, and the growth of the Chinese deterrent will continue to increase the risks. 90. The military risks are not the only con- siderations which deter a major Soviet attack on China, whether by nuclear strike or on the ground. The Soviets would have to weigh carefully the significant international reper- cussions that would flow from any major Soviet campaign against China?even a limited ground invasion. So long as the Soviets were militarily involved with China, they would be concerned about possible ways that other powers, especially the US, might seek to take advantage of their reduced influence in other areas of the world. They would also have to consider the likelihood that the US would perceive a new aggressiveness or in- stability in Soviet policy and alter its policies toward the USSR, perhaps even taking steps to improve its strategic weapons program. The Soviets would also surely be concerned that their first use of nuclear weapons, even if militarily successful, might fundamentally alter world opinion against the USSR. 91. In addition to the new problems that would be raised, important existing Soviet policies would be jeopardized. Moscow's gen- eral policy of detente with the West, and most importantly its effort to foster economic ties, especially with advanced Western coun- tries, would be imperiled. The Soviet attempt to portray the USSR as a force for peace and 25X1 31 a protector of the poor, the weak, and the non-white would be undermined, especially in the Third World. Chinese hostility toward the Soviets would intensify and greatly lessen whatever chances may exist of a post-Mao or post-Brezhnev reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. 92. While Moscow is prepared to punish the Chinese at any point on the frontier where they might act forcibly to assert territorial claims, the main Soviet policy to counter China is centered on diplomatic efforts and on activities within the Communist movement, A major attack on China, especially one in- volving nuclear weapons, would involve not only accepting serious new risks, but also rejecting an established policy that has quieted the border with China and, in other parts of the world, promises political and economic benefits. Future Force Relationships 93. Just as the prospective general rela- tionship between the USSR and China is one of continuing confrontation and contest, but with no major military conflict, so the pros- pective force relationship is one in which each side maintains its forces opposite the other, but at a level which does not disrupt or distort its total military commitments. Planned Soviet divisional deployments along the Sino-Soviet border appear to be close to being realized. There is thus little prospect that future border requirements will impinge noticeably on force requirements in Europe and mutual force re- duction talks. The continued buildup of sup- port forces will also be undertaken with little effect on forces opposite NATO. The growing flexibility of Soviet strategic attack forces per- mits the Soviets to target China more com- pletely while at the same time increasing their capability against Europe and America. While no extensive modification of equipment --- 25X1 TOP SECRE" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8_5x1 32 TOP SECRET organization is foreseen, it is likely that there will be some limited tailoring of the forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier to provide a quicker reaction over longer distances. The co-location of two regiment size ground force units with two helicopter units may be a case in point. 94. To the present time, the guiding strategy of the Chinese military leadership has been to maintain China's capability to defend against attacks from all directions, and not to give preferential treatment to defense against possible attack from the north to the detriment of China's defense posture else- where. This approach was appropriate in a time when US forces were still fighting in Vietnam and were stationed in force on pe- ninsulas and islands on the eastern periphery of China. Now that US forces are withdraw- ing from Southeast Asia, it is possible that the issue will again arise as to whether the limited Chinese forces and resources should be concentrated to a greater degree against the USSR. To date there is no evidence that a basic reorientation of Chinese forces is under way, and any rapid large-scale shift seems unlikely, in part because of Chinese concern not to alarm the Soviets unduly. It would be expressed in preferential deployment of mis- siles, aircraft, and ground troops in northern China, and perhaps in increasing the capa- bilities of the Northern Fleet in relation to those of the Eastern and Southern Fleets. Until such developments occur, Chinese leaders must be considered to have given a negative answer to the question of whether China should reorient its defenses from a gen- eral capability to defend against attack from all directions to a preference for defense against attack from the north. This decision is consistent with the more realistic view of Soviet strength on the border noted above (see paragraph 63, page 22). 25X1 TOP SECRET 95. In view of the limited specific inter- action discernible in the evolution of the Sino-Soviet military confrontation, the mod- ernization of both the Soviet and the Chinese forces will continue to be determined by the general pace of research and development and weapons production throughout the respective forces, rather than by special considerations related to the border standoff. Thus, Soviet force modernization will continue largely in response to Warsaw Pact and intercontinental requirements. In fact, the resources devoted to defenses against China as a share of the total Soviet defense effort are likely to decline in the near future as the force levels planned against China are reached. 96. Peking can likewise be expected to press ahead with its longstanding program to mod- ernize its armed forces as a part of its general effort to establish China's status as a great power. It is also likely that, in contrast to the largely politically-inspired surges and slow- downs in Chinese weapons development and production in the past, future Chinese weapons development and production will take place within the framework of a more balanced economy; in this sense also, the creation of a strong China?not a specifically anti-Soviet effort?will be the touchstone of the growth of the armed forces. 97. It is possible, of course, that if Sino- Soviet tensions grow in the future, each side will build its forces into a yet more formidable posture. If the Soviets intended to develop a force along the border designed for major ground actions against China, they would probably begin by setting up a structure for a five-front force and possibly a theater head- quarters. A Chinese reaction to increased ten- sion and evidence of a further Soviet buildup would probably take the form of an increased effort to strengthen China's northern defenses. 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 I.0 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET Chinese ground forces, if they were to be prepared to undertake offensive operations away from their bases, would need enlarged logistics support, training in joint operations, and a much greater supply of tanks, artillery, and ground-support aircraft. Although Chinese forces will improve over the next few years, there is little chance that the improvement would be so great as to support a capability to undertake operations against the USSR. 98. Heightened tension would also have an influence on the strategic weapons postures of the two powers. It might cause the USSR to be more reluctant to sign an offensive arms agreement with the US; it would certainly make the USSR more determined to negotiate an agreement that would permit it to keep what it regarded as an adequate deterrent against both China and the US. In the event of an agreement limiting ICBMs and inter- continental bombers, there would be greater Soviet incentive to develop and deploy larger numbers of weapon systems oriented toward China. As for the Chinese, heightened tensions would probably cause them, among other things, to push the deployment of their region- al deterrent more rapidly, to improve their air defenses, and to establish underground shelters and defenses in even greater numbers. Chi- nese technological deficiencies and high de- velopment costs appear to preclude a success- ful effort to develop an ABM in the next decade, although ballistic missile early warn- ing radars would probably be deployed. 99. In a situation of lessened tension, it is possible that the USSR would reduce its forces along the border, though probably not to the levels existing before 1965. But even in a con- dition of general detente the maintenance of current force levels at lower levels of readiness would be more likely than any substantial reductions in those force levels. The Soviets, having made a substantial investment in equip- 25X1 TOP SECRET 33 ment and facilities in Soviet Asia, would prob- ably be inclined to allow unit personnel strength levels to decline, rather than to close bases and remove equipment. 100. Whatever the force development poli- cies followed over the next several years, however, the relative strengths of the opposing forces will change but slowly. The Chinese have much further to go in developing modern armed forces, and they can therefore make more rapid and noticeable improvements. But the Soviet research and development and in- dustrial base is so much greater that, despite any Chinese advances, the USSR will retain its substantial advantages. 101. As Soviet forces are already at higher levels of capability and readiness, it will be difficult for them to make a substantial in- crease in relative strength vis-a-vis the Chi- nese forces. The Chinese, on the other hand, will achieve increased effectiveness for their forces from relatively modest additions to the low levels of equipment now on hand and from increased levels of training. The addi- tion of a battalion of tanks to a division, for instance, would only add some 10-15 percent to the Soviet divisions, but would double the tank inventory of a Chinese division. The Chi- nese division would thus grow in capability relative to the Soviet division, but would still have only about one-fourth as many tanks. The relative changes in the Chinese posture will not be sufficient to embolden the Chi- nese and cause them to consider offensive op- erations, but they will increase the deterrent capability of the Chinese forces in Soviet eyes. 102. During the period of the 1970s, the Soviet Union will also remain far ahead of China in the strategic balance. Soviet stra- tegic attack forces are growing in flexibility and capability against China. The new Back- fire bomber will be able to cover all of Ch125x No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25x1 34 TOP SECRET unrefueled from Far East bases, an option not open to the Badger.r' 103, These increases in Soviet weapons will add to an already overwhelming strategic capability, but will not make for any ap- preciable change in the balance. Our pro- jections of Chinese missile forces, however, TOP SECRET indicate that China will be able in the late 1970s to cover several hundred Soviet targets. Soviet projections almost certainly "worst case" this development. Relatively speaking, therefore, the small growth in the Chinese retaliatory capability will carry more signifi- cance in the strategic relationship between the two countries than the more extensive Soviet growth. 104. Force developments on the border and in the strategic forces thus indicate that the optimal time has passed for the Soviets to use military force to disarm China or to coerce Peking, and that likely future Chinese force developments will further reduce Soviet mili- tary options vis-?is China, 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TrIP RFC2FT ANNEX A CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 36 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25)(1 TOP SECRET Chronology of the Buildup on the Sino-Soviet Border and Related Events, 1964-1973 Kheunbthev remeved. Political events a En Lot ed Moscow. tie *0014104g. Ostratatra occurred twat Date Oct 1964 ?Nev 1964 Feb 1$65,,.._,. Mar 1965 May 1965 Nov 1966 Late 1965_ End 1985____ Ittatda usebhcty 0400d 1r saiit in Coin psillist Maveine t. ..Mongolian Treaty 0 Assistance 0400d- , ,Saatirts' eatt 414000., trailed 00? t00 00040400C $00400001. 401tirral'000'Mutbin hego'h in Chin? Military events Chide eXpledid first a vide. Soviets have 14-13 divisions near the border, 3 divisions in the Siberian MD, and less than 200 tactical aircraft in the area.* ;Mounted troop strength at 2.,423,006, Mutual _Jan 1966 Jan-Fab 1960 Summer 1968 Late 1986_ 1966-1967_ End 1966_ 1987_ End 1967_ Chinese esptade second nuelear deVice, Soviet corps PeaddearterO Moved "fropi,PoiShant,Oel te,?!irtite kta Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border to 15. 'L its!" Chinese MR Soviet corps headquarters,, moved Irons Odessa,..10,to Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border to 18-21. deoetivoted c%:? nbiki;010,,, in Western USSR on theetledseor with target- sectors covering China. 'Three Soviet SeatiPaSkill'bitaidedePtcyeiet, aloe Soviet divisions added 'during year increased strength near the border 1968 to 22-27. Chinese 00001:00100,100 0f P00,1,_,0,..T;LI.0,416 Construction began in western R en I ? sectors')'.$0,000,00",000!*?:01` corps10001000 moved Irons began construction at two mt ern , End 1088 Soviet divisions added during year increased border strength to 25-3 Mar 1969_, ,.',?Mater'Sion-Seetit,Cieetree?eteerrediee,tbehon-pa lln ,010',10,0t)00' .00i3 " corps eafQva ' '0'00'0*, Orz,00114, ?May 1969 Jun 1969 Aug 1969 *The number of Soviet divisions listed in this chronology is sometimes expressed by two figures. The first represents DIA 's holdings; 'bp CIA s. Differences in the two agencies' holdings are explained in the footn25)(1 egraph 27. TOP SECRET 561944 (LEFT) 9-73 C 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 t ? 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Oct 1969 1999 37 , ? End 1909 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the horde Late 1969- to 27-34. Divisions in the Siberian MD increased from 3 to 4. Early 1970 1110, ArniiPe?',0101D,000014D1 8n4eti$tervehirta to der deactivated. I)) pa** trans 1970 End 1970* Mar-Apr 1971 Sept 1971 1871 End 1971 Mar 1972 Nov-Dec 1972 Dec 1972 1972 End 1972 Jan 1973 Mar 1973 Aug 1973 25X1 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near border to 33-36. Soviet divisions near the border totaled 36-37. tnt, South, By end of year, 38 divisions were in place on the border and five TOP SECRET 561 944 (RIGHT) 9-73 CIF No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 z6X1 TCP RFCRFT ANNEX B COSTS OF SOVIET FORCES OPPOSING CHINA 25X1 TOP SECRE1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 1 TOP SECRET 41 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 42 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 44 TOP SECRET I 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET RUFF ANNEX C SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA This Annex, while included in this Estimate for convenience, is not part of the Estimate in the sense that it has been coordinated within and agreed to by the Intelligence Community. Rather, this Annex has been developed by DIA and informally reviewed by military planners of the Joint Staff, in direct response to an NSC staff request for a professional US military planners' appraisal of how Soviet General Staff planners might plan hypothetical Soviet military actions against China. Within the Intelligence Com- munity as a whole there are divergent views as to the manner in which these scenarios might be planned by the Soviet General Staff and with respect to some of the details of the factual data utilized. The coordinated Estimate itself provides a full discussion of the likelihood of Soviet military action against China. I. INTRODUCTION I. A DIA study prepared in support of this Estimate presents hypothetical planning cri- teria for two strategic strikes and two con- ventional ground campaigns the Soviet Union might consider undertaking against China. The strategic strikes are described in Part II of this Annex, and the ground campaigns in Part HI. Each presents a military judgment of Soviet force capabilities based on estimates of the strengths, dispositions, and system capa- bilities of Soviet and Chinese forces, as well as on data regarding lines of communications, terrain, and climate factors. 2. From the Soviet viewpoint, the hypothe- sized attacks on Chinese nuclear capabilities would be technically feasible, although fraught with serious military and 25 X TInlitical costs and 1 25X147 risks. Operations envisaged with the objective of destroying Chinese nuclear capabilities are often popularly labeled "surgical," implying that the perceived threat can be easily elimi- nated by a small and carefully measured ap- plication of strategic striking power which would cause little or no collateral damage to China's non-nuclear resources and promise virtual assurance that the Soviets would sustain no damage in return. As the following por- trayal indicates, however, the Soviet leader- ship would have to consider employing sub- stantial nuclear power and would face major uncertainties and risks in contemplating such a strike. Infliction of such destruction and acceptance of such risks could only be justified by a Soviet perception of a clear and im- mediate Chinese threat to Soviet national security. 3. The hypothesized Soviet ground cam- paigns depict limited-objective attacks into Sinkiang and Manchuria which could ( and probably would) be executed simultaneously. In these operations the Soviet objectives are in lightly defended regions distant from the main concentrations of Peoples' Liberation Army ( PLA) forces. In this scenario, the So- viet forces would be expected to seize their objectives quickly and hold them without dif- ficulty while the Kremlin leadership nego- tiated the terms of Soviet withdrawal. 4. More ambitious attacks into northeastern China would offer more complex problems for the Soviets both politically and militarily. If, for example, the Soviet forces attempted to seize territory south of the Chita-Ha-erh- TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 48 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRPT pin-Vladivostok rail line or the central valley south to the Liaotung Gulf, the Chinese would probably react by sending forces into Man- churia from the south, and a prolonged, large- scale conflict could result. The Soviets would require extensive mobilization and a heavy augmentation of the forces now near the border. If the Soviets planned to move be- yond Peking deeper into China, a far more formidable task would face them, They would have to undertake full mobilization and would perhaps require an initial force on the order of 200 divisions in the area before beginning such a campaign. The Soviet planner would have to assume massive and determined armed Chinese conventional and unconventional re- sistance in addition to the problems of ad- ministering any occupied territory. Similar problems could also develop from the limited incursions described in Part III. The Soviets would probably only undertake them under circumstances in which they perceived a direct threat to their national interests or in which the internal political situation in China was favorable to such action. II. STRIKES AGAINST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 5. This section outlines the planning con- siderations and requirements for two hypo- thetical Soviet strategic strikes against China? one nuclear and the other conventional. The nuclear strike is designed to destroy the Chi- nese nuclear retaliatory capability and to set the Chinese capacity to produce nuclear weapons back 5 to 8 years. The conventional strike is limited to critical nuclear research and industrial facilities and is designed to set the Chinese nuclear weapons production ca- pacity back 3 to 6 years. Bomber and missile design and production facilities are not tar- geted in either strike, 25X1 TOP SECRET A. Nuclear Strike 6. The hypothetical nuclear strike is di- rected against all known deployed nuclear- capable Chinese offensive systems and se- lected Chinese nuclear weapons production and research facilities. To maximize the pene- tration capability of the Soviet bomber force, the strike would ideally be initiated at night when the performance capability of the Chi- nese air defense system would be reduced, Launch orders would be transmitted simul- taneously to the SRF complexes, LRA bases, and naval forces directly involved. Other strategic attack units would be directed to assume a condition of high readiness, as would units of the national PV0, and those ground forces which might be employed in a war with China would begin mobilization if they had not done so already. 7. Targets. Chinese targets are categorized as time- urgent or non-time-urgent based on their po- tential for launching retaliatory strikes at the Soviet Union ( See Table C-I ). The time- urgent category includes deployed MRBMs and IRBMs ( some of which are assumed to be located at training and R&D facilities) and nuclear-capable medium and light bombers. The non-time-urgent category includes Also in this category are re- search and production facilities of the Chinese nuclear program such as fissionable materials production installations, weapons fabrication plants, and weapons development facilities. Bomber dispersal bases, some missile R&D positions, and missile launch positions from which a strike against the USSR could not 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 2 25X1 25X1 * a -25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 (1 TOP SECRET TABLE C-1 NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST AIMING TIME-URGENT TARGETS Poimrs MRBM Launch Sites ? 2 IRBM Launch Sites 27 Bomber Bases " 12 R&D Launch Sites 6 Missile Command and Control Facilities e 12 NON-TME-URGENT TARGETS MRBM Launch Sites z MRBM/IRBM/ICBM Caves and Silos Missile Support MRBM/Space R&D Launch Sites Bomber Dispersal Fields Nuclear Materials and Weapons Facilities Nuclear Submarine Base TOTAL TARGETS 59 1 141 20 6 11 18 1 198 257 Target data are based on information as of May 1973. 25X1 MRBM identified and deployed within striking range of Soviet population centers. "Includes Chinese airfields within range of the USSR at which Badgers and Beagles have been identified. Excluding Peking. MRBMs not within range of USSR targets. ICBM launch facilities are still under construction. IRBM launch positions under construction are con- sidered as within the destruction radius of weapons targeted at their associated caves. be launched ( either because they are under construction or out of range) are included in this category. Non-time-urgent targets gen- erally are those which either represent a ca- pability to inflict delayed retributive harm to the Soviet Union or comprise the indus- trial and research sectors of the Chinese nu- clear program. They would come under at- tack at a more measured pace. 25X1 TOP SECRET 8. Target Vulnerability. 2455(1 All known targe s are vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack, though varying weapon size or accuracy is re- quired to achieve minimum overpressures on different structures. Nuclear weapons research and production facilities and unprotected mis- siles standing at launch sites are more vulner- able to nuclear strikes and do not demand either the yield or the accuracy necessary to destroy targets such a These are less vulnerable and would require either greater yield or more accurate weapons delivery Vulnerability in all cases is base on a p armed optimum height of burst ( air burst) to insure most efficient use of weapons. 9. Overall Kill-probability (Pk) Require- ments. In the following calculations, no non- technical ( i.e., political or diplomatic) re- straints are imposed on the attack forces the Soviets could employ, and each target in the postulated strike is subjected to an attack of sufficient destructive magnitude to provide a high probability of overall success. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 The attainment of these criteria requires allocation of more than one weapon against some aiming points. 25x1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 50 TOP SECRET 10. Alternative Soviet Strike Force Packages. Various strikes with different targeting con- cepts and force mixes were simulated by computerized wargarning with the Arsenal Exchange models. The results of the simula- tions were similar; each strike illustrated that the Soviets could destroy the Chinese targets and still retain a massive strategic capability. Three Soviet forces mixes were made available to the computer in three different simulations: ( a) a large arsenal of Soviet land-based missiles and bombers:12 (b) the same arsenal minus the SS-9; and (c) a limited force of 250 SS-11s, 10 SS-5s, and 193 bombers, which may be near what the Soviets have deployed in large part with Chinese targets in mind. Forces employed by the computer, using common damage cri- teria, against Chinese targets varied from 198 missiles (123 SS-9s) and 127 bombers to 128 missiles (118 S5-11s and 10 SS-Ss) and 192 bombers in different simulations. Results, in terms of worst-case 11. In a separate simulation the limited force of 190 SS-11 Mod 1, 60 SS-11 Mod 3, 10 SS-5, and 193 LRA bombers were all used to obtain an estimate of damage potential and possible residual Chinese retaliatory ca- " This arsenal includes all strategic attack forces except SLBMs on submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet, MRBMs and IRBMs deployed out of range of Chinese targets, and most strategic bombers in the European USSR. 25X1 TOP SECRET pability. In this simulation the worst-case sta- tistical probability of Soviet lives lost was 1.1 million in cities east of the Urals. 12. In the various scenarios, the residual Soviet land-based missile forces included be- tween 1,250 and 1,385 ICBMs. The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force would remain virtually intact. Many of the aircraft used in the attack should have returned, and more than 650 LRA aircraft based in the western USSR and more than 340 naval aviation bombers in all fleet areas would also be available. and the over- whelming magnitude of their own retaliatory forces, the Soviets would calculate the chances of a Chinese retaliatory strike as slight, whether leadership-directed or on the initiative of an individual bomber or missile crew. 14. Chinese Fatalities from Nuclear Bursts. An estimate of the likely number of Chinese fatalities which would be directly caused by a Soviet disarming strike is difficult to estab- lish with confidence because of several fac- tors which tend to complicate the analysis: ( c ) the geographic setting of each target can alter the damage done by any given weapon; and ( d) exact data on the population around each target are difficult to obtain. A DOD computer-model casualty projection has been made, however, using the best available data for population density in the various target areas. 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 :25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET number is this low relative to the overall Chinese population because most missiles and airfields are well removed from populated areas and the actual number of target areas is low. as 15. Fallout. If all weapons were detonated in- crease that wou .e ess t an t e natural regional variation that occur among inhabited areas of the world. On the other hand, if malfunctions occurred and some weapons det- onated on the surface, fall-out would be a problem in some areas , it no allowance is made for civil defense. There could also 25X1 be some danger to the Soviet and other popu- lations in the Far East. This latter damage could be reduced by alternate selection of weapons or delivery systems, but the most critical variable is weather. Summer wind patterns would minimize the danger to the Soviet population. B. Conventional Strike 16. In a hypothetical conventional operation, the Soviets would attack a restricted target list of nuclear-related facilities. The Chinese nuclear strike capability would remain fully intact and available for retaliation if the Chinese were to choose to implement that option, at the risk of devastating Soviet nu- 25X1 TOP SECRET TABLE C-II 25X1 51 clear retaliation. The primary object of the attack would be to set back the Chinese nu- clear program for three to six years by attack- ing key elements of China's fissionable ma- terials production and weapons fabrication facilities. The number of targets to be struck would be limited by the large numbers of bombs needed to achieve sufficient damage to each target. ( Table C-II gives the postulated conventional strike target list.) 17. The conventional attack, like the nu- clear strike, would begin at night when the effectiveness of th The attack would require an intensive effort by these aircraft, dropping about 32,000 tons of bombs in seven days, depending upon com- bat losses, success in achieving damage, and the number of aircraft available to replace losses sustained in combat. ( Table C-III indi- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 52 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET 25X1 TABLE C-III CONVENTIONAL BOMB REQUIREMENTS AGAINST TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES Bomn TARGET TONNAGEb 1,700 3,800 4,200 8,400 ? 750 1,450 " Require gom tonnages are compute to achieve a sufficiently severe damage level to critical elements of the target to achieve their complete reconstruction. cates specific bomb requirements for repre- sentative Chinese nuclear weapons production and R&D facilities.) If this attack were per- formed in conjunction with a land campaign, Probable Soviet Front Axes of Advance 25X1 no LRA or SNA bomber sorties would be available to support the ground forces until the strike was completed. III. GROUND CAMPAIGNS A. Setting 18. By capturing and holding territory in Sinkiang, the Soviets might plan to embarrass the present Maoist leadership, enhance latent factionalism within the Chinese Communist Party, and undermine the confidence of the people in the regime's ability to protect the nation's territorial integrity. Simultaneously, the Soviets would conduct limited military operations in Manchuria in order to compli- cate the Chinese military response in Sinkiang, to apply additional pressure against Peking, and to create a buffer for important facili- ties in the Far East. ( See Figure C-1. ) 19. While mobilizing the forces they would use against China, the Soviets would keep in place their ground and tactical air forces in Eastern Europe and the Western MDs. Figure C-1 561938 8-73 CIA 25X1 Front designations are arbitrary, TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET They would, however, redeploy ground and air forces from elsewhere in the USSR for the campaigns against China. 20. Sinkiang. The Soviets could undertake military operations in northern Sinkiang with a high assurance of success. The Central Asian MD provides a suitable staging area for supporting sustained operations in Sin- kiang. The Chinese, on the other hand, lack the necessary transportation facilities to sup- port large-scale conventional operations in the region. The area to be attacked is lightly defended by regular forces. The Chinese would not be able to prevent the Soviets from initially establishing ground and air superiority. 21. Manchuria. The Soviets would time their attack into Manchuria to coincide with their invasion of Sinkiang. Their advance into Man- churia could proceed with relative ease up to 300 kilometers in some locations, stopping short of the heavily populated and industrial- ized Manchurian Plain. It would be accompa- nied by extensive air action throughout Man- churia. The Soviets could threaten to use nuclear weapons if the Chinese did not ac- quiesce to their demands and in order to deter them from undertaking a massive counterattack. 22. Soviet combat operations in Manchuria would require large-scale commitment of ground and air forces. Despite the lack of initial resistance by organized regular forces, attacking elements would be subjected to continuing harassment by border defense and paramilitary forces familiar with the terrain and trained in guerrilla warfare. The Soviets would also be under some threat of eventual attack by the more than 20 Chinese line divisions in Manchuria as well as by other forces that could be brought in from the south. 25X1 TOP SECRET 53 B. Soviet Mobilization and Reinforcement 23. The Soviets would need to mobilize the required forces before initiating even these limited combat operations against China. Vari- ous deception measures would be instituted to conceal the scope and objective of the in- tended operations. But the Chinese would almost certainly become aware that some form of mobilization and readying of Soviet forces was underway opposite their border prior to the attack. It has been assumed that the Soviets would initiate major operations before the mobilization was complete in order to reduce warning time and consequent Chi- nese defensive measures. 24. Railroads would be the major means of transporting ground forces to their designated deployment locations. The capacity of the So- viet highway networks in the border area is extremely limited, and the road movement for large-scale military operations would be restricted primarily to deployment to or from railroads. 25. The Soviets would build up their forces in Mongolia, although no initial operations would be launched from this area. The two existing rail lines would be employed to move forces into Mongolia. Movement to deploy- ment areas would be via the primitive high- way network and cross-country. There is also an extensive network of unimproved airfields in Mongolia adjacent to the eastern border area opposite China, which would be em- ployed to augment logistic support of the forces assembled in this area. 26. The Soviets would form five fronts to conduct this projected ground and air cam- paign against China. Soviet forces facing the northeastern part of China would consist of four fronts probably headquartered in Us- suriysk, Belogorsk, Chita, and Ulaanbar2'5---x No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 54 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRET The fifth front, which we have called the Central Asian, would be established opposite Sinkiang. The total force that would be built up opposite China would consist of 80 line divisions,14 up to 2,000 fixed-wing combat air- craft," and some 500 helicopters. Forty-three of those divisions, including the airborne di- vision at Fergana in the Turkestan MD, are now located in the general Sino-Soviet border area. The additional 37 divisions would be mobilized and transported to the area. An additional tactical air army, from the Turke- stan MD, would supplement the approximately 1,150 Frontal Aviation ( FA ) combat aircraft now available to support ground operations. An eastward shift of some air units from the Moscow, Transcaucasus, Kiev, or Odessa MDs would be accomplished to fill the void left in Turkestan and to provide readily available reserves. Sufficient LRA bombers are presently deployed opposite China to support the ground campaign. All Military Transport Aviation ( VTA ) transports would be available to sup- port the campaign. 27. Twenty-two divisions could be mo- bilized and in place by M+7, 39 by M+14, and 49 by M+21, at which time hostilities are postulated to begin. Corps, army, and front headquarters, as well as support units, would not all be filled out by D-Day. The entire five-front force of 80 divisions could be in place by M+36. Local ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants stocks in excess of the combat requirements set forth in the scenario are now available in Soviet Asia. The sequence of mobilization and reinforce- ment would be as shown in Table C-IV: This total does not include two additional di- visions which may exist in the Far East MD, or the two divisions on Sakhalin and the one on Kamchatka, which remain in place under this scenario. This would include elements of Frontal Aviation, LRA, SNA, and Aviatior25X1 Defense (APV0). TOP SECRET TABLE C-IV SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT READY DIVISIONS UNIT (M+21) (D-DAY) Far Eastern Theater READY DIVISIONS (M+36) Ussuriysk Front 13 13 Belogorsk Front 8 14 Chita Front 8 17 Ulaanbataar Front . . 9 16 Theater Reserve 2 8 Central Asian Front 8 8 Front Reserve 1 4 TOTAL 49 80 C. Chinese Reaction 28. Upon detecting the Soviet preparations, Peking would initiate action to improve China's defensive posture in the northern MRs. PLA forces there would be alerted, and those units lacking personnel and major items of equipment would be filled out where possible. Concurrently, additional land and air forces would be moved northward to pro- tect Peking and the industrial areas in Man- churia. 29. Within a week or so, the Chinese could deploy as many as six additional armies to the Peking MR. The movement of sizable forces to reinforce Manchuria would probably not occur unless the Chinese were confident that the Soviets did not intend to attack Peking. Within two weeks, five more armies could be redeployed into the eastern portion of the Lan-chou MR to reinforce the two armies currently there. One or two of these armies could be moved farther westward to defend the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Center and the western end of the Kansu cor- ridor. These forces could be supported by the armored and infantry divisions currently de- ployed in the corridor south of Shuang-ch'eng- tzu. Because of the sensitivity of this area and the threat of Soviet attack out of Mon- golia, it is unlikely that any of these Chinese forces would be moved into western Sinkiang. 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET D. Seasonal Environmental Considerations 30. Climatic conditions and their effect on the terrain in the major avenues of approach are outlined in Figure C-2. Weather plays an important role in Soviet timing. Winter would be the optimal season for launching attacks simultaneously on Sinkiang and Manchuria. Fall would also be suitable for operations in both areas, but heavy rains in Manchuria in summer and melting snows in spring in both locations, cause heavy runoff, and some flood- ing which would adversely affect off-road mo- bility. 25X1 E. Operations in Sinkiang 31. Soviet forces designated for commit- ment in Sinkiang would consist of one com- bined-arms army, two separate corps, a re- serve of four divisions, and one reinforced tac- tical air army. These forces, together with their necessary combat and service support units, would comprise the Central Asian Front, with headquarters in Alma Ata. The Central Asian Front would operate under the control of the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, which would also allocate an airborne division to the front reserve and about 600 medium transport aircraft. 32. On D-Day ( M +21 ) the Soviet forces of the Central Asian Front would attack into Sinkiang. The ground effort would have Urum- chi, Kuldja ( I-ning ), and Kashgar as its initial objectives. Soviet air strikes in support of this effort would seek to neutralize the Chinese air defenses and attain air superiority for sub- sequent FA, LRA, and VTA operations as needed. Extensive air reconnaissance support would also be provided. 33. Urumchi. The combined-arms army ( three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division), supported by two regiments of FA 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 55 25X1 fighters and LRA bombers, would advance eastward in two columns on D-Day with the objective of capturing Ururnchi by D + 6. ( See Map, page 52.) Initial Chinese resistance would be light. Heavier resistance would be expected around Urumchi from the nearl 40,000 Chinese troops in the area sou eas o irumc 1. an many of the ta-ki_ 34. After capturing Urumchi, the Soviet forces would turn to the elimination of major Chinese resistance along the Urumchi-Turfan road and the capture of the lightly defended city of Turfan. They would then attack south- westward toward Wu-shih-ta-la to seize the airfields there and at nearby Ku-erh-lo. Two reinforced regiments of the Fergana airborne division could be dropped in support of this operation to help overcome a Chinese force of about 5,000 combat support and service troops. 35. In the meantime a motorized rifle di- vision ( MRD ), supported by two fighter bomber regiments, helicopters, and Cub trans- ports would be moving toward Ha-mi against light resistance. The seizure of the airfield there would be completed by D+9 or D+10. From Ha-mi the Soviets would be able to maintain air superiority over Sinkiang and continue air interdiction of the main rail line from the east. 36. Valley. A separate corps of two MRDs would operate in the I-1i Valley around Kuldja ( I-ning) against located there. This separate force would seek to secure the valley and to conduct operations against any Chinese troops ---)erating out of the surrounding mountaim25xi 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 56 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 TOP SECRET Seasonal Influence of Environmental Conditions Upon Cross-Border Movement 25X1 Figure C-2 Environmental Conditions Seasonal Environmental Conditions Affecting Offroad Cross-Border Movement Sectors 1 ? 3 Ground conditions best in winter with autumn next best. Dust or sandstorms common throughout year in Sectors 1 and 2; in late winter and spring in Sector 3. Severe winter temperatures usual in mountains and high summer temperatures common in basins within Sectors 1 and 2. Principal year- round problem in Sector 3 is shortage of reliable water supply; high summer temperatures important restraint in Sector 3 because of deficient water supply for operation of mechanized equipment. Local flooding after rains in Sector 3 during July and August. Mountain passes occasionally blocked by drifting snow in Sector 1; occasional blizzards in Sector 2. 25X1 561937 8-73 CIA Sectors 4 ? 7 Ground conditions best in winter, although at times extreme cold may pose problems. Improved offroad movement in autumn follows summer high water period. Offroad movement in Sectors 5, 6, and 7 hampered by extensive marshlands, numer- ous streams, and areas of miry soils from spring thaw to late autumn freezeup. Bypass often diffi- cult in Sector 4 for periods of several days to a week around large areas of miry ground during spring freeze-and-thaw and flooded areas during summer high water. Shortage of reliable water supply a problem in western part of Sector 4. Snow drifts may occasionally slow movement in Sectors 4, 5, and 6; strong winds may hamper winter move- ment in Sector 4, CONFIDENTIAL TOP SECRET 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 :25X1 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 TOP SECRE1 37. Kashgar. Another corps of two Soviet MRDs would proceed from the border south of Naryn in the USSR on D-Day. Its mission would be to seize Kashgar, the principal Chinese city in western Sinkiang. The city is defended by only totaling about 4,000 men, and could probably be captured by D+2. Air supp'ort would include reconnaissance and strikes on Chinese de- fenses around Kashgar and 40 Cub sorties per day beginning on D+1. 38. The seizure of Kashgar would permit preparations for subsequent operations along Route 3 south of the Tien Shan Mountains in the direction of Wu-shih-ta-la with the objective of destroying the the only east-west route in the area. F. Operations in Manchuria 39. In this hypothetical scenario, the So- viets would penetrate Manchuria at several points along the border between Vladivostok and Mongolia. Their forces in the Far East would comprise a Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations consisting of four fronts: the Ulaanbaatar Front, the Chita Front, the Belogorsk Front, and the Ussuriysk Front. In addition there would be eight divisions allocated to theater reserve. These four fronts would be fully mobilized by M +36. D-Day for the operation would be M + 21, at which time some 40 divisions could be available for commitment. Some nine of these divisions, in the Ulaanbaatar Front, would move to posi- tions near the Chinese border, but would remain in place ready to undertake operations only if needed. 40. Air support for combat operations in Manchuria would be provided by more than 900 FA aircraft from the Far East and Trans- baikal MDs and Mongolia. These include 25X1 TOP SECRET 57 about 200 Fishbed, 250 Fresco, and 100 Fitter B aircraft. About 75 Beagle light bombers and 175 reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike aircraft make up the rest of the force. These units would operate from home and dispersal bases in the USSR and Mongolia. 41. Up to 80 medium bombers of the LRA would be immediately available to strike im- portant targets which required heavy tonnages or were beyond the range of FA. APVO has about 900 fighters to protect the rear area. Naval Aviation could commit up to 115 Badg- ers for support. 42. Deploying from assembly areas near Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, and Ussuriysk, the Ussuriysk Front, supported by counterair and interdiction operations of the 12th Tactical 25X1 Air Army and LRA bomber sorties, would seize the Chinese cities of Tu-men, Mu-tan- chiang, Chia-mu-ssu, and Nan-cha, all of which are located on the Chinese rail line paralleling the border. This front would be fully mobi- lized by D-Day, and would consist of 13 di- visions organized into three combined-arms armies. 43. The Belogorsk Front would consist of three combined-arms armies totaling 14 di- visions by M+38. On D-Day ( M+21), some eight divisions would be committed with some support from the interdiction and counterair operations of the Ussuriysk Front. The pri- mary offensive thrust would be from Blago- veshchensk and have the mission of seizing the railroad towns of Pei-an, Nen-chiang, and 0-lun-chun-tzu-chih-chi. Only limited direct air support would be assigned to these forces; it would be provided primarily by reconnais- sance and light bomber support from Kom- somolsk. Thirty Cub sorties per day could be allocated for resupply. 44. The Chita Front could be organized into three combined-arms armies totaling 21gX No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 25X1 58 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 xi TOP SECRET visions by M + 36. On D-Day some eight divisions could advance southeastward along the Trans-Manchurian Railroad, seizing the towns of Man-chou-li, Hailar, Ku-tu-lu-erh, and I-tu-Il-ho. 45. The Ulaanbaatar Front with nine di- visions would deploy to the Sino-Mongolian border, but would not undertake ground op- erations into China unless required. By M +36, this front would build up to 16 divisions com- prising two combined-arms armies and one tank army. FA forces of the front would operate from bases in Mongolia and the Trans- baikal MD. Extensive reconnaissance support could be provided, and 30 Cub sorties would be available for resupply of critical items. 46. The planned ground operations in Man- churia would be virtually complete by D+3, although air interdiction, counterair opera- tions, and reconnaissance would continue. After seizing their objectives, Soviet forces would have advanced to points at varying depths from the border up to 300 kilometers. They would then consolidate positions from which they could continue the march to Chi- chi-ha-erh, Ha-erh-pin, and other objectives, if desired at a later time. G. Naval Operations 47. The Soviet Pacific Fleet would have little difficulty in establishing supremacy over Chinese naval forces in the Far East. However, the nature of the planned conflict is such that naval operations would play little active part. 48. In conjunction with the ground and air mobilization and reinforcement preparations, Soviet naval forces would deploy under the 25X1 TOP SECRET guise of normal exercise activity. Combatants and the necessary logistics support forces would establish early-warning stations, sub- marine barriers, and defensive patrols along strategic approaches to the Soviet mainland south of the Kamchatka Peninsula, along the Kurile chain, and in the La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits. H. Post-Operation Situation 49. Upon completion of offensive operations in Sinkiang and Manchuria, the Soviets would consolidate their positions. The Chinese would have enormous difficulty mounting a counter- offensive powerful enough to dislodge the multidivision Soviet force in Sinkiang, which can be readily reinforced and resupplied from the USSR. The Soviets would probably under- take to complete the railroad line from Druzhba to Urumchi. The nearest sizable Chinese reinforcements are over 1,000 kilo- meters away, and attempts to move them into western Sinkiang would be subject to disrup- tion by air strikes on the single available railroad line. However, the Soviets probably would face extensive guerrilla warfare in th area. 50. Soviet forces in Manchuria would or ganize defenses, conduct operations to elm nate remaining Chinese resistance in their rear and prepare to launch additional attacks to ward the south if these become necessary If the Chinese buildup in Manchuria becam too menacing the Soviets might threaten th use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the would hold out the prospect of withdrawa from Manchuria in return for substantial Chi nese concessions on longstanding issues. 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8 AIM= o Obiection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5- NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy ? is for the Information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the follow- ing officials within their respective departments: a. Director of intelligence and Research, for the Department of State b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ? c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army ? cl, Director of Naval intelligence, for the Department of the Navy e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force f. Assistant General Manager for National Security, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of investigation h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency. i. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, for the Department of the Trecauty j. Director of National Estimates, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of National Estimates, CIA. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or per- mission should be requested' of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC?D-69/2, 22 June 1953. 4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be !os- sified: SECRET 0 Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02: LOC-HAK-541-7-5 25X1,? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/02 : LOC-HAK-541-7-5-8