THE MILITARY OUTLOOK FOR THE CURRENT INDOCHINA DRY SEASON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-553-9-5-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 24, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/01/10: LOC-HAK-553-9-5-3
MEMORANDUM
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP /SENSITIVE SPOKE
FROM:
SUBJECT:
OSD and JCS
reviews completed
W
375-X
INFORMATION
January 24, 1972
THE p j ! WDENT EAS SUN. . 001
HENRY A. KISSINGER
The Military Outlook for the Current
Indochina Dry Season
Secretary Laird has forwarded a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well
as some separate comments by General Westmoreland on this subject
(Tabs A and B). Mr. Laird draws upon General Westmoreland's comments
to conclude that friendly forces should be able to cope with the situation
with the help of U. S. air and providing that ARVN uses its mobility to
respond to enemy initiatives. The JCS study is a bit more cautious; it
raises the possibility, that the situation could become extremely critical
if U. S. air power were forced to respond to simultaneous enemy pressure
in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
Beyond this difference, there seems to be general agreement on the
following points:
-- The enemy is currently engaged in a significant buildup in the
western highlands of South Vietnam and adjacent Laos. Heavy fighting
is expected to erupt in the South Vietnamese highlands probably next
month in order to coincide with your trip to Peking as well as to shake
the confidence of the ARVN. The magnitude of the enemy buildup is
sufficient to require the dispatch of ARVN reserves, but it is not big
enough to suggest that the enemy intends to push into the coastal lowlands.
-- Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the situation appears to be reasonably
well in hand. The enemy does not have the capability to conduct sustained
offensives in the southern half of the country. NVA units could move fairly
quickly through and around the DMZ into northern MR I. If they did, ARVN
reserves would also be needed there. General Abrams has reported that
the ARVN general reserve is now being readied for deployment as necessary.
/SENSITIVE SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/01/10: LOC-HAK-553-9-5-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/01/10: LOC-HAK-553-9-5-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE SPOKE
-- The enemy is expected to continue to exert pressure in Laos and
Cambodia, but not to implement an all-out military option in either of
these countries.
Comment. The difference between the JCS paper and the comments of
General Westmoreland is largely a matter of emphasis. General Westmoreland
focuses on the probability that friendly forces will cope with the situation,
while the JCS paper notes the possibility that a critical situation could develop.
Otherwise, there is general agreement that the enemy will not opt for an
all-out offensive, in Indochina during this dry season. A recent CIA assess-
ment also conveyed this judgment.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/01/10: LOC-HAK-553-9-5-3