NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
September 1, 2010
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 25, 1971
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1.pdf | 162.6 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
V
sue
ACTION
For Signature (Z/26/7I)
February 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. FINGER
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDIUDGt
SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Infiltration
CIA has published a new memorandum which discusses the apparent
stand down in North Vietnamese Infiltration since Jas ary 5 (Tab U).
It offers no firm conclusion on the actual state of infiltration since
that date; instead, it discusses the following possible explanations: .
Infiltration may have been drastically curtailed because
of the use of the support facilities within the infiltration system
by organic units which have recently deployed f North Vietnam
to reinforce the Laotian panhandW
-- ,infiltration may have continued since Jan iry 5 but son*
undetected. On that date, the North Vieturnese. ae*r Services
way station whose radio communications have provided most of
the i*brm ation on infiltration departures from the Vink area was
physically relocated, and in its new location it may not need to use
its radio.
Ia co lasso, tbo mem orsndam notes that if we hav* lost our ability
to deteect infiltration departures from the Vin area, our future esti-
mates of infiltration will be ranch leas timely and complete.
Co st. In our vier, current evidence strongly xagge0s that
infiltration continues and that we have indeed lost our ability to
duct infiltration departures from the Vinh area. The followia
points apply.
- The uncertainty over infiltration hinges on c cations
from one key way motion,in the Vinb area. Thoo'bet t we have Pat
S'We'R_ VV SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
1P W
C UTisPOKE
board from it since January 5 is our only
there has been an infiltration stand down.
for believing that
-_ Yet on that very date this station moved 25 miles closer to
Viaah, in a position to use more secure means of communication with
the Binh Tram in Vinh and to dispatch troops southward by road,
rail, and water. It seems strange that this move would have been
made only to have all infiltration cease--beginning on the very
same day.
-_ This way station has maintained radio silence in its new loca-
tion even though it was previously told to be ready to receive one
infiltration group each day from January 5 through January 10.
-- There are various indications of a general enemy effort to
improve communications .ecurity elsewhere in southern North
Vietnam.
On January 27, an infiltration group was detected moving
through the Ban laic rai Pass into Laos. If it had been moving at a
normal pace, it would have passed through the way station in Vinh
about the middle of January. (The way station, of course, has not
reported this or any other group since January 5.) Moreover, the
numerical designator of this group suggests that 10 other undetected
groups, or the equivalent of about 6, 000 men, may have preceded it
south after January S.
-- Since the CIA memorandum was published, other infiltration
groups have been detected for the first time in the Laotian panhandle.
It seems almost certain that some of these started out from North
Vietnam after January 5 (Tab C).
It also appears more than likely that additional groups
in the coming weeks. As this occurs, the conclusion that infiltration
continues--and that we have lost our intelligence advantage in the Vinh
area--will be inescapable, if it is not already sac.
SECRET/SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1
SECRETISPOKE
As the CIA memorandum points out, this will represent a serious
intelligence loss. The pattern of infiltration will begin to emerge
only when the groups are much closer to their destinations in South
Vietnam and Cambodia, and even then our estimates will probably be
hedged by phrases such as "plus or minus 40 per cent. ~a
We believe that it is not too early for the intelligence community to
begin a thorough motion of this problem from the operational
point of view the hope of discovering some now exploitable links
in the infiltration system or of using our past a ezperiamc`e'derive the
best possible data. We have drafted a memorandum along those ties
from you to Mr. Helms (Tab B). We have also drafted a brief memo-
randum to the President Worming him of developments and what is
being done about them (Tab A).
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward the memoranda at at Tabs A and B to the Presid*At and
Mr. Helms re spectiveely.
SECRET/SPA
JHH:ME:bib 2/25/71
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-12-8-1