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September 20, 1973
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HA K-541-8-2- F4S.~z~a~a~r 90 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE The Sin-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects (Supporting Analysis) 25X1 toy scare NLE 1443-73 25X1 DIA review completed No Objection ptimer 1973, :o Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 TOP;. SECRET THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the document: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart- ments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC. Concurring: The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, National Security Agency The Assistant General Manager for National Security, Atomic Energy Commission The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury Abstaining: The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, U.S. Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States, It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METMODS INVOLVED TOP SECRET No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 -+ G r ? TOP SECRET NIE 11-13-73 THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS (Supporting Analysis) ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 TOP SECRET CONTENTS Page I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER ............ 1 Background to the Buildup ........................................ 1 The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the Border ........... . ............. 3 Chinese Reactions ........................................ 4 The Pattern of Military Interaction ................................. 5 The Cost of the Soviet Buildup ..................................... 7 Theater Forces ................................................... 8 Strategic Attack Forces .......? ..................................... 15 Strategic Defense Forces .......................................... 16 Naval Forces ..................................................... 16 III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR ........................ 17 Ground Forces ................................................... 17 Air and Air Defense Forces ....................................... 18 Strategic Attack Forces ........................................... 19 Naval Forces .................................................... 21 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 T SECRET Page IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES .................................. 21 The Adversaries' View of the Balance ..........................._... 21 Exercises and Contingency Planning ................................ 23 Comparative Military Capabilities .................................. 24 Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies ...................... 26 The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict ........................... 29 Future Force Relationships ....................................... 31 ANNEXES Page ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SING-SOVIET BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 ................... 35 41 ANNEX C: SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA ......................................................... 47 TABLES Page TABLE I: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUB- MARINE ORDER OF BATTLE ................................... 16 TABLE II: COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER .............................................. 25 43 TABLE C-I: NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST ..................... 49 TABLE C-II: CONVENTIONAL ATTACK TARGET LIST ............ 51 TABLE C-Ill: CONVENTIONAL BOMB REQUIREMENTS AGAINST TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES .............................. 52 TABLE C-IV: SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCE- MENT .......................................................... 54 ? ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS 1. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO- SOVIET BORDER Background to the Buildup 1. The victory of the Communists in China encouraged Soviet leaders to believe for a time that Soviet security in Asia had been enhanced. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s China emerged as an increasingly con- tentious rival of the USSR, disputing post- Stalin Soviet views on revolutionary strategy and relations with the West and supporting anti-Soviet Communist parties. Tensions on the border between the two powers grew after 1960, resulting in numerous minor incidents, and in 1963 the issue of Chinese territorial claims to large portions of the Soviet Far East and Central Asia was publicly joined. (See Figure 1.) By the mid-1960s the Soviets had come to regard their hostile neighbor as some- thing of a security threat as well as a political and ideological adversary. 'Annex A gives a chronology of political and mili- tary milestones in the buildup. 2. Soviet concern over the border incidents and the growing stridency of China's attacks on Soviet policies led to responses on several levels. - In 1962 Khrushchev began to reor- ganize and redeploy the 150,000-man KGB Border Guards. By 1964, although the total number of Border Guard districts had been reduced from 11 to 7, the number opposite China had been increased from 3 to 4. By the fall of 1964 about one-half of the Border Guard force had been stationed opposite China. -The Soviet military also showed in- creasing concern. In 1962 the Far East Mili- tary District (MD) conducted a field exer- cise whose object was to repel a Chinese invasion. In 1963 a Soviet General Staff journal warned against Chinese strategy as anti-Soviet, and in November a motorized rifle regiment moved within the Turkestan MD some 1,500 miles to the Dzhungarian TOP SECRET r No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 2 TOP SECRET/ Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Areas and Sites of Clashes in 1969 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? Lion. Moscow avoided anti-Chinese polemics, retreated from Khrushchev's demands for an international Communist conference intended to read China out of the movement, and played down the theme of peaceful coexistence with the West. Chou En-lai went to Moscow in November 1964 and Kosygin saw Mao in Peking in February 1965, but neither side was prepared to compromise on basic political or territorial issues. The principal result of these face-to-face confrontations was to dispel any Soviet hopes that the removal of Khrushchev would be followed by some improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Gate. Shortly after mid-1964 an under- strength division was moved from the Mos- cow to the Far East MD. 3. But Khrushchev still did not expect a large military buildup; in fact, his military budget and manpower were still planned to decline. Instead, he tried to resolve border problems by negotiations. Sino-Soviet talks took place in 1964 in Peking, but the Soviets broke them off after becoming convinced that Mao was more interested in keeping tension alive and in branding the USSR as a modern- day imperialist power than in settling border disputes. This belief was no doubt strength- ened by the first Chinese nuclear test (CHIC-1) in October 1964, which signified that the Chinese challenge was not only serious and long term, but would increasingly involve considerations of relative national power. 4. Khrushchev was ousted in the same month, and the new Kremlin leadership took steps to explore the possibility of reconcilia- ? saying as early as January 1965 that Moscow was talking about the need for additional regular military forces to control the border, Border 5. Although sources The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the the basic Soviet decision to reinforce the border area probably was made several months later. The announcement in February that Soviet forces had been reduced to 2,423,000-a target figure set by Khrushchev in 1960---probably would not have been made if the new Soviet leadership had already decided to increase general purpose forces. In the middle of the year, however, Soviet leaders indicated publicly that defense ex- penditures would be increased, and direct communications between Moscow and Soviet Border Guard units opposite Manchuria were improved. In October 1965 Brezhnev justified to Gomulka new Soviet deployments in Asia by reviewing border incidents. In November a Soviet Army corps headquarters was moved from a point opposite Afghanistan to a point opposite Sinkiang; the transfer implied that a multidivision force would soon follow. In subsequent months regular army units began to move into the border area and to build permanent garrisons. In January 1966 the So- viets signed a treaty of mutual cooperation with Mongolia, and within the year moved a division into this client state. 6. The pattern of ground force deployment which the Soviets adopted in the course of their buildup since 1965 was largely deter- mined by the geography of the area. The prox- imity of the vital Trans-Siberian Railroad to the border in the Far East MD and the nar- rowness of the band of habitable Soviet ter- ritory along the frontier required that the buildup be concentrated in areas close to the border so that the Soviets could stop any Chinese attack and begin immediate of- fensive operations aimed at pushing Chinese forces out of reach of the railroad and back into their own territory. Where possible, and particularly to the west of Manchuria, divi- sions have also been located in or near larger cities where the principal reserves of trained 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 manpower east of the Urals are to be found. The large manpower and equipment levels demanded by the length of the frontier (over 6,800 miles, including the 2,650-mile Sino- Mongolian sector) and the need to create them without drawing down forces opposite NATO or overloading the Soviet economy re- quired that the buildup proceed deliberately. Moreover, the immediate priority assigned to getting an operational force in place required that the buildup of support units be delayed until the combat forces had reached a suitable level. 7. The decision in 1965 to initiate the build- up was clearly a major policy decision, in- volving the collegial responsibility of the entire 'Politburo. The buildup was an impor- tant change in the Soviet military posture in Asia, and it reversed Khrushchev's policy of reducing the size of general purpose forces. The military plans to implement the decision were undoubtedly drawn up in the General Staff by the "operators"-officers of the Main Operations Directorate---responsible for the Far East. Commanders of MDs along the border probably requested reinforcements in order to maintain border security, and both Minister of Defense Malinovskiy and Chief of the General Staff Zakharov probably took an especially personal interest in these deci- sions because of their experience in the Far East in World War II? Chinese Reactions 8. Although Peking became aware of the Soviet buildup on the border soon after it began in 1965, there was a lag of four years 'Malinovskiy commanded the Transbaikal Front in 1945, and Zakharov was his Chief of Staff. After the war, Malinovskiy remained in the Far East as commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East until 1953 and as commander of the Far East MD until 1955, before it launched specific countermeasures. The policymakers in Peking, who saw the US as the main military threat in 1965, early concluded that and Soviet actions along China's northern borders. The Chinese leaders were also at this time preoccupied internally with the gathering storm of the Cultural Revolution. 9. But by 1967 the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution had spilled over into the foreign arena. The Soviets, along with others, suffered from China's revolutionary excesses: Soviet diplomats were harassed in Peking; Chinese in Moscow put on vociferous demon- strations; and the Sino-Soviet border felt the tensions of highly-charged Chinese emotions. Within China, discord and violence suggested that the country was drifting toward anarchy. This violence reached its peak in 1967, how- ever, and Peking thereafter began reasserting its control. 10. In that year the Chinese moved five divisions from the Shenyang Military Region (MR), opposite the USSR, to the central region of China to help restore order. One more division was moved in 1968, bringing withdrawals to 75,000 men, In late 1969 and early 1970 five armies (about 165,000 men) were moved from south and east China to north central China. These forces were placed on interior main rail lines along which they could move back to the south or east as well as north or west toward the Soviet and Mon- golian borders. 11. The return to a more rational foreign policy received its strongest impetus from the dangerous confrontation with the Soviets that erupted on the Ussuri River in early 1969. With the example of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in mind, the Chinese also ap- ? 0 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 is parently realized that the factionalism and confusion of the Cultural Revolution might appear to the Soviets to create a unique op- portunity for intervention. To reduce their vulnerability, the Chinese accelerated the phase-out of the Cultural Revolution, accepted negotiations with the Soviets to cool border tensions, and launched a "war preparations" drive. By early 1970 Peking had laid the groundwork for what was to become a major reorientation of its foreign policy. Abandoning the intense xenophobia and fanatic Maoism characteristic of the Cultural Revolution, Peking moved actively to develop diplomatic ties with a wide range of countries, with special attention to establishing relations with the US. The results of this effort have been, in Peking's view, gratifying. Moscow has been impressed (and worried) by Chinese suc- cesses abroad and understands that Peking's emergence from isolation surely complicates and probably inhibits Soviet policy vis-a-vis China. In any case, the Chinese are persuaded that their international efforts, together with their continuing defensive preparations, have helped greatly to diminish the risk of hostil- ities with the Soviets. ? The Pattern of Military Interaction 12. The Soviet decision to build up its forces opposite China was not a reaction to an increased Chinese military threat along the border. There had been no change in the strength of the relatively meager Chinese forces near the border, no particularly violent encounter or marked rise in border incidents, nor any other event obviously affecting So- viet border security. The decision seemed rather to be a result of more general consid- erations, the principal ones being the deteri- oration of political relations between the two powers, continuing Chinese assertiveness along the border, uncertainty regarding internal Chinese political developments, the failure of the post-Khrushchev Soviet attempt at recon- ciliation, and a growing concern over the longer-range implications of Chinese strategic weapon programs. 13. On the latter point, the Soviets were certainly aware, following the successful deto- nations of CHIC-1 in October 1964, and CHIC-2 in May 1965, that the Chinese had mastered the basic technology for producing fission weapons. They probably were also in a position to follow the development pro- gram of the CSS-1, the Chinese MRBM, which by mid-1965 had made sufficient progress to promise an operational capability within a year or two. The threat of even this limited capability in the hands of the Chinese may have been quite disturbing in Moscow, and the Soviets may have considered it prudent to as- sume that China would progress relatively quickly to master the technology of thermo- nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles. One concern might have been that as China developed a credible nuclear deterrent, it would feel freer to meddle on the ground along the border. Thus, from the Soviet point of view, the troop buildup may have been seen as necessary, not for the moment, but for the future when a stronger, more assertive China would emerge. 14. There was little specific interaction so far as the overall ground force buildup was concerned. The Soviet buildup generally re- flected the implementation of a long-range plan rather than one improvised or added to from year to year. In retrospect at least, it can be seen that the buildup was not pointed to- ward maximizing readiness for an invasion at some particular and early date. The Chinese ground forces did not take specific steps to counter the Soviet buildup. Even after 1969, both sides seemed concerned primarily with filling out general defenses throughout the No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 border area, and neither side appeared to take military steps in response to specific border incidents or to troop deployments by the other side. 15. The most important point of Sino-Soviet interaction was probably the border violence of 1969, especially the March encounters on Damanskiy (Chen-pao) Island in the Ussuri River, in which regular army forces and ar- tillery were used and dozens of Soviets and hundreds of Chinese were killed. In all likeli- hood the Soviets were genuinely surprised at the Chinese ambush. The incident raised the specter of heightened small-scale Chinese provocations all along the border that could become a bleeding sore tying down Soviet manpower and resources for years. Soviet fears of unpredictable, even irrational Chinese ac- tions had been heightened by the Cultural Revolution, and lacking any firm information on the upheavals in China, the Soviets had no way to gauge where Peking's bizarre be- havior might lead. Those Soviets who ex- pected the worst had considerable evidence to support their fears. 16. In the months following this fighting, threats and rumors of a Soviet invasion of China and of air or missile strikes against China's nuclear weapons facilities were reach- ing Peking through numerous channels, and the Kremlin simultaneously urged the resump- tion of talks. These threats were clearly more credible than Khrushchev's earlier warnings: they were more numerous, definite, and varied; the Soviets had by that time tactical as well as strategic nuclear forces available; and Soviet willingness to use military force had been demonstrated convincingly in Czech- oslovakia the preceding year as well as on the Ussuri and in Sinkiang. 17. The Chinese, in turn, were alarmed at the scale of the Soviet retaliation and at the subsequent war threats. They seemed con vinced that they faced a real and possibl imminent threat from the Soviets and too military and diplomatic steps to strengthe themselves. Chou En-lai finally receive Kosygin in Peking in September and agree to quiet the border and to hold talks. Both sides since then have restrained their actions on the border. The Chinese have not resorted to attacking Soviet units on disputed terri- tory, and the Soviets have permitted the re- turn of a Chinese presence to some areas (in- cluding Damanskiy Island). 18. One possible example of specific inter- action has taken place in the Soviet missile forces. Shortly after the deployment of the CSS-1 in 1966, and continuing for the next four years, the Soviets deactivated all their MRBM and IRBM sites in the Soviet Far East within range of a Chinese missile at- tack. Moreover, the Soviets have since 1968 built two early warning radars whose sector of cov- erage includes all of China. Chinese missile deployment also shows concern, though not preoccupation, with targets across the border. The deployment patterns of the Chinese mis- sile forces show a desire to be able to attack potential targets all around the periphery of China, not just toward the north. A major area of deployment, in fact, is in the east cen- tral part of China, from which IRBMs can attack the USSR as well as US bases on the eastern and southern periphery of China. In addition, what looks like a phased-array early warning radar is under construction north- west of Peking. It is oriented toward Soviet missile bases, but will probably not be in effective operation for several years. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 0 ? 19. There has been very little discernible Sino-Soviet interaction with respect to the air attack and air defense forces since 1965. Soviet frontal aviation forces along the border have increased from about 200 to some 1,150 aircraft, but opposing Chinese fighter strength (tactical and air defense) has grown from less than 850 to about 1,600, more slowly than the growth from some 950 to some 2,300 in the rest of China. Although the Chinese stra- tegic bomber force has increased from 2 to 60 medium bombers, Soviet national air de- fenses near the border have improved at about the same rate as air defenses in the western USSR and show no change in emphasis. to- ward the Chinese. Aside from a concentra- tion around Peking, which would be expected in any case, Chinese air defenses appear to defend centers of population in the south as heavily as those in the north. The Cost of the Soviet Buildup 20. By 1965 Soviet Border Guards and ground, air, and strategic defense forces along the China border were costing about.QJil lion rubles a year (the equivalent of about $2.5 billion). By 1970 expenditures for these forces had grown to some 1.5 billion rubles (about $5.7 billion). 'Annex B discusses the problems, methodology, and caveats in estimating costs of Soviet forces op- posing China. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, wish to empha- size the caveats in the Annex which describe serious obstacles and uncertainties in developing reliable figures. Until these are overcome, they believe that conclusions reached in Annex B must be viewed with considerable reservation. Thus, Soviet expenditures in 1970 to counter the Chinese threat were close to 2.0 billion rubles ($7.0 billion). The annual costs have declined slightly since then as the rate of buildup has slowed. (See Figure 2.) Expendi- tures for forces on the Chinese border in 1965 accounted for about 3 percent of total Soviet defense spending; by 1972 they had risen to about 7 percent. Another way to gauge out- lays for the border forces is to say that they are now at about the same level as for all the Soviet general purpose naval forces. Over the eight years 1965-1972, the cumulative cost to the USSR of those forces now cc e r ec. w h the China threat has been h"a v' 1- of a rout $40 billion.4 The incremental cost, over 'Costs were not included for command and con- trol, logistics, and support elements at the military district level and above, or for Soviet naval forces in the Far East. Estimated Costs of Soviet Forces Primarily Oriented to Defense Against China 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 what they would have cost if the 1965 level of expenditure had continued, has been the equivalent of about $20 billion. II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE POSTURE Theater Forces 21. Deployment. There are 43 Soviet com- bat divisions whose deployment indicates that they would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. (See Figure 3.) Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near the Sino-Soviet border. Included in this total are 18-19 divisions in the Far East MD, 10 divisions in the Transbaikal MD, 7 divisions in the Central Asian MD, 2 divisions in Mon- golia, and the airborne division in the Turke- stan MD.5 The remaining five divisions are located as much as 700 miles from the border in the Siberian MD, but are undoubtedly in- cluded in Soviet contingency plans for corn- mitment against China. Most of the border divisions are organized into 8 armies or corps, which are controlled by the headquarters of the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Two i1JUaW_,dWsJQp JQp.( not including " CIA and DIA agree on the total of 38 divisions near the border. The DIA total includes an airborne division in the Turkestan MD which CIA does not view as being oriented primarily toward China. On the other hand, the CIA total of 19 divisions in the Far East MD includes a motorized rifle division (MRD) at Varfolomeyevka which DIA does not the division at Varfolomeyevka, whose status is in doubt) may exist in the Far Eags D, since there are as many as 10 regiments which have not been associated with a particular division. some 20,000 are assigned to five MRDs k cated in the Siberian MD, are ava' a le fc commitment o the im are; There are some 8,000-8,600 tanks in the div 22. In addition to the ground combat units an air army, a signal brigade, and a Scaleboar brigade are located in each of the Far East Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Thes units are of a type that would, in wartime, b associated with a front-a Soviet wartime or ganization that controls a number of group armies and one or more air armies. Up to fiv fronts could be created in the border are after extensive mobilization and reinforcement 23. At least 10 specialized units-calle "fortified areas" by the Soviets-have been de ployed in the Far East and Transbaikal MDs These are roughly the size of an infantry bat talion reinforced with tanks, antitank guns and multiple rocket launchers and are locate near prepared positions which they woul occupy if an enemy attack were expected They are designed to block avenues of ap proach, to screen the concentration of force to their rear, and to canalize enemy attacks. When Soviet forces have passed through the on the offensive, they would presumably ful fill their normal roles in support of the at tack. Such units are known to exist also along the Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran. 24. Troop Strength and Equipment. The estimated total troop strength of Soviet group forces neap r er is 36 . Some 240,00 are assigned to the 38 divisions near the bo der, while the remaining personnel are di tributed in non-divisional support units an, I headquarters. Another 30,000 troops, of whit 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 There are 43 Soviet combat divisions whose deployment indicates that they would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near the border. The other five divisions are located in the Siberian MO. The total strength of the entire force, including nondivisional units and headquarters, is estimated at 390,000, of which some 360,000 are located in the area near the border. In addition, there are 7 to 8 combat divisions and several non divisional support units located in other parts of Soviet Asia which could be used to reinforce the border-a total force of some 46,000 men (27,000 in the Turkestan MO and 19,000 on Sakhalin Island and the Kamchatka Penin- sula). The forces in the remote areas of the Far East MO, however, are not likely to be used in the event of hostilities with China because of Soviet concern with maintaining the defense of these areas. The forces in Turkestan, on the other hand, may be used against China in the absence of a threat from Afghanistan or Iran. The total number of air defense aircraft is about 450. There are also some 50,000-55,000 border guards in the immediate border area. I Motorized rifle division 46 Tank division V Airborne division + Airbase housing tactical or air defense units Helicopter unit + Helicopter assault type regiment Scaleboard site 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 Figure 3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 Q a zg ro a 2 Q' ry m O q ~o m o c 5' y"~ h ~, an ro ro o a cQ d ro ry o a a ro ~_ o w` C5, z m f~ R ~? n d n 4 `~? o ,p d a ti y y fi 3. a e ro; a` ro .d 4j?ro "rods O~y n w r a h a? ~~ ~, n ,~ w ro fi ro ro ro a w ro N 5a -`'1 ro p d 5 au p d h k fi 3 ?W? `C d R 5 a Co H ~_ ~' d d~ 3 p ro a a a a y n W j c Q M1 m d p lb 203 m m fi S H ro ro ~ ro ~ j ~ )Kb Cb r d ?: H fi ro ro rz, t i + 0 N M i fl 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? sions near the border and another 2,500 in border guard units, fortified area units, schools, and storage.6 These divisions have a total strength of some 2,650 howitzers and 950 antitank guns. Included in these figures are about 200 howitzers and some 400 antitank guns which have augmented the normal tube complement of about one-fourth of the 90 or so motorized rifle regiments near the bor- der. Non-divisional artillery support has been concentrated in the Far East MD, where there are 5 artillery divisions containing approxi- mately 500 artillery pieces. In the Transbaikal MD, a 72-tube division has been formed, and another is forming. Two 72-tube divisions have been newly identified in the Central Asian MD-one near the border and one some 1,000 miles northwest of the border area. There are another 500 guns either in fortified area units or in storage in areas near the border. The five divisions in the Siberian MD are esti- mated to have 900-1,000 tanks and 350 howit- zers, while there are another 200 field ar- tillery pieces in storage. The forces oriented toward China have serious shortages of ar- mored personnel carriers (APCs) ; only nine motorized rifle and tank divisions have all of their APCs. Should the Soviets mobilize, they would have to rely heavily on cargo trucks to carry personnel. The use of cargo trucks to offset APC shortages in line divi- sions would probably slow down rates of ad- vance. This would also require some departure No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 11 25X1 25X1 from Soviet offensive doctrine, which dictates that troops will fight from APCs until forced to dismount by the tactical situation. 141 .11 halin and Kamchatka, however, are not 25X1 likely to be used in the event of hostilities with China, at least initially, because of So- viet concern with maintaining the defense of these areas; the divisions in Turkestan, on the other hand, might be used against China in the absence of a threat from Iran or Af- ghanistan. 27. Readiness and Mobilization. The dis- tinct slowdown in the rate at which combat There are 2, possibly 3, in the Far East MD, 1 in the Transbaikal MD, and possibly two more forming-one additional brigade in the Transbaikal MD and another in the Central Asian MD. There is also a Scud brigade lo- cated in the Siberian MD. A mobile Scale- board SS-12 brigade with 12 launchers is lo- cated in each of the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. There is also one obsolescent Shaddock cruise missile unit with four launchers located in the Far East MD. 28. In addition to the forces described above, there are 7 or 8 more combat divisions in Soviet Asia which could be sent to rein- force the border: 4-5 in the Turkestan MD, and 3 in remote areas of the Far East MD (2 on Sakhalin Island and 1 on the Kam- chatka Peninsula), Non-divisional reinforce- ments available include a Scud brigade and a 108-tube artillery division in the Turkestan MD and a.corps headquarters, a Scud bri- gade, and two 54-tube artillery brigades on Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The forces on Sak- 25X15X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 divisions have begun to appear in the border area suggests that the Soviets may be close to being satisfied with the number of divisions now formed. (See Figure 4.)' Nonetheless, the z There is a difference of view as to when the buildup peaked out and the slowdown began. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat strength have been achieved. As a consequence of this difference in methodology, CIA dates the beginning of the slow- down from 1989-1970; where as DIA dates it in 1971-1972. Soviets have continued to strengthen several of the divisions already in place and have added several non-divisional support units. As of mid- 1973, however, only some 25 of the 43 combat divisions near the border and in the Siberian MD were considered available for commitment within three to five days. The remaining divi- sions would require a more extensive mobili a- tion of both equipment and personnel. Before the Soviets could conduct a large-scale offen- sive with forces now in place, they wo Id have to fill out understrength divisional a d non-divisional units. Soviet Divisions Opposite China Die CU' Siberian MONAM *C/A and D/A have different methods for counting Soviet divisions near the border. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the dote of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat strength have been achieved. CIA considers these divisions near the border to be the primary Soviet force opposite China. Ank 25X 1 MAW No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? 28. To meet the requirements for mobilizing units in the four border MDs and in Mon- golia, about 375,000 additional men and 85,000 major items of equipment would be required. There are probably an adequate number of trained reservists under 35 years of age to meet the requirements for staffing units in the Siberian and Central Asian MDs, but older reservists up to 50 years of age would have to be used in addition to fill out the units in the Transbaikal and Far East MDs. The required items of equipment, a high proportion of which are general purpose trucks, would be mobilized from existing stocks and the civilian economy. In the four MDs considered, 22 avtokolonnas (truck parks whose vehicles are used in the civilian economy but driven by reservists and main- tained according to military standards) have been identified. 29. Logistics. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is the only surface route capable of provid- ing logistic support to the Soviet Far East, It can transport reinforcements to the border area at a maximum rate of two divisions per day if supplies for combat do not also have to be transported. The capacity of the high- way network is extremely limited, and road movement for large-scale military operations would be restricted to deployment to or from railheads. Probably for this reason, the So- viets have stockpiled large amounts of am- munition and fuel with their forces now in place along the border. There are some 250 known major military depots which provide ammunition and fuel support. They contain sufficient stocks to support a major Soviet offensive into northeast China and to support operations in west China. 30. Nuclear Warhead Storage. Prior to 1969, there was nuclear weapons storage at only one airfield near the Sino-Soviet border at which tactical aviation was based. Now eight 13 25X1 25X1 more tactical airfields along the border have storage sites completed or under construction. Seven of the eight provide at least three times the usual amount of bunkered storage space. This suggests that these sites are intended to supply nuclear weapons to more than one tac- tical unit and, therefore, that the airfields might be used as staging bases. (It is con- ceivable that these airfield storage sites also could be used to store tactical missile war- heads. ) 31, Prior to 1970, five tactical SSM support facilities along the Sino-Soviet border had nu- clear warhead storage available. At present what appears to be a new type of warhead storage facility, providing up to three times as much storage space as the earlier facilities, is under construction at one of these five as well as at three more tactical SSM support facili- ties in the border area. They, like the airfield sites, probably are intended to supply more than just local units. 32. Military Air Transport. There are about 105 medium transports (An-12/CUB) of So- viet Military Transport Aviation positioned where they could readily support operations on the border (60 in the Far East MD and 45 in the Turkestan MD). In addition, there are some 635 medium transport and 19 heavy transports (An-22/COCK) based in the west- ern USSR which would be available, should the need arise, to provide logistic support or to support airborne operations. 33. Assuming one round trip per day for available aircraft, the Soviets could aiilift, dur- ing an unopposed operation in good weather, approximately 6,750 tons of supplies daily to a radius of about 1,250 miles or to a range of 2,500 miles. Soviet planning apparently allows for the use of as few as approximately 350 medium transports in the initial airdrop of an airborne division to a radius of at least 850 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1 i No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 miles. A minimum of 150 sorties would be re- quired to airland the division's combat and service support elements and much of the divi- sion's supplies after the airhead is secured. One hundred seventy-five sorties are required for the follow-up phase, while 30 to 60 sorties are needed for daily resupply. A regiment size airdrop operation would require approximately 140 medium transport sorties for the assault, 45 for the follow-up units, and 13 for daily resupply. In a ferrying operation in which all elements of an airborne division are airlanded, about 430 medium transports would be re- quired to lift this force all at the same time. 34. Heliborne Capability. In 1965, there was only one helicopter regiment in the bor- der area. There are now six helicopter regi- ments containing about 380 (275 medium and 105 heavy) helicopters." They are capable of performing general purpose airlift and heli- borne operations. The total simultaneous lift capability of all six regiments is estimated at 2,000 men and equipment with mortar and howitzer support. 35. Since 1969, the Soviets have collocated two of their larger helicopter regiments with two regiment size infantry units at Mag- dagachi (Far East MD) and Mogocha (Trans- baikal MD). These infantry units are the only known combat units along a 500-mile stretch of the border and apparently have been tailored specifically for helicopter assault op- erations Y While the more obvious purpose of s There are another 100 helicopters in various head- quarters and support units. The ground force units appear to be equipped with only air-transportable equipment and lack the tanks and APCs normally found in a motorized rifle regiment. These units most likely would perform a quick reaction mission, such as protecting the Trans- Siberian Railroad where it passes through mountains close to the border from the threat of Chinese ground interdiction. these arrangements is to provide maxim mobility in a lightly defended area, they may presage the formation of large air assault units having up to 100 helicopters and several thousand troops. 36. Border Guards. There are an estimated 50,000 to 55,000 border guards positioned n the immediate border area. The Soviets, n response to the serious border incidents f 1969, reinforced Border Guard posts in mo e sensitive border areas with small maneuv r elements equipped with tanks and APCs. So e of the maneuver elements are equipped wi h the T-62 tank, and the BMP personnel carri , equipment as modern as that found in ma y regular units. At several locations along the border, a motorized rifle regiment has been positioned near a Border Guard headquarte , presumably to provide prompt reinforcement. 37. Tactical Air Support. Before 1965, the only tactical air strength in the border regi n was a small air army, with less than 200 ai - craft, located in the Soviet Far East. By t le end of 1969, the Soviets had three air armies (in the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs) with some 700 aircraft in the border region. The three air armies now ha e about 1,150 aircraft including 500 fighter 3, 400 fighter-bombers, 50 light bombers, an 200 reconnaissance planes. Since 1970, the force has been modernized with 180 late- model Mig-21s. Almost 200 airfields with long runways are located within 300 miles of t border and in Mongolia. Of the 162 airfields within the USSR, 74 have hard-surface r - ways (either concrete or asphalt) and the remainder are temporary (e.g., graded earth . 38. The mobilization and redeployment f air units along the border would be rapi . Units could be combat-ready at dispers 1 fields within 1 to 2 days of a decision t mobilize. Aircraft immediately available to r - 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? ? inforce units along the border probably would come from the Turkestan MD, where there are 133 planes, including 80 fighters, 37 fighter- bombers, and 16 reconnaissance aircraft. Some aircraft from flyable storage or training schools could be available as attrition fillers within 4 to 5 days. 39. Approximately 600,000 metric tons of fuel are available at home bases and other major airfields along the border and in Mon- golia. This is enough for 18 days of air opera- tions. Some 500,000 tons of fuel located at storage depots would permit operations to continue for an additional 16 days. Approxi- mately 150,000 tons of ammunition are avail- able both on and off base. This would be suffi- cient for approximately 75 days of combat. Seven air force depots, 5 in the Far East MD and 1 each in the Turkestan and Transbaikal MDs, distribute air technical supplies to the air forces. Strategic Attack Forces The Soviets could, nevertheless, use a ? few of their Pacific-based Y-class SSBNs against targets in China without seriously weakening their deterrent posture against the US. 43. The Soviets have in their Far East Bomber Corps about 132 Tu-16 (Badger) medium bombers and 84 Tu-95 (Bear) and M-Type (Bison) heavy bombers, including tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, home- 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 15 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 based in the MDs adjoining China and Mon- golia. A few medium bombers might be tar- geted against Alaska and western Canada, but it is unlikely that any would be directed against US targets farther south because of their limited radius of action. They could, of course, be used against US facilities in the Pacific area near the USSR. Most Chinese targets could be attacked by medium bombers flying from their bases in the Far East, and Soviet heavy bombers could hit any target in China. In the event of war with China the Far East Bomber Corps could be reinforced in a matter of hours by some of the 530 medium and 80 heavy bombers based in the west. Strategic Defense Forces 44. The continuous improvement in the So- viet national air defense forces along the Sino- Soviet border over the period of the buildup has been on par with the strengthening, dur- ing the same period, of air defenses through- out the rest of the USSR and in Eastern Eu- rope. It does not indicate any extraordinary concern with the Chinese air threat. There have been qualitative improvements in inter- ceptor forces along the border-at about the same rate as in the west-although the total number of interceptors has declined to around 450 aircraft. With the exception of the south- ern portion of the Primorskiy Kray, inter- ceptor strength continues to be below that of other land border areas of the USSR. Thirty- three SA-3 battalions and 12 SA-5 complexes have been deployed near specific target areas currently defended by 128 SA-2 battalions. Deployment' of the SA-2 began in 1960, and the SA-3s and SA-5s appeared later. The total of current operational surface-to-air (SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5) sites and complexes within 300 miles of the border now exceeds 170. In addition there are about 100 operational sites and complexes in regions east of the Ur is which provide defense of selected locations outside the 300-mile zone. These sites are augmented by tactical SAM units assigned to military units in the area. Since 1966 th re has been a general improvement of air defe se radar and communications systems. Naval Forces 45. Mission and Order of Battle. The So et Pacific Fleet has about 80 general purlx se submarines, over 50 surface combatants of escort size and larger, as well as a naval it force of about 290 combat aircraft. (S e Table I for operational order of battle.) Tie primary mission of this fleet is defense ag . t SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS Missile Cruisers 3 Cruisers ......... ........... 3 Missile Destroyers .......... ... 8 Destroyers 3 Destroyer Escorts ....................... TOTAL ........... .................. SUBMARINES Cruise Missile Nuclear ...... . ............ . Cruise Missile Diesel ..................... 6 Attack Nuclear .......................... 9 Attack Diesel ........................... TOTAL MINOR COMBATANTS .................J72 AUXILIARIES ............................ 1 NAVAL AVIATION Medium Bomber/Air-to-Surface Missile In- Medium Bomber/Reconnaissance .......... . Heavy Reconnaissance .................... ASW Fixed-Wing ...................... . AS W Helicopter ........................ . No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? the US. In the event of war with China, the extent to which the Pacific Fleet would be committed would largely depend on the So- viet perception of the attitude of the US to- ward the war, and particularly the posture and activity of the US Navy in the Pacific. 46. In a war with China, the Pacific Fleet would, in any event, defend the sea approaches to the Soviet Far East, and if the US appeared to take a hands-off posture, the fleet might undertake operations off the Chinese coast. These could include interdiction of Chinese sea lines of communication, bombardment of selected targets, and support to any Soviet ground forces operating along the coast or the Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Soviet Navy would have little incentive to attack the Chi- nese naval forces in their home waters. ugmente by some 35 attack submarines and 20 major conventional combatants expected to be normally available, these units give the Soviets a first-rate capa- bility to undertake such operations. The So- viets also have a good capability for offensive mine-laying using non-missile surface combat- ants, submarines, some missile-equipped ships, and possibly some Badger aircraft configured for this role. The conduct of large-scale mine warfare would limit the availability of the units concerned for other roles. Defense of the coasts is a primary mission of the guided- missile boats of the Osa Class, the coastal escorts and submarine chasers augmented by medium-range diesel submarines, the mari- time border guard, and the Coastal Missile Ar- tillery Troops. Soviet naval aviation, in addi- tion to antiship strikes, can perform long- range reconnaissance, free-fall bombing, mine laying, antisubmarine warfare missions, and signal intelligence collection. III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR 17 25X1 25X1 Ground Forces 48. About 1,300,000 combat and 100,000 service troops of the some 3,200,000 Chinese ground forces are now deployed in the four MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia (Shen-yang, Peking, Lan-chou, Sinkiang). Most of this strength-slightly over one mil- lion men-is in the east, in the Shen-yang and Peking MRs. Almost all these forces are de- ployed well back from the border, most of them 300 to 500 miles from the closest points on the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. In re- cent years, the Chinese have established heavily fortified areas in the first good defensi- ble terrain below the border, particularly north of Peking. At the same time, the Chi- nese have been developing lightly-manned po- sitions closer to the border. This latter action suggests that Peking may gradually move its first lines of defense forward over the next several years. 49. Within the four MRs the combat forces are deployed as follows (see Figure 3, page 9): a. The Peking MR has 530,000 troops, of whom 80,000 are in Inner Mongolia. The balance are within 100 to 200 miles of posi- tions from which they could defend against a Soviet advance through Inner Mongolia toward Peking. b. The Shen-yang MR has some 420,000 troops, a decline of some 75,000 troops since 1964. The bulk of these troops are concen- trated in garrisons in the southern half of the region. c. The Lan-chow MR has 240,000 troops, most of whom are strung out along almost 700 miles of rail line from Sian to a point No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 about 150 miles southwest of the missile test rangehead at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. The bulk of these forces could move along these and connecting rail lines into the two good inva- sion routes in this region-the Yellow and 0-chi-na river valleys. d. The Sinkiang MR has some 100,000 troops; about 40,000 of these are deployed around Urumchi. The remaining forces are so widely dispersed that reinforcement of the troops near Urumehi would be difficult. 50. Considering the reduced threat to other areas of China, Peking might feel free to move reinforcements to the four MRs opposite the USSR from the pool of 1.8 million troops sta- tioned in the seven other Chinese MRs. The size and destination of the movement would depend on the Chinese perception of the threat. There is no information available on Chinese contingency plans. Transportation of these forces would be a major problem; most would have to move long distances over rail lines which are vulnerable to interdiction at numerous points. 51. The most significant realignment of Chi- nese forces since the mid-1950s occurred in late 1969 and 1970, when five armies (165,000 men) moved from south and east China to north and central China. These repositioned armies are now near main rail lines along which they can more readily move in any di- rection-either toward the Soviet and Mon- golian borders or toward the south and east. Two of the armies moved to the Peking MR from the east, and one from the south to the Lan-thou MR. The other two moved from the south to central China. 52. Chinese ground forces have been re- ceiving a fairly steady flow of equipment since 1969. This has upgraded their firepower and mobility. The most significant improvements have been in tanks and artillery. The ground forces have also shared in the general i provernents and modernization of command and control communications. There seems o be no marked priority for forces nearer the border regions in the modernization progra although there is evidence of a slight fav ing of units in these areas. In any event, China's ground forces remain basically an i fantry force and are distinctly inferior to S viet forces in terms of modern equipment. Air and Air Defense Forces 53. The Chinese air defense system is so d ployed as to provide a point defense of k urban and industrial areas, military install tions, and advanced weapons complexes. 1- though this system has undergone significa t upgrading over the past few years, Although air defense equipment will continue to increase in quantity and improve in c - pability, it will take a number of years for China to complete the modernization and training programs necessary to develop a c - ordinated air defense system capable of Ef- fectively defending against a large-scale A- tack by aircraft employing the latest equip- ment and technology. 54. China has about 4,300 tactical fighte , light bombers, and air defense aircraft. Of these, 440 tactical and 1,400 air defense a' - craft are deployed in the four northern M Rs opposite the USSR. Most of these aircraft a e deployed well away from the border. Ma e than half of the fighters and one-third of e bombers in the northern regions are deploy (d 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 0 19 25X1 25X1 targets only in the southern part of the Far East MD and in the extreme eastern portion of Mongolia from identified areas of deploy- ment. (See Figure 5.) Deployment of this missile continued through the late 1960s and 971-1972. F apparently ceased in 1971-1972.F- in the Shen-yang MR in northeast China. The in Chinese thus concede air superiority to the So- viets over most or all of the border areas, recognizing that their inventory of aircraft, mostly obsolescent, would be at a disadvan- tage if matched against Soviet aircraft close to or over Soviet territory. 55. The Chinese have deployed at least 57 SAM battalions, principally around Peking, a few other cities, and the most important ad- vanced weapons complexes. Aside from this thin deployment, became operational in 1971. This missile could strike military targets in virtually the entire Sino-Soviet border area and many urban industrial targets in Siberia. Current deployment is estimated at 25-40 launchers and continues. In late 1968, China began production of copies of the Soviet Tu- 16 medium bomber. About 60 of these aircraft have been deployed to date. Sometime within the next few years, possibly as early as 1974, 56. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it is possible that the Chinese are developing a modified version of the CSA-1. If so, this missile might be expected to have an increased range, a better low-altitude capability, and improved electronic counter countermeasures performance. Although the northern portions of China had priority in deployment of early warning radars in 1971-1972, ground control intercept coverage is still spotty and below the capabilities of the system in the east. The air units in the border areas have received no significant preferential treatment; they appear to receive normal allocations of new aircraft production. it could reach well into the western USSR, possibly to Moscow and beyond. 58. The deployment pattern of these stra- tegic forces provides a capability to strike around the entire periphery of China. F_ The Tu-16 bomber could also reach these targets. Thus, despite the obvious Chinese concern with the Soviet threat, the overall deployment of strategic strike forces has shown no markedly anti- Soviet bias. 59. The Chinese have shown that they con- sider survivability to be the key to their stra- tegic missile deployment. From the beginning of CSS-1 deployment in 1966, some units have been deployed in the semimobile mode. In this mode, equipment normally is kept some miles away from launch sites that have mini- Strategic Attack Forces 57. Prior to 1988, China had no strategic strike capability against the USSR. They began to develop such a capability in 1966 with the deployment of the CSS-1. This missile, with a range of about 600 nm, could strike Soviet No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1:1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 Approximate Coverage of China's Strategic Weapon Systems No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? mum improvements, and the sites have few readily recognizable features. 60. Although the Chinese have deployed their small strategic missile force primarily to attain a strategic deterrent, there are indica- tions that they contemplate contingencies in which they could employ such missiles tacti- cally, against targets in their own territory if necessary. Deployment to date suggests that these weapons could be used against choke points along invasion routes into northeast China or against hostile staging areas in Mon- golia. If a Soviet invasion made rapid and sub- stantial progress, this option might be con- sidered as a means of forcing withdrawal with- out striking targets on Soviet territory. It is probable however, that, the Chinese would adhere to their no-first-use policy even in these circumstances rather than provide the Soviets with justification for use of their over- whelmingly superior nuclear attack forces. Naval Forces 61. Although Chinese naval forces include about 60 submarines, 6 guided missile de- stroyers, 1 destroyer, 5 guided missile de- stroyer escorts, and 5 destroyer escorts, most of their combat strength consists of vessels designed for coastal defense. These forces are not likely to venture far beyond coastal waters. 21 25X1 25X1 On the other hand, their capabilities to carry out assigned missions are sufficiently impres- sive to discourage attacks by Soviet naval vessels in areas where Chinese fleets are strongest. This would be particularly true in the Pohai (Gulf of Chili), which is protected by the North Sea Fleet, containing some 275 combat vessels, including about 28 subma- rines, 6 major surface vessels, and 45 guided missile patrol boats. IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES The Adversaries' View of the Balance 25X1 62. Soviet intelligence resources are better than those of the Chinese. 40 TOP SECRET 25X25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1 25X1 The Chinese, possibly for propa- ganda purposes, have claimed publicly that the Soviets massed one million troops on the border after the serious border fighting n 1969. They also expressed fear of an irn i- nept Soviet nuclear attack. However, a rece it Chinese assessment of the Soviet border for e is closer to the US estimate, and since ear [y 1972, Chinese fears of an imminent Soviet at- tack-ground or nuclear-appear to have diminished. (It is too early to tell wheth.r Chou En-lai's speech at the Tenth Party Co e- gress in late August 1973 marks renewed con- cern over a possible Soviet attack.) ? 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? 64. The Soviet force now appears to have capabilities in excess of those required to repel any force that the Chinese could send against the USSR in the next few years. But this assessment may not give sufficient weight to such key factors as the degree to which the Soviets are determined to maintain the integ- rity of the border, Soviet concern about the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and Soviet evaluations of the combat capa- bilities of the Chinese forces. Finally, it does not weigh the value the Soviets place on the deterrent effect of the forces they have in place. For example, the Soviets probably con- sider their investment well worth the cost if they attribute China's restrained conduct along the border since 1969 to the Soviet military capabilities demonstrated on Daman- skiy Island. 65. Peking elected not to confront the So- viet forces directly along the border; instead the Chinese have been building fortified areas in good defensive terrain well back from the border, thus compensating in part at least for the greater mobility and firepower of the So- viet forces, To compensate for their strategic inferiority they have been constructing under- ground facilities and dispersing and hardening their strategic missile forces. Although both sides are skilled in the use of psychological warfare and have used all available techniques to influence the outside world and each other during the dispute, all evidence indicates that each side holds the other in high regard as a military opponent. They have observed each Exercises and Contingency Planning 66. 23 25X1 25X1 other's military forces closely, and they are 67, both familiar with the possible theaters of mili- tary operations, The military effort both have made is prima facie evidence that each side realizes it is engaged in a deadly earnest con- Peking's mili- test for power in the Far East. tart' posture in t e north, however, is entirely 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 TOP SECRET defensive. Thus far, construction of fortified areas in good defensive terrain athwart in- vasion routes has indicated a preoccupation with defense of Peking. Such areas also have appeared along three major routes through mountains bordering the western edge of the Manchurian Plain, but defensive developments do not yet reflect a clearly defined plan for protecting this heavily industrialized area. Thus, Peking's present plan may be to fight only a delaying action in northern and central Manchuria in the face of a determined So- viet invasion. But over the longer term more fortifications may be constructed and troops may be moved into positions from which they could more readily react to defend the plains area. Comparative Military Capabilities 68. Assessing the capabilities of the forces we have described is complicated to some ex- tent by our imperfect knowledge of the various objective and subjective factors usually used to judge combat readiness. Their performance against each other would also depend on the specific circumstances under which combat operations were initiated. Both sides have been conditioned to expect provocative acts from the other and are prepared to retaliate, It is uncertain, however, whether these conditioned responses would be adequate to sustain the morale of the troops through a difficult cam- paign if the causes of the war were vague or ambiguous. The problem of maintaining mo- rale would become particularly acute for an invading force in any case because it would probably be met by the traditional resistance with which both sides have met foreign in- vaders. Any assessment of how the two forces would perform against the other must, there- fore, begin by recognizing that intangibles such as morale can greatly strengthen resist- ance, even against a technologically superior force. 69. The forces which the two sides have - ployed along the border reflect different st - tegies, Soviet superiority in military tec - nology and production, and the exigencies f geography. The Soviets, in order to accompli ;h the missions of border defense and deterrence in the Far East MD, where the Chinese threat is potentially the most serious, have been building a modern combined arms force posi- tioned farther forward than would be the case under less restrictive geographic conditions. (See Figure 3, page 9.) The relatively n r- row band of habitable land provided by t e Amur-Ussuri river system provides the rig t of way for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, t e locale for most of the important populati n and industrial centers in the Far East, a d the location of most of the Soviet garriso s. On the Chinese side the absence of vi al centers near the border permits the Chinese to deploy well back from the border and to avoid being rapidly overrun by the hig y mobile Soviet forces. 70. Because of the asymmetries in the two force postures, relative troop strengths do of indicate the Soviet military superiority in the immediate border area. Soviet ground troop strength near the border is around 360,O DO troops, of which some 240,000 are assigned to 38 divisions. Although the Chinese now have 1,400,000 ground troops and 1,800 coin- bat aircraft in the four MRs bordering t e USSR and Mongolia, few major units are n car the border and at least half of these troo s are deployed some 300-500 miles from t e closest border points. The Soviet superiority in equipment in the vicinity of the border, illustrated in Table II, is magnified by Soy et technological superiority in most major ite s of equipment. For example, the Chinese Type 59 medium tank is based on the Soviet T 54 A, which first appeared in the Soviet inventory in the 1949-1951 period. The cur- 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25 25X1 25X1 COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY! OF THE BORDER" TACTICAL AIRCRAFT TA NKS AR LLERY L MULTIPLE TACTICAL ROCKETS NUCLEAR AUNCHERS LAUNCHERS USSR" Far East MD ......... 400 5,300( 4,800) 2,20 (2,100) 370 (380) 94 Transbaikal MD ....... 350 3,200( 3,100) 87 200(220) 57 Soviet Forces, Mongolia . 150 530( 550) 13 38(54) 8 Central Asian MD ..... 250 2,000 73 (800) 130 40 Siberian MD ...... . ... 0 1,000( 910) 55 100 21 836(884) 220 ? " Soviet and Chinese strategic air defense equipment in the border region is not included in this chart because of differences in missions, equipment, and organizations. Mission, in- ventory, and capability of these forces are discussed in paragraphs 44, 54, 55, and 58. b The figures for Soviet equipment in this Table represent an estimate of the gross inven- tories by type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat maneuver units, fortified area units, ground forces storage, army schools, and border guard units. CIA and DIA have reached common estimates except as indicated by figures appearing in paren- theses, which represent DIA estimates. All differences have been influenced by order of battle variances between agencies. The tank inventory estimates, however, have been most affected by differences in methodology (see footnote to paragraph 24, page 11), All figures have been rounded to two significant digits except in cases where they were sufficiently small to make any variance significant. rent Soviet tank inventory consists largely of improved second and third generation suc- cessors to this model. The Chinese Air Force continues to consist largely of Mig-15/17s, Mig-19s, and IL-28s, models now considered obsolescent by the Soviet forces. The deploy- ment of F-9s is adding firepower, versatility, and range to the ground attack force, but the Soviet force remains far superior owing to its Mig-21 (some of which are the latest models) and Mig-17 fighters and its Su-7 and Su-17 fighter-bombers. A similar disparity exists in the relative antiaircraft defense posture, heli- copter and transport aviation capability, com- mand and control systems, and other combat and combat service support capabilities. The Chinese have no mobile nuclear delivery sys- tems similar to the Soviet FROG, Scud, and Scaleboard. The Soviet force is also better trained than the Chinese force. 71. Soviet divisions along the border are designed for mobile warfare. They have a relatively high ratio of tanks to infantry and possess great firepower, but are supported by 25X1 a logistics structure at division level which would experience considerable difficulty in No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 supporting a prolonged period of rapidly mov- ing intensive combat. The Soviet capability to conduct prolonged combat operations would depend upon the mobilization of non-divisional logistic resources at front and army level, where the bulk of Soviet logistic support is found. The ratio of tank to motorized rifle divisions in the border areas (1:6), lower than that in Central Europe (1;1), probably represents a Soviet concession to the terrain and opposition they expect to encounter in China. The motorized rifle regiments of sev- eral Soviet divisions have been augmented with additional 100 mm field or antitank guns and 122 mm howitzers. The 100 mm guns may be intended for use in a direct fire role to neutralize emplaced weapons. The additional pieces improve the capabilities of the regi- ments to act independently. These minor dif- ferences in organization between Soviet forces in Asia and those in Central Europe provide insufficient basis, however, to assume that they are designed to fight under different tactical doctrines. Their organization, equip- ment, and training exercises have produced a force designed to halt any likely Chinese attack and rapidly shift to the offensive. 72. Given limitations in the Soviet logistic structure, the nature of the Chinese defenses, and the desirability of executing any campaign with stunning rapidity, Soviet planners would undoubtedly weigh the relative merits of con- ventional versus nuclear weapons in reducing Chinese defenses. Although the Soviets claim that the conventional firepower in current divisions is at least 31 times greater than that of World War II divisions, the use of this firepower, plus that of Soviet frontal aviation, could still result in a campaign of unaccept- ably long duration. Various Soviet spokesmen have declared that in the event of a full-scale conflict in the area all available means would be used, presumably including nuclear weap- ons. These assertions have generally been made while hypothesizing a clear Chinese provocation, which would provide the Soviets with the rationale to use any weapons avail- able in their own defense. Nevertheless, the Soviets would have to measure the political disadvantages of their first use of nuclear weapons and the possibility that the Chinese would retaliate in kind either against the in- vading Soviet troops or by escalating the con- flict with a strike on Soviet cities in the Far East. Under the current Chinese leadership it is unlikely that the Chinese will provide the Soviets with the kind of provocation that would clearly justify a major military respon e. However, if the Soviets, for whatever reason, found it necessary to initiate a major military operation against China, the use of nuclear weapons in the interest of bringing the ca i - paign to a quick conclusion might have many advocates regardless of the negative political consequences and the risks of Chinese e- taliation. Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies 73. Border Clashes. Since 1969 both the in- tensity and number of border clashes have declined. Considering the emotional overtones both sides have attached to the issue and the potential for local conflicts, the reduction in the number of incidents reflects strong central control from both Moscow and Peking. To significant military capability is necessary to cause a border incident, and since there is likely to be bad blood between local units, the possibility that an incident could become a border clash is always present. Of the two sides, the Soviets have the most highly - veloped capability to react and to control t e level of intensity of such a clash. Event e local Soviet Border Guard Headquarters n some areas have tanks and APCs nearby 'o 25X1 25X1 ? `'c v1 25X1' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 support them in meeting any Chinese incur- sion. Additional reinforcements are available from within the Border Guard district. The regular forces in the border, some of which could be heliborne to the conflict area, would be called in for situations beyond the capa- bilities of the Border Guard. Soviet rules of engagement in force along the border appear to have been given careful consideration, and any decision to move beyond these rules and escalate the clash probably would be made in Moscow, where local passions would be but one of the numerous elements which would be considered before an escalatory step would be taken. Given Soviet capabilities in the border areas, Soviet reactions to border probes could be quite powerful, but they would be consistent with the broader consider- ations of Soviet foreign policy objectives. 74. The Chinese would appear to have little incentive to resume provocative actions on the border, although they have a wide range of options available, including sabotage of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Soviets demonstrated their capabilities and determina- tion at Damanskiy Island in 1969, and the Chinese are aware that the Soviet forces could retaliate at a higher intensity if sufficiently provoked. Any attempt to interrupt operations of the railroad would be considered extremely provocative by the Soviets and would require a Soviet punitive action in response. 75. Punitive Actions. The objectives of these operations would be to disrupt, punish, and humiliate a regional command by a strike or raid on a limited objective such as a head- quarters or other installation. For example, if the Chinese were to interfere with the func- tioning of the railroad, Soviet forces might retaliate with a raid on the major headquarters which they believed had planned and exe- cuted the Chinese operation. If it was decided not to cross the border, retaliation could be No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 27 25X1 25X1 executed by either artillery or tactical aircraft. In a more serious retaliation, a combined air- ground operation could be mounted. In either case the Chinese ability to defend in the im- mediate border area would be limited. Again, any decision to retaliate heavily would be made in Moscow and would be calculated to refresh Chinese awareness of Soviet capa- bilities. It would also be calculated to meet the needs of current Soviet foreign policy. 76. Major Conventional Campaign. In the current situation the circumstances under which a major conventional campaign would be launched can be conceived only in terms of an operation initiated by the Soviet forces. Various reasons why the Soviets would under- take such an operation can be postulated, but considering the risks such a step would in- volve, only a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Far East would seem likely to trigger such a Soviet reaction. A major con- sideration in the planning of a Soviet opera- tion would be the possibility of becoming in- volved in a protracted war. In an effort to cope with this possibility, Soviet planners would recommend significant reinforcement of their forces in place. Additional forces would increase the impetus of the initial at- tack and would be necessary to protect lines of communication and to provide protection to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The require- ment for protection of lines of communica- tion and rear areas would grow as the Soviet forces penetrated more deeply into Manchuria and China itself. The scale of reinforcement re uired to execute a limited a in- tend-e-1 to seize northern Sinkiang an e a 200- . e er in Manchuria for th - Sj erian ailx ad has be .n _ 1 nla^v~ ~T~ at some 37 divisions. This reinforcement would bring 7C e strength of the invasion force to 80 divisions, about 70 of which would face northeastern China. Soviet planners would No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 probably calculate that they could reach as far as Peking with such a force, but they would need a much larger force built up through extensive mobilization to seize and hold Peking. 77. The initial phases of any major Soviet ground campaign could be expected to give the appearance of success as the Soviet forces overwhelmed the Chinese forces on the border and proceeded into China. Soviet air inter- diction would slow and disrupt Chinese at- tempts to move PLA forces to meet the Soviet thrusts. The Soviet drive would begin to slow, however, as the first Chinese fixed defenses were encountered and as Chinese local forces began operations in the Soviet rear. Delays and Chinese successes could confront the Soviets with the choice of a protracted con- ventional war or escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. 78. Any Soviet decision to use nuclear weapons would be made at the highest po- litical level and would include such limita- tions as the political leadership deemed neces- sary. These limitations could require that tactical nuclear weapons be used only against Chinese defensive positions delaying the Soviet advance. If it were believed that the Chinese would not accept such an escalation without also resorting to nuclear weapons or if the Chinese were detected preparing to use them, the Soviets probably would plan a concurrent strike at the Chinese nuclear weapons and facilities. 79.1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict 82. Whatever prospects it may once have had for long-term "fraternal comradeship," the Sino-Soviet relationship has now plainly evolved into a stark confrontation of adver- saries. The key source of contention between the two countries is no longer, as it was dur- ing the early 1960s, primarily a dispute over China's relationship with the Soviet Union and its proper role within the socialist com- munity. The dispute has now expanded into a fundamental clash of conflicting national in- terests and ambitions, in which each side per- ceives its physical security as well as its inter- national position to be threatened by the other. 83. The recent intensification in the ex- change of recrimination, accusation, and insult 29 25X1 25X1 between Moscow and Peking demonstrates the continuing tension and hostility in Sino- Soviet relations. A key question is whether this situation will persist, change toward a more controlled competition, or change toward the extremes of genuine rapprochement or war. 84. In view of Soviet military superiority generally, and in the border area itself, it is extremely unlikely that China would deliber- ately attack Soviet forces across the border. Chinese regular troops in the four northern MRs opposite the USSR are positioned well back from the border, and Chinese military activities in the border area, apart from strictly limited probes at particular points in- tended to support Chinese border claims, have been clearly defensive in nature. A lim- ited Chinese military action in Soviet terri- tory, such as an attempt to interdict the Trans- Siberian Railroad at some point close to the border or to raid a Soviet Border Guard head- quarters, would seem out of the question in the absence of some prior Soviet military ac- tion. Even a return to aggressive Chinese patrolling in the disputed border areas is un- likely because of the evident Soviet capacity and willingness to respond at a more powerful level. In both domestic and foreign policies since 1969 the Chinese have shown that they take the Soviet threat seriously. They have adopted publicly the posture of a threatened state, and while they have not changed their basic negotiating positions or territorial claims because of the Soviet threat, they have re- strained their actions along the border. 85. The possibility exists, of course, that a border incident, no matter bow it began, could escalate toward a major military conflict. But this seems unlikely in light of the desire of both sides to restrict fighting-the Soviets be- cause they wish to avoid a drawn-out series of border clashes, and the Chinese because they do not want to provide a pretext for Soviet No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 military action. The Soviets should be able to control the level of violence in any border en- counter because of their capacity to contain locally any Chinese offensive actions, and So- viet rules of engagement in force along the border appear to have been given careful con- sideration. Any decision to retaliate heavily would almost certainly be made in Moscow. Such action could be quite powerful-for ex- ample, heavy artillery barrages-without in- volving Soviet troops in ground actions on Chinese territory and could probably be car- ried out without creating grave complications for Soviet foreign policy generally. 86. Soviet punitive actions at a higher level-raids across the border by ground troops-are improbable without some Chinese provocation more serious than the original ambush on Damanskiy Island in 1969. Neither the Chinese nor the Soviets wish to risk the momentum of their policies of detente and improved relations with the US by presenting to the world an image of unreasonableness or bellicosity. Both powers would also be aware that preoccupation with a military struggle between them might weaken their influence elsewhere, If a conflict were to break out in the border area, arising perhaps from a flare- up of border tension or a miscalculation in either capital, it would probably be limited to non-nuclear operations close to the border. 87. A major Soviet ground attack against China-whet Ter a response to Chinese actions at lower levels of conflict or an attempt to take advantage of political turmoil within Chinaee?ML 'k l,;. Even more unlikely would be a deliberate un-deM, ILL at the con ues As noted above, the Soviets probably judge that they would have to reinforce their ground forces substantially even in order to move into and hold border areas in Sinkiang or northern China, and would undoubtedly believe it necessary to undertake an extensive mobilization in order to take and hold Peking. In either case Mo - cow might foresee getting bogged down n a protracted and costly struggle and bei g confronted eventually with a choice between withdrawal or the use of nuclear weapons an effort to force a decisive end to the co - flict. The latter action, even if it were su - cessful, could have many and far reachi g adverse repercussions damaging to the USSR s position in the world. 88. In weighing the possible use of nuclear weapons against China, Moscow would ha e to give foremost consideration to the growl Chinese nuclear strike capability. It is possib e that the Soviets have already considers taking deliberate action against that cap - bility-apart from any ground action because it is the most dramatic and poten- tially effective military aspect of the Chinese challenge to the USSR as the dominant power in Asia. But the Soviets probably believe the have not targeted all Chinese strategic offen- sive forces, and their apprehensions probably incline them toward worst-case assumptions, (See paragraph 81, page 29.) Consequently, they now face the probability, which has bee acknowledged in a Leningrad lecture, th t several of China's surviving missiles coul destroy military targets or cities in Soviet Asia even after a Soviet first strike, The deterre t effect of the Chinese strategic attack capa- bility will be enhanced significantly in the next 2-3 years when an inventory of missiles capable of reaching targets in the wester part of the USSR probably will becorn operational. 89. The Soviet leadership could, of cours simply disregard the possibility of Chinese r - taliation and proceed with an attack on the assumption that the Chinese would follow the rational course and refrain from retaliat- ing with their few remaining missiles-a No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? 31 25X1 25X1 90. The military risks are not the only con- siderations which deter a major Soviet attack on China, whether by nuclear strike or on the ground. The Soviets would have to weigh carefully the significant international reper- cussions that would flow from any major Soviet campaign against China-even a limited ground invasion. So long as the Soviets were militarily involved with China, they would be concerned about possible ways that a protector of the poor, the weak, and the non-white would be undermined, especially in the Third World. Chinese hostility toward the Soviets would intensify and greatly lessen whatever chances may exist of a post-Mao or post-Brezhnev reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. 92. While Moscow is prepared to punish the Chinese at any point on the frontier where they might act forcibly to assert territorial claims, the main Soviet policy to counter China is centered on diplomatic efforts and on activities within the Communist movement. A major attack on China, especially one in- volving nuclear weapons, would involve not only accepting serious new risks, but also rejecting an established policy that has quieted the border with China and, in other parts of the world, promises political and economic benefits. act of pure vengeance which would only guarantee that they would sustain even greater damage in retribution. The Soviets could scarcely count on such Chinese restraint, how- ever, and would be unlikely to jeopardize major cities unless they came to believe that inaction carried greater risks than proceeding with the attack. To date the manifold uncer- tainties and risks in any military action against China have clearly outweighed any possible advantages, and the growth of the Chinese deterrent will continue to increase the risks. Future Force Relationships 93. Just as the prospective general rela- tionship between the USSR and China is one of continuing confrontation and contest, but with no major military conflict, so the pros- pective force relationship is one in which each side maintains its forces opposite the other, but at a level which does not disrupt or distort its total military commitments. Planned Soviet divisional deployments along the Sino-Soviet border appear to be close to being realized. There is thus little prospect that future border requirements will impinge noticeably on force requirements in Europe and mutual force re- duction talks. The continued buildup of sup- port forces will also be undertaken with little effect on forces opposite NATO. The growing flexibility of Soviet strategic attack forces per- mits the Soviets to target China more com- pletely while at the same time increasing their capability against Europe and America. While 25X1 no extensive modification of equipment and other powers, especially the US, might seek to take advantage of their reduced influence in other areas of the world. They would also have to consider the likelihood that the US would perceive a new aggressiveness or in- stability in Soviet policy and alter its policies toward the USSR, perhaps even taking steps to improve its strategic weapons program. The Soviets would also surely be concerned that their first use of nuclear weapons, even if militarily successful, might fundamentally alter world opinion against the USSR. 91. In addition to the new problems that would be raised, important existing Soviet policies would be jeopardized. Moscow's gen- eral policy of detente with the West, and most importantly its effort to foster economic ties, especially with advanced Western coun- tries, would be imperiled. The Soviet attempt to portray the USSR as a force for peace and No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 organization is foreseen, it is likely that there will be some limited tailoring of the forces along the 5ino-Soviet frontier to provide a quicker reaction over longer distances. The co-location of two regiment size ground force units with two helicopter units may be a case in point. 94. To the present time, the guiding strategy of the Chinese military leadership has been to maintain China's capability to defend against attacks from all directions, and not to give preferential treatment to defense against possible attack from the north to the detriment of China's defense posture else- where. This approach was appropriate in a time when US forces were still fighting in Vietnam and were stationed in force on pe- ninsulas and islands on the eastern periphery of China. Now that US forces are withdraw- ing from Southeast Asia, it is possible that the issue will again arise as to whether the limited Chinese forces and resources should be concentrated to a greater degree against the USSR. To date there is no evidence that a basic reorientation of Chinese forces is under way, and any rapid large-scale shift seems unlikely, in part because of Chinese concern not to alarm the Soviets unduly. It would be expressed in preferential deployment of mis- siles, aircraft, and ground troops in northern China, and perhaps in increasing the capa- bilities of the Northern Fleet in relation to those of the Eastern and Southern Fleets. Until such developments occur, Chinese leaders must be considered to have given a negative answer to the question of whether China should reorient its defenses from a gen- eral capability to defend against attack from all directions to a preference for defense against attack from the north. This decision is consistent with the more realistic view of Soviet strength on the border noted above (see paragraph 63, page 22). 95. In view of the limited specific ins r- action discernible in the evolution of the Sino-Soviet military confrontation, themod- ernization of both the Soviet and the Chinese forces will continue to be determined by the general pace of research and development and weapons production throughout the respective forces, rather than by special considerate ns related to the border standoff. Thus, Soy et force modernization will continue largely in response to Warsaw Pact and intercontinental requirements. In fact, the resources devot.d to defenses against China as a share of t e total Soviet defense effort are likely to decline in the near future as the force levels planned against China are reached. 96. Peking can likewise be expected to press ahead with its longstanding program to mo - ernize its armed forces as a part of its gene al effort to establish China's status as a great power. It is also likely that, in contrast tot the largely politically-inspired surges and slow- downs in Chinese weapons development and production in the past, future Chinese weapons development and production will take pla e within the framework of a more balanced economy; in this sense also, the creation of a strong China-not a specifically anti-Sove t effort-will be the touchstone of the growth of the armed forces. 97. It is possible, of course, that if Sin:)- Soviet tensions grow in the future, each side will build its forces into a yet more formidab e posture. If the Soviets intended to devel p a force along the border designed for major ground actions against China, they would probably begin by setting up a structure for a five-front force and possibly a theater head- quarters. A Chinese reaction to increased ten- sion and evidence of a further Soviet builds would probably take the form of an increas effort to strengthen China's northern defense . 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? Chinese ground forces, if they were to be prepared to undertake offensive operations away from their bases, would need enlarged logistics support, training in joint operations, and a much greater supply of tanks, artillery, and ground-support aircraft. Although Chinese forces will improve over the next few years, there is little chance that the improvement would be so great as to support a capability to undertake operations against the USSR. 98. Heightened tension would also have an influence on the strategic weapons postures of the two powers. It might cause the USSR to be more reluctant to sign an offensive arms agreement with the US; it would certainly make the USSR more determined to negotiate an agreement that would permit it to keep what it regarded as an adequate deterrent against both China and the US. In the event of an agreement limiting ICBMs and inter- continental bombers, there would be greater Soviet incentive to develop and deploy larger numbers of weapon systems oriented toward China. As for the Chinese, heightened tensions would probably cause them, among other things, to push the deployment of their region- al deterrent more rapidly, to improve their air defenses, and to establish underground shelters and defenses in even greater numbers. Chi- nese technological deficiencies and high de- velopment costs appear to preclude a success- ful effort to develop an ABM in the next decade, although ballistic missile early warn- ing radars would probably be deployed. 99. In a situation of lessened tension, it is possible that the USSR would reduce its forces along the border, though probably not to the levels existing before 1965. But even in a con- dition of general detente the maintenance of current force levels at lower levels of readiness would be more likely than any substantial reductions in those force levels. The Soviets, having made a substantial investment in equip- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 33 25X1 25X1 ment and facilities in Soviet Asia, would prob- ably be inclined to allow unit personnel strength levels to decline, rather than to close bases and remove equipment. 100. Whatever the force development poli- cies followed over the next several years, however, the relative strengths of the opposing forces will change but slowly. The Chinese have much further to go in developing modern armed forces, and they can therefore make more rapid and noticeable improvements. But the Soviet research and development and in- dustrial base is so much greater that, despite any Chinese advances, the USSR will retain its substantial advantages. 101. As Soviet forces are already at higher levels of capability and readiness, it will be difficult for them to make a substantial in- crease in relative strength vis-a-vis the Chi- nese forces. The Chinese, on the other hand, will achieve increased effectiveness for their forces from relatively modest additions to the low levels of equipment now on hand and from increased levels of training. The addi- tion of a battalion of tanks to a division, for instance, would only add some 10-15 percent to the Soviet divisions, but would double the tank inventory of a Chinese division. The Chi- nese division would thus grow in capability relative to the Soviet division, but would still have only about one-fourth as many tanks. The relative changes in the Chinese posture will not be sufficient to embolden the Chi- nese and cause them to consider offensive op- erations, but they will increase the deterrent capability of the Chinese forces in Soviet eyes. 102. During the period of the 1970s, the Soviet Union will also remain far ahead of China in the strategic balance. Soviet stra- tegic attack forces are growing in flexibility and capability against China. The new Back- fire bomber will be able to cover all of China 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 25X1 25X1 unrefueled from Far East bases, an option not indicate that China will be able in the la re open to the Badger. 1970s to cover several hundred Soviet targe s. Soviet projections almost certainly "worst case" this development. Relatively speaking, therefore, the small growth in the Chinese retaliatory capability will carry more sign - cance in the strategic relationship betwe n the two countries than the more extensive Soviet growth. 104. Force developments on the border a d in the strategic forces thus indicate that t le 103. These increases in Soviet weapons will optimal time has passed for the Soviets o add to an already overwhelming strategic use military force to disarm China or to coerce capability, but will not make for any ap- Peking, and that likely future Chinese force preciable change in the balance. Our pro- developments will further reduce Soviet mi jections of Chinese missile forces, however, tary options vis-a-vis China. ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 ? 25X1 25X1 ANNEX A CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 36 TOP SECRET Chronology of the Buildup on the Sino-Soviet Border and Related Events, 1964-1973 Political events Chou En-Lai visited Moscow. ttosygin""visited Peking. " Demonstration mr pt ed outside SoViet Embassy, Peking. -Nov 1965 Late 1965- End 1965???.,,? -Nov 1964 ,,,,,,Feb 1965?,,? Soviets" anndunced troop strength at 2,4$3iQQ0.. -Mar 1965 May 1965??? ` Chinese,evploded ,second nuclear device. Soviet Mpngoiian Treaty of 'Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual ssistanee signed. Societe aod;Chinose traded denunciations in letters circulated in the Communist movement: Cultural fRaVolution began? in China, Chinese"?9th'Party ConArakt'coiv ed:" decitaloa to engage in "Prep. aratibias''Ibw Wat"i campaign, iovuving increased production efforts, disperea!.of "pvp~ile n>"Digging of alt raid shelters, and stockpiling of food and strategic materials', Chinese charged that Soviets Have provoked more than 00, harder incidents between October 15,!1904 and March 15, 1969. Brezhnev admitted at the World,Commoniat Conference that the Chinese have split 30 Communist parties. A stern editorial in Pravda called attention specifically to the Chinese nukllepr IthreVt and described.Chi.o as a, problem affecting the whole wyorid " ' , restraint Cbott 'and" 009 10, 040J,436, Peking, resolved to am acid to held Seiko. .,..-Jan-Fab 1966 Soviets have 14-13 divisions near the border, 3 divisions Siberian MD, and less than 200 tactical aircraft in the area. Soviet corps headquarters mooed froth Dushanbe to Alms At Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near thi to 15. -Summer 1966 Late 1966_, First Chinese MRBM'aeployed. 1966-1967 Soviet corps headquarters mowed lrom ftdoasa M0 to Pat l ae MD. End 1966 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near th borde Mar 1969___ Maior Siitq Sbviet doylies ocourfed oli"thR ltatit#".River over skly (Chen-pan) lslaitd. to 18-21. FourSoviet S$r4',M f1N1"launchers dear'""border deactivpted. ConstruofiGttt began tee, western ildSR on ten $"wif I BM la nGtrers with target.sectors coveting China. Three Soviet Scaleboard brigpdes depinye'd pan l' border. End 1967 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border to 22-27. 1968 Chinese began production of"c`oi of'',Tp;1g Mediumbpmber," Construction began it w$fei td,ti$$1G n 1d $ It MC M'1 t6frers with target septmrs"riiareting china. Soviet corps hoadgwlertars tttoged frdrrt liyaein+ nt a idgro k. $ovletu"be o ooisti'oetldtl' ofitavo 11$ House'b'pl uric missi ";early warn6rl"fl3 f w~" re pis deal blp a""b cad"r", aped atao d n,iin- prmvement or Air WarniGig hbllityralohg, ardor" fifth "$nnttl gg.' End 1968_ Soviet divisions added during year increased border strength to 25-33. - Apr 1969,,?,??? . $dviet'dotPs headeuar ra" adtl~r ed' tip NG bdreli" f tf cam`" uMca. ttona, at Piorxya, Asllkhabbt, tlti n?tlde kl'eis Satvp k an i ofd rbbnn1 -Jun 1969_ , Soviet troops reportedly destroy 0 Zq ,-Mail cbptpany "of the P ople's Liberation Army (PLA) in a b'otoor l;l, t Tlaidtt'ang~"Sl hang. -Aug 1969---_ Border clash in the Dzhungarian fine,-Feld"uld ihia li "rypoft d. - Sept 1969 _ Fotkbatau MD" was,uiirid d fetbi ttGO plpr x` ho " " dP1hh; pui "I" Central Astio$ MD along"i kt rg bgrdo p ca pe lobed at Al' forted tiro"roe l vs' tp M t iis~ ae .~" headq' W 8"0:00: Far S at ieinbatS dw tt dd to *Vtpk train aeahokOtt. The number of Soviet divisions listed in this chronology is sometimes expressed by two figures. The first represents 0/A's holdings; the second, CIA's. Differences in the two agencies' holdings are explained in the footnote to paragraph 27 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0 1 Slho4ovlet border tpl{cs b n 240 Soviet Patty "t79ngrp ~e,401l Br *hnev implied friendly ne~s,will have to awkdbi d"deatk `~i Iwt 4fbtp~+hpg+dao' i. > ,u toon* d Cie for t*rred of tIG~ltie~ fd411 1 ', . "" tefht" ;Chitte$"e"retectad uftdr gnrUuo4, Sovretd "refl dG " $ir, fbroes ntat ti porde"r, 3725X1 25X1 Col tru tinn bldaa In lventern USSR on 70 Soviet SS-11 ICBM laud hers with tatge! aeetbrs Covering Chlna, M'our I"rbv1et SS?ha IRBM #auihdbers aear border deactivated. rttorne ditllsien tit Be gote (for'EastMD) possibly transferred to Bo1 tW