SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-547-11-1-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-547-11-1-1
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Military Assistance to North Vietnam
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Soviet Military Assistance to
North Vietnam
Summary
Since the cease-fire, the USSR has continued to
send military supplies to North Vietnam, but the amounts
are probably well below those of. the peak war years. As
long as the USSR continues to assign the highest priority
to rapprochement with Washington, the Soviets can prob-
ably be expected to exercise restraint in their arms
deliveries to the North Vietnamese and to discourage
the North Vietnamese from launching.-a major military
action.
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Another argument for the thesis that military
deliveries are continuing comes from the activities
of the North Vietnamese themselves.
--Since the cease-fire, North Vietnam has dis-
patched large amounts of arms and ammunition
to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the
past, such efforts were not undertaken unless
Hanoi were ensured of replacement stocks from
its Communist allies.
It can be argued, however, that past practices and
reasoning do not apply in the current situation.
--Hanoi could have opted for a quick and heavy
infusion of supplies into the combat zones
before the cease-fire became effective, in
part to counter the heavy infusion of US mili-
tary supplies to South Vietnam. If Hanoi were
not contemplating an early return to major
military action, the. need to be assured of
having replacement stocks already in hand
would not be controlling. They could be built
up over time.
As might have been expected, treatment of the
aid issue in Soviet propaganda since the signing of
the peace agreement suggests some de-emphasis of the
military aspect.
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--Soviet media have not referred explicitly to
current or future military aid to North Viet-
nam, but have instead strongly implied that
future Soviet assistance would be primarily
economic.
--North Vietnamese pronouncements have contained
a number of hints that Hanoi is not pleased
with the aid the Soviets are providing.
Our judgment is that total military aid to North
Vietnam in 1972 may have reached a value of one-half
billion dollars, the largest such commitment since
1967. Of this, the USSR probably provided about two
thirds. The aid continued right up to the cease-fire.
With the cessation of US bombing over North Viet-
nam, Hanoi's requirement for large amounts of expen-
sive SAM and AAA equipment and ordnance has been
greatly reduced. The slackening of the fighting else-
where in Indochina has cut Hanoi's needs for materiel
to the lowest level of the past decade.
Prior to the cease-fire, the North Vietnamese
probably had enough materiel to pursue a range of
military options--up to and including a major offen-
sive. The Soviets, therefore, cannot prevent an of-
fensive should the Vietnamese decide it is in their
interests. Hanoi would probably be reluctant to
launch a major military action without the support
of its great-power allies and without guarantees
that the materiel expended would be replaced. This
attitude gives the USSR some degree of leverage,
though the effectiveness of this leverage is limited
as we have seen in the past.
The Soviet attitude toward future military aid
deliveries will, in large measure, be determined by
the extent of their desire to get on with the poli-
cies of detente with the West and rapprochement with
the US. They recognize that renewed heavy fighting
in Indochina could jeopardize at least this latter
policy and they will probably work to keep the Indo-
chinese problem relegated to the back burner. Since
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China has demonstrated that it too attaches more im-
portance to relations with Washington than to North
Vietnamese victories in Indochina, the Soviets prob-
ably believe they can exercise some restraint in
their arms deliveries to the Vietnamese, even if
there were a resurgence of major military action,
and still maintain their position in Hanoi. In ad-
dition, they may have some hope that by exercising
restraint in Indochina, they can extract concessions
.from the US on issues of more direct and immediate
consequences to the USSR (e.g., trade legislation,
economic credits, CSCE).
In sum, it seems likely that the Soviet Union
is continuing to send military supplies to North
Vietnam, but the amounts probably are well below
those of the peak war years.
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