LAOTIAN LOGISTICS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 16, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21: LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TOP SECRET
CONTAINS CODEWORD
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Bennett will be ready to discuss the following points:
Colonel Kennedy 01.
NSC JCS NSA
DIA DOS USAF
review of pgs
32-47 complete
per MORI
C03233170.-.
INFORMATION
March :16., 1971
.W 7/Zvi .yn,"nc...
At today's meeting, Director Helms will be prepared to
enemy supply activity and throughput during this dry season;
NSA DIA review of
pgs 8-17 only per
MORI C05125419.
and the anticipated results for the whole dry season;
any disagreements on interpretation of data;
any differences in assessments, specifically defining the nature
of such differences and why they exist.
defined for the benefit of the WSAG principles. Director Helms and
Lt. Gen. Bennett will have key analysts at the meeting.. Ray Cline and
other prior to this meeting in order that their differences could be clearly
Director Helms and Lt. Gen. Bennett were to have consulted with each /
his key analysto will also attend.
The Problem
para.12, CIA memo The Ho Chi Minh Trail", Tab A),, and DIA's position
that "the throughput of supplies this year is significantly below the level
achieved this time last year. " (para. 3, DIA Intelligence Appraisal, Tab B
Minh Trail seem adequate for maintaining a hot war in Indochina" (page 10,
OSD JCS NSA DIA DOS review of pgs 1-3 complete per
MORI C03231643
In brief, the problem arises from the apparent contradiction between CIA's
view that "the ammunition and weapons that nightly move down the Ho Chi
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-
assessments which have been made of supply movements to date
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TOP SECRET
CONTAINS CODEWORD
--'CIA says it has a "large amount of indirect evidence suggesting
that this year's tonnages (into the Ban Bac area) will be higher
(than last year's) (page 10, para 24, Tab A), while DIA states
that it has "no evidence to support" CIA's claim (para 3, Tab B).
Key Questions
-- How much material has the enemy sent from north of Tchepone
to areas south of Tchepone since the initiation of operation
LAMSON 719?
- - How much of his original goal does this constitute?
How much of the total moved through the Tchepone area is
believed to be throughput to South Vietnam and Cambodia?
-- Has the operation substantially cut the amount.of throughput thus
far?
How much of the input is being consumed by the enemy forces in
southern Laos? ... The real.question is whether the continued
-shipments south through the system are being diverted largely
for support of enemy forces in south Laos (they have increased
.by 30, 000 over last year).. or whether the.bulk is still moving
south to base areas intended to support operations in South Vietnam.
What did CIA mean by "hot war" in its assertion that the ammuni-
tion and weapons that nightly move down the trail seem adequate
for maintaining a hot war? (Is it implied that the enemy capability
to keep up his attacks in South Vietnam and Cambodia will be as
great as last year, less or more? If the answer is that his capa-
bility is the same or greater, how do we account for his ability
to offset the loss of Sihanoukville and the effects of LAMSON and
last year's supplies lost in Cambodia?
TOP SECRET
CONTAINS CODEWORD
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TOP SECRET
CONTAINS CODEWORD
Can the enemy fully offset the interdiction of Rt. 914 and Rt. 92
by greater use of Rt. 23?
During the rainy season, is it possible for the enemy to move
enough supplies to make up for any shortfall he may experience
during the dry season?
-- Ask both Director Helms and Lt. Gen. Bennett to explain the
methodologies used by their respective agencies in assessing
the level of enemy logistics flow through Laos.
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C L ( - - 330 a?
TOP SECRET
Dr. Kissinger's Talking Points for
the WSAG Meeting
March 16, 1971
1. Purpose of this meeting is to clarify the facts on the South Laos
logistics situation.
2. I understand CIA has..a briefing to get things underway.
3. Because of the complexity of this issue, can we order our
discussiontoday by starting with..the question of inputs, then'examine
throughput estimates, and finally layout the criteria that will allow
us to assess the significance of the data.
4. Input: I understand there. is agreement that the input levels
of this year are roughly equivalent to those for the same time period
a year ago. What we need to know is..
-- What has the input been by time 'period (week, month) this year?
How do, these estimates differ according to whether they derive
from sensors, intercepts, etc. ?
What is the CIA and DIA assessment of the reliability of these
various sources of intelligence both separately and together?
~- How does the input data look when broken out by: pre-Lam Son,
:Lam Son and post-Lam Son time periods?
TOP SECRET
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similar period last year and in earlier years?
-- I-low do the input flows described compare with those for a
TOP SECT ET
this year is running at roughly 22% of last year's throughput:
- Where do these estimates come from?
Thxouf;hnt: I have seen a throughput series from DIA
which shows that throughput into South Vietnam and Cambodia thus far
(a)llow much is the enemy losing to our air interdiction effort,
particularly the AC-130s?
(b) 1-low much of tl se input supplies are consumed by the enemy's
What is the CIA and DIA assessment of their reliability?
What do other pieces of data tell us about the credibility of
such a data series'
vastly increasing force structure in South Laos?
(c) What does the mix of the logistics flow (ammo, POL, food, etc.)
supplies tl.t are intended to be final combat consumables in South Vietnam
.this year compared with last year tell us about the proportion of the
the throughput series itself would allow us to make an intelligent
A review of this data juxtaposed with our assessment of the reliability of
or Cambodia?
judgment about what is getting through.
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TOP SECRET
I also wonder if it is possible to piece together a sub-series"
of input/throughput data from particular Binh Trains, for example
BT 32 "and l3T 34.
Output. vs. Requirements: What's really important is not how
s year compares with last year in terms of throughput but what
terribly enlightening to be told that the throughput will support a
level of activity this years throughput will support. It is not
of the requirements for (a) protracted war, (b)a Che-MR or Cambodian
offensive, (c) Two-MR offensive, and (d) a general offensive of the
Tot 196s variety.
unless one is told what a hot war is. We need to establish.
What?.the loss of Sihanoukville implies about the additional
throughput requirement to support combat operations in Cambodia and
South Vietnam.
-- the relationship between various levels of enemy combat
activities in South Vietnam and Cambodia and the logistic throughput
requirements necessary to support such activities. Let's do an analysis
in disrupting the logistics flow into MRs 1 and 2. What is the evidence
issues. General Abrams has placed great stress on the role of Lain Son
Partial Logistics Disruption: It may be that we are painting
ourselves into 'a corner by stressing too much the aggregate supply
on this score?
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Other Issues: Another way to assess the South Laos,ope ration
would be in terms of its force diversion/destruction effects. On this
score we need:
-~ an estimate of those units that were heading to Carhbodia or
South Vietnam but which were diverted to cope with ARVN in South Laos,
-- evidence on. a planned enemy offensive in MR 1, 2 or in Cambodia
this dry season,
-- evidence on the total casualties inflicted by ARVN in South Laos
and on enemy units put out of action by the Lam Son operation.
We also need an estimate of the additional NVA deployments to
South Laos caused by Lam Son.
Can the intelligence community do an assessment along the
lines we have described, stating clearly differences of view and provide
such a report within a week or ten days?
TOP SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET
' MEMORANDUMFO R DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith 0V
-SUBJECT: Logistics and Force Diversion
on South Laos
Problem
INFORMATION
March 16, 1971
CIA has provided its estimate of the current logistics situation in
South Laos and you have received DIA's rebuttal..
CIA maintains that:
-- "There is a large amount of indirect evidence suggesting that
this year's tonnages will be higher-[than last year's)." CIA cites
the 108 ton per day average of 1970 versus the 140 ton average
had data on the inputs through the other two passes, input could
through just one of three passes in 1971. CIA surmises that if we
Another intercept reports possibly 165 tons per day-arriving shipped
run as high as 400 tons per day if one assumed proportional flows.
from. BT32, which according to CIA is "the highest ever noted in
enemy logistical traffic for a month. " Other indirect' evidence cited
are reports from various Binh Trains that they have repeatedly
exceeded their quotas.
-- After adding to previous supply:flows the increment required
to replace the lost Sihanoukville -flow (estimated rather glibly by
CIA at 20 tons per day) CIA says "Thus the ammunition and weapons
that nightly move down the Ho Chi Minh trail seem adequate for
maintaining a hot war in Indochina."
DIA's rebuttal argues as follows in an attempt to refute CIA's
assessment:
TOP SECRET
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-- DIA has no evidence to support CIA's contention that this
year input tonnages "are comparable" to last year's while
throughput tonnages are well below those of a year ago.
year's flows will exceed last year's. DIA notes that thus far this
--'DIA disagrees with CIA's inference that Binh Tram's
reports of goal fulfillment constitute evidence that the communist
supply system is reaching its goal.
The foregoing viewpoints constitute another episode in the continuous
intelligence scandal of the Vietnam war:
---CIA and DIA could both be correct. CIA may be correct that
replace Sihanoukville, increased food shipments required to offset
food requirements previously covered from Cambodia -- all these
factors could yield.a lowir throughput than a year ago. The, point is,
full analysis of these statements shows them to be half truths. 'No
single intelligence authority is responsible for putting together the
entire picture. This we are left with no full appreciation for what
we do know, and do not know. Neither DIA or CIA is 'doing solid
enemy force structure in South Laos, increased losses to more
effective truck killing AC-130s, offsets plus losses on offsets to
higher, losses-to Lam Son, supplies consumed by the much-enlarged
this year's tonnages will exceed last year's if they mean input
tonnages. DIA also could be correct in asserting that throughput
is less. It clearly is thus far. Moreover, even if input is much
analysis.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
25X1
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use of the coil
reliability judgements.
ction techniques they control --
Neither agency
compares the evidence from all sources and makes basic
Both CIA and DIA.refuse to face up to the fundamental
without ever saying what level of activity and associated supply
final end-use requirements: What throughput is required to support
what level of enemy activity? Yet CIA will offer a statement to the
effect that supply movements will allow the "hot war" to continue
ssues. Both CIA and DIA have refused to relate supply flows to
requirement constitutes a "hot war. 1'
I strongly believe that little will be gained by having a DIA /CIA
confrontation at tomorrow's WSAG. Neither agency has provided
you with a candid and comprehensive assessment of the logistics
for an assessment of the situation in South Laos and the Lam Son
operation. This framework encompasses two basic issues:
be criticized for saying too little rather than too much.
I attempt below to lay-out a comprehensive analytical framework
easy to protect yourself with a phrase like "hot war. " They should"
This can be done because they have not ventured very far. It is
issue. Both agencies can and will defend their views successfully.
logistics -
-- enemy force diversion and force destruction,
In my opinion too much attention has been given to the former and
assessing the situation in South Laos and its impact on the war in
too little to the latter. They deserve at least equal weight in
-I have attempted to piece together the data I had in hand to illustrate
portions of the analysis.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
25X1
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We need the following evidence to assess the logistics situation:
Logistics Benefits
available.
intelligence source should be provided. Some of this evidence is
provided by CIA an DIA. Evidence on the accuracy of. each
source etc. ) and a final overall assessmen
periods. These estimates should be given separately by intelligence
t
(1) Supply Inputs and Throughputs for the 1970-71' Dry Season
(a) We need evidence on supply inputs broken down by week
and month and into pre-Lam Son, Lam Son, and post-Lam Son time
Supply input to the trail system got off to a late start due to the
magnitude through February 1971.
prolongation of the wet season into October 19b' . The supply input
weekly average rate caught up to last year's rate in December and
thereafter fairly closely paralleled last year's effort in trend and
Average
Weekly
Tons Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar(-Mar 9) Total
1969-70* 221 2024 1660 2768 3155 2273 44,394
1970-71 184 .1124 1752 2830 2812 2978 41,301
Notes: * 1969-70 input does not include tonnage shipped via Sihanoukvllle.
and input at the DMZ was 1644 -- most of which it is bei.Aeve xs es xne
level of input activity. Input this March at Ban Karai ZP'ass was 1208 tons,
I d d 44 d
remains higher than usual at Mu Gia Pass, indicating continued high
tons. February 1971 input was 11, 248 tons. Normally in March the
which was downward at 4546 tons from a February 1970 input of 12, 619
March 1971 total input of 5956 tons departs greatly from I970 trend
-for, enemy forces opposing the Lam Son operation.
Problems like the following would be resolved by an analysis like that
outlined above.
No Objection to Declassification in
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TOP SECRET
This evidence would tend to support a judgment that supply
year. On the other hand, .: did phase one of the offensive end a month
later than.phase one a year ago? Has the acceleration of the enemy's
effort due to Lam Son put him back on last year's timetable?
inputs in 1970-71 will exceed 1969-70 levels if it is true that the late
monsoon forced the enemy to start his effort about a month later this
between CIA and DIA on the relative importance of the three passes?
CIA ventures a guess of equal proportionality. Is DIA's assertions
that we don't know the best we can do?
Do we know enough to resolve the proportionality dispute
South Vietnam and Cambodia is. only 21% of the level of last year.
throughput of supplies estimated arriving at points of entry into
(b). Evidence on throughput estimates in 1970 should also be
provided broken down as described in (1) above. Serious problems
underly the following series provided by DIA which shows that
Throughput (RVN & Cambodia)
Ay Oct Nov . -Dec Jan Feb Mar (thru 9 Mar) Total (9 Mar)
Weekly
1969-70*
20
95
370
904
1478
984
1970-71
0
30
48
219
309
294
Does not include tonnage arriving via Sihaoukville in 1969-70.
For this data series' we need to know:
-? where these estimates come.from;
13,567
2,897
what information is available on: supplies consumed in South
weather, etc.
Laos, supplies destroyed by bombing, and by Lam Son, supply offsets
pluss losses on offsets to overcome loss of Sihanoukville, and losses to
.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
how the series would look if it were seasonably adjusted to
account for the kte monsoon this year.
Such an aialysis, would raise problems like the following:
-- CIA may be correct in its assertion that "tonnages" (read
inputs) this year will exceed last year's. But DIA could also be
correct in asserting that throughput will be less.
-- Truck kills have soared this year, primarily due to the fact that we
now have 12 AC - 130 gunships operating as opposed to only one last year.
The AC-130 gunship is credited with 70% of truck kills, It takes about
2, 500 trucks to operate the trail's logistic system. At the current rate
of kills, there should be a turnover of truck inventory about every three
weeks. Even if we accept DIA's estimate that 75% of damaged trucks
can be repaired and returned to service, the current rate of truck kills
should have required a turnover of inventory three times this dry season.
Weekly
Avg. Truck
Kill S
1970-71
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar (thru 9 Mar) Total (to 9 Mar)
20
120
148
290
311
298
28
193.
499
643
804
-. How has the loss of Sihanoukville increased the throughput (and
thereby input) requirement? Does CIA's 20 ton per day estimate account
for the losses the enemy would bear in South Laos?
(c) Can a special input /throughput series be designed to assess
the. impact of Lam Son operation, e.g. , a BT32/ B T34 comparison
before, during and after the operation?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
 (2) Total Enemy Logistics Requirements via the Trail for Alter-
native Strategies /Activity Levels and the Implied Input/ Throughput
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
TOP SECRET
In order to assess the significance of various throughput levels
we need to know what they might imply for possible enemy activity
levels, e.g., protracted war, general offensive, two MR offensive. DIA
and CIA have shied away from such an estimate even though they have
the individual data pieces necessary to accomplish it. A useful way to
calibrate the range of offensive activity would be to -examine previous
dry season flaws before past offensives, adjust these to compare.with
1970-71 Trail conditions and making alternative assumptions about
stockpiles, estimate what types of military activities in 1971, the current
throughput would support.
Requirement.
It is possible that input and throughput in 1970-71 dry season
will exceed 1969-70 levels and the enemy could still fall short of meeting
last year's requirement for combat. This might be the case if the 1971
increment did not offset what in the past was obtained via Sihanouville.
The ultimate test of the significance of the logistics effort is not how it
compares with last year's but the level of combat activity it will sustain.
(3) Other Logistics Evidence.
Also relevant to our overall logistics assessment is evidence
on the following:
shortfalls.
-- Local logistics shortages, e. g., in MR's L..'or 2 of
South Vietnam.
What is the significance of recent changes in ?ma.npower
infiltration for the logistics estimate?
What is the significance of data on the expanded trail
network in South Laos and the enemy's use of new roads, etc. ?
-- What do data on the mix of supplies (food, POL, ammunition,
etc) tell us about current logistics capabilities compared with past experience?
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
-- Individual Binh Tram reports on..goal achievement and
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TOP SECRET
- - What do the enemy' s efforts to defend the Trail tell
us about its importance to him?
- (4):Concluding Logistics Assessment.
of Lam Son in which one could have some confidence. The data need
to be judged against alternative logistics success criteria for
Lam.Son. Such criteria should include the following justifications. for
With the foregoing analysis, we could move to assessments
Lam Son:
it cut the aggregrate level of logistics throughput in
1971 and thereby forced the enemy to operate at a lower overall
level of combat and/or to consume stockpiles.
-- The local disrupture efforts in MR 1 and 2 denied the
enemy offensive opportunities this dry season.
in the dry season.
-- The delays caused by Lam Son (and the late monsoon)
caused the enemy to cancel operations in Cambodia and elsewhere
because supplies did not arrive in time to begin offensive operations
damage and expanding the Trail.
The operation into South Laos forced the enemy to
devote more resources that could be used elsewhere to restoring
Force Division and Force Destruction Benefits
In my judgment, the strongest justification for Lam Son
would rely on a force diversion/destruction rationale. Very briefly the issues are:
mounted an offensive in the highlands of MR 2. General Abrams was
reported in the February 25 Washington Post to have offered such a
evidence that had ARVN not entered. Laos, enemy units there: would have
by diverting forces designated for such offensives? There is some
(1) Did the Lam Son Operations 'pre-empt a Highland's
and/or MR 1 or Cambodia Offensive
pre-emptive justification for Lam Son.
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TOP SECRET
areas from which U. S. units had redeployed (the highlands) in order to
take advantage of MR' 2 short supply line.
A P. O. W. from the 64th NVA Regiment reported his unit,
which entered South Vietnam in early January, was headed for the
highlands to take part in an. offensive. However, after arriving at
Ban Dong in Laos on February 11, this unit was ordered to defend the
area against ARVN attacks. A high level rallier reported in early
August 1970 of enemy'plans to mount a priority offensive in MR 2 against
We also have a report that units headed for Cambodia
were held up in South Laos because of Lam Son.
In general,. there is a serious question whether the enemy's
roughly 35, 000 combat troops in South Laos are all fully occupied for
the long term. One might argue that the Laos effort was crucial if
ARVN's threat was to be credible and the enemy's forces were not to be
diverted to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
reports on enemy intentions and movements for forces in South Laos.
Most of this evidence is readily available.
For a judgment on the force diversion benefits of Lam
Son we need a complete OB appraisal and P. O. W., rallier and other
(2) Did Lam Son disrupt the manpower infiltration
effort? The enemy's 1970-71 manpower infiltrations effort has
exhibited strange fluctuations. Possible these may in part be due to
Lam Son which might be credited with disrupting the enemy's effort
to build-up his forces for .combat.
out of commission by Lam Son.
strikes associated with Lam Son, on the 25X1
status of enemy units to arrive at an assessmen o the enemy units put
to pull together the data on ARVN-inflicted casualities, losses to air
Infiltration data are readily available for such an assessment.
-- (3) ARVN and U. S., air support have hurt- some NVA units
badly, possibly placing them out of service for the dry season. We need
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
Other Benefits and the Costs of Lam Son,
include possible improvements in ARVN effectiveness.
Other benefits to-Lam. Son that should be weighed
-- Possible control losses in South Vietnam pursuant
to ARVN diversions to Laos (thus far these appear to be slight).
-- Losses in ARVN combat effectiveness due to
enemy attacks in Laos.
Other more general risk/cost considerations are:
-- Risk of Chinese intervention,
Cost to Laotian neutralith,
destruction considerations would provide a sound basis for an initial
Increased NVA mobilization attributable to Lam Son.
Increased political oppisition to war in U. S.
An assessment of the foregoing logistics and force. diversion/
'judgment on the utility of the Lam Son operation.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
 March 18, 1971'
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
SUBJECT: South Laos, Lam Son and the Indo-China War
We have been unable to obtain the data necessary to arrive at a final
.assessment of the impact of the South Laos/Lam Son situation on
the Indo-China war. The intelligence community is obsessed with
preparing for today's WSAG and would not accomplish the analytical
tasks we set out.
However, we have arrived at a very simple and solvable model for
assessing the logistics situation and the impact of Lam Son. It has
been informally discussed at the analyst level in CIA. CIA's
analysts agree with the methdology and believe the data to solve it
could be generated in a few days, if the agency and DIA are told to
march in that direction. Unfortunately, CIA views itself as defend-
ing the proposition that all enemy supplies have not been cut off,
whereas DIA (according to CIA) is maintaining that they have. Of
course, CIA is right on this point, which, unfortunately is not
fundamental.
The Model
The key issue is what new inputs into the logistics system are
required to maintain Iast year's level of throughput given:
ammo increment, plus the increment necessary to offset destruction
-- the loss of Sihanoukville. Input must increase by the annual`
tonnage shipped into Sihanoukville plus the POL, food, etc. increment
to get this increment through -- roughly a factor of four iita w the
by bombing of this increment.
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.LI S --tt5
E d:
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TOP SECRET
-- new demands for non-combat consumption in 1971 vs. 1970
by additional forces in South Laos. A rough estimate is that the
increase is 25%, but it could be higher.
-- new demands for combat consumption in South Laos caused
by Lam Son.
tonnage destroyed by Lam Son. (To illustrate our data problem,
while we have DIA's estimate on weapons, etc. destroyed by Lam Son,
we were unable to get them to convert the item-by-item data to
tonnages. They can easily do this.)
-- increased tonnage destroyed by bombing in the 1970-71 dry
season as compared with 1969-70. This gets us around any arguments
as to the total destroyed. We just want to know how much more this
year than last. This could be estimated by taking the increased truck
kills this year and multiplying by an average tonnage loss estimate
per truck kill.
-- tonnage required to support NVA/KR operations in Cambodia.
This is an incremental requirement over last year because the input
level (onto the Trail plus Sihanoukville) last year was designed to
support a protracted war strategy in South Vietnam. .
If we had these a stimate s they would repre sent the additional input
required in the 1970-71. dry season to support a protracted war strategy
in 1971. (The variables are given in symbolic form and defined
precisely at Tab A.) Such a calculation would be based on the following
assumptions:
the enemy's planned Trail input (plus Sihanoukville) for the
1969-70 dry season was intended to support the protracted war
strategy he pursued in. 1970.
activities in 1971 by running down his stockpiles. It is possible
-- stockpiles remain unchanged. It is probably safe to say
that stockpiles at the outset of the 1970-71 dry season were at minimum
levels. This it is unlikely that the enemy could support combat
TOP SECRET
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however that he could build up his stockpiles this year. Therefore,
any conclusion we draw as to the level of combat activity the 1970--71
input could support would have to be qualified to recognize the possi-
bility that he could elect to build up his stockpiles in 1971.
the enemy's logistics system, outside the variables identified'
above, is operating at about the. same level of effectiveness this year
as it was last year. In other words, whatever gains the enemy has
obtained from expanding his road network have been offset by improve-
ments in our bombing (outside the gunship increment explicitly
accounted for in the model), by our SGU-type operations and by the
increased throughput the expanded system must support -- i, e. , the
load factor is the same this year as last.
I believe we can live with these assumptions. They permit us to deal
only with the increments and escape major battles over bombing
effectiveness, stockpiles, etc.
When we have the increment defined, it can be converted into trail
days at the 1970-71 dry season input rates. Then we can say how
long the enemy has to sustain his input effort to sustain a protracted
war. My guess is that merely to do as well on the throughput side as
he did a year ago, the enemy will need; to increase his input by at least
one -third.
If the increment for protracted war in 1971 is of this order of magnitude,
the enemy would be hard pressed to get the supplies through by the outset
of the rainy season, but if he sustains the current rate he might do it.
In the 1969-70 dry season, enemy supply input averaged 250 STPD.
This year the effort in January, which began a month later than last
year, was roughly 400 STPD (CIA and DIA agree on this).
These are crude assessments. We need the analysis before firm
conclusions are drawn.
After we get this basic analysis, we can calculate the incremental
input requirement to support strategies above protracted war, e. g. ,
one-MR, two-MR, or T et-style offensives. The findings might look
like this:
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-- the' enemy can put through the supplies to support,a protracted
war in 1971 if he continues his current effort through the dry season
at the end of April,
-- but he will not be able to build up his stockpiles for a 1972
.offensive, meaning such an offensive could not be launched until
April or May 1972 unless he operated the Trail in the wet season,
and/ox
-- the enemy cannot launch a major offensive in 1971.
Again these are illustrative conclusions, pending completion of the
analysis.
Lam Son
practically all of the incremental requirements identified at the
beginning of this memorandum are attributable to Lam Son. Even
the incremental consumption requirement for the enemy's added
forces in South Laos has to be attributed to the threat of a Lam Son
operation. Only the bombing increment and the Sihanoukville incre -
ment are not attributable to Lam Son.
Therefore, since it is the logistics throughput surplus at the margin
that sustains higher activity levels, Lam Son can probably receive
some credit for logistically constraining the enemy's options in
1971 and possibly in 1972, through its effect on the enemy's aggregate
level of throughput.
As I pointed out in my earlier memo, however, there are other
benefits to Lam Son that may be even more crucial. These are:
the logistics flow, even if adequate in aggregate
terms to support a protracted war or higher level of activity, will
reach South Vietnam and Cambodia too late in the dry season to
fuel the enemy's effort in what has traditionally been his period of
offensive activity. Enemy activity data for 1971 to date show a
decline in enemy initiated large and small scale attacks it 1971
over similiar periods in previous years.
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-- local supply shortage s - Lam Son would appear to have pre -
empted an MR 1 or MR 2 offensive this dry season by preventing the
enemy from establishing forward-based stocks in the Northern
portion of South Vietnam and the adjoining Laos border,
.. force diversion/destruction - by tying down the enemy's forces
in combat and putting some of his units out of commission, Lam Son has
prevented the enemy from moving his units en mass from South Laos
into South Vietnam for an offensive. If one buy s the evidence that the
enemy planned an offensive in MR 2, which is plausible, this is a key
benefit. This argument carries over into 1972, because the enemy
may have to plan forces to protect the trail next year as he did this year.
These are the strongest arguments for Lam Son. Another argument
is that the operation is responsible for improvements in ARVN
effectiveness, if they offset the damage inflicted on ARVN's best
units.
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 TOP SECRET/NODIS/COMINT
Time and Place:
classification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0 j - C 3 U-t:l
WASIIINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
Mdreh 16, 1971
5:10 - 6:40 p.m.,, White House Situation Room
Subject: Intelligence' on North Vietnamese Supply Movements
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson,
Ambassador William Sullivan
Mr. Ray Cline
Defense Mr. David Packard
Col. Harold Belles
Lt. Gen. Donald V.
Mr. Donald Linker
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. George Carver
JCS. Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
OMB Mr. James Schlesinger
NSC Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Staff Mr. John H. Holdridge
Mr. Wayne K. Smith
Mr. Keith Guthrie
The WSAG received a briefing on the methodology employed in preparing
intelligence estimates of supply movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
An the accompanying discussion, the WSAG considered the discrepancies
between CIA and DIA estimates and the problems involved in comparing data
from different years and in assessing the impact of the Lam Son operation on
enemy supply throughput. It was agreed to hold a second WSAG meeting to
11
discuss these topics further.
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 . T
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C 47Aa\.J 1V A..s A. / A%'.'UA. 1I ~U LVA LA. - --
Dr. Kissinger: I may be wasting everybody's time, but I have been reading
the intelligence reports from DI_A and CIA about movement of supplies down
the Ho. Chi Minh Trail, and I am totally confused. I thought that we all
ought at least to be able to leak the same facts. I want to establish a common
25X1
understanding regarding what we are talking about.
Mr. Johnson I would greatly welcome that.
-,.Dr.. Kissinger: What I thought we would do is have Dick [Helms] give his
analysis, then let General Bennett provide his analysis, and finally have
any other inputs that anyone else wishes to make. Then I have some questions
to ask. 25X1
Mr. Helms: I would like to have (present a briefing on
.-:methodology. (.asked him to visit Saigon a while back to see how the 7th Air
Force goes about putting together their intelligence figures.
Dr. Kissinger: We want to know not only methodology but also the conclusions
that you draw from it.
The Washington intelligence community is working from the
same data base. Our information comes from a wide variety of sources--
In day-to-day
25X1
25X1
reporting the Washington community is pretty well agreed on such things as
the fact that trucks have moved up or down a particular road or that the road
is in good or bad condition. Problems develop when longer term assessments
are made on such matters as how much in the way of supplies actually goes
through. This is where the, Washington community breaks ranks.
We have been trying for a number of years to devise a system of numbers
to measure throughput and input. Invariably it is a futile effort. I believe
that it is not possible to come up with any reliable set of hard numbers using
the existing data base. Although we understand very well how the enemy
supply system'works, we can't give exact figures on tonnages moved. Only
the 7th Air Force produces a hard number series on tonnages. These figures
-are used by DIA and by the service intelligence organizations. We have
strong reservations about these series. 25X1
To explain this is a bit complicated. The Air Force series relies primarily
on
Dr. Kissinger Why don t the North Vietnamese know there are
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 TOP SFCR T/NODISICOMINT -3.
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Dr. Kissinger: Why don't they pick them up?
.25X1 Ambassador Sullivan: The answer to the question is that the
constantly being reseeded.
25X1
Gen. Vogt: They are difficult to find becuase they are camouflaged. We have
run tests by seeding them around one of our own airbases. Our people couldn't
Mr. Packard: Most of ,them self-destruct.
find them.
The Air Force produces three series of figures: input, BDA
input; we believe it comes closest to reflecting the actual flow of suppiies.25X1
Our gravest reservations are about the throughput figures.
Lbomb damage assessment], and throughput. Probably the best series is for
Dr. Kissinger : That explains why fewer trucks are reported south of Route 92Z.
On that basis Lam Son can't fail. 25X1
I think so. The 7th. Air Force reports only a small daily tonnage of
pp ies going into Cambodia from Laos. 'We are about to publish a
enemy sup
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 t-% C r' t- r r.'? m /r.T r' Tl T C / r" t % T T NT T' A .
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study that will not provide any magic numbers but will give an idea that
4
quite a bit of tonnage has been moved through the system.
Dr. Kissinger: Was the throughput figure last year calculated according to
th.e same methodology used this year? There may be a real difference in
supplies regardless of the defects in methodology. %
Gen. Vogt: The number
It need
is not important as
location for bombing'.- You don't need to count the
times.
long as you cover 25X1
to assist in target
same trucks fourteen
--Dr.- Kissinger: Why is the throughput series different from the input series?
Aren't they based on the same figures?
The techniques and data are the same. I was just pointing out25X1
the problems that arise.
Dr. Kissinger: I can see why if there were weaknesses that were general
throughout the system, you would want to compensate by introducing some
sort of correction factor. But that doesn't explain this discrepancy. Perhaps.
it is in the bomb damage figures. Are these based on pilot reports?
Mr. Packard: I think the difficulty is that the BDA is a very soft figure.
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 Yes, but they are never corrected.
Gen. Bennett: What t1- ey. are trying -to say is that the effort tp.develop an
'25X1 equation should be suspended.
25X1
With regard to inter-seasonal comparisons, what the Air Force
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'Ambassador Sullivan: With regard to the question of why the throughput
figures are derived independently, are [in calculating
throughput] located on the exit roads?
Yes.
Ambassador Sullivan: Then the figure would be independent,
wrong.
Dr. Kissinger: The easiest explanation is that the bomb damage. data are
bt;)A~J.Ub Lt-,11 US is that this year in the period from October 1 to March 10,
41, 003 tons of supplies were moved. In the same dry-season period last year,
the figure was 44,416 tons. Thus input has decreased 7%.
Dr. Kissinger: Was Sihanoukville open last year? Was it being used
,-actively? Do we know the tonnages that came in through the port?
Mr. Packard: We do know that the estimated tonnage turned out to be_below..
the figures we got from the bills of lading.
Dr. Kissinger: What was the total brought in through the port?
Gen. Vogt; Sihanouk stopped movement through the port in hrly 1969. He
opened it again in September 1969, and it remained open until c:l-ised by Lon
Nol. Of course, -while the port was closed, the enemy was tale,ng some
supplies already stored in the port areas to the sanctuaries..
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 .25X1
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I don't have the figures for that.
Dr. Kissinger: If the figures you quoted are correct, then the enemy put
3, 000 tons less into the system this year. This leaves aside the question
of throughput.. Whatever the.amount that came through Sihanoukville, the
conclusion is that last year the total input was greater by 3, 000 tons: plus
the amount that passed through Sihanoukville.
.Mr. Packard: There is another factor to be considered. The material
that came through Sihanoukville was mostly ammunition and. medicine.
Sixty per cent of the supplies coming down the trail were food.
was even less this year.
.Dr. Kissinger: This reinforces the conclusion. The total operational input
figures report a throughput of 2, 987 tons this year and 13, 526 tons last year.
This is a decrease of 78%.
The numbers say the input decreased by 7%. Let's look at the25X1.
same set of numbers for the two dry seasons on throughput. The Air Force
compared to 105 tons per week this year. Therefore, we conclude that
Force estimates for the pipeline are 420 tons per week last year as
A third figure is for pipelines. The Air force says that movement
through the pipeline decreased by 75%. The Air Force makes its estimates
by preparing an estimate of consumption, that is, the amount of fuel that
is required to operate the enemy's fleet of trucks.. We can't find that the
enemy truck inventory decreased from last year to this year; yet, the Air
something must have been done to change the methodology.
Dr. Kissinger: What difference does it make?
If the waterway and pipeline figures were to correspond to the
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 TOP SECRET/NODIS/COMINT -7-
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by 17%. This would be the same thing as saying that input had increased,
c ornpared.to last year.
factors I have mentioned, the Air Force would be underestimating input
Dr. Kissinger: POL all gets consumed. It makes no difference to the
outcome.
It does make a difference on how you formulate a judgment on 25X1
now mucii can be'moved through the system.
Gen.Vo;t: If the destruction rate for trucks was increased 100%, fuel
consumption would go down drastically.
Dr. Kissinger: Has the methodology been changed?
Gen. Bennet: N
wo pipelines are being used. They have a capacity of about 25X1
Dr. Kissin er: What we are interested in is throughput. If the methodology
has .not changed, then the enemy has found a way of masking his movements.
'Otherwise, why are the figures at one end of the system incompatible with
those at the other end? Whatever mistakes there are in the assessments,
the quantities should be uniform throughout'the system. Your case should
be equally devastating at both ends. Why should there be differences in
the ratios of the [input and throughput] figures [for this year and last. year]
unless the enemy has new roads or has some way of fooling us?
tons per day.
be able to accept the proposition that we can say there has been a certain
percentage decrease in tonnage moved even if we don't trust the exact tonnage
figures.
These are conceptual problems.
Dr. Kissin er: But if these same problems applied last year, we should
TOP SECRET/NODIS/COMINT
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until we had some indications that the enemy was going to start using it.
Gen. Bennett: This is a new road. We didn't start putting
What about the pipeline figures? Why is there a decrease from 7800 tons
to 1700 tons through the pipeline?
Ambassador Sullivan: Not all of these figures are from
Mr. Johnson: Those figures are based on consumption.
number of trucks detected in the area, we calculate the amount of fuel these
Gen. Bennett: They are related to] data on trucks. Taking the
trucks would use.
Gen. Vogt: They just take out what they need.
To sum up, we think that some misleading judgments have bee25X1
~ropoi LiUL1aL Gii ti, t .
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made on how the system has operated.
Dr. Kissinger, (to General Bennett) The methodology for making the
estimates has not changed-?
Gen. Bennett: Basically, no.
. 3r-, Kissinger: Then'why aren't the relative figures [for this year and last
year] valid?
The methodology has been changed.
:Dr. Kissinger: How?
I don't know.
25X1
Mr. Packard: The big problem is that we are looking at the figures too
precisely. They may bear a relation to the actual tonnages of about two to
one. They just give a general idea of the size of movements.
in methodology, and we can therefore challenge the figures; or 'the methodology h2
Dr. Kissinger: There are two possibilities. Either there has been a change
 TOY SLC:IZ~'1'/NODIS/C:UMINT -V-
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Dr. Kissinger (to Gen
pipeline?
ral Bennett)
Has the methodology changed?
Dr. Kissinger: Then how do you explain the changes in the figures,for the
Gen.' Bennett: No.
because they want to keep the decanting area small in order not to,present
any targets.
Gen. Bennett: Thf- more the enemy uses the pipeline, the .bigger the
decanting space he requires at the far end.. This presents problems
Dr.,Kissinger: Are these figures for actual throughput rather than maximum
capacity?
_Gen. Bennett: Yes. There are a number of separate items that we use in
estimating what is going through the pipeline: 25X1
observing.55-gallon drums on trucks, the absence of decanting stations,
Dr. Kissinger: How do you explain the anomaly of the enormous drop in
pipeline use?
Gen. Bennett: Our figures don't show such an enormous drop.
Dr. Kissinger It says here that this year the figure was 1700 tons, and last
year, 7800 tons.
Gen. Bennett: I thought we had a higher figure.
Last week the figure went up.
Dr. Kissinger: I thought we captured the pipeline.
There are two. One goes through the Mu Gia Pass.
Gen. Bennett: All we have done is take off one joint of the finger on the
pipeline. They can still tap into it further up.
Gen. Vogt: Now they have to bring POL around [the section we have captured].
That is a tremendous inconvenience.
..might be confirmation of the truck-kill figures,
Dr. Kissin.g.er: If the DIA figures [on use of the pipeline] arc: correct, this
Let's leave the matter of the pipeline. Has there been change in the
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 T aA F SL!U1%z I / 1NVLID/ 1..L)1V111N 1. _lll
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methodology on throughput?
base in the first place. That is, that we don't know what we are doing.
Dr. Kissinger: There are three possibilities. The enemy is masking his
movements. Or he is using some route that we are not covering.
Mr. Packard: There is also the possibility that our methodology is off
Gen. Bennett: None.
establish the proportional change.
Dr. Kissinger: I still think we can make comparisons. We can try to
Gen. Bennett: There is a new type of North Vietnamese force in that area
[southern Laos].'. This force is using up ordnance, gasoline, and food.
Dr. Kissinger It can't use up gasoline. There isn't any coming down the
pipeline.
Gen. Vogt: It is. coming down the pipeline. What they use depends on what
they need.
Mr. Johnson: This figure for the pipeline is not estimated input?
they will move that much through the pipeline.
s~imdLes axe based on the assumption that'if they need 60 tons per day
It is an estimate of the input into the system. The pipeline
....Dr. Kissinger: Why can we not use this data to establish proportionality?
Mr. Packard: The methodology is no good.
'Dr. Kissinger: It is your bloody methodology. You mean it is not even
good enough to give us a proportional estimate.
Mr. Packard: 'That's_,ri.gh#,
Mr. Johnson: . The pipeline is not important. What is important is the
throughput--how much is delivered at the other end.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the point of my question.
25X1
During the first four weeks of this dry season the pipeline'in.put 25X1
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 0 T1 V"f n T:+m INTr1! TC I f"1-1w tTKTm
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Ambassador Sullivan: How was that figure obtained?
I don't know.
Mr. Johnson: What is the CIA judgment on all of this?
That the throughput was at least as high this year as last year. 25X1
Dr. Kissinger : What is the evidence? (to Packard) Is the whole of Pentagon
"iiatelligence useless on 'this'?"-"
Mr. Packard: I don't think you can say more than that the input was up
roughly 10-Z0%.
Mr. Johnson: What about throughput?
Mr. Packard: I think it was lower. The truck-kill has been higher.
Gen. Vogt: The consumption in Laos is high.
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Mr. Johnson: CIA doesn't agree. Why?
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Dr. Kissinger: What votes are you waiting for? Why can't you make a
judgment on the basis of what happened in February?
Gen. Vogt: They had to support six regiments further down. Do
we have. reports on the binh trams further south.
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 TOP s]eRlur/ NUD1 i/ UUM1NT -13-
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Dr. Kissin er: How are the regiments south Of Route 9 being supplied?
Our judgment is that the bulk of the supplies are moving 25X1
puts the comint data in the proper perspective.
Gen. Bennett: You mentioned a movement of 3900-4600 tons, or about
160 tons per day through Binh Tram 32 northwest of Tchepone.
During the same period the input was 479 tons per day. This would
indicate a fair degree of interference with the flow of supplies. This
25X1
Mr. Johnson: How about
Dr. Kissinger: That can't be right.
south of Lam Son?
show an increase.
25X1
Dr. Kissinger: Does that cover all readings in the system?
All those on the exit routes. 25X1
'Dr. Kissinger: Then where do we get the low throughput figure we
were discussing before?
Gen. Vogt: That was our figure.
25X1
Dr. Kissinger: Do we have throughput
correspond to these?
for last year to
For the two four-week periods they are 3928 and 5700. 25X1
in throughpufj compared to last year.
Dr. Kissinger: This confirms what they are saying [about a decrease
It says, that the throughput is less than last year, but th 25X1
the tonnage figure:
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Mr. Packard: We don't argue that. it is certainly true that the ARVN
dicin t get over there far enough.' The point is that throughput is lower
this year than last year.
Dr.' Kissinger: That s right. This supports the conclusion that there has
has increased since Lam Son.
 TOP SECRET /NODIS/COMINT -14-
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Mr. Packard: I -think there is ample evidence that the throughput
is lower. They probably were able to step up their supply movements
before.our forces got to Tchepone. That doesn t mean the operation
was a failure. In addition, there have been lots of truck kills.
Dr. Kissinger: There are two' separate questions. One is whether there
was lower throughput than last year. The other is what is the cause.
Was it the result of Lam Son? I don t see how you can prove that it
was. Where do we measure throughput?
Gen. Bennett:. Input is measured at three points where the trails
.cross the mountains into southern Laos. Throughput is measured
at six points down below.
Dr. Kissinger: Why don t we let
let General Bennett say what he wants.
session to discuss this.
finish? Then we can 25X1
And then we will need another
]Dr. Kissinger: How do you conclude that?
Mr. Packard: The figures for waterway movements are ve ry
questionable. Last year they had no reason to use the waterways.
This year they have more incentive.
Mr. Sullivan: Is this figure for input. via the waterways in the north?
Gen. Bennett: Yes. It is the amount that has gone down from up north.
One last point. We can't yet make a final judgment on th25X1
logistical impact of Lam Son. All the indicators say that the traffic
flow has been disrupted since the start of the operation. The enemy
has had to change to less satisfactory routes, which provide him less
jungle canopy. Whatever the amount of supplies' he moves,, he will
fall short of his goal- -which was to move the amount that was formerly
transported both,,ia the 11o Chi Mirth Trail and through Siharioukville.
TOP SECRET/NODIS/COMINT
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 Dr. Kissinger, The only question is whether those supplies .were'consixmed
or left there.
Mr. Packard: How much do you figure one of those regiments would use?
TOP ST,CRET/NODIS/COMJ.NT
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Dr. Kissinger: General Bennett.
Gen. Bennett: You have to look at two areas--the input and the output
areas. The in ut and throughput figures come from these areas. The
re not required to measure throughput and input. - Th,25X1
for measuring input are at three passes: Mu Gia,
Ban Karai, and one other. There is a smaller movement along
the waterways.
Dr. Kissinger: l-low do you answer the Secretary s [Packard s] point
.that there is now more incentive for the enemy to use the waterways?
Mr. Packard: We are talking about different waterways.
Gen. Bennett: They moved 40 tons per day last year on the waterways.
This year they have moved less. Last year they were sending water-
proof stuff, such as POL in drums. They have found they don't need to
do that this year.
There are alleged defects at the exits. This 25X1
involves the question of how responds to changes in
enemy supply routes. Just because the enemy is wording on Route 97
doesn't mean there has been a massive flow of supplies along it. We
are continuing to watch the lateral roads and. will seed them if there
is any activity. The basic point is to look at the system at two points--
where the input and throughpu The tactical 25X1
in the center area. We try to check against 25X1
a o er sources and use the latter to adjust the
Dr. Kissinger: How do you explain that the 165-ton-per-day movement
south of Lam Son doesn t show. up in the throughput data?
Gen. Bennett: Those supplies must have been used up by the combat
forces moved into the area.
Dr. Kissinger: You two ~and Bennett] agree that 165 tons per uy
were moved south of Lam Son in February.
Gen. Bennett: We have no quarrel on that score.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0
1 LJ J- 0Jil Lr 11.C. 1 / 1V V JJ 1w.J I L. LJ J.VA. J. 1V i 1/
It is difficult to estimate right now because the battle is
Before Lam Son, I would say about 1Z5 tons per day.
Dr. Kissinger: Do you think there could have been a significant
increment to the 165 tons per day through some other area?
I don't know how significant an increment there could
Dr. Kissinger: We need to have another session, now that we have
covered the methodology.
Mr. Cline: As a neutral observer, could I make an observation?
One reason why you might not be able to use the figures to measure
proportional change from last year to this year is that, as Mr. Packard
said, the totals are made ofdindividual calculations, some of which
may be off by a factor of two. The cumulative error could be great,
since individual errors might not cancel out.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/21 : LOC-HAK-556-6-8-0