THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ASPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 20, 1973
• Content Type: NIE

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K-541-8-2-
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INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
The Sin-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects
(Supporting Analysis)
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NLE 1443-73
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No Objection
ptimer 1973,
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TOP;. SECRET
THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the document:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager for National Security, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the United
States within the meaning of the espionage laws, U.S. Code, Title 18, Sections
793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the
benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States, It is
to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive
information in the designated control channels.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METMODS INVOLVED
TOP SECRET
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G r
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TOP SECRET
NIE 11-13-73
THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP:
THE MILITARY ASPECTS
(Supporting Analysis)
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TOP SECRET
CONTENTS
Page
I. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER ............ 1
Background to the Buildup ........................................ 1
The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the Border ........... . ............. 3
Chinese Reactions ........................................ 4
The Pattern of Military Interaction ................................. 5
The Cost of the Soviet Buildup ..................................... 7
Theater Forces ................................................... 8
Strategic Attack Forces .......? ..................................... 15
Strategic Defense Forces .......................................... 16
Naval Forces ..................................................... 16
III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE USSR ........................ 17
Ground Forces ................................................... 17
Air and Air Defense Forces ....................................... 18
Strategic Attack Forces ........................................... 19
Naval Forces .................................................... 21
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T SECRET
Page
IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES .................................. 21
The Adversaries' View of the Balance ..........................._... 21
Exercises and Contingency Planning ................................ 23
Comparative Military Capabilities .................................. 24
Capabilities for Various Military Contingencies ...................... 26
The Likelihood of Major Military Conflict ........................... 29
Future Force Relationships ....................................... 31
ANNEXES
Page
ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SING-SOVIET
BORDER AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973 ................... 35
41
ANNEX C: SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST
CHINA ......................................................... 47
TABLES
Page
TABLE I: SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUB-
MARINE ORDER OF BATTLE ................................... 16
TABLE II: COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY
OF THE BORDER .............................................. 25
43
TABLE C-I: NUCLEAR STRIKE TARGET LIST ..................... 49
TABLE C-II: CONVENTIONAL ATTACK TARGET LIST ............ 51
TABLE C-Ill: CONVENTIONAL BOMB REQUIREMENTS AGAINST
TYPICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES .............................. 52
TABLE C-IV: SEQUENCE OF MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCE-
MENT .......................................................... 54
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THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP:
THE MILITARY ASPECTS
1. THE BUILDUP ALONG THE SINO-
SOVIET BORDER
Background to the Buildup
1. The victory of the Communists in China
encouraged Soviet leaders to believe for a
time that Soviet security in Asia had been
enhanced. But in the late 1950s and early
1960s China emerged as an increasingly con-
tentious rival of the USSR, disputing post-
Stalin Soviet views on revolutionary strategy
and relations with the West and supporting
anti-Soviet Communist parties. Tensions on the
border between the two powers grew after
1960, resulting in numerous minor incidents,
and in 1963 the issue of Chinese territorial
claims to large portions of the Soviet Far East
and Central Asia was publicly joined. (See
Figure 1.) By the mid-1960s the Soviets had
come to regard their hostile neighbor as some-
thing of a security threat as well as a political
and ideological adversary.
'Annex A gives a chronology of political and mili-
tary milestones in the buildup.
2. Soviet concern over the border incidents
and the growing stridency of China's attacks
on Soviet policies led to responses on several
levels.
- In 1962 Khrushchev began to reor-
ganize and redeploy the 150,000-man KGB
Border Guards. By 1964, although the total
number of Border Guard districts had been
reduced from 11 to 7, the number opposite
China had been increased from 3 to 4. By
the fall of 1964 about one-half of the Border
Guard force had been stationed opposite
China.
-The Soviet military also showed in-
creasing concern. In 1962 the Far East Mili-
tary District (MD) conducted a field exer-
cise whose object was to repel a Chinese
invasion. In 1963 a Soviet General Staff
journal warned against Chinese strategy as
anti-Soviet, and in November a motorized
rifle regiment moved within the Turkestan
MD some 1,500 miles to the Dzhungarian
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2 TOP SECRET/
Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Areas
and Sites of Clashes in 1969
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Lion. Moscow avoided anti-Chinese polemics,
retreated from Khrushchev's demands for an
international Communist conference intended
to read China out of the movement, and
played down the theme of peaceful coexistence
with the West. Chou En-lai went to Moscow
in November 1964 and Kosygin saw Mao in
Peking in February 1965, but neither side was
prepared to compromise on basic political or
territorial issues. The principal result of these
face-to-face confrontations was to dispel any
Soviet hopes that the removal of Khrushchev
would be followed by some improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations.
Gate. Shortly after mid-1964 an under-
strength division was moved from the Mos-
cow to the Far East MD.
3. But Khrushchev still did not expect a
large military buildup; in fact, his military
budget and manpower were still planned to
decline. Instead, he tried to resolve border
problems by negotiations. Sino-Soviet talks
took place in 1964 in Peking, but the Soviets
broke them off after becoming convinced that
Mao was more interested in keeping tension
alive and in branding the USSR as a modern-
day imperialist power than in settling border
disputes. This belief was no doubt strength-
ened by the first Chinese nuclear test
(CHIC-1) in October 1964, which signified
that the Chinese challenge was not only serious
and long term, but would increasingly involve
considerations of relative national power.
4. Khrushchev was ousted in the same
month, and the new Kremlin leadership took
steps to explore the possibility of reconcilia-
?
saying as early as January 1965 that Moscow
was talking about the need for additional
regular military forces to control the border,
Border
5. Although sources
The Soviet Decision to Reinforce the
the basic Soviet decision to reinforce the
border area probably was made several
months later. The announcement in February
that Soviet forces had been reduced to
2,423,000-a target figure set by Khrushchev
in 1960---probably would not have been made
if the new Soviet leadership had already
decided to increase general purpose forces.
In the middle of the year, however, Soviet
leaders indicated publicly that defense ex-
penditures would be increased, and direct
communications between Moscow and Soviet
Border Guard units opposite Manchuria were
improved. In October 1965 Brezhnev justified
to Gomulka new Soviet deployments in Asia
by reviewing border incidents. In November
a Soviet Army corps headquarters was moved
from a point opposite Afghanistan to a point
opposite Sinkiang; the transfer implied that
a multidivision force would soon follow. In
subsequent months regular army units began
to move into the border area and to build
permanent garrisons. In January 1966 the So-
viets signed a treaty of mutual cooperation
with Mongolia, and within the year moved
a division into this client state.
6. The pattern of ground force deployment
which the Soviets adopted in the course of
their buildup since 1965 was largely deter-
mined by the geography of the area. The prox-
imity of the vital Trans-Siberian Railroad to
the border in the Far East MD and the nar-
rowness of the band of habitable Soviet ter-
ritory along the frontier required that the
buildup be concentrated in areas close to
the border so that the Soviets could stop
any Chinese attack and begin immediate of-
fensive operations aimed at pushing Chinese
forces out of reach of the railroad and back
into their own territory. Where possible, and
particularly to the west of Manchuria, divi-
sions have also been located in or near larger
cities where the principal reserves of trained
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manpower east of the Urals are to be found.
The large manpower and equipment levels
demanded by the length of the frontier (over
6,800 miles, including the 2,650-mile Sino-
Mongolian sector) and the need to create
them without drawing down forces opposite
NATO or overloading the Soviet economy re-
quired that the buildup proceed deliberately.
Moreover, the immediate priority assigned to
getting an operational force in place required
that the buildup of support units be delayed
until the combat forces had reached a suitable
level.
7. The decision in 1965 to initiate the build-
up was clearly a major policy decision, in-
volving the collegial responsibility of the
entire 'Politburo. The buildup was an impor-
tant change in the Soviet military posture in
Asia, and it reversed Khrushchev's policy of
reducing the size of general purpose forces.
The military plans to implement the decision
were undoubtedly drawn up in the General
Staff by the "operators"-officers of the Main
Operations Directorate---responsible for the
Far East. Commanders of MDs along the
border probably requested reinforcements in
order to maintain border security, and both
Minister of Defense Malinovskiy and Chief
of the General Staff Zakharov probably took
an especially personal interest in these deci-
sions because of their experience in the Far
East in World War II?
Chinese Reactions
8. Although Peking became aware of the
Soviet buildup on the border soon after it
began in 1965, there was a lag of four years
'Malinovskiy commanded the Transbaikal Front
in 1945, and Zakharov was his Chief of Staff. After
the war, Malinovskiy remained in the Far East as
commander in chief of Soviet forces in the Far East
until 1953 and as commander of the Far East MD
until 1955,
before it launched specific countermeasures.
The policymakers in Peking, who saw the
US as the main military threat in 1965, early
concluded that
and
Soviet actions along China's northern borders.
The Chinese leaders were also at this time
preoccupied internally with the gathering
storm of the Cultural Revolution.
9. But by 1967 the radical policies of the
Cultural Revolution had spilled over into the
foreign arena. The Soviets, along with others,
suffered from China's revolutionary excesses:
Soviet diplomats were harassed in Peking;
Chinese in Moscow put on vociferous demon-
strations; and the Sino-Soviet border felt the
tensions of highly-charged Chinese emotions.
Within China, discord and violence suggested
that the country was drifting toward anarchy.
This violence reached its peak in 1967, how-
ever, and Peking thereafter began reasserting
its control.
10. In that year the Chinese moved five
divisions from the Shenyang Military Region
(MR), opposite the USSR, to the central
region of China to help restore order. One
more division was moved in 1968, bringing
withdrawals to 75,000 men, In late 1969 and
early 1970 five armies (about 165,000 men)
were moved from south and east China to
north central China. These forces were placed
on interior main rail lines along which they
could move back to the south or east as well
as north or west toward the Soviet and Mon-
golian borders.
11. The return to a more rational foreign
policy received its strongest impetus from the
dangerous confrontation with the Soviets that
erupted on the Ussuri River in early 1969.
With the example of the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia in mind, the Chinese also ap-
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is
parently realized that the factionalism and
confusion of the Cultural Revolution might
appear to the Soviets to create a unique op-
portunity for intervention. To reduce their
vulnerability, the Chinese accelerated the
phase-out of the Cultural Revolution, accepted
negotiations with the Soviets to cool border
tensions, and launched a "war preparations"
drive. By early 1970 Peking had laid the
groundwork for what was to become a major
reorientation of its foreign policy. Abandoning
the intense xenophobia and fanatic Maoism
characteristic of the Cultural Revolution,
Peking moved actively to develop diplomatic
ties with a wide range of countries, with
special attention to establishing relations with
the US. The results of this effort have been,
in Peking's view, gratifying. Moscow has been
impressed (and worried) by Chinese suc-
cesses abroad and understands that Peking's
emergence from isolation surely complicates
and probably inhibits Soviet policy vis-a-vis
China. In any case, the Chinese are persuaded
that their international efforts, together with
their continuing defensive preparations, have
helped greatly to diminish the risk of hostil-
ities with the Soviets.
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The Pattern of Military Interaction
12. The Soviet decision to build up its
forces opposite China was not a reaction to
an increased Chinese military threat along
the border. There had been no change in the
strength of the relatively meager Chinese
forces near the border, no particularly violent
encounter or marked rise in border incidents,
nor any other event obviously affecting So-
viet border security. The decision seemed
rather to be a result of more general consid-
erations, the principal ones being the deteri-
oration of political relations between the two
powers, continuing Chinese assertiveness along
the border, uncertainty regarding internal
Chinese political developments, the failure of
the post-Khrushchev Soviet attempt at recon-
ciliation, and a growing concern over the
longer-range implications of Chinese strategic
weapon programs.
13. On the latter point, the Soviets were
certainly aware, following the successful deto-
nations of CHIC-1 in October 1964, and
CHIC-2 in May 1965, that the Chinese had
mastered the basic technology for producing
fission weapons. They probably were also in
a position to follow the development pro-
gram of the CSS-1, the Chinese MRBM, which
by mid-1965 had made sufficient progress to
promise an operational capability within a
year or two. The threat of even this limited
capability in the hands of the Chinese may
have been quite disturbing in Moscow, and the
Soviets may have considered it prudent to as-
sume that China would progress relatively
quickly to master the technology of thermo-
nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles.
One concern might have been that as China
developed a credible nuclear deterrent, it
would feel freer to meddle on the ground
along the border. Thus, from the Soviet point
of view, the troop buildup may have been
seen as necessary, not for the moment, but
for the future when a stronger, more assertive
China would emerge.
14. There was little specific interaction so
far as the overall ground force buildup was
concerned. The Soviet buildup generally re-
flected the implementation of a long-range
plan rather than one improvised or added to
from year to year. In retrospect at least, it can
be seen that the buildup was not pointed to-
ward maximizing readiness for an invasion at
some particular and early date. The Chinese
ground forces did not take specific steps to
counter the Soviet buildup. Even after 1969,
both sides seemed concerned primarily with
filling out general defenses throughout the
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border area, and neither side appeared to take
military steps in response to specific border
incidents or to troop deployments by the
other side.
15. The most important point of Sino-Soviet
interaction was probably the border violence
of 1969, especially the March encounters on
Damanskiy (Chen-pao) Island in the Ussuri
River, in which regular army forces and ar-
tillery were used and dozens of Soviets and
hundreds of Chinese were killed. In all likeli-
hood the Soviets were genuinely surprised at
the Chinese ambush. The incident raised the
specter of heightened small-scale Chinese
provocations all along the border that could
become a bleeding sore tying down Soviet
manpower and resources for years. Soviet fears
of unpredictable, even irrational Chinese ac-
tions had been heightened by the Cultural
Revolution, and lacking any firm information
on the upheavals in China, the Soviets had
no way to gauge where Peking's bizarre be-
havior might lead. Those Soviets who ex-
pected the worst had considerable evidence
to support their fears.
16. In the months following this fighting,
threats and rumors of a Soviet invasion of
China and of air or missile strikes against
China's nuclear weapons facilities were reach-
ing Peking through numerous channels, and
the Kremlin simultaneously urged the resump-
tion of talks. These threats were clearly more
credible than Khrushchev's earlier warnings:
they were more numerous, definite, and
varied; the Soviets had by that time tactical
as well as strategic nuclear forces available;
and Soviet willingness to use military force
had been demonstrated convincingly in Czech-
oslovakia the preceding year as well as on
the Ussuri and in Sinkiang.
17. The Chinese, in turn, were alarmed at
the scale of the Soviet retaliation and at the
subsequent war threats. They seemed con
vinced that they faced a real and possibl
imminent threat from the Soviets and too
military and diplomatic steps to strengthe
themselves. Chou En-lai finally receive
Kosygin in Peking in September and agree
to quiet the border and to hold talks. Both
sides since then have restrained their actions
on the border. The Chinese have not resorted
to attacking Soviet units on disputed terri-
tory, and the Soviets have permitted the re-
turn of a Chinese presence to some areas (in-
cluding Damanskiy Island).
18. One possible example of specific inter-
action has taken place in the Soviet missile
forces. Shortly after the deployment of the
CSS-1 in 1966, and continuing for the next
four years, the Soviets deactivated all their
MRBM and IRBM sites in the Soviet Far
East within range of a Chinese missile at-
tack.
Moreover, the Soviets have since 1968 built
two early warning radars whose sector of cov-
erage includes all of China. Chinese missile
deployment also shows concern, though not
preoccupation, with targets across the border.
The deployment patterns of the Chinese mis-
sile forces show a desire to be able to attack
potential targets all around the periphery of
China, not just toward the north. A major
area of deployment, in fact, is in the east cen-
tral part of China, from which IRBMs can
attack the USSR as well as US bases on the
eastern and southern periphery of China. In
addition, what looks like a phased-array early
warning radar is under construction north-
west of Peking. It is oriented toward Soviet
missile bases, but will probably not be in
effective operation for several years.
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0
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19. There has been very little discernible
Sino-Soviet interaction with respect to the
air attack and air defense forces since 1965.
Soviet frontal aviation forces along the border
have increased from about 200 to some 1,150
aircraft, but opposing Chinese fighter strength
(tactical and air defense) has grown from
less than 850 to about 1,600, more slowly than
the growth from some 950 to some 2,300 in
the rest of China. Although the Chinese stra-
tegic bomber force has increased from 2 to
60 medium bombers, Soviet national air de-
fenses near the border have improved at about
the same rate as air defenses in the western
USSR and show no change in emphasis. to-
ward the Chinese. Aside from a concentra-
tion around Peking, which would be expected
in any case, Chinese air defenses appear to
defend centers of population in the south as
heavily as those in the north.
The Cost of the Soviet Buildup
20. By 1965 Soviet Border Guards and
ground, air, and strategic defense forces along
the China border were costing about.QJil
lion rubles a year (the equivalent of about
$2.5 billion). By 1970 expenditures for these
forces had grown to some 1.5 billion rubles
(about $5.7 billion).
'Annex B discusses the problems, methodology,
and caveats in estimating costs of Soviet forces op-
posing China. The Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, and the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy, wish to empha-
size the caveats in the Annex which describe serious
obstacles and uncertainties in developing reliable
figures. Until these are overcome, they believe that
conclusions reached in Annex B must be viewed
with considerable reservation.
Thus, Soviet expenditures in 1970 to counter
the Chinese threat were close to 2.0 billion
rubles ($7.0 billion). The annual costs have
declined slightly since then as the rate of
buildup has slowed. (See Figure 2.) Expendi-
tures for forces on the Chinese border in 1965
accounted for about 3 percent of total Soviet
defense spending; by 1972 they had risen to
about 7 percent. Another way to gauge out-
lays for the border forces is to say that they
are now at about the same level as for all the
Soviet general purpose naval forces. Over the
eight years 1965-1972, the cumulative cost to
the USSR of those forces now cc e r ec. w h
the China threat has been h"a v' 1- of
a rout $40 billion.4 The incremental cost, over
'Costs were not included for command and con-
trol, logistics, and support elements at the military
district level and above, or for Soviet naval forces
in the Far East.
Estimated Costs of Soviet Forces
Primarily Oriented to Defense Against China
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what they would have cost if the 1965 level
of expenditure had continued, has been the
equivalent of about $20 billion.
II. THE CURRENT SOVIET FORCE
POSTURE
Theater Forces
21. Deployment. There are 43 Soviet com-
bat divisions whose deployment indicates that
they would be used in the early stages of any
major conflict with China. (See Figure 3.)
Of these, some 38 divisions are stationed near
the Sino-Soviet border. Included in this total
are 18-19 divisions in the Far East MD, 10
divisions in the Transbaikal MD, 7 divisions
in the Central Asian MD, 2 divisions in Mon-
golia, and the airborne division in the Turke-
stan MD.5 The remaining five divisions are
located as much as 700 miles from the border
in the Siberian MD, but are undoubtedly in-
cluded in Soviet contingency plans for corn-
mitment against China. Most of the border
divisions are organized into 8 armies or corps,
which are controlled by the headquarters of
the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central Asian
MDs. Two i1JUaW_,dWsJQp JQp.( not including
" CIA and DIA agree on the total of 38 divisions
near the border. The DIA total includes an airborne
division in the Turkestan MD which CIA does not
view as being oriented primarily toward China. On
the other hand, the CIA total of 19 divisions in the
Far East MD includes a motorized rifle division
(MRD) at Varfolomeyevka which DIA does not
the division at Varfolomeyevka, whose status
is in doubt) may exist in the Far Eags D,
since there are as many as 10 regiments which
have not been associated with a particular
division.
some 20,000 are assigned to five MRDs k
cated in the Siberian MD, are ava' a le fc
commitment o the im are;
There are some 8,000-8,600 tanks in the div
22. In addition to the ground combat units
an air army, a signal brigade, and a Scaleboar
brigade are located in each of the Far East
Transbaikal, and Central Asian MDs. Thes
units are of a type that would, in wartime, b
associated with a front-a Soviet wartime or
ganization that controls a number of group
armies and one or more air armies. Up to fiv
fronts could be created in the border are
after extensive mobilization and reinforcement
23. At least 10 specialized units-calle
"fortified areas" by the Soviets-have been de
ployed in the Far East and Transbaikal MDs
These are roughly the size of an infantry bat
talion reinforced with tanks, antitank guns
and multiple rocket launchers and are locate
near prepared positions which they woul
occupy if an enemy attack were expected
They are designed to block avenues of ap
proach, to screen the concentration of force
to their rear, and to canalize enemy attacks.
When Soviet forces have passed through the
on the offensive, they would presumably ful
fill their normal roles in support of the at
tack. Such units are known to exist also along
the Soviet borders with Turkey and Iran.
24. Troop Strength and Equipment. The
estimated total troop strength of Soviet group
forces neap r er is 36 . Some 240,00
are assigned to the 38 divisions near the bo
der, while the remaining personnel are di
tributed in non-divisional support units an, I
headquarters. Another 30,000 troops, of whit
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There are 43 Soviet combat divisions whose deployment indicates that they
would be used in the early stages of any major conflict with China. Of these, some
38 divisions are stationed near the border. The other five divisions are located in
the Siberian MO. The total strength of the entire force, including nondivisional
units and headquarters, is estimated at 390,000, of which some 360,000 are
located in the area near the border. In addition, there are 7 to 8 combat divisions
and several non divisional support units located in other parts of Soviet Asia which
could be used to reinforce the border-a total force of some 46,000 men (27,000
in the Turkestan MO and 19,000 on Sakhalin Island and the Kamchatka Penin-
sula). The forces in the remote areas of the Far East MO, however, are not likely
to be used in the event of hostilities with China because of Soviet concern with
maintaining the defense of these areas. The forces in Turkestan, on the other
hand, may be used against China in the absence of a threat from Afghanistan or
Iran. The total number of air defense aircraft is about 450. There are also some
50,000-55,000 border guards in the immediate border area.
I Motorized rifle division
46 Tank division
V Airborne division
+ Airbase housing tactical
or air defense units
Helicopter unit
+ Helicopter assault type regiment
Scaleboard site
25X1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
Figure 3 25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
?
sions near the border and another 2,500 in
border guard units, fortified area units,
schools, and storage.6 These divisions have a
total strength of some 2,650 howitzers and 950
antitank guns. Included in these figures are
about 200 howitzers and some 400 antitank
guns which have augmented the normal tube
complement of about one-fourth of the 90
or so motorized rifle regiments near the bor-
der. Non-divisional artillery support has been
concentrated in the Far East MD, where there
are 5 artillery divisions containing approxi-
mately 500 artillery pieces. In the Transbaikal
MD, a 72-tube division has been formed, and
another is forming. Two 72-tube divisions have
been newly identified in the Central Asian
MD-one near the border and one some 1,000
miles northwest of the border area. There are
another 500 guns either in fortified area units
or in storage in areas near the border. The
five divisions in the Siberian MD are esti-
mated to have 900-1,000 tanks and 350 howit-
zers, while there are another 200 field ar-
tillery pieces in storage. The forces oriented
toward China have serious shortages of ar-
mored personnel carriers (APCs) ; only nine
motorized rifle and tank divisions have all
of their APCs. Should the Soviets mobilize,
they would have to rely heavily on cargo
trucks to carry personnel. The use of cargo
trucks to offset APC shortages in line divi-
sions would probably slow down rates of ad-
vance. This would also require some departure
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11 25X1
25X1
from Soviet offensive doctrine, which dictates
that troops will fight from APCs until forced
to dismount by the tactical situation.
141 .11
halin and Kamchatka, however, are not 25X1
likely to be used in the event of hostilities
with China, at least initially, because of So-
viet concern with maintaining the defense of
these areas; the divisions in Turkestan, on the
other hand, might be used against China in
the absence of a threat from Iran or Af-
ghanistan.
27. Readiness and Mobilization. The dis-
tinct slowdown in the rate at which combat
There are 2, possibly 3, in the Far East MD,
1 in the Transbaikal MD, and possibly two
more forming-one additional brigade in the
Transbaikal MD and another in the Central
Asian MD. There is also a Scud brigade lo-
cated in the Siberian MD. A mobile Scale-
board SS-12 brigade with 12 launchers is lo-
cated in each of the Far East, Transbaikal,
and Central Asian MDs. There is also one
obsolescent Shaddock cruise missile unit with
four launchers located in the Far East MD.
28. In addition to the forces described
above, there are 7 or 8 more combat divisions
in Soviet Asia which could be sent to rein-
force the border: 4-5 in the Turkestan MD,
and 3 in remote areas of the Far East MD
(2 on Sakhalin Island and 1 on the Kam-
chatka Peninsula), Non-divisional reinforce-
ments available include a Scud brigade and
a 108-tube artillery division in the Turkestan
MD and a.corps headquarters, a Scud bri-
gade, and two 54-tube artillery brigades on
Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The forces on Sak-
25X15X1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
divisions have begun to appear in the border
area suggests that the Soviets may be close
to being satisfied with the number of divisions
now formed. (See Figure 4.)' Nonetheless, the
z There is a difference of view as to when the
buildup peaked out and the slowdown began. CIA
adds divisions to the order of battle as of the date
of arrival of leading elements. DIA adds divisions
only when certain levels of combat strength have
been achieved. As a consequence of this difference
in methodology, CIA dates the beginning of the slow-
down from 1989-1970; where as DIA dates it in
1971-1972.
Soviets have continued to strengthen several of
the divisions already in place and have added
several non-divisional support units. As of mid-
1973, however, only some 25 of the 43 combat
divisions near the border and in the Siberian
MD were considered available for commitment
within three to five days. The remaining divi-
sions would require a more extensive mobili a-
tion of both equipment and personnel. Before
the Soviets could conduct a large-scale offen-
sive with forces now in place, they wo Id
have to fill out understrength divisional a d
non-divisional units.
Soviet Divisions Opposite China
Die CU'
Siberian MONAM
*C/A and D/A have different methods for counting Soviet divisions near the
border. CIA adds divisions to the order of battle as of the dote of arrival of
leading elements. DIA adds divisions only when certain levels of combat
strength have been achieved. CIA considers these divisions near the border
to be the primary Soviet force opposite China.
Ank
25X 1
MAW
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?
28. To meet the requirements for mobilizing
units in the four border MDs and in Mon-
golia, about 375,000 additional men and
85,000 major items of equipment would be
required. There are probably an adequate
number of trained reservists under 35 years
of age to meet the requirements for staffing
units in the Siberian and Central Asian MDs,
but older reservists up to 50 years of age
would have to be used in addition to fill out
the units in the Transbaikal and Far East
MDs. The required items of equipment, a
high proportion of which are general purpose
trucks, would be mobilized from existing
stocks and the civilian economy. In the four
MDs considered, 22 avtokolonnas (truck
parks whose vehicles are used in the civilian
economy but driven by reservists and main-
tained according to military standards) have
been identified.
29. Logistics. The Trans-Siberian Railroad
is the only surface route capable of provid-
ing logistic support to the Soviet Far East,
It can transport reinforcements to the border
area at a maximum rate of two divisions per
day if supplies for combat do not also have
to be transported. The capacity of the high-
way network is extremely limited, and road
movement for large-scale military operations
would be restricted to deployment to or from
railheads. Probably for this reason, the So-
viets have stockpiled large amounts of am-
munition and fuel with their forces now in
place along the border. There are some 250
known major military depots which provide
ammunition and fuel support. They contain
sufficient stocks to support a major Soviet
offensive into northeast China and to support
operations in west China.
30. Nuclear Warhead Storage. Prior to 1969,
there was nuclear weapons storage at only
one airfield near the Sino-Soviet border at
which tactical aviation was based. Now eight
13 25X1
25X1
more tactical airfields along the border have
storage sites completed or under construction.
Seven of the eight provide at least three times
the usual amount of bunkered storage space.
This suggests that these sites are intended to
supply nuclear weapons to more than one tac-
tical unit and, therefore, that the airfields
might be used as staging bases. (It is con-
ceivable that these airfield storage sites also
could be used to store tactical missile war-
heads. )
31, Prior to 1970, five tactical SSM support
facilities along the Sino-Soviet border had nu-
clear warhead storage available. At present
what appears to be a new type of warhead
storage facility, providing up to three times as
much storage space as the earlier facilities, is
under construction at one of these five as well
as at three more tactical SSM support facili-
ties in the border area. They, like the airfield
sites, probably are intended to supply more
than just local units.
32. Military Air Transport. There are about
105 medium transports (An-12/CUB) of So-
viet Military Transport Aviation positioned
where they could readily support operations
on the border (60 in the Far East MD and 45
in the Turkestan MD). In addition, there are
some 635 medium transport and 19 heavy
transports (An-22/COCK) based in the west-
ern USSR which would be available, should
the need arise, to provide logistic support or
to support airborne operations.
33. Assuming one round trip per day for
available aircraft, the Soviets could aiilift, dur-
ing an unopposed operation in good weather,
approximately 6,750 tons of supplies daily to
a radius of about 1,250 miles or to a range of
2,500 miles. Soviet planning apparently allows
for the use of as few as approximately 350
medium transports in the initial airdrop of an
airborne division to a radius of at least 850
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25X1
i
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
miles. A minimum of 150 sorties would be re-
quired to airland the division's combat and
service support elements and much of the divi-
sion's supplies after the airhead is secured.
One hundred seventy-five sorties are required
for the follow-up phase, while 30 to 60 sorties
are needed for daily resupply. A regiment size
airdrop operation would require approximately
140 medium transport sorties for the assault,
45 for the follow-up units, and 13 for daily
resupply. In a ferrying operation in which all
elements of an airborne division are airlanded,
about 430 medium transports would be re-
quired to lift this force all at the same time.
34. Heliborne Capability. In 1965, there
was only one helicopter regiment in the bor-
der area. There are now six helicopter regi-
ments containing about 380 (275 medium and
105 heavy) helicopters." They are capable of
performing general purpose airlift and heli-
borne operations. The total simultaneous lift
capability of all six regiments is estimated
at 2,000 men and equipment with mortar and
howitzer support.
35. Since 1969, the Soviets have collocated
two of their larger helicopter regiments with
two regiment size infantry units at Mag-
dagachi (Far East MD) and Mogocha (Trans-
baikal MD). These infantry units are the only
known combat units along a 500-mile stretch
of the border and apparently have been
tailored specifically for helicopter assault op-
erations Y While the more obvious purpose of
s There are another 100 helicopters in various head-
quarters and support units.
The ground force units appear to be equipped
with only air-transportable equipment and lack the
tanks and APCs normally found in a motorized rifle
regiment. These units most likely would perform a
quick reaction mission, such as protecting the Trans-
Siberian Railroad where it passes through mountains
close to the border from the threat of Chinese ground
interdiction.
these arrangements is to provide maxim
mobility in a lightly defended area, they may
presage the formation of large air assault units
having up to 100 helicopters and several
thousand troops.
36. Border Guards. There are an estimated
50,000 to 55,000 border guards positioned n
the immediate border area. The Soviets, n
response to the serious border incidents f
1969, reinforced Border Guard posts in mo e
sensitive border areas with small maneuv r
elements equipped with tanks and APCs. So e
of the maneuver elements are equipped wi h
the T-62 tank, and the BMP personnel carri ,
equipment as modern as that found in ma y
regular units. At several locations along the
border, a motorized rifle regiment has been
positioned near a Border Guard headquarte ,
presumably to provide prompt reinforcement.
37. Tactical Air Support. Before 1965, the
only tactical air strength in the border regi n
was a small air army, with less than 200 ai -
craft, located in the Soviet Far East. By t le
end of 1969, the Soviets had three air armies
(in the Far East, Transbaikal, and Central
Asian MDs) with some 700 aircraft in the
border region. The three air armies now ha e
about 1,150 aircraft including 500 fighter 3,
400 fighter-bombers, 50 light bombers, an
200 reconnaissance planes. Since 1970, the
force has been modernized with 180 late-
model Mig-21s. Almost 200 airfields with long
runways are located within 300 miles of t
border and in Mongolia. Of the 162 airfields
within the USSR, 74 have hard-surface r -
ways (either concrete or asphalt) and the
remainder are temporary (e.g., graded earth .
38. The mobilization and redeployment f
air units along the border would be rapi .
Units could be combat-ready at dispers 1
fields within 1 to 2 days of a decision t
mobilize. Aircraft immediately available to r -
25X1
25X1
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?
?
inforce units along the border probably would
come from the Turkestan MD, where there
are 133 planes, including 80 fighters, 37 fighter-
bombers, and 16 reconnaissance aircraft. Some
aircraft from flyable storage or training schools
could be available as attrition fillers within
4 to 5 days.
39. Approximately 600,000 metric tons of
fuel are available at home bases and other
major airfields along the border and in Mon-
golia. This is enough for 18 days of air opera-
tions. Some 500,000 tons of fuel located at
storage depots would permit operations to
continue for an additional 16 days. Approxi-
mately 150,000 tons of ammunition are avail-
able both on and off base. This would be suffi-
cient for approximately 75 days of combat.
Seven air force depots, 5 in the Far East MD
and 1 each in the Turkestan and Transbaikal
MDs, distribute air technical supplies to the
air forces.
Strategic Attack Forces
The Soviets could, nevertheless, use a
?
few of their Pacific-based Y-class SSBNs
against targets in China without seriously
weakening their deterrent posture against
the US.
43. The Soviets have in their Far East
Bomber Corps about 132 Tu-16 (Badger)
medium bombers and 84 Tu-95 (Bear) and
M-Type (Bison) heavy bombers, including
tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, home-
25X1
25X1
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15 25X1
25X1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
based in the MDs adjoining China and Mon-
golia. A few medium bombers might be tar-
geted against Alaska and western Canada, but
it is unlikely that any would be directed
against US targets farther south because of
their limited radius of action. They could, of
course, be used against US facilities in the
Pacific area near the USSR. Most Chinese
targets could be attacked by medium bombers
flying from their bases in the Far East, and
Soviet heavy bombers could hit any target in
China. In the event of war with China the
Far East Bomber Corps could be reinforced
in a matter of hours by some of the 530
medium and 80 heavy bombers based in the
west.
Strategic Defense Forces
44. The continuous improvement in the So-
viet national air defense forces along the Sino-
Soviet border over the period of the buildup
has been on par with the strengthening, dur-
ing the same period, of air defenses through-
out the rest of the USSR and in Eastern Eu-
rope. It does not indicate any extraordinary
concern with the Chinese air threat. There
have been qualitative improvements in inter-
ceptor forces along the border-at about the
same rate as in the west-although the total
number of interceptors has declined to around
450 aircraft. With the exception of the south-
ern portion of the Primorskiy Kray, inter-
ceptor strength continues to be below that of
other land border areas of the USSR. Thirty-
three SA-3 battalions and 12 SA-5 complexes
have been deployed near specific target areas
currently defended by 128 SA-2 battalions.
Deployment' of the SA-2 began in 1960, and
the SA-3s and SA-5s appeared later. The total
of current operational surface-to-air (SA-2,
SA-3, and SA-5) sites and complexes within
300 miles of the border now exceeds 170. In
addition there are about 100 operational sites
and complexes in regions east of the Ur is
which provide defense of selected locations
outside the 300-mile zone. These sites are
augmented by tactical SAM units assigned to
military units in the area. Since 1966 th re
has been a general improvement of air defe se
radar and communications systems.
Naval Forces
45. Mission and Order of Battle. The So et
Pacific Fleet has about 80 general purlx se
submarines, over 50 surface combatants of
escort size and larger, as well as a naval it
force of about 290 combat aircraft. (S e
Table I for operational order of battle.) Tie
primary mission of this fleet is defense ag . t
SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AIR, SURFACE,
SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE
MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS
Missile Cruisers
3
Cruisers .........
...........
3
Missile Destroyers
.......... ...
8
Destroyers
3
Destroyer Escorts .......................
TOTAL ........... ..................
SUBMARINES
Cruise Missile Nuclear ...... . ............ .
Cruise Missile Diesel ..................... 6
Attack Nuclear .......................... 9
Attack Diesel ...........................
TOTAL MINOR COMBATANTS .................J72
AUXILIARIES ............................ 1
NAVAL AVIATION
Medium Bomber/Air-to-Surface Missile In-
Medium Bomber/Reconnaissance .......... .
Heavy Reconnaissance ....................
ASW Fixed-Wing ...................... .
AS W Helicopter ........................ .
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?
the US. In the event of war with China, the
extent to which the Pacific Fleet would be
committed would largely depend on the So-
viet perception of the attitude of the US to-
ward the war, and particularly the posture and
activity of the US Navy in the Pacific.
46. In a war with China, the Pacific Fleet
would, in any event, defend the sea approaches
to the Soviet Far East, and if the US appeared
to take a hands-off posture, the fleet might
undertake operations off the Chinese coast.
These could include interdiction of Chinese
sea lines of communication, bombardment of
selected targets, and support to any Soviet
ground forces operating along the coast or the
Amur and Ussuri rivers. The Soviet Navy
would have little incentive to attack the Chi-
nese naval forces in their home waters.
ugmente by some 35
attack submarines and 20 major conventional
combatants expected to be normally available,
these units give the Soviets a first-rate capa-
bility to undertake such operations. The So-
viets also have a good capability for offensive
mine-laying using non-missile surface combat-
ants, submarines, some missile-equipped ships,
and possibly some Badger aircraft configured
for this role. The conduct of large-scale mine
warfare would limit the availability of the
units concerned for other roles. Defense of the
coasts is a primary mission of the guided-
missile boats of the Osa Class, the coastal
escorts and submarine chasers augmented by
medium-range diesel submarines, the mari-
time border guard, and the Coastal Missile Ar-
tillery Troops. Soviet naval aviation, in addi-
tion to antiship strikes, can perform long-
range reconnaissance, free-fall bombing, mine
laying, antisubmarine warfare missions, and
signal intelligence collection.
III. CHINESE FORCES OPPOSITE THE
USSR
17 25X1
25X1
Ground Forces
48. About 1,300,000 combat and 100,000
service troops of the some 3,200,000 Chinese
ground forces are now deployed in the four
MRs bordering the USSR and Mongolia
(Shen-yang, Peking, Lan-chou, Sinkiang).
Most of this strength-slightly over one mil-
lion men-is in the east, in the Shen-yang and
Peking MRs. Almost all these forces are de-
ployed well back from the border, most of
them 300 to 500 miles from the closest points
on the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. In re-
cent years, the Chinese have established
heavily fortified areas in the first good defensi-
ble terrain below the border, particularly
north of Peking. At the same time, the Chi-
nese have been developing lightly-manned po-
sitions closer to the border. This latter action
suggests that Peking may gradually move its
first lines of defense forward over the next
several years.
49. Within the four MRs the combat forces
are deployed as follows (see Figure 3,
page 9):
a. The Peking MR has 530,000 troops, of
whom 80,000 are in Inner Mongolia. The
balance are within 100 to 200 miles of posi-
tions from which they could defend against
a Soviet advance through Inner Mongolia
toward Peking.
b. The Shen-yang MR has some 420,000
troops, a decline of some 75,000 troops since
1964. The bulk of these troops are concen-
trated in garrisons in the southern half of
the region.
c. The Lan-chow MR has 240,000 troops,
most of whom are strung out along almost
700 miles of rail line from Sian to a point
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/28: LOC-HAK-541-8-2-0
about 150 miles southwest of the missile test
rangehead at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. The bulk
of these forces could move along these and
connecting rail lines into the two good inva-
sion routes in this region-the Yellow and
0-chi-na river valleys.
d. The Sinkiang MR has some 100,000
troops; about 40,000 of these are deployed
around Urumchi. The remaining forces are
so widely dispersed that reinforcement of
the troops near Urumehi would be difficult.
50. Considering the reduced threat to other
areas of China, Peking might feel free to move
reinforcements to the four MRs opposite the
USSR from the pool of 1.8 million troops sta-
tioned in the seven other Chinese MRs. The
size and destination of the movement would
depend on the Chinese perception of the
threat. There is no information available on
Chinese contingency plans. Transportation of
these forces would be a major problem; most
would have to move long distances over rail
lines which are vulnerable to interdiction at
numerous points.
51. The most significant realignment of Chi-
nese forces since the mid-1950s occurred in
late 1969 and 1970, when five armies (165,000
men) moved from south and east China to
north and central China. These repositioned
armies are now near main rail lines along
which they can more readily move in any di-
rection-either toward the Soviet and Mon-
golian borders or toward the south and east.
Two of the armies moved to the Peking MR
from the east, and one from the south to the
Lan-thou MR. The other two moved from the
south to central China.
52. Chinese ground forces have been re-
ceiving a fairly steady flow of equipment since
1969. This has upgraded their firepower and
mobility. The most significant improvements
have been in tanks and artillery. The ground
forces have also shared in the general i
provernents and modernization of command
and control communications. There seems o
be no marked priority for forces nearer the
border regions in the modernization progra
although there is evidence of a slight fav
ing of units in these areas. In any event,
China's ground forces remain basically an i
fantry force and are distinctly inferior to S
viet forces in terms of modern equipment.
Air and Air Defense Forces
53. The Chinese air defense system is so d
ployed as to provide a point defense of k
urban and industrial areas, military install
tions, and advanced weapons complexes. 1-
though this system has undergone significa t
upgrading over the past few years,
Although air defense equipment will continue
to increase in quantity and improve in c -
pability, it will take a number of years for
China to complete the modernization and
training programs necessary to develop a c -
ordinated air defense system capable of Ef-
fectively defending against a large-scale A-
tack by aircraft employing the latest equip-
ment and technology.
54. China has about 4,300 tactical fighte ,
light bombers, and air defense aircraft. Of
these, 440 tactical and 1,400 air defense a' -
craft are deployed in the four northern M Rs
opposite the USSR. Most of these aircraft a e
deployed well away from the border. Ma e
than half of the fighters and one-third of e
bombers in the northern regions are deploy (d
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0
19 25X1
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targets only in the southern part of the Far
East MD and in the extreme eastern portion
of Mongolia from identified areas of deploy-
ment. (See Figure 5.) Deployment of this
missile continued through the late 1960s and
971-1972. F
apparently ceased in 1971-1972.F-
in the Shen-yang MR in northeast China. The
in
Chinese thus concede air superiority to the So-
viets over most or all of the border areas,
recognizing that their inventory of aircraft,
mostly obsolescent, would be at a disadvan-
tage if matched against Soviet aircraft close
to or over Soviet territory.
55. The Chinese have deployed at least 57
SAM battalions, principally around Peking, a
few other cities, and the most important ad-
vanced weapons complexes. Aside from this
thin deployment,
became operational in
1971. This missile could strike military targets
in virtually the entire Sino-Soviet border area
and many urban industrial targets in Siberia.
Current deployment is estimated at 25-40
launchers and continues. In late 1968, China
began production of copies of the Soviet Tu-
16 medium bomber. About 60 of these aircraft
have been deployed to date. Sometime within
the next few years, possibly as early as 1974,
56. Although the evidence is inconclusive,
it is possible that the Chinese are developing
a modified version of the CSA-1. If so, this
missile might be expected to have an increased
range, a better low-altitude capability, and
improved electronic counter countermeasures
performance. Although the northern portions
of China had priority in deployment of early
warning radars in 1971-1972, ground control
intercept coverage is still spotty and below
the capabilities of the system in the east. The
air units in the border areas have received no
significant preferential treatment; they appear
to receive normal allocations of new aircraft
production.
it could reach well into
the western USSR, possibly to Moscow and
beyond.
58. The deployment pattern of these stra-
tegic forces provides a capability to strike
around the entire periphery of China. F_
The Tu-16 bomber
could also reach these targets. Thus, despite
the obvious Chinese concern with the Soviet
threat, the overall deployment of strategic
strike forces has shown no markedly anti-
Soviet bias.
59. The Chinese have shown that they con-
sider survivability to be the key to their stra-
tegic missile deployment. From the beginning
of CSS-1 deployment in 1966, some units have
been deployed in the semimobile mode. In
this mode, equipment normally is kept some
miles away from launch sites that have mini-
Strategic Attack Forces
57. Prior to 1988, China had no strategic
strike capability against the USSR. They began
to develop such a capability in 1966 with the
deployment of the CSS-1. This missile, with
a range of about 600 nm, could strike Soviet
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Approximate Coverage of China's Strategic Weapon Systems
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mum improvements, and the sites have few
readily recognizable features.
60. Although the Chinese have deployed
their small strategic missile force primarily to
attain a strategic deterrent, there are indica-
tions that they contemplate contingencies in
which they could employ such missiles tacti-
cally, against targets in their own territory if
necessary. Deployment to date suggests that
these weapons could be used against choke
points along invasion routes into northeast
China or against hostile staging areas in Mon-
golia. If a Soviet invasion made rapid and sub-
stantial progress, this option might be con-
sidered as a means of forcing withdrawal with-
out striking targets on Soviet territory. It is
probable however, that, the Chinese would
adhere to their no-first-use policy even in
these circumstances rather than provide the
Soviets with justification for use of their over-
whelmingly superior nuclear attack forces.
Naval Forces
61. Although Chinese naval forces include
about 60 submarines, 6 guided missile de-
stroyers, 1 destroyer, 5 guided missile de-
stroyer escorts, and 5 destroyer escorts, most
of their combat strength consists of vessels
designed for coastal defense. These forces are
not likely to venture far beyond coastal waters.
21 25X1
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On the other hand, their capabilities to carry
out assigned missions are sufficiently impres-
sive to discourage attacks by Soviet naval
vessels in areas where Chinese fleets are
strongest. This would be particularly true in
the Pohai (Gulf of Chili), which is protected
by the North Sea Fleet, containing some 275
combat vessels, including about 28 subma-
rines, 6 major surface vessels, and 45 guided
missile patrol boats.
IV. COMPARATIVE CAPABILITIES
The Adversaries' View of the Balance 25X1
62. Soviet intelligence resources are better
than those of the Chinese.
40 TOP SECRET 25X25X1
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The Chinese, possibly for propa-
ganda purposes, have claimed publicly that
the Soviets massed one million troops on the
border after the serious border fighting n
1969. They also expressed fear of an irn i-
nept Soviet nuclear attack. However, a rece it
Chinese assessment of the Soviet border for e
is closer to the US estimate, and since ear [y
1972, Chinese fears of an imminent Soviet at-
tack-ground or nuclear-appear to have
diminished. (It is too early to tell wheth.r
Chou En-lai's speech at the Tenth Party Co e-
gress in late August 1973 marks renewed con-
cern over a possible Soviet attack.)
?
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64. The Soviet force now appears to have
capabilities in excess of those required to repel
any force that the Chinese could send against
the USSR in the next few years. But this
assessment may not give sufficient weight to
such key factors as the degree to which the
Soviets are determined to maintain the integ-
rity of the border, Soviet concern about the
vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
and Soviet evaluations of the combat capa-
bilities of the Chinese forces. Finally, it does
not weigh the value the Soviets place on the
deterrent effect of the forces they have in
place. For example, the Soviets probably con-
sider their investment well worth the cost if
they attribute China's restrained conduct
along the border since 1969 to the Soviet
military capabilities demonstrated on Daman-
skiy Island.
65. Peking elected not to confront the So-
viet forces directly along the border; instead
the Chinese have been building fortified areas
in good defensive terrain well back from the
border, thus compensating in part at least for
the greater mobility and firepower of the So-
viet forces, To compensate for their strategic
inferiority they have been constructing under-
ground facilities and dispersing and hardening
their strategic missile forces. Although both
sides are skilled in the use of psychological
warfare and have used all available techniques
to influence the outside world and each other
during the dispute, all evidence indicates that
each side holds the other in high regard as a
military opponent. They have observed each
Exercises and Contingency Planning
66.
23 25X1
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other's military forces closely, and they are 67,
both familiar with the possible theaters of mili-
tary operations, The military effort both have
made is prima facie evidence that each side
realizes it is engaged in a deadly earnest con- Peking's mili-
test for power in the Far East. tart' posture in t e north, however, is entirely
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TOP SECRET
defensive. Thus far, construction of fortified
areas in good defensive terrain athwart in-
vasion routes has indicated a preoccupation
with defense of Peking. Such areas also have
appeared along three major routes through
mountains bordering the western edge of the
Manchurian Plain, but defensive developments
do not yet reflect a clearly defined plan for
protecting this heavily industrialized area.
Thus, Peking's present plan may be to fight
only a delaying action in northern and central
Manchuria in the face of a determined So-
viet invasion. But over the longer term more
fortifications may be constructed and troops
may be moved into positions from which they
could more readily react to defend the plains
area.
Comparative Military Capabilities
68. Assessing the capabilities of the forces
we have described is complicated to some ex-
tent by our imperfect knowledge of the various
objective and subjective factors usually used
to judge combat readiness. Their performance
against each other would also depend on the
specific circumstances under which combat
operations were initiated. Both sides have been
conditioned to expect provocative acts from
the other and are prepared to retaliate, It is
uncertain, however, whether these conditioned
responses would be adequate to sustain the
morale of the troops through a difficult cam-
paign if the causes of the war were vague or
ambiguous. The problem of maintaining mo-
rale would become particularly acute for an
invading force in any case because it would
probably be met by the traditional resistance
with which both sides have met foreign in-
vaders. Any assessment of how the two forces
would perform against the other must, there-
fore, begin by recognizing that intangibles
such as morale can greatly strengthen resist-
ance, even against a technologically superior
force.
69. The forces which the two sides have -
ployed along the border reflect different st -
tegies, Soviet superiority in military tec -
nology and production, and the exigencies f
geography. The Soviets, in order to accompli ;h
the missions of border defense and deterrence
in the Far East MD, where the Chinese threat
is potentially the most serious, have been
building a modern combined arms force posi-
tioned farther forward than would be the case
under less restrictive geographic conditions.
(See Figure 3, page 9.) The relatively n r-
row band of habitable land provided by t e
Amur-Ussuri river system provides the rig t
of way for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, t e
locale for most of the important populati n
and industrial centers in the Far East, a d
the location of most of the Soviet garriso s.
On the Chinese side the absence of vi al
centers near the border permits the Chinese
to deploy well back from the border and to
avoid being rapidly overrun by the hig y
mobile Soviet forces.
70. Because of the asymmetries in the two
force postures, relative troop strengths do of
indicate the Soviet military superiority in the
immediate border area. Soviet ground troop
strength near the border is around 360,O DO
troops, of which some 240,000 are assigned
to 38 divisions. Although the Chinese now
have 1,400,000 ground troops and 1,800 coin-
bat aircraft in the four MRs bordering t e
USSR and Mongolia, few major units are n car
the border and at least half of these troo s
are deployed some 300-500 miles from t e
closest border points. The Soviet superiority
in equipment in the vicinity of the border,
illustrated in Table II, is magnified by Soy et
technological superiority in most major ite s
of equipment. For example, the Chinese
Type 59 medium tank is based on the Soviet
T 54 A, which first appeared in the Soviet
inventory in the 1949-1951 period. The cur-
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25 25X1
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COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES EQUIPMENT IN THE VICINITY! OF THE BORDER"
TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT TA
NKS
AR
LLERY L
MULTIPLE TACTICAL
ROCKETS NUCLEAR
AUNCHERS LAUNCHERS
USSR"
Far East MD .........
400 5,300(
4,800)
2,20
(2,100)
370 (380)
94
Transbaikal MD .......
350 3,200(
3,100)
87
200(220)
57
Soviet Forces, Mongolia .
150 530(
550)
13
38(54)
8
Central Asian MD .....
250 2,000
73
(800)
130
40
Siberian MD ...... . ...
0 1,000(
910)
55
100
21
836(884)
220
?
" Soviet and Chinese strategic air defense equipment in the border region is not included
in this chart because of differences in missions, equipment, and organizations. Mission, in-
ventory, and capability of these forces are discussed in paragraphs 44, 54, 55, and 58.
b The figures for Soviet equipment in this Table represent an estimate of the gross inven-
tories by type in each MD and include equipment found in tactical air units, combat maneuver
units, fortified area units, ground forces storage, army schools, and border guard units. CIA
and DIA have reached common estimates except as indicated by figures appearing in paren-
theses, which represent DIA estimates. All differences have been influenced by order of battle
variances between agencies. The tank inventory estimates, however, have been most affected
by differences in methodology (see footnote to paragraph 24, page 11), All figures have been
rounded to two significant digits except in cases where they were sufficiently small to make
any variance significant.
rent Soviet tank inventory consists largely
of improved second and third generation suc-
cessors to this model. The Chinese Air Force
continues to consist largely of Mig-15/17s,
Mig-19s, and IL-28s, models now considered
obsolescent by the Soviet forces. The deploy-
ment of F-9s is adding firepower, versatility,
and range to the ground attack force, but the
Soviet force remains far superior owing to its
Mig-21 (some of which are the latest models)
and Mig-17 fighters and its Su-7 and Su-17
fighter-bombers. A similar disparity exists in
the relative antiaircraft defense posture, heli-
copter and transport aviation capability, com-
mand and control systems, and other combat
and combat service support capabilities. The
Chinese have no mobile nuclear delivery sys-
tems similar to the Soviet FROG, Scud, and
Scaleboard. The Soviet force is also better
trained than the Chinese force.
71. Soviet divisions along the border are
designed for mobile warfare. They have a
relatively high ratio of tanks to infantry and
possess great firepower, but are supported by 25X1
a logistics structure at division level which
would experience considerable difficulty in
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supporting a prolonged period of rapidly mov-
ing intensive combat. The Soviet capability
to conduct prolonged combat operations would
depend upon the mobilization of non-divisional
logistic resources at front and army level,
where the bulk of Soviet logistic support is
found. The ratio of tank to motorized rifle
divisions in the border areas (1:6), lower
than that in Central Europe (1;1), probably
represents a Soviet concession to the terrain
and opposition they expect to encounter in
China. The motorized rifle regiments of sev-
eral Soviet divisions have been augmented
with additional 100 mm field or antitank guns
and 122 mm howitzers. The 100 mm guns may
be intended for use in a direct fire role to
neutralize emplaced weapons. The additional
pieces improve the capabilities of the regi-
ments to act independently. These minor dif-
ferences in organization between Soviet forces
in Asia and those in Central Europe provide
insufficient basis, however, to assume that
they are designed to fight under different
tactical doctrines. Their organization, equip-
ment, and training exercises have produced
a force designed to halt any likely Chinese
attack and rapidly shift to the offensive.
72. Given limitations in the Soviet logistic
structure, the nature of the Chinese defenses,
and the desirability of executing any campaign
with stunning rapidity, Soviet planners would
undoubtedly weigh the relative merits of con-
ventional versus nuclear weapons in reducing
Chinese defenses. Although the Soviets claim
that the conventional firepower in current
divisions is at least 31 times greater than that
of World War II divisions, the use of this
firepower, plus that of Soviet frontal aviation,
could still result in a campaign of unaccept-
ably long duration. Various Soviet spokesmen
have declared that in the event of a full-scale
conflict in the area all available means would
be used, presumably including nuclear weap-
ons. These assertions have generally been
made while hypothesizing a clear Chinese
provocation, which would provide the Soviets
with the rationale to use any weapons avail-
able in their own defense. Nevertheless, the
Soviets would have to measure the political
disadvantages of their first use of nuclear
weapons and the possibility that the Chinese
would retaliate in kind either against the in-
vading Soviet troops or by escalating the con-
flict with a strike on Soviet cities in the Far
East. Under the current Chinese leadership
it is unlikely that the Chinese will provide
the Soviets with the kind of provocation that
would clearly justify a major military respon e.
However, if the Soviets, for whatever reason,
found it necessary to initiate a major military
operation against China, the use of nuclear
weapons in the interest of bringing the ca i -
paign to a quick conclusion might have many
advocates regardless of the negative political
consequences and the risks of Chinese e-
taliation.
Capabilities for Various Military
Contingencies
73. Border Clashes. Since 1969 both the in-
tensity and number of border clashes have
declined. Considering the emotional overtones
both sides have attached to the issue and the
potential for local conflicts, the reduction in
the number of incidents reflects strong central
control from both Moscow and Peking. To
significant military capability is necessary to
cause a border incident, and since there is
likely to be bad blood between local units,
the possibility that an incident could become
a border clash is always present. Of the two
sides, the Soviets have the most highly -
veloped capability to react and to control t e
level of intensity of such a clash. Event e
local Soviet Border Guard Headquarters n
some areas have tanks and APCs nearby 'o
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support them in meeting any Chinese incur-
sion. Additional reinforcements are available
from within the Border Guard district. The
regular forces in the border, some of which
could be heliborne to the conflict area, would
be called in for situations beyond the capa-
bilities of the Border Guard. Soviet rules of
engagement in force along the border appear
to have been given careful consideration, and
any decision to move beyond these rules and
escalate the clash probably would be made
in Moscow, where local passions would be
but one of the numerous elements which
would be considered before an escalatory
step would be taken. Given Soviet capabilities
in the border areas, Soviet reactions to border
probes could be quite powerful, but they
would be consistent with the broader consider-
ations of Soviet foreign policy objectives.
74. The Chinese would appear to have
little incentive to resume provocative actions
on the border, although they have a wide
range of options available, including sabotage
of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Soviets
demonstrated their capabilities and determina-
tion at Damanskiy Island in 1969, and the
Chinese are aware that the Soviet forces could
retaliate at a higher intensity if sufficiently
provoked. Any attempt to interrupt operations
of the railroad would be considered extremely
provocative by the Soviets and would require
a Soviet punitive action in response.
75. Punitive Actions. The objectives of these
operations would be to disrupt, punish, and
humiliate a regional command by a strike or
raid on a limited objective such as a head-
quarters or other installation. For example,
if the Chinese were to interfere with the func-
tioning of the railroad, Soviet forces might
retaliate with a raid on the major headquarters
which they believed had planned and exe-
cuted the Chinese operation. If it was decided
not to cross the border, retaliation could be
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27 25X1
25X1
executed by either artillery or tactical aircraft.
In a more serious retaliation, a combined air-
ground operation could be mounted. In either
case the Chinese ability to defend in the im-
mediate border area would be limited. Again,
any decision to retaliate heavily would be
made in Moscow and would be calculated to
refresh Chinese awareness of Soviet capa-
bilities. It would also be calculated to meet
the needs of current Soviet foreign policy.
76. Major Conventional Campaign. In the
current situation the circumstances under
which a major conventional campaign would
be launched can be conceived only in terms
of an operation initiated by the Soviet forces.
Various reasons why the Soviets would under-
take such an operation can be postulated, but
considering the risks such a step would in-
volve, only a direct threat to the security of
the Soviet Far East would seem likely to
trigger such a Soviet reaction. A major con-
sideration in the planning of a Soviet opera-
tion would be the possibility of becoming in-
volved in a protracted war. In an effort to
cope with this possibility, Soviet planners
would recommend significant reinforcement
of their forces in place. Additional forces
would increase the impetus of the initial at-
tack and would be necessary to protect lines
of communication and to provide protection
to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The require-
ment for protection of lines of communica-
tion and rear areas would grow as the Soviet
forces penetrated more deeply into Manchuria
and China itself. The scale of reinforcement
re uired to execute a limited a in-
tend-e-1 to seize northern Sinkiang an e
a 200- . e er in Manchuria for th -
Sj erian ailx ad has be .n _ 1 nla^v~ ~T~
at some 37 divisions. This reinforcement would
bring 7C e strength of the invasion force to
80 divisions, about 70 of which would face
northeastern China. Soviet planners would
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probably calculate that they could reach as
far as Peking with such a force, but they
would need a much larger force built up
through extensive mobilization to seize and
hold Peking.
77. The initial phases of any major Soviet
ground campaign could be expected to give
the appearance of success as the Soviet forces
overwhelmed the Chinese forces on the border
and proceeded into China. Soviet air inter-
diction would slow and disrupt Chinese at-
tempts to move PLA forces to meet the Soviet
thrusts. The Soviet drive would begin to slow,
however, as the first Chinese fixed defenses
were encountered and as Chinese local forces
began operations in the Soviet rear. Delays
and Chinese successes could confront the
Soviets with the choice of a protracted con-
ventional war or escalation to the use of
nuclear weapons.
78. Any Soviet decision to use nuclear
weapons would be made at the highest po-
litical level and would include such limita-
tions as the political leadership deemed neces-
sary. These limitations could require that
tactical nuclear weapons be used only against
Chinese defensive positions delaying the
Soviet advance. If it were believed that the
Chinese would not accept such an escalation
without also resorting to nuclear weapons or
if the Chinese were detected preparing to
use them, the Soviets probably would plan
a concurrent strike at the Chinese nuclear
weapons and facilities.
79.1
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
The Likelihood of Major Military
Conflict
82. Whatever prospects it may once have
had for long-term "fraternal comradeship,"
the Sino-Soviet relationship has now plainly
evolved into a stark confrontation of adver-
saries. The key source of contention between
the two countries is no longer, as it was dur-
ing the early 1960s, primarily a dispute over
China's relationship with the Soviet Union
and its proper role within the socialist com-
munity. The dispute has now expanded into a
fundamental clash of conflicting national in-
terests and ambitions, in which each side per-
ceives its physical security as well as its inter-
national position to be threatened by the
other.
83. The recent intensification in the ex-
change of recrimination, accusation, and insult
29 25X1
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between Moscow and Peking demonstrates
the continuing tension and hostility in Sino-
Soviet relations. A key question is whether this
situation will persist, change toward a more
controlled competition, or change toward the
extremes of genuine rapprochement or war.
84. In view of Soviet military superiority
generally, and in the border area itself, it is
extremely unlikely that China would deliber-
ately attack Soviet forces across the border.
Chinese regular troops in the four northern
MRs opposite the USSR are positioned well
back from the border, and Chinese military
activities in the border area, apart from
strictly limited probes at particular points in-
tended to support Chinese border claims,
have been clearly defensive in nature. A lim-
ited Chinese military action in Soviet terri-
tory, such as an attempt to interdict the Trans-
Siberian Railroad at some point close to the
border or to raid a Soviet Border Guard head-
quarters, would seem out of the question in
the absence of some prior Soviet military ac-
tion. Even a return to aggressive Chinese
patrolling in the disputed border areas is un-
likely because of the evident Soviet capacity
and willingness to respond at a more powerful
level. In both domestic and foreign policies
since 1969 the Chinese have shown that they
take the Soviet threat seriously. They have
adopted publicly the posture of a threatened
state, and while they have not changed their
basic negotiating positions or territorial claims
because of the Soviet threat, they have re-
strained their actions along the border.
85. The possibility exists, of course, that a
border incident, no matter bow it began, could
escalate toward a major military conflict. But
this seems unlikely in light of the desire of
both sides to restrict fighting-the Soviets be-
cause they wish to avoid a drawn-out series of
border clashes, and the Chinese because they
do not want to provide a pretext for Soviet
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military action. The Soviets should be able to
control the level of violence in any border en-
counter because of their capacity to contain
locally any Chinese offensive actions, and So-
viet rules of engagement in force along the
border appear to have been given careful con-
sideration. Any decision to retaliate heavily
would almost certainly be made in Moscow.
Such action could be quite powerful-for ex-
ample, heavy artillery barrages-without in-
volving Soviet troops in ground actions on
Chinese territory and could probably be car-
ried out without creating grave complications
for Soviet foreign policy generally.
86. Soviet punitive actions at a higher
level-raids across the border by ground
troops-are improbable without some Chinese
provocation more serious than the original
ambush on Damanskiy Island in 1969. Neither
the Chinese nor the Soviets wish to risk the
momentum of their policies of detente and
improved relations with the US by presenting
to the world an image of unreasonableness or
bellicosity. Both powers would also be aware
that preoccupation with a military struggle
between them might weaken their influence
elsewhere, If a conflict were to break out in
the border area, arising perhaps from a flare-
up of border tension or a miscalculation in
either capital, it would probably be limited
to non-nuclear operations close to the border.
87. A major Soviet ground attack against
China-whet Ter a response to Chinese actions
at lower levels of conflict or an attempt to
take advantage of political turmoil within
Chinaee?ML 'k l,;. Even more unlikely
would be a deliberate un-deM, ILL at
the con ues As noted above, the
Soviets probably judge that they would have
to reinforce their ground forces substantially
even in order to move into and hold border
areas in Sinkiang or northern China, and
would undoubtedly believe it necessary to
undertake an extensive mobilization in order
to take and hold Peking. In either case Mo -
cow might foresee getting bogged down n
a protracted and costly struggle and bei g
confronted eventually with a choice between
withdrawal or the use of nuclear weapons
an effort to force a decisive end to the co -
flict. The latter action, even if it were su -
cessful, could have many and far reachi g
adverse repercussions damaging to the USSR s
position in the world.
88. In weighing the possible use of nuclear
weapons against China, Moscow would ha e
to give foremost consideration to the growl
Chinese nuclear strike capability. It is possib e
that the Soviets have already considers
taking deliberate action against that cap -
bility-apart from any ground action
because it is the most dramatic and poten-
tially effective military aspect of the Chinese
challenge to the USSR as the dominant power
in Asia. But the Soviets probably believe the
have not targeted all Chinese strategic offen-
sive forces, and their apprehensions probably
incline them toward worst-case assumptions,
(See paragraph 81, page 29.) Consequently,
they now face the probability, which has bee
acknowledged in a Leningrad lecture, th t
several of China's surviving missiles coul
destroy military targets or cities in Soviet Asia
even after a Soviet first strike, The deterre t
effect of the Chinese strategic attack capa-
bility will be enhanced significantly in the
next 2-3 years when an inventory of missiles
capable of reaching targets in the wester
part of the USSR probably will becorn
operational.
89. The Soviet leadership could, of cours
simply disregard the possibility of Chinese r -
taliation and proceed with an attack on the
assumption that the Chinese would follow
the rational course and refrain from retaliat-
ing with their few remaining missiles-a
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31 25X1
25X1
90. The military risks are not the only con-
siderations which deter a major Soviet attack
on China, whether by nuclear strike or on
the ground. The Soviets would have to weigh
carefully the significant international reper-
cussions that would flow from any major
Soviet campaign against China-even a
limited ground invasion. So long as the Soviets
were militarily involved with China, they
would be concerned about possible ways that
a protector of the poor, the weak, and the
non-white would be undermined, especially
in the Third World. Chinese hostility toward
the Soviets would intensify and greatly lessen
whatever chances may exist of a post-Mao or
post-Brezhnev reconciliation between Peking
and Moscow.
92. While Moscow is prepared to punish
the Chinese at any point on the frontier where
they might act forcibly to assert territorial
claims, the main Soviet policy to counter
China is centered on diplomatic efforts and
on activities within the Communist movement.
A major attack on China, especially one in-
volving nuclear weapons, would involve not
only accepting serious new risks, but also
rejecting an established policy that has quieted
the border with China and, in other parts of
the world, promises political and economic
benefits.
act of pure vengeance which would only
guarantee that they would sustain even greater
damage in retribution. The Soviets could
scarcely count on such Chinese restraint, how-
ever, and would be unlikely to jeopardize
major cities unless they came to believe that
inaction carried greater risks than proceeding
with the attack. To date the manifold uncer-
tainties and risks in any military action against
China have clearly outweighed any possible
advantages, and the growth of the Chinese
deterrent will continue to increase the risks.
Future Force Relationships
93. Just as the prospective general rela-
tionship between the USSR and China is one
of continuing confrontation and contest, but
with no major military conflict, so the pros-
pective force relationship is one in which each
side maintains its forces opposite the other,
but at a level which does not disrupt or distort
its total military commitments. Planned Soviet
divisional deployments along the Sino-Soviet
border appear to be close to being realized.
There is thus little prospect that future border
requirements will impinge noticeably on force
requirements in Europe and mutual force re-
duction talks. The continued buildup of sup-
port forces will also be undertaken with little
effect on forces opposite NATO. The growing
flexibility of Soviet strategic attack forces per-
mits the Soviets to target China more com-
pletely while at the same time increasing their
capability against Europe and America. While 25X1
no extensive modification of equipment and
other powers, especially the US, might seek
to take advantage of their reduced influence
in other areas of the world. They would also
have to consider the likelihood that the US
would perceive a new aggressiveness or in-
stability in Soviet policy and alter its policies
toward the USSR, perhaps even taking steps
to improve its strategic weapons program. The
Soviets would also surely be concerned that
their first use of nuclear weapons, even if
militarily successful, might fundamentally alter
world opinion against the USSR.
91. In addition to the new problems that
would be raised, important existing Soviet
policies would be jeopardized. Moscow's gen-
eral policy of detente with the West, and
most importantly its effort to foster economic
ties, especially with advanced Western coun-
tries, would be imperiled. The Soviet attempt
to portray the USSR as a force for peace and
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25X1
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organization is foreseen, it is likely that there
will be some limited tailoring of the forces
along the 5ino-Soviet frontier to provide a
quicker reaction over longer distances. The
co-location of two regiment size ground
force units with two helicopter units may be
a case in point.
94. To the present time, the guiding strategy
of the Chinese military leadership has been
to maintain China's capability to defend
against attacks from all directions, and not
to give preferential treatment to defense
against possible attack from the north to the
detriment of China's defense posture else-
where. This approach was appropriate in a
time when US forces were still fighting in
Vietnam and were stationed in force on pe-
ninsulas and islands on the eastern periphery
of China. Now that US forces are withdraw-
ing from Southeast Asia, it is possible that
the issue will again arise as to whether the
limited Chinese forces and resources should
be concentrated to a greater degree against
the USSR. To date there is no evidence that
a basic reorientation of Chinese forces is under
way, and any rapid large-scale shift seems
unlikely, in part because of Chinese concern
not to alarm the Soviets unduly. It would be
expressed in preferential deployment of mis-
siles, aircraft, and ground troops in northern
China, and perhaps in increasing the capa-
bilities of the Northern Fleet in relation to
those of the Eastern and Southern Fleets.
Until such developments occur, Chinese
leaders must be considered to have given a
negative answer to the question of whether
China should reorient its defenses from a gen-
eral capability to defend against attack from
all directions to a preference for defense
against attack from the north. This decision
is consistent with the more realistic view of
Soviet strength on the border noted above
(see paragraph 63, page 22).
95. In view of the limited specific ins r-
action discernible in the evolution of the
Sino-Soviet military confrontation, themod-
ernization of both the Soviet and the Chinese
forces will continue to be determined by the
general pace of research and development and
weapons production throughout the respective
forces, rather than by special considerate ns
related to the border standoff. Thus, Soy et
force modernization will continue largely in
response to Warsaw Pact and intercontinental
requirements. In fact, the resources devot.d
to defenses against China as a share of t e
total Soviet defense effort are likely to decline
in the near future as the force levels planned
against China are reached.
96. Peking can likewise be expected to press
ahead with its longstanding program to mo -
ernize its armed forces as a part of its gene al
effort to establish China's status as a great
power. It is also likely that, in contrast tot the
largely politically-inspired surges and slow-
downs in Chinese weapons development and
production in the past, future Chinese weapons
development and production will take pla e
within the framework of a more balanced
economy; in this sense also, the creation of a
strong China-not a specifically anti-Sove t
effort-will be the touchstone of the growth
of the armed forces.
97. It is possible, of course, that if Sin:)-
Soviet tensions grow in the future, each side
will build its forces into a yet more formidab e
posture. If the Soviets intended to devel p
a force along the border designed for major
ground actions against China, they would
probably begin by setting up a structure for
a five-front force and possibly a theater head-
quarters. A Chinese reaction to increased ten-
sion and evidence of a further Soviet builds
would probably take the form of an increas
effort to strengthen China's northern defense .
25X1
25X1
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?
Chinese ground forces, if they were to be
prepared to undertake offensive operations
away from their bases, would need enlarged
logistics support, training in joint operations,
and a much greater supply of tanks, artillery,
and ground-support aircraft. Although Chinese
forces will improve over the next few years,
there is little chance that the improvement
would be so great as to support a capability
to undertake operations against the USSR.
98. Heightened tension would also have an
influence on the strategic weapons postures of
the two powers. It might cause the USSR to
be more reluctant to sign an offensive arms
agreement with the US; it would certainly
make the USSR more determined to negotiate
an agreement that would permit it to keep
what it regarded as an adequate deterrent
against both China and the US. In the event
of an agreement limiting ICBMs and inter-
continental bombers, there would be greater
Soviet incentive to develop and deploy larger
numbers of weapon systems oriented toward
China. As for the Chinese, heightened tensions
would probably cause them, among other
things, to push the deployment of their region-
al deterrent more rapidly, to improve their air
defenses, and to establish underground shelters
and defenses in even greater numbers. Chi-
nese technological deficiencies and high de-
velopment costs appear to preclude a success-
ful effort to develop an ABM in the next
decade, although ballistic missile early warn-
ing radars would probably be deployed.
99. In a situation of lessened tension, it is
possible that the USSR would reduce its forces
along the border, though probably not to the
levels existing before 1965. But even in a con-
dition of general detente the maintenance of
current force levels at lower levels of readiness
would be more likely than any substantial
reductions in those force levels. The Soviets,
having made a substantial investment in equip-
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33 25X1
25X1
ment and facilities in Soviet Asia, would prob-
ably be inclined to allow unit personnel
strength levels to decline, rather than to close
bases and remove equipment.
100. Whatever the force development poli-
cies followed over the next several years,
however, the relative strengths of the opposing
forces will change but slowly. The Chinese
have much further to go in developing modern
armed forces, and they can therefore make
more rapid and noticeable improvements. But
the Soviet research and development and in-
dustrial base is so much greater that, despite
any Chinese advances, the USSR will retain
its substantial advantages.
101. As Soviet forces are already at higher
levels of capability and readiness, it will be
difficult for them to make a substantial in-
crease in relative strength vis-a-vis the Chi-
nese forces. The Chinese, on the other hand,
will achieve increased effectiveness for their
forces from relatively modest additions to the
low levels of equipment now on hand and
from increased levels of training. The addi-
tion of a battalion of tanks to a division, for
instance, would only add some 10-15 percent
to the Soviet divisions, but would double the
tank inventory of a Chinese division. The Chi-
nese division would thus grow in capability
relative to the Soviet division, but would still
have only about one-fourth as many tanks.
The relative changes in the Chinese posture
will not be sufficient to embolden the Chi-
nese and cause them to consider offensive op-
erations, but they will increase the deterrent
capability of the Chinese forces in Soviet eyes.
102. During the period of the 1970s, the
Soviet Union will also remain far ahead of
China in the strategic balance. Soviet stra-
tegic attack forces are growing in flexibility
and capability against China. The new Back-
fire bomber will be able to cover all of China
25X1
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25X1
25X1
unrefueled from Far East bases, an option not indicate that China will be able in the la re
open to the Badger.
1970s to cover several hundred Soviet targe s.
Soviet projections almost certainly "worst
case" this development. Relatively speaking,
therefore, the small growth in the Chinese
retaliatory capability will carry more sign -
cance in the strategic relationship betwe n
the two countries than the more extensive
Soviet growth.
104. Force developments on the border a d
in the strategic forces thus indicate that t le
103. These increases in Soviet weapons will optimal time has passed for the Soviets o
add to an already overwhelming strategic use military force to disarm China or to coerce
capability, but will not make for any ap- Peking, and that likely future Chinese force
preciable change in the balance. Our pro- developments will further reduce Soviet mi
jections of Chinese missile forces, however, tary options vis-a-vis China.
?
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25X1
25X1
ANNEX A
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
AND RELATED EVENTS: 1964-1973
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36 TOP SECRET
Chronology of the Buildup on the Sino-Soviet Border and Related Events, 1964-1973
Political events
Chou En-Lai visited Moscow.
ttosygin""visited Peking. "
Demonstration mr pt ed outside SoViet Embassy, Peking.
-Nov 1965
Late 1965-
End 1965???.,,?
-Nov 1964
,,,,,,Feb 1965?,,? Soviets" anndunced troop strength at 2,4$3iQQ0..
-Mar 1965
May 1965??? ` Chinese,evploded ,second nuclear device.
Soviet Mpngoiian Treaty of 'Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual
ssistanee signed.
Societe aod;Chinose traded denunciations in letters circulated in
the Communist movement:
Cultural fRaVolution began? in China,
Chinese"?9th'Party ConArakt'coiv ed:" decitaloa to engage in "Prep.
aratibias''Ibw Wat"i campaign, iovuving increased production efforts,
disperea!.of "pvp~ile n>"Digging of alt raid shelters, and stockpiling
of food and strategic materials',
Chinese charged that Soviets Have provoked more than 00, harder
incidents between October 15,!1904 and March 15, 1969.
Brezhnev admitted at the World,Commoniat Conference that the
Chinese have split 30 Communist parties.
A stern editorial in Pravda called attention specifically to the Chinese
nukllepr IthreVt and described.Chi.o as a, problem affecting the whole
wyorid " '
, restraint
Cbott 'and" 009 10, 040J,436, Peking, resolved to am
acid to held Seiko.
.,..-Jan-Fab 1966
Soviets have 14-13 divisions near the border, 3 divisions
Siberian MD, and less than 200 tactical aircraft in the area.
Soviet corps headquarters mooed froth Dushanbe to Alms At
Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near thi
to 15.
-Summer 1966
Late 1966_, First Chinese MRBM'aeployed.
1966-1967 Soviet corps headquarters mowed lrom ftdoasa M0 to Pat l ae MD.
End 1966 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near th borde
Mar 1969___ Maior Siitq Sbviet doylies ocourfed oli"thR ltatit#".River over
skly (Chen-pan) lslaitd.
to 18-21.
FourSoviet S$r4',M f1N1"launchers dear'""border deactivpted.
ConstruofiGttt began tee, western ildSR on ten $"wif I BM la nGtrers
with target.sectors coveting China. Three Soviet Scaleboard brigpdes depinye'd pan
l' border.
End 1967 Soviet divisions added during year increased strength near the border
to 22-27.
1968 Chinese began production of"c`oi of'',Tp;1g Mediumbpmber,"
Construction began it w$fei td,ti$$1G n 1d $ It MC M'1 t6frers
with target septmrs"riiareting china.
Soviet corps hoadgwlertars tttoged frdrrt liyaein+ nt a idgro k.
$ovletu"be o ooisti'oetldtl' ofitavo 11$ House'b'pl uric missi ";early
warn6rl"fl3 f w~" re pis deal blp a""b cad"r", aped atao d n,iin-
prmvement or Air WarniGig hbllityralohg, ardor" fifth "$nnttl gg.'
End 1968_ Soviet divisions added during year increased border strength to 25-33.
- Apr 1969,,?,??? . $dviet'dotPs headeuar ra" adtl~r ed' tip NG bdreli" f tf cam`" uMca.
ttona, at Piorxya, Asllkhabbt, tlti n?tlde kl'eis Satvp k an i ofd rbbnn1
-Jun 1969_ , Soviet troops reportedly destroy 0 Zq ,-Mail cbptpany "of the P ople's
Liberation Army (PLA) in a b'otoor l;l, t Tlaidtt'ang~"Sl hang.
-Aug 1969---_ Border clash in the Dzhungarian fine,-Feld"uld ihia li "rypoft d.
- Sept 1969 _ Fotkbatau MD" was,uiirid d fetbi ttGO plpr x` ho " " dP1hh; pui
"I" Central Astio$ MD along"i kt rg bgrdo p ca pe lobed
at Al' forted tiro"roe l vs' tp M t iis~ ae .~" headq'
W
8"0:00: Far S at ieinbatS dw tt dd to *Vtpk train
aeahokOtt.
The number of Soviet divisions listed in this chronology is sometimes expressed by two
figures. The first represents 0/A's holdings; the second, CIA's. Differences in the two
agencies' holdings are explained in the footnote to paragraph 27
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1
Slho4ovlet border tpl{cs b n
240 Soviet Patty "t79ngrp ~e,401l Br *hnev implied friendly
ne~s,will have to awkdbi d"deatk `~i
Iwt 4fbtp~+hpg+dao' i. > ,u toon* d Cie for t*rred of
tIG~ltie~ fd411 1 ', . "" tefht" ;Chitte$"e"retectad uftdr
gnrUuo4, Sovretd "refl dG " $ir, fbroes ntat ti porde"r,
3725X1
25X1
Col tru tinn bldaa In lventern USSR on 70 Soviet SS-11 ICBM
laud hers with tatge! aeetbrs Covering Chlna,
M'our I"rbv1et SS?ha IRBM #auihdbers aear border deactivated.
rttorne ditllsien tit Be gote (for'EastMD) possibly transferred to
Bo1 tW