LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-557-1-17-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 May 1973
DCI WSAG BRIEFING
LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE PROSPECTS
LEBANON
I. The cease-fire appears to be taking hold. None-
theless, the seeds for renewed fighting remain.
In view of pressures on him to avoid a confes-
sional split and .to ward off intervention from
Syria, President Franjiyah probably will be
forced to compromise.
A. Should he persist in trying to cripple the
guerrillas, however, he could touch off an-
other round offighting.
B. Except as a last resort he would be unlikely
to ask for US intervention'because of the
.
backlash from the other Arabs.
C. The Israelis, however, would not need any
invitation if they believed Franjiyah had
lost control.
II. At present, Franjiyah is trying to enlist *broad
support for tough bargaining with the guerrillas.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVI: INiaLIGENCE SOURCES
ioNAVE.D ?
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A. He wants to tip the balance of power much
more decisively in the government's favor
than was the case before the fighting.
1. At a minimum, he wants all but light
weapons removed from Palestinian camps
around Beirut and freedom for the Leb-
anese police to inspect and, if neces-
sary, control the camps.
2. In this, Franjiyah has the support of
the Christian community and the army.
An important segment of the Muslim com-
munity does not support this hard a line,
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could provoke a confessional split and
lead to civil strife.
B. The army performed effectively last week, but
it probably cannot impose a solution on the
fedayeen.
III. The guerrillas are on the defensive. Despite
some posturing, they are aware that they cannot
return to the precarious situation before the
fighting, which gave them considerable freedom
of action.
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A. The fedayeen probably will work toward a co-
existence formula which would leave them in
control of the Palestinian camps and would al-
low some freedom in the countryside.
B. The considerable sympathy for the guerrillas
which exists in the Muslim community, the
threat of Syrian intervention, and pressure
from the business community for a resumption
of commercial activity favor compromise.
C. Loss of their Jordan base in 1970 severely
narrowed the guerrillas' options against Is-
rael, and they are intent on preserving a
measure of operational capability in Lebanon.
They could be forced to rely even more on
foreign terrorism if Franjiyah significantly
clips their wings.
IV. Other Arab states, particularly Egypt, played a
useful role in mediating the cease-fixe and de-
terring Syria. They are likely, however, to ar-
gue against the imposition of tighter controls
on the guerrillas.
A. Damascus has allowed modest infiltration of
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New Page 4 WSAG Middle East Briefing
fedayeen--but no regular forces--into Lebanon.
B. A harsh settlement, however, might prompt the
'Syrians to allow more substantial infiltra-
tion. They would hope thereby to prevent any
exporting of the problem to Syria.
1. Damascus' fear of Israeli intervention
makes the commitment of regular troops
problematical.
C. .For their part, the _Israelis seem disinclined
to meddle unless the Syrian army becomes in-
volved or unless massive infiltration of feda-
yeen threatens Israel.
V. The Soviets do not appear to have played a major
role, although there are indications they may have
restrained all the parties.
MIDDLE EAST PROSPECTS
VI.
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New Page 5 WSAG Middle East Briefing
VII.
VIII. These preparations are as necessary for psycho-
logical as for military purposes. President Sadat
hopes to arouse US concern and thereby lead the
US to press Israel for concessions.
A. Sadat probably does not want to risk war at this
juncture, and he undoubtedly hopes that his psy-
chological gambits will obviate the need for it;.
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even if they fail to arouse us they may help
his Arab image temporarily.
B. He further hopes that the UN session on the
Middle East (late May or early Jute) or the
US-Soviet summit, or both, will produce
diplomatic pressure on Israel.
C. In the meantime his military preparations
serve to create tensions that lend urgency
to his diplomacy.
IX. Sadat has been under pressure to avoid hostili-
ties.
A. The Soviets--worried not only about the ef-
fect of another Arab defeat on their position
in the Middle East, but also about the
ef-
feet of a new crisis on detente with the US--
have been advising against precipitate ac-
tion.
B. King Faysal, concerned lest he be pulled into
openly anti-US actions, has counseled re-
straint. This apparently was the reason be-
hind his visit to Cairo this past weekend.
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X. We doubt that Egypt will deliberately initiate
military action, at least until after the conclu-
sion of the US-Soviet summit, even though the
temptation will be strong to do something that
would focus attention on the problem as the sum-
mit draws near.
A. The period from mid-June on will be a par-
ticularly dangerous one if Sadat is not able
to argue convincingly, from the summit results
or from other developments, that he is making
progress.
B. The military preparations--and the pressures
for militancy from Qadhafi--could develop a
momentum of their own even if Sadat calculated
that he could draw back at the last moment.
He could also talk himself into believing
that the Israeli response would be manageable..
XI. If Egypt does open hostilities, its capabilities
will be Improved by the acquisition of approxi-
mately 30 Libyan Mirage 5 aircraft.
A. Unlike other aircraft in the Egyptian in-
ventory, the mirage can fly at the low al-
titudes required to penetrate Israeli de-
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fences and still reach its target with a
sizable payload.
B. Egyptian pilots have been training on Mirages
for over a year and appear capable of flying
them in combat.
XII. Israeli officials are playing Egyptian threats
of renewed hostilities in low key, while at the
same time keeping at the ready.
A. Mrs. Meir has said that it would not be
logical for Egypt to renew the fight and be
defeated; but Israel must be prepared for
Sadat to do the "illogical."
XIII. The Israeli attitudes stem in part from a desire
to avoid Big Power intervention and the fear
thatsa "dangerous" situation might ultimately
lead to an imposed settlement--a development
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they have always felt would be detrimental to
Israel's security.
A. The Israelis believe that Sadat's moves are
designed less for fighting than to create
a climate of concern that would help Egypt
get better terms. The Israelis also say
they believe that much of Sadat's activity
is for domestic effect.
XIV. At the same time, Israel continues to demonstrate
to the Arabs its military power (e.g., the recent
Independence Day parade and fly-by in Jerusalem,
and current maneuvers of the crack Golani brigade
-., the r7^1,1 1.1,,4ghts).
A. Israeli officials have repeatedly warned
publicly that the Arabs would be dealt an-
other devastating military defeat..
B. Israel's traditional preoccupation with the
advantages of surprise in warfare suggests
that it will?if the Arabs make moves that
Israel feels threaten its security?under,-
take pre-emptive action.
C.
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D. The Israelis would also seek to destroy the
Libyan Mirages before they could be used
against them.
F. While Egypt is viewed as the principal enemy,
Defense Minister Dayan has also warned Syria.
He indicated that Israel would regard the
move of regular Syrian forces into southern
Lebanon as a threat to Israeli security.
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