(SANITIZED) PROPECTS FOR THE DRY SEASON IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-11-7-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 19, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

44.
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NSA Review Completed
INFORMATION
October 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KLSSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: CIA Study: Prospects For The Dry Season In Laos
-5 a, Cr)
Attached is an October 8 CIA study on Hanoi's possible outlook toward
the dry season situation in Laos. It makes these main points:
--CIA believes that Hanoi's basic strategy for Laos remains generally
unaltered. It is a defensive strategy designed to protect the infiltra-
tion routes to South Vietnam and vital areas in the north.
--The new element in the situation this year is that Southern Laos
has assumed greater importance to the Communists because of
developments in Cambodia.
--The situation remains unclear in Northern Laos. Based on an in-
ventory of military resources available, the Communists are now in
a better position to attack and perhaps take Long Tieng or Luang
Prabang.
--Other factors, however, suggest the Communists may wish to keep
military activity in Northern Laos at about the same level through
the dry season as obtained prior to 1969. The Communists effort to
get Souvanna to the negotiating table could be an indication that they
wish to avoid costly hostilities in Northern Laos during the winter
dry season.
--An end to U.S. bombing presumably remains their primary objective,
but they might also be seeking to reduce ground combat in Northern
Laos in order to free manpower to be applied to more important ob-
jectives elsewhere in Indo-China. They could have in mind proposing
a cease fire in Northern Laos.
SE R.}:.1 5/Juick;
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
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-.The Communists are as wary of Vang Pao's intentions in the Plaine
des Jarres as he is of theirs with respect to Long Tieng. Both remain
sensitive to opportunities afforded by appearances of weakness on the
other side. The Thai forces, particularly the artillery batteries, re-
main crucial to Long Tieng's defense.
?"What is clear is that the guerillas (Yang Pao and the Meo) in the
north have been engaged in an increasingly bitter and costly war of
attrition that they cannot win. "
...A major buildup of Communist forces is now under way in South
Laos which combined with RLG and U. S. plans to harass infiltration
routes almost certainly guarantees a greater volume of military ac-
tions in this area during the upcoming dry season.
-The magnitude of the Communist buildup in Southern Laos does not
appear to be commensurate to the degree of harassment and raise.
the threat of a major and sustained offensive directed westward against
Lao government forces and positions as well as the SGU's. As of
early October as many as 20-25 thousand North Vietnamese have been
deployed or are on their way into Southern Laos.
--Numerous indications and communications intelligence and collateral
reporting suggest that the Communists will open the dry season in the
panhandle with an attack on Paksong. This raises the possibility that
the Communists will threaten the major towns on the Mekong especially
Pekoe and Thakhek. This could create a major crisis in Vientiane and
headlines around the world, especially Washington.
...There is no evidence that this move is under way, but the dangers of
it taking place are aseessed by CIA as more than theoretical due to
increased Communist capability in the area.
This is a good paper which lays out the problem clearly. My observations
on it follow:
-.The North Vietnamese now have great military strength In Southern
Laos but this does not necessarily presage an attack on Cambodia.
pr,CRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
....We should anticipate the application by the North Vietnamese
of substantial forces to counter our harassment of Communist
L000 in Souttiern Laos.
Both nresent and projected FAR and SGT.). strength (including
Cambodian SGUs) will be inadequate to counter this 25X1
major Communist threat. Our efforts on the ground in South
Laos will probably not be able to deter the North Vietnamese in
the area, though this does not necessarily presage an attack on
major Mekong cities.
-4n the light of the foregoing, friendly air interdiction attacks on
Communist LOCs in Southern Laos will assume an even more
important role this winter than heretofore.
Attachment
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