THE SITUATION IN JORDAN, 24 SEPTEMBER 1970
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-556-6-7-1
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
December 16, 2010
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 24, 1970
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 111.27 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/16: LOC-HAK-556-6-7-
TH SITUATION IN JORDAN, 24 ST;t'TI.(~IT'~T;Tt j l)70
K-~`3r3ca
Amman: The army plans to make a determined effort today to push
the fedayeen off the hills of the capital and into the
center of town. This will be hard on the restaurants and
movie theaters, I expect. Zaid Rifai told the embassy
they will use 20,000 men, including some infantry this
time, to wipe out the last pockets of resistance. Rifai
appears to be aware that this will be a tougher job than
.the army originally expected. Rifai said the government
is doing its best to restore public services, but the
Embassy is still fending for itself.
Amman airport: The far end of the air strip at Amman airport
is still in range of fedayeen mortars, but the evacua-
tion planes are getting in and out without trouble.
The main problem appears to be collecting the people
who want to leave in time to meet the plane schc:cluie.
MORI/CDF per
C03233103
Hostages: The Palestinian Red Crescent Society has announced
in Bern that it now has custody of the airline hostages 25X1
in Jordan. The announcement noted that the hostages
were well but are subject to the hazards and conditions
of the war zone. We cannot confirm a
report that the hostages have been taken to the Syrian
border area. The Israelis, meanwhile, have reiterated
their refusal to exchange any convicted Arab terrorists
for the hostages.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/16: LOC-HAK-556-6-7-1
L
?s
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/16: LOC-HAK-556-6-7-1
TOX' SECRET UMBRA
71h]r fedayeen have rockets, anti-tank weapons
and land manes, but they have nothing to counter the
artillery that is pounding them from the heights around
the city. The Israelis think the Syrians are holding the
option of returning, but this does not seem likely.
Our own analysis is that the Syrians determined in
advance that they would limit their involvement to the
armored, mechanized and artillery units already stationed
near the border. Since these outgunned the available
Jordanian tanks by more than two to one, they probably
expected to eliminate the Jordanian armor, seize the main
roads, and support the fedayeen units in Irbid, Mafraq
and the other northern towns.
The Syrians had the element of surprise as well,
and in the almost continuous battles on Saturday and
Sunday they pressed the Jordanian tanks very hard. Had
they concentrated on breaking through to the south,. they
might well have made it. Instead, they seem to have
divided their force to relieve Irbid as well, giving the
Jordanians a chance to recover and bring in their aircraft.
Jordanian artillery on the heights overlooking Israel
was turned around and used to good effect, and their
tanks rallied and dug in. The Syrians also suffered
from notoriously poor maintenance, and by Tuesday their
operational tanks were no longer a match for the Jordan
army, whose tank force had been reinforced. The Israeli
build-up probably had some effect on shortening the Syrian
incbrsion and may have had something to do with deterring
them from using their own aircraft. It is more likely,
however, that the Syrians. wanted to keep their involve-
ment a deniable one, at least until they and the fedayeen
had complete control of the north. A Palestinian armored
division is one thing, but a Palestinian air force is just
too big a lie for even the Syrians to try. When it became
clear that they were not going to break through, we think
they decided to cut their losses and withdraw. The Soviets
were leaning on them all this time, and if nothing succeeds
like success, it is also true that tithing fails like
failure, and they had clearly failed.
TOP SECRET UMBRA
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/16: LOC-HAK-556-6-7-1