SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-556-7-5-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 29, 1971
• Content Type: MISC

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SENIOR WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
Monday, November 29, 1971
Time and Place: 2:36 - 3:36 p.m., White House Situation Room
Subject: South Asia
Participants:
Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger CIA - Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
State - John N. Irwin, II
Joseph Sisco
Christopher Van Hollen
Samuel DePalma
Bruce Laingen
David Schneider
Defense - David Packard
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
John Wailer
AID - Maurice Williams
Staff - Donald MacDonald
NSC Harold H. Saunders
Staff - Samuel Hoskinson
Adm. Robert O. Welander
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Jeanne W. Davis
OSD & DOS review
complete per
C03233154 Pgs 1-1-
ONLY
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
JCS - Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Capt. Howard N. Kay
It was agreed that:
1. the question of the extent of the cutoff of military assistance to India
(whether to suspend issuance of new licenses or to cut off provision of
material in the pipeline for which licenses had already been granted) would
be presented to the President for decision along with a CIA statement on
the effect on our intelligence capability;
2. we will not take the initiative or encourage others to take the initiative
to call a Security Council meeting; however, if the issue moves into the
SC, we will take a position along the lines of the draft resolution prepared
by State and the draft speech prepared for Ambassador Bush, once it has
been reviewed and amended, as required.
TOP CEOrU T1CODEWORD
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Mr. Kissinger (to Gen. Cushman) Bob, can you tell us where we stand?
(General Cushman briefed from the text attached at Tab A.)
Mr. Kissinger: Do you think the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad
was acting on his own in his meeting with Yahya?
Gen. Cushman: That's a very puzzling situation. In a later conversation
at a party with Ambassador Farland, he didn't seem to know what messages
he had sent to New Delhi or where the game stood.
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Mr. Kissinger: Did I understand that he didn't know the content of the
messages he was sending to New Delhi or of the messages he was receiving
from New Delhi?
Gen. Cushman: The messages he had sent to New Delhi.
Mr. Kissinger: Hasn't he just come from New Delhi?
Gen. Cushman: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: (to Moorer) What are your views on the military side?
Adm. Moorer:
Mr. Irwin: What is your estimate of the time limit for the Pakistani supplies?
Adm. Moorer: Lessthan 30 days.
Mr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) Will you give us a .rundown on the diplomatic moves.
Mr. Sisco: The principal move, of course, was the President's messages to
Mrs. Gandhi, Kosygin and Yahya. The focus of the message to Mrs. Gandhi
was to try to get a positive response to the concrete proposals for disengage-
ment -- to try to get India and Pakistan to name representatives who could
work out some form of withdrawal from the border to get them out of this
eyeball-to--eyeball situation in West Pakistan. .1n East Pakistan, we called
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attention to the fact that Yahya was willing to position UN observers uni-
laterally. My preliminary reaction, based on Ambassador Keating's
reporting telegram, is to doubt that there will be any positive response.
I believe India has every intention of continuing its present military posture
to serve its political objectives.
Mr. Kissinger: Do you think this campaign was planned before the Gandhi
trip?
Mr. Sisco: Militarily, yes. There had already been some deployments.
But the most active military moves were made post-Washington.
Adm. Moorer: They obviously had a contingency plan.
Mr. Kissinger: I'm asking this for my own education. We have been debating
all sumzr er whether or not the Indians were being restrained. If they had
been planning this all along, would this have been the earliest they could
attack, given the time needed for deployment and the advent of the rainy season?
If the decision had been made last June, what would have been the earliest
time they could have attacked?
Adm. Moorer: Four or five weeks.
Mr. Williams: It was timed to the requirement for the training of the Bengalis.
Mr. Kissinger: I'm not trying to put words in people's mouths. But one
could argue that everything the Indians have done since June has been designed
to prepare for this, and that the trips by Foreign Secretary Singh and
Mrs. Gandhi were smoke-screens. Or, one could say that the Indians have
been making a serious effort to solve the problem and that they finally moved
out of desperation.
Adm. Moorer: I think the readiness of the Bengalis dictated the timing. The
Indians could have moved earlier with their regular forces. What is happening
is that guerrillas are backing up against the Indians, who then are giving
them artillery and other support. The Indian objective is to change the
relative strength of the Pakistanis and the guerrillas.
Mr. Kissinger: (to Williams) What do you think?
Mr. Williams: I think the Indians might have moved two or three weeks earlier,
allowing for time to train the Bengalis and for the monsoon. They did have
a margin, of about three weeks before they invaded, which coincided with Mrs.
Gandhi's trip. I think they waited for her to return.
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Adm. Moorer: They have obviously been training and supplying the guerrillas.
Mr. Williams: I think they had hoped the guerrillas would be more effective
in their internal operations than they were. They found, however, that the
guerrillas were only effective when stiffened by the Indians, which was their
second strategy. They would have preferred that it be done internally,
strictly by the Mukti. Bahini.
Mr. Kissinger: Does this put an end to relief operations? Will there be
famine?
Mr. Williams: Relief operations are at an end. The UN personnel have been
withdrawn and the situation is deteriorating. The crops are in and a good deal
of the supplies are there, but the imports are not moving, the things aren't
being distributed, and there will be pockets of famine.
Mr. Irwin: There will also be some hoarding.
Adm. Moorer: And the guerrillas are destroying the boats.
Mr. Williams: Yes. They have dismantled in a few days what it took weeks
to put together. There are twenty-two people left in Chittagong, but all ships
have been withdrawn and the trucks are,-immobilized.
Mr. Kissinger: Dave (Packard), what do you think?
Mr. Packard: I don't have much to add. India has done nothing that could
be considered constructive. There's been no evidence that they had any
intention of going anywhere except where we are.
Mr. Kissinger: In her talks with the President, Mrs. Gandhi wrote off
East Pakistan altogether. Her complaints were about Baluchistan and the
northwest frontier.
Mr. Packard: Yahya has indicated his flexibility. We have transmitted his
willingness to withdraw to the Indians with no response. It looks as though
India has been moving right ahead, taking advantage of the situation as it
develops.
Mr. Kissinger: India didn't exploit the possible opening of talks between
Yahya and the Bangla Desh which Joe Sisco worked on last summer. That
could have been the beginning. If the Bangla Desh had asked for the release
of Mujib in those talks there might have been some movement and the situation
might have been stabilized.
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We have three problems we need to discuss: (1) military assistance; (2)
an approach to the UN; and (3) a cutoff in economic assistance. All of
you have seen the State and Defense papers on a military aid cutoff, haven't
you? The President and the Secretary decided last Wednesday that the
military aid suspension would be announced on Friday. State suggested
we await a reply to our overtures to Yahya, Kosygin and Mrs. Gandhi
before the announcement, and that was accepted. We now have the replies,
and the President wants to go ahead. I have talked to the Secretary and he
agrees. So, unlesssomeone makes a strong reclama, the question of the
suspension of military assistance is pretty well decided. There remains
the question of what should be cut off. There are two ways to do it: (1) to
suspend the issuance of new licenses, or ( ) to suspend new licenses and
revoke all existing licenses.
Mr. Irwin: You have the questions of the timing of going to the cutoff and
the amount of the cutoff.
Mr. Kissinger: What is the difference between the two choices in terms of
amounts?
Mr. .Irwin: I'm not sure of the totals. -
Mr. Schneider: Licensed items, for which there are contracts, total $5. 3
million. Additional licensed items without contracts total $8.2 million.
Adm. Moorer: Are there any contracts without licenses?
Mr. Schneider: Yes, over $16 million.
Mr. Irwin: Where are the spare parts for the C-119 aircraft?
Mr. Schneider: There are contracts for $4 million for C-119 spares, but
no licenses have been granted. -
Mr. Irwin: They are without licenses but are under contract. I understand
they are pretty far advanced on the manufacturing -- the manufacturers just
haven't asked for the licenses.
Mr. Noyes: That's correct.
Mr. Packard: This creates problems. We have firm contracts on some of
these things. If they are cut off, we'll have some liability.
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Adm. Moorer: Of course other people are using C-119s. We might buy
them and slip them into some other program.
Mr. Irwin: We have two categories: items licensed for export and those
licensed and under contract. Those licensed and under contract total
$5 million and those licensed, $8 million. We also have unlicensed contracts
for C-119 spares--$4 million; radar communications equipment from the
FMS $17.million line of credit -- $12.8 million; and FMS cash sales--
$70, 000. The total of it all is about $30 million.
Dr. Kissinger: What is the definition of "unlicensed"? Do you mean a
contract which requires a license but the license has not been requested, or
are there contracts which don't require licenses?
Mr. Irwin: We mean a contract which requires a license but the license
has not yet been obtained.
'Dr. Kissinger: If we cut off future licenses, we will hit the full amount.
Mr. Irwin: If you cut off the $4 million for C-119 spares you will ground
the C-119s. I understand India needs those spares fairly quickly and they
are almost available.
Dr. Kissinger: If we grant no new licenses, with a possible exception for
the C-119 spares, we will hit $16 million. If we dry up the pipeline, we
will hit $30 million.
Mr. Irwin: Sometimes manufacturers get a license before a sale, and then
use the license to help make the sale. Sometimes they get an order and sign
a contract before they have the license. This accounts for some of the unknowns;
Dr. Kissinger: So we have contracts without licenses and licenses without
contracts. The choice we have to put to the President is whether to stop
only items which have not been licensed or to stop both licensed and
unlicensed items. The argument for stopping only unlicensed items is to
hold something in reserve for future pressure. The argument for cutting off
both licensed and unlicensed items is that we would have to take the heat for
a first step and would have twice as much heat if we did it in two steps. We
don't reduce the heat by reducing the amount of the cut-off.
Mr. Sisco: Also, from a domestic point of view, the question will be, why we
left the pipeline untouched. On the other hand, if we act on only new
licenses it could be equated with what we did with regard to Pakistan where
we moved on a step by step basis.
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Mr. Packard: There are some special problems here. For example,
there is the $17 million line of credit to buy communications equipment
to make our radar in Nepal more effective.
Mr. Irwin: Is this our radar or theirs? I thought it was their radar screen,
to which we tie in.
Mr. Packard:- It's theirs but we get a potential take from it.
Mr. Irwin: Our take is just warning, though, isn't it?
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Adm. Moorer: We get an indication of the level of activity of Chinese
forces.
Mr. Noyes: The Air Force gets a take on Chinese Air Force movements.
Mr. Irwin: But it's primarily to warn India of attack.
Mr. Packard: I think we should, get a decision either to stop everything not
licensed or to stop everything in the pipeline, and then we can work out the
details.
Dr. Kissinger: That's right. We can't ask the President to decide each
little detail.
Mr. Sisco: Yes, but we need to be as clear as possible as to exactly what
the action applies to and what are the implications. I learned my lesson
from the Pakistan pipeline exercise, where it developed we just couldn't be
sure where the stuff was.
Mr. Packard: If we stop everything in the pipeline, there are significant
items---the C-ll9s spares, the radar equipment, the road work in Nepal.
If we just stop all new licenses it will be less significant.
Mr. Waller:
Dr. Kissin er: But all the key items are in the new category, aren't they?
Mr. Irwin: The more important ones.
Mr. Van Hollen: The $4 million for C-119 spares is in the new license
category.
Dr. Kissinger: What is in the licensed category?
Mr. Sisco: About $5 million in aircraft spares, radar jamming equipment,
cartridge cases and cartridge case manufacturing equipment.
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Mr. Packard: $22 million worth of licenses were issued in the last year.
That's an awful lot of stuff.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think the President can get into all this. Would it
be proper to use the State Department paper as the basins for putting the
question to the President. Then, may we have a one /ar'er from CIA on
the intelligence that would be lost.
Gen. Cushman: We have it and will get it to you.
Dr. Kissinger: We'll put this in a memo to the President and get a decision
tomorrow. My understanding from Secretary Rogers is that he has agreed
to the cut-off but would like to wait a day or two. The present idea is that
State would make the announcement on Wednesday.
Mr. Irwin: The Secretary thinks we should cut off military assistance---
he thinks we should cut off both new licenses and the pipeline. But he wants
to wait until we see Kosygin's reply and also what, if anything, happens at
the UN. Yahya has asked his UN Ambassador to ask for UN observers on
his side of the border and this might lead to a Security-Council meeting.
Dr. Kissinger: Does he think we should not cut off military assistance if
the matter goes to the Security Council?
Mr.. Irwin: Not necessarily. He thinks we should go ahead, subject to a last
look.
`Dr. Kissinger: We'll take another look at the situation tomorrow and will
plan to go ahead on Wednesday. We'll give the President the choice between
the two options for a cut-off, along with the intelligence material. I'm sure
the President and the Secretary will be talking on the phone about it over the
next day or two.
Mr. Sisco: We have given you a draft press statement on the limited option
of new licenses. We will prepare another draft press statement on an across-
the board cut.
Dr. Kissinger: I thought the papers we got over the weekend were damned good.
Adm. Moorer: Timing is important. India has invaded Pakistan, which
gives you a good basis for a cut-off of military assistance. If we wait until
the Pakistanis retaliate, we'll hear the same argument for a cut-off to them.
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Dr. Kissinger: We're planning for a release Wednesday noon. Let's defer
the discussion of an economic aid cut-off for the moment. That's further
down the line. , Can we talk about the UN? Joe [Sis co], would you like to
summarize the State paper?
Mr. Sisco: The paper is self-explanatory. We understand that the Paks by
the end of the day will have told U Thant that they are willing to accept UN
observers on their side of the border. They have done this on their own. I
don't know to what degree they have thought this through. They probably
think they can achieve their purpose by informal means without a Security
Council meeting. I personally think the Secretary General will say he
wants to refer the matter to the Security Council, but this will be clearer
tomorrow. Recourse to the Security Council has one great advantage for
the Paks and one great risk. The advantage is that the Security Council will
focus.on some provisions to deter broader military action. However,
Indian strategy will be to block those elements which undermine their
policy of military pressure and try to move the SC to express itself on
political accommodation. Our draft resolution has four elements: 1) with-
drawal of foreign forces; 2) a ceasefire; 3) a call on both sides to do every-
thing possible to get the refugees back; and 4)'a call on the parties to avail
themselves of the good offices of the Secretary General. We think we can
probably get the required nine votes,for such a resolution. However, all
the SC members, including our friends, will be under great pressure to
support a concrete provision in the direction of political accommodation.
That would be part of the quid pro quo. I have one modification of our
paper. We say on page 3 (reading): In our judgment, there will be strong
efforts by the Soviets to delete the withdrawal paragraph, soften the cease-
fire paragraph, and to call upon Pakistan to take concrete steps for a
political solution. India, with as much support as she can get will go
further: she will seek as a quid pro quo for withdrawal and a ceasefire
as categoric a Security Council provision as possible calling for negotia-
tions between Yahya and Mujib. Such a paragraph could get majority
support in the Council since even some of our closest friends ... would
be very sympathetic to it. In short, the thrust of the Council will be a
cool-off of the military activity in exchange for getting Yahya-Mujib
negotiations started. "
On reflection, I think that with a maximum U. S. effort we can influence
.the provision on political accommodation to be less precise than an out-
right call on Yahya and Mujib to negotiate. It's hard to say how much less
we could get, but I think we could get a provision that didn't go that far.
Mr. Kissinger: Who will sit in for Russia? For China?
Mr. Sisco: Malik for Russia and Huang_Hua, the Chinese Permanent
Representative.
.? /r?r.r~r~ttYr~1D r
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Mr. Kissinger: So it's round two. The Chinese have a real ability to
get under the Russians' skin.
Mr. Sisco: Yes and in acrimonious terms. Malik has a shorter fuse than
most Russians.
(Mr. Kissinger was called from the room.)
Mr. Sisco: We have a very preliminary draft of a speech that Ambassador
(Handed copies
Bush might make which we will circulate for comment.
of the speech attached at Tab B around the table. )
(Mr. Kissinger returned.)
Mr. Kissinger: On the UN, we will look over the speech. We will not take
the initiative for a meeting or encourage anyone else to take the initiative.
If it goes into the Security Council, we will move in the direction of the
draft resolution and of the draft speech, as commented on.
Mr. Sisco: If the Pakistani Ambassador raises the issue of going into the
SC with me when I see him this.afternoon, I will say that this is a decision
for them to make. I will take no initiative, but if he asks me question I
will try to answer.
Mr. Irwin: The Paks,may have already started the process by their request
for observers.
Mr. Kissinger: We will meet within the next forty-eight hours to tie up
the military assistance question. Then we should have a session on
economic assistance.
Mr. Irwin: One argument for delaying a decision on the timing of the
cutoff until we know about the UN is that a bilateral U. S. cutoff might not
be necessary if an adequate solution can be worked out in the Security
Council.
Mr. Kissin er: If the issue goes to the Security Council before Wednesday
noon, this would certainly be considered.
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