NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARD LAOS AND CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-15-14-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 19, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

1076
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
March 19, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
North Vietnamese Attitudes Toward
Laos and Cambodia
MORI/CDF
C05125551
As the result of your March 8 conversation with Bill Colby, he has sent
you a memorandum on North Vietnamese attitudes toward Laos and
Cambodia (T a.b A) which is summarized below.
In both Laos and Cambodia, the North Vietnamese seem to believe
that they already have most of what they need and that.action to alter this
situation is not called for.
-.Hanoi is satisfied with the current :situation in Laos which permits
unchallenged use of the eastern Lao panhandle and offers the prospect of
a neutral,. non-hostile coalition government in Vientiane and a sharply
reduced U. S. military commitment. "There thus seems little likelihood
that they [the North Vietnamese] will do anything to upset the cease-fire
in Laos."
-- The North Vietnamese would "obviously be unhappy" if the Khmer
Communists (KC) lost out to the Lon Nol regime and NVA use of Cambodia
were jeopardized; however, Hanoi would have mixed feelings about a KC
victory which brought its fractious, self-centered Khmer allies to power
in Phnom Penh. Therefore, "Hanoi probably would not be displeased if
the war in Cambodia simply went on for a while longer." In any case,. the
last thing Hanoi presently wants is "to tie up any part of the North Vietnamese
Army in Cambodia in order to resolve the situation the way Hanoi would
want it."
Comment:
We generally agree with CIA's assessment of Hanoi's attitude towards
Laos; however, Hanoi probably anticipates that the. Vientiane coalition gov-
ernment will evolve from neutral to Pathet Lao (i. e. Hanoi) domination.
-- We do not agree that the North Vietnamese have most of what they
want in Cambodia. A Communist victory in Cambodia would not only
ensure the security of NVA base areas and LOC's in that country, it
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would also. deal a Major. psychological blow 'to the GVN and Thailand'and
would greatly improve. the NVA's 'logistics posture through direct shipments-
-to Karnpong.Sorn, increased availability. of Cambodian resources (especially
rice). and decreased military shipments to the KC.
-,? The North Vietnamese would be more than "unhappy" if the KC, lost
out to Lon Nail. They would find this unacceptable.. The DRV 'Foreign
Minister recently declared that "solidarity among Vietnam, Laos and.
Cambodia is an extremely important matter of life-or-death significance. "
Should the KC face imminent collapse., we. believe. the North Vietnamese
would intervene with limited, but adequate, "forces.
-? We agree that Hanoi'. may be presently satisfied with the indecisive
1 fighting in Cambodia. Coping with the ARVN has a higher priority more-
over, ".Hanoi. may want a KC victory to be postponed until the KC have been.
brought under tighter. control ?4 as have the Pathet Lao. For example,
the KC Central Committee must bring to heel. fractious local forces (e. g.
in the southeast) which have harassed. NVA forces. :
Dick Smys er_ concurs in :these comments.
:SECRET /SENSITIVE
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 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON,. D. C. 20505
Copy # I.
13 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Attitudes Toward
Laos and Cambodia
In our conversation last Friday (8 March), you raised
several questions about present North Vietnamese attitudes'
and intentions toward Laos and Cambodia. You may be
interested in the attached brief memorandum, prepared within
the Agency, which responds to these questions somewhat more
comprehensively than I did in my oral comments to you.
Will-f m r.- Colby
irector
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SUBJECT: Hanoi's Current Attitude Toward Laos
1. Hanoi's assumptions in Laos and Cambodia have
agood manysimilarities. In both countries the North
Vietnamese-seem to_believe that?they already have most
of what they need andthat actiono alter the basic
situation is not called for. In Laosthis means suppqKting
the Vz ent xane_ agreement and withdrawing some, -troops abut
not. pressix g very hard for the-full , implementation Of the
_4greement. Inwcambodia it means _ giving __the_, __hm.er
Communists material aidbutavoiding~the.kind of extensive
support that would maketheir.victory.a foregone conclusion.
2. In Laos as a result of the oeasefire agreement,
Hano _has.an unchallenged buffer zone next to North
Vietnamlunchallenged use of the eastern Lao panhandle for
logistics activity,, t he prospect of a neutra_1rL non-hostile
coalition government in Vientiaiae,. _and a:_sharply__r.educed
bS military commitment. Were the North Vietnamese to set
the Vientiane agreement in jeopardy by new military action,
either on their own or by proxy through the Pathet Lao,
all these valuable gains would be in question.
o There
thus seems little likelihod that they will do anything
to upset the ceasefire in Laos. Nor are the Pathet Lao
likely to kick the aces; Prince Souphanoitvong probably
hopes that establishment of a coalition government would
provide the Pathet Lao a better life than continued fighting.
With the danger of heavy fighting substantially reduced,
Hanoi has felt able to withdraw some North Vietnamese
troops from northern Laos back into North Vietnam and to
move some forces from the panhandle into South Vietnam.
The withdrawals in northern Laos may have been calculated
to encourage concessions by Souvanna Phouma to Pathet Lao
demands in the negotiations on a political coalition.
On the other hand, Hanoi probably sees no reason.to urge
the Pathet Lao to move faster in.-.the.-negotiations over
SECRET
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Cambodia, .but -here ;too - Hanoi___se.ems_ to, -feel- that a relatively
3. Hanoi'sequities are less easy to sort out in
achievement of Pathet Lao goals would dictate.
the implementation of the Vientiane. agreement than-the
1 .1 -as the Khmer -must bas cally.._.win._their revolution on their
doctrine that other ethnic groups (particularly ones which
are not contxc uous geographically_ to North Vietnam)
such
is derived from the strongly-held Vietnamese Communist
conservative,,ppA,ipy _ s appropriate In _part -,this belief
materiel this dry, season to the Khmer Communists to at least
enable them to keep the government's military forces.on
the defensive and Khmer Communist territorial control intact.
But Hanoi wouldalmost -certainly have mixed feelings about
ad.ear and total Khmer Communist victory that put these
fractious and self-centered allies in power in Phnom Penh.
They probably rest easiest, in fact, when Khmer Communist
attention is focused on the struggle with Lon Nol and when
their allies' dependence on Vietnamese Communist material
support is most acutely felt. This serves to keep frictions
between Khmer and Viet Cong operating in eastern Cambodia
within reasonable bounds. Hanoi probably would not be
displeased if the war in Cambodia simply went on for a*
while longer. This would parallel their strategy in Laos
where they built up the Pathet Lao to a certain strength,
but were careful to keep their allies' capability from
becoming a threat to North Vietnamese interests. Hanoi
4. 'he-North Vietnamese would obviously be unhappy
if the Khmer Communists lost out to. the Lon Nol regime and
Hanoi's own freedom of action in Cambodia along the 'South
Vietnamese border were jeopardized.- Hence the North
Vietnamese have provided fairly substantial auantities'of
North. Vietnamese interests In -certain situations.
ethnic groups , and. thatthe_.North Vietnamese doubt that
the Khmer' Communists could be counted on to fully honor
ayercomethe_centuries-old antagonism between.the-tw6,
reasons nothing-approaching-4n open , split. between the
Vi tnamese and Khmer Communists is likely., but it is
obvious that Marxism and revolutionary fervor have not
probaby~also play. a part. For both Practical and
ideological
own, out the troubles , Hanoi has had.-with the Khmer insurgents
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may have estimatedthat the recent infusion .'; of supplies to
the Khmer Communa:sts would_ b.e more than enough to . keep
them in the field but~that manpower and organizaiona].
problems would keep them_fram v_ ictory. Such an. estima e
would square with__our own view that the Khmer Communists
have not-yet shown the organizational capacity to .
simply
raise and maintain and deploy f orces large enough to
.brinq about the government s defeat.
5. C,ertarily~ the last .thing Uanoi.wants ' at the, moment
s to t.e up ary. .part of the.. North Vietnamese Army
Cambodia in order to resolve the. situation .the way Hanoi
would want it. Last fall.. the North Vietnamese even
agreed to withdraw their personnel from southeastern
Cambodia rather than. continue the confrontation with:the
local. Khmer.
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