MOVEMENT AND PRESENT LOCATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY'S 325TH DIVISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-13-8-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 21, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE
POLITICAL STRATEGY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS
Hanoi has always given 1,CENX high priority to the political
? side of its revolutionary struggle. This has immix involved efforts
to organize and stimulate mass Opposition to the GVN within South
Vietnam, and to maintain popular support at home in the North
for a prolonged conflict. On the international scene, it has involved
? efforts to manipulate world opinion in order to isolate the GVN and
to intensify U.S. domestic opposition to the war, and attempts
through negotiations to secure a U. S. withdrawal under conditions
? favoring the disintegration of the GVN.
2. Hanoi has recognized in recent years that its political
strategy has been losing its effectiveness in the face of Allied
progress in pacification and Vietnamization, and in the absence of
demonstrated military success. At the moment, however, there is
no sign that Hanoi plans any dramatic shifts or changes in its basic
approach on the political side. Current directives in the COSVN
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S-41X-4-11anges?i'll
.44*eetil......ea.in?t1re?GOS4g area, for example, are still
exhorting the cadre "to motivate the people for a long
term continuous struggle", to lay the groundwork for
spontaneous uprising, and generally to accelerate the
political struggle movement. Given the admitted failure
of the cadre to make much progress in these tasks over
the past several years, these current injunctions appear
more exhortatory than programatic.
? ? . .
ih earo.0 h
On the diplomatic front, there is also no visible
ciltgof any marked shift in Hanoi's strategy. Hanoi has
seemed preoccupied with the acceleratina Sino-American
thaw and is devoting considerable effort to ensuring that
both of its major allies -- China and the USSR -- stand
firmly behind the war effort. In Paris, there is no indi-
cation that the Vietnamese communists are yet ready to make
any significant concessions to move the talks forward,
although a rzi;ackaging of communist proposals is always
possible.
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4. Thus it appears that the Communists are marking time on
the political. side, waiting perhaps to assess the impact of their
military campaigns over the next few months.
5. Hanoi's military actions, in turn, will be aimed at
discrediting the Vietnarnization program and creating an impression
of undiminished Communist capacity for carrying on the war. By
discrediting Vietnamization, the Communists would really hope to
discredit President Nixon's whole policy on Vietnam; and this they
would dearly love to accomplish in 1972, before the U.S. presidential
.?.
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election. Under present circumstances, Hanoi probably sees little 41VA-,?.4,
chance of a political collapse in Saigonor of any negotiation with the
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U.S.ofavorable to Communist interests. Therefore, Hanoi's hopes
for overcoming its opponents in Saigon rest to an increasing extent
on removal of all U.S. support for South Vietnamese (and Cambodian
and Lao) military forces. The Communists would almost certainly see'.
I an electoral defeat? President Nixon as the best means of achieving
?
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this result. The reelection o i G
Presidente-oareil. would face
t?t?tor '----,,
thrT-r, with a continuation for several moryears at least of U.S. action!'
Zatl?to.1, ?p,t..?-iirojeecti 1,31. .
How:
at a-G-2.44-4-1.as?--t-ht?n-rre-e-a.s.aari Vietnamization. T.Le.y?N.vould also s
aimed
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tut to, (.1.a_ Lottotver 1.?/?1 414Na-fa 1.
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government to consolidate its position.
tion as promidinf; four more years for the F-
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6. This is not to say that the North Vietnamese perceive
1972 as a "now or never" situation. Hanoi remains patient, and
apparently sanguine concerning its ultimate ability to outlast the
U.S. and shatter AIWN's confidence. But Hanoi can hardly be com-
placent regarding the consequences of yet another year of indifferent
Communist performance on the Indochina battlefields. War-weariness
I.
is already quite apparent;in the North, and defects in the Communist
political apparatus in the South are also of great concern. In addition,
there now appear to be morale problems in the Indochinese Communist
. camp arising from the changing Sino-American relationship. Some
significant military successes would help Hanoi's leadership in dealing
with all of these problems.
7. In sum, the case for doing something substantial in South
Vietnam, or Laos, or Cambodia--and sooneerather than later--must
be a strong one to the leadership in Hanoi. Successful military efforts
in. 1972 would at least lift Communist hopes; and depending on the mag-
nitude of the successes, political soft spots in Saigon might be exploited,
pacification set back, and Vietnarnization discredited. More important,
the war issue might be reintroduced into American politics, raising
pressures on all candidates for a commitment to complete U. S. military
withdrawal from Indochina and opening the way for a variety of Communist
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negotiating ploys. Among the tactics that might appeal to Hanoi in
such circumstances would be a call for a Cease-fire tied closely to
rior political concessions for the communists in Saigon.
The North Vietnamese might sweeten such a proposition for the U.S.
audience by offering more explicit reassurances regarding prisoner
return. The short-term objectives would be to terminate the U.S.
military role in South Vietnam and shake the confidence of the GVN
leadership.
. 8. If North Vietnam cannot achieve a degree of success on
the military front in the next half year, this does not mean that policy
changes in Hanoi are likely.. .A failure to .gain militarily in 1972,
?
however, combined (in the eyes of Hanoi's leaders) with a high probability
that President Nixon would be reelected, could conceivably lead to
meaningful change in Communist policy. The.?fia.s-t-hope-ctire North
dee. proZJZ/y otoWir e .C- t" c4.4,, ?ft;
Vietnamese
vdeith ( tad ri.; I:, e -Re I es 71- p .110:0 ?1St:
N...../..Ttxort-rwa.-11-43t-7defeatedelis.04at-hls-clefeat,will-rnak7; their own ob-
jectives in Indochina n-a4a4y. attainable. But if they become con-
.
vinced that1i-eis not going to happen, we should not rule out the possibility
that they might try other initiatives. It is possible, for example, that
the North Vietnamese, while remaining determined to continue the war,
might sometime before the U.S. election reverse field and offer a return
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f prisoners for an immediate cessation of any U.S. combat role in
the war in the air as well s_ on the ground, separating this from an
olitical conditions affecting the Saigon government. Hanoi might
calculate that this would be very difficult for the President to refuse
during the election campaign, while acceptance of the proposal would
enable the Communists to test Vietna.mization once again in early
1973 under more favorable circumstances- -i, e., without the
SSence of U.., S. airpower.
9. A new Communist initiative of this sort, though nota.
probability over the next six months is at least possible, It is out
of the question, however, that Hanoi would agree to any overall
settlement of the war (except on its own present terms), even if it .
Is unable to achieve some military success in coming months. The
weight of all historical precedent, the total lack of evidence of an
weakening in the resolve of Hanoi's leaders, and the inflexibility o
these leaders who have been waging N.var throughout their adult live
all factors Must make any observer concluder that Hanoi,
cane what may, is likely to persist in the war into -1973 and beyond.
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