WHITE HOUSE REQUEST FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-13-6-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
29 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Members, NSC Indochina Ad Hoc Group
SUBJECT : White House Request for an Assessment of North
Vietnamese Strategy over the Next Six Months
Attached for your consideration are first drafts of the two
papers requested by the White House:
(a) Assessment of P-robable North Vietnamese
Military Strategy over the Net Six Months
(b) Assessment of Probable North Vietnamese
Political Strategy over the Next Six Months
The drafts are rough because of the speed with which they were put.
together. They are offered as points of departure for your comments,
criticism, and additions.
.-a4 ~,. .
George A.. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
OSD, ARMY review
completed
-Copy No.
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ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY
STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
Overview
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The focus of this effort is likely to be in the
rugged western parts of Military Regions (MR s) I and 2 in South Vietnam,
where large numbers of well-equipped Communist troops are already
arrayed. In southern South Vietnam, an expansion of terrorism and
guerrilla activity is possible, but extensive Communist main force action
seems unlikely unless the Saigon government moves enough of its troops
north to MRs I and 2 to present Hanoi with an exploitable opportunity.
2. The Communists are also likely to continue the current offensive
in northern Laos through the end of the dry season unless they secure the
Long Tieng area before then. Southern Laos, by contrast, will probably
see only limited activity designed to protect Hanoi's logistic network from
any possible ground threat. Extensive main force activity in Cambodia
looks unlikely given the extent to which Communist forces have been re-
targetted against South Vietnam. In Laos and particularly in Cambodia,
however, the Communists are almost certain to mount terrorist activities
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especially when they want to unsettle the local government or. feel them-
selves in need of headlines.
Timing
4. For maximum impact, it is likely that the Communists would
in fact like to attack more or less simultaneously in MR 1 and MR Z. In
MR 2 they still have time before the rains begin in May to mount a major
attack against Kontum or Pleiku cities; at the least they would hope to
give ARVN a highly visible bloodying. After the rainy season gets under
way, they might return the 320th Division to North Vietnam, but it seems
just as likely that they will keep their force structure in and near the
highlands at something like its present level.
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5. Farther north, the Communists now have a new road on the
east side of the mountains, and they will probably use it to keep on
fighting in MR 1 through the summer. In both MR I and MR 2, they.
will be trying to bring unprecedentedly heavy firepower to bear on their
adversaries. Elsewhere in South Vietnam, the goal of their main force
units will be to tie down as many South Vietnamese troops as possible 25X1
and to test for weaknesses, probably in a fairly cautious way.
'
A "Spontaneous Uprising_?'
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7. Broadly speaking, the Communists probably have three
interrelated objectives in this period: To undermine ARVN's self-
confidence and its credibility with the populace, and thereby to reduce
the effectiveness of the pacification program; to influence U. S. domestic
politics, particularly the election campaign; and to stimulate pressure in
both South Vietnam and the U. S. for a negotiated settlement on something
approaching the Communists' terms. Hanoi may also be harboring grander
hopes--for a military victory so smashing as to undermine the Saigon
regime, . for instance, or for a significant surge of popular unrest. The
Communists probably do not, however, consider such events particularly
likely. They almost certainly have ruled out an all-or-nothing operation
along the lines of the 1968 offensives, and they probably are prepared
to live with the possibility that they will achieve no more than fairly modest
gains in the next six months.
Enemy Capabilities: Manpower and Disposition of Forces
This judgment of the enemy's objectives fits his capabilities
quite well. Conscription in North Vietnam has been high over the past
year, with large numbers of young men being inducted into the NVA to
replace the troops sent to fight beyond the borders of North Vietnam. Thus
far this dry season (i. e. , from 1 October 1971 to 25 March 1972), Hanoi
has dispatched about 117,000 infiltrators to the southern war zones. This
compares with some 106,200 during the entire dry season last year (1970-
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 1971). Since the infiltration flow in most dry seasons has almost ceased
by the end of March, we may have seen the bulk of the infiltration this
spring. already. Infiltrators beginning the trek from the north after
March would generally arrive in the south at the end of the campaigning
season, and rain comes to the Lao Panhandle in May--making travel more.
difficult. Furthermore, combat. losses have not been heavy during the
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dry season campaigning to date, and thus the need for late-season infil-
trators as replacements is not great. (This could change, of course, if large
scale military action gets under way in coming weeks.)
Infiltration starts, by destination, compare as follows:
1970%71 1971/72
(Oct 70-May 71) (Oct 71-25 Mar 72):
GVN MRs 1 and 2
DMZ-Tri Thien-Hue
6,000
12,000.
MR5
14,000
16,000
B-3 Front
14,500
40,000
GVN MRs 3 and 4
and Cambodia
COSVN
45,000
35,000
South Laos
26,500
14,000
Total
106,200
117,000
As the infiltration figures indicate, the NVA threat to MRs 1 and 2
has developed more strongly than to MRs 3 and 4. The estimate for the
$-3 Front includes the 320th Division. The figure for the DMZ and the
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0 W3 4 25X1
Estimated Strength
of Communist Regular Combat Forces
in Indochina
(Thousand)
De
cember
December December
March
1969
1970
1971
.
1972
VC/NVA 13
0-150
105-120 105-120
140.155.
South Vietnam a/ 130-150 85-95
80-90
110-120
Cambodia
-
20-25
25-30
30--35
Rhmex Communist N
.A.
10-20
15-30
15-30
PL/NVA 5
5-65
60- 70
70-85
70--85
Northern Laos 3
5-40
30-35
40-45
40-45
Southern Laos 2
0-25
30-35
30-40
30-40
F. Figures for South Vietnam include. those NVA forces located
in southern North Vietnam between Dong Hoi and the DMZ which
are considered to be a threat to south Vietnam. These forces
numbered 13,000 in December 1969, 10,000 in December 1970,
12,000 in December 1971 and 20,000 in March 1972.
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10. We estimate that this year's infiltration has provided for an
expansion of the VC/NVA combat order of battle (OB) in South Vietnam and
Cambodia by about 27,000 men, increasing the combat OB from about
69,000 to 91,000 in South Vietnam and providing for a 5,000-man increase
e- r-
concentration of forces in Cambodia opposite GVN MR 3./1 The
to COSVN s
remaining 9.0.,:000 infiltrators have been used to expand the rear services
system in South Laos and Cambodia and provide a stock of fillers to offset
combat casualties.
11. It seems clear from the manpower situation that Hanoi has
committed a large portion of its military assets this year to the various
military fronts outside Forth Vietnam. As a result of (a) this year's
infiltration, (b) the recent unit deployments into South Vietnam., and (c)
an earlier expansion of the force structure in North Laos, there will
remain in North Vietnam only 17 regular infantry regiments.* This is the
smallest reserve force kept at home by Hanoi during any dry season since
1968 when the General Offensive was underway. In addition, there is some
is assumes that the 308th Division, which at the moment is still in North
Vietnam, is committed to redeploy to South Vietnam.
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queation concerning the. combat capability of some of these reserve
regiments.
12. This willingness of Hanoi to move an increasing proportion of
its troops to areas outside North Vietnam has led to some change in the
comparative enemy-versus-friendly combat strengths in South Vietnam.
As can be` seen from the following tabulation, GVN Main Forces still enjoy
superiority in all Military Regions, but that superiority is. significantly
greater in MRs 3 and 4 than in MRs 1 and Z.
Main Force Ratios (Allied/VC/NVA) a./
MR 1
MR?2
MR 3
MR 4
SVN
1968
2.4
'3.3
3.9
2.4
2.9
1970
2.7
7.0
4.5
8.3
4.3
1972
1.9.
2.4
19.5
7.4
3.7
(3.3) b/
(2.9) b/
a. The figures are a ratio of aggregate maneuver battalion strength. They
include U. S. forces for 1968 and 1970 only, and in 1972 they include the GVN's
Regional Force battalions. The ratios also reflect a maximum NVA buildup
concept, including in 197, the 308th Division. The ARVN side of the ratio
for MRs 1 and 2 also includes the planned deployment of the remaining Marines
and Airborne out of the reserves.
b. The figures in parentheses result.from the inclusion of COSVN's 5th,
'7th, and 9th Divisions, which are targetted against South Vietnam but are
presently in Cambodia near the GVN MR 3 border.
13. To the extent Hanoi's strategy, considerations are based on its
manpower commitments (and its judgments regarding allied strengths),
MRs 1 and 2 continue to seem the most likely candidates for enemy-initiated
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NVA should launch such an offensive, fighting would be heavy and casualties
high. Casualties would be particularly high for the NVA, however, which
is the offensive force and which is highly vulnerable--when its units are
concentrated--to Allied firepower. Although local situations might develop
that appeared desperate, the South Vietnamese forces in MRs 1 and 2 should
be capable of protecting themselves and the populated areas of the region,
and of retaking any key objectives lost in the opening round of NVA attacks.
(This assessment is consistant with the views held by most senior South
Vietnamese commanders.)
15. Hanoi's military strategy in the southern MRs themselves is
closely related to its strategy in Cambodia. The North Vietnamese in
Cambodia have attempted to create a situation in which Khmer Communist
unitsj along with certain NVA regiments which have been converted into
territorial-type light units, are strong enough on their own to hamstring the
Cambodian army. This would free the regular North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong main force units--which we designate as "mobile regulars''--to put
pressure on GVN MR 3 and MR 4. Hanoi's objective Is to tic down as many
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"9" -
GVN forces in MRs 3 and 4 as possible. Hanoi will doubtless also seek
to expand terrorist and sapper activity to the extent possible in both
Cambodia and South Vietnam in furtherance of this objective. Given the
ratio of opposing main forces,' however, it is unlikely that the VC/NVA
can bring off any striking successes in southern South Vietnam in the
next six months.
16. Hanoi also sharply increased its commitment of forces to the
war in North Laos this season. Heavy infiltration toward the end of 1971
included the deployment of three infantry regiments, improvements in the
air and defense system, and increases in heavy artillery'. By the end of
1971, the NVA enjoyed a combat force superiority of about 2. 5 to 1 over
the Meo irregulars, Thais, and Lao regular army (FAR) personnel in the
Plain des Jarres area.
..1?. Hanoi's intention this season was to secure the Plaine des
Jarres area by taking friendly strong points to the south, including Long
Tieng, and to.destroy th;, remaining effectiveness of Vang Pao's army.
The growing participation of Thai troops was probably one factor in Hanoi's
decision to try for a major breakthrough in North Laos this year. At this
point, it is not yet clear whether NVA forces have steam enough to complete
the job of taking Long Tieng and associated areas. Because it is now late
in the dry season, Hanoi probably will be unable to precipitate a major
political crisis in Vientiane, even if the NVA should be successful against
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,5 .5
Enemy Logistics
18., The overall picture of the Communists' logistical activity
during the past several months matches that of their military manpower
commitment. Unusually heavy levels of resupply have been detected in
South Laos and along the Cam:)odian and South Vietnam frontiers--particularly
the borders of MR I and MR 2. In North Laos the enemy's offensive, now
several months along, continues to receive substantial logistics support.
19. Currently, supply stockpiles in North Vietnam are extensive.
Petroleum stocks in southern North Vietnam may be as high as 40,000 tons
(the enemy's entire dry season POL requirement in southern Laos in only on
the order of 15,000 to 20,000 tons) and the current inventory of trucks is the
highest ever.
20. Logistics-related construction continues to complement the
buildup in stocks in North Vietnam. Two new airfields are under construction
in southern North Vietnam which when completed--probably this summer--
will bring to six the number of airfields south of the 20th Parallel capable
of handling jet aircraft. A major new north-south road system is also being
constructed. Segments extend from the Vinh area southward some 150
miles to within 17 miles of the DMZ. New construction extending the rail-
road south of Vinh to within a few miles of Mu Gia Pass, and new pipeline
construction to connect Hanoi with the pipeline systems in the North Viet-
namese and Laotian Panhandles is also underway.
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a 5
Supply Movements This Dry Season
2I. The Communist's annual dry season "General Transportation
Offensive" in southern Laos got into high gear in early January and has
continued unabated to the present. * Facilitated by a considerable road
construction. effort and restructured logistic apparatus, large quantities
of supplies have been moved from North Vietnam through the Laotian
Panhandle into Cambodia and South Vietnam. A new road system has
been built through the central Laos. Panhandle; more than 100 miles
of new roads are being constructed in northeastern Cambodia; four new
roads are under construction through the DMZ into South Vietnam; and
a series of new roads is being built 'south of the
* The area has now entered the transitional weather phase preceding
the rainy southwest monsoon season which starts usually in May.
Thus far, however, weather has not yet affected the road system which
remains in generally excellent condition.
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tri-border area, presumably to support troop deployments
in the Central Highlands of South-Vietnam.
2.)..The level of logistic activity noted in the southern-
most part of the Laos Panhandle has been particularly
impressive this dry season. For example, as the General
Transportation Offensive began in January, Binh Tram 35
in the Ban Bac area reportedly delivered some 3,500 short
tons (an average of 113 short tons daily) of supplies dur-
ing the month "- probably the largest monthly total ever.
detected moving that far south.* Besides these heavy
southward deliveries, large quantities of supplies also
have been detected moving.eastward toward South Vietnam. ".,Binh Tram 42 reported the delivery of 102 tons daily to
GVN MR 1 on seven days in late January. Similarly, Binh
Tram 37 revealed an average supply flow of some 64 tons
daily to the B-3 Front in early February, while at the
same time maintaining a significant flow of supplies south
to Binh Trams in northeastern Cambodia. A northward flow
of supplies -- chiefly rice -- has also been maintained
in the tri'-border area. The rice is delivered through
7Previous record levels of supply deliveries in the
southern Panhandle were reached during February and March
of 1970 when Binh Tram 35 reported receiving an average
of 107 tons of supplies daily.. Comparing the two, the 113
STPD figure for January 1972 represents Binh Tram 35's
deliveries farther south (not receipts from the North)
well before the normal peak levels of activity in February--
March .
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the northern Cambodia logistical network to Binh Tram 37
which distributes it among units in the southern part of
the Panhandle and also moves it to the east along supply
routes to South Vietnam.
23. Massive quantities of arms and ammunition have been
included in the detected supply deliveries. For example,
Binh Tram'45 shipped some 2,800 tons of ordnance to Binh
Tram.46 along the new central road system during February.
The shipments included virtually every category of weapon
and ammunition known to be in the North Vietnamese inven-
tory and represent the largest monthly shipment of muni-
tions ever noted in COMINT in southern Laos. This high
level of activity along the central corridor has continued
into March. A summary report for the period '1-12 March
?indicated that 1,650 tons of supplies, --- roughly half
arms and ammunition -- were moved between Binh Trams 45
and 46.
24. This heavy supply activity in the southern Panhandle
has had a dual impact. First, activity on the exit
corridors has resulted in supply throughput to South Viet-
nam and Cambodia this season being considerably higher
than that of last year at this time. Secondly, this per-
formance has allowed the Communists to augment their
stockpiles of supplies, particularly of arms and
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While throughput has been at high levels, one anomoly
exists in the intelligence available for evaluating the
dry season effort. The level of supply input into southern
Laos as detected by sensors is running well below that re-
corded last year. Several factors could explain this:
~- Resupply requirements may be considerably
smaller this year than last when the enemy
was building very large supply stockpiles
in anticipation of and defense against
the ARVN operations.
Required inputs from North Vietnam may be
lower this year because of concentrated
efforts by the Communists to achieve greater
? self-sufficiency in rice in south Laos and
northern South Vietnam. Supplementing
this.is a probably increased flow of rice
from Cambodia to southern Laos and South
Vietnam. a flow which should conceptually
be considered "input".
The extensive, expansion of the South Laos/
Cambodia logistic system probably required
levels of supply input which are currently
unnecessary. With that system now. operat-
ing more efficiently it presumably requires
less input from the north for its own
consumption.
? --- The Communists may be moving large
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~.. X15.. .~ .
Northeast Cambodia
2,S';Resupply activity in northeast Cambodia this dry
season has tracked closely with that in South Laos.
Traffic.levels on the overland corridor-(Route 110/97)
increased markedly in January and by mid-February had
surged to moderate rates between the border and Stung
Treng,. South of Stung Treng, sizable volumes of ordnance
supplies have continued to be shipped southward via. the
Mekong and Route 13 to Kratie, thence to enemy strongholds
on either side of the Mekong. At the same time, the Com-
munists have sustained a large flow of rice and gasoline
north for consumption by enemy forces in the -Northeast,
the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle, and.in the
B-3 Front.area of South Vietnam. Concurrent 'with the
.large troop buildup in the.B--3 Front area, enemy engineers
have constructed a series of new motorable roads and re-
lated facilities in the area. The latest reports from
aerial observers reveal that the roadnet will apparently
Continued from page 5
quantities of supplies stockpiled in the
-northern and central Panhandle last year
forward toward South Vietnam and Cambodia
this year.
Finally, our sensor data on input may be
incomplete.
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-16- p
r~i
link Base Areas 609 and 702 and also 11 provide a
direct link to the Stung Treng military complex.
North Laos
7--?,The Communist dry season supply effort in northern
Laos got into full swing well ahead of that in the Laos
Panhandle. By September, extensive road work was underway
and some resupply activity apparent, and by early Novem-
ber very large quantities of supplies -- particularly arms
and -ammunition -- were on their way to Communist forces
who would launch the Communist dry season offensive in
the Plaine des Jarres area. The results of this effort
have been impressive: an evaluation of intercepted enemy
communications suggests that the North Vietnamese have
delivered 30% to 50% more supplies this dry season than
ever before during a comparable period. Although the
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pace of supply activity has now slcx ad .rom its peak.
period of November through January, there is ample evi-
dence that significant :'deliveries ---- possibly including
40 to 50 'tons daily of ammunition ---- have continued over
the past two months.
y While continuing a high level of supply deliveries,
the Communists also have greatly upgraded their logis-
tical and tactical capability in northern Laos by con-
structing a major new supply route west of the Plaine.
Now motorable to.within a few 'miles of the Long Tieng
Valley, this road gives the Communists for the first time
a motorable supply route by which to supply forces west
of the Plaine. Through its use the Communist posture for
. pressing the assault on the Long Tieng 'complex is greatly
enhanced.
Outlook for the Wet Season
2 Overall, the Communists' current logistic posture
appears to be in its best shape of the past two years:
their stockpiles -- especially of arms and ammunition --
appear sizable; their route structure has gained further
redundancy and capability; and, they are capable of sup-
porting a record level of rainy season activity, both
across the DMZ and in the Laos/Cambodia border area.
Finally, these developments will give them a stronger
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1
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- 18 - ,
logistics posture in the early stages of the 1972-73 dry
season than they had this dry season.
All signs indicate that the Communists will sustain
a relatively high level of logistic activity over the
next two months. By June, however, the seasonal monsoons
will affect the road network in south Laos and Cambodia
and the level of activity will be sharply curtailed. Dur-
ing the. summer, when rains are heaviest, the focus of
activity throughout must of the Panhandle will be on local
logistical activity.
'Same resupply into South Vietnam and Cambodia will
occur, however. Mid-March" photography has shown that the
new Route 103/6086 structure through the DMZ can support
vehicle traffic as far south as Khe Sanh. During the
rainy season in Laos this route, as well as two others ex-
tending into the DMZ are shielded by the mountains along
the western DMZ boundary which effectively block.most of
the rain. Thus, these roads give the Communists the
ability 'to move supplies directly into MR-1 from North
Vietnam during the summer months if they so choose. In*
the Laos/Cambodia border area the Communist rainy season
effort is facilitated by their use of waterways. During
last year's rainy season, the Communists relied heavily
on these to deliver substantial quantities of arms and
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ammunition south into Cambodia and equally large quantities of rice
(and some petroleum) north into the Laos Panhandle for consumption there
or eastward delivery to South Vietnam.
32. In sum,. from the viewpoint of logistics, the Communists are
now in a fairly favorable position in most parts of Indochina--in GVN
MR.s I and 2, in Laos and in Cambodia. Assuming other factors provide/
no hindrance, they have the supplies to sustain extensive combat activities
in each of these areas, though not simultaneously in both Cambodia and MRs
I and Z of South Vietnam.
33. in MR 3 and MR 4 of South Vietnam, the logistics situation of
the Communists is less rosy. The loss of the Sihanoukville supply route is
still being felt. The enemy's problems in MR 3 are substantial, but perhaps
tdl.~~t: a1~, G fp to
less 3 than a year ago. Despite ARVN pre-emptive operations in Cambodian
areas adjacent to GVN MR 3, the Communists have had some success in sus-
taining small but steady supply flows into Tay Ninh Province and points
farther south. Several large caches, principally foodstuffs, were seized
T~eJc
in northwest MR 3 early this year. i seizures provided limited evidence
of enemy intentions to stockpile for future operations. 25X1
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 MM '.
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34. The Communists face their. most difficult problems.,in terms
of supplies in MR 4. The recent surge in enemy sea infiltration attempts
(I4 this dry season, seven since January) attests to Communist resupply
difficulties. Enemy forces in the Delta do have an overland supply link
to Cambodia, but deliveries over this route must be considerably less than
desired -given the magnitude of the sea infiltration effort. Judging by the
Communists' logistics problems, we do not foresee any significant threat from
enemy main forces in this area over the next six months, although attention-
.,getting terrorist and sapper activities are always possible.
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