CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST GUIDANCE ON SIHANOUK

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2
Release Decision: 
RIFLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
September 3, 2010
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 8, 1973
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2.pdf86.21 KB
Body: 
., // No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL _L 4. V [CONTAINS CODEWORD] INFORMATION May 8; 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSING ER FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN 'IU.L ON-FILE NSC RELEASE Cambodian. Communist Guidance on Sihanouk An intercepted April 16 Cambodian Communist Central Committee guidance (Tab A) on Sihanouk's recent trip to the "liberated areas" reflects the Party's dichotomous approach to Sihanouk and its determination to keep the Prince in his place. The guidance stated: "The welcome for Sihanouk in the liberated zone is in accordance with our Party's objectives and the political goals of the Front. " It went on to explain: "As for Sihanouk and his faction;... we make a front with him and he makcs a f+. one. with us. This is very excellent and we should definitely carry it out... " However, the guidance noted that this marriage of convenience has its limits and cautioned that while Sihanouk' E; views may be openly broadcast, his power (as well as that of "the feudal lords and the capitalists") should nit be reinforced by disseminating everything he says within Cambodia. The guidance also calls for building up the Party's position "both over the American imperialists, their lackeys and puppets and over Sihanouk, the feudal lords and their capitalists. " Comment: We have for some time seen evidence of a mutual distrust between Sihanouk'and his non-Communist Peking entourage (i. e. "faction") on one hand and the Hanoi-controlled GRUNK leaders on the other. Sihanouk and his Peking "court" have been kept fairly well under Khmer Communist control -- with the obvious concurrence of the Chinese. Clear evidence of this is the watchdog role played by Hanoi's Ieng Sary who seems to accompany Sihanouk everywhere. S-MCIZET [CONTAINS C ODEW ORD] XGDS (2) No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2 SECRET/SENSVE CONTAINS CODEWORD] Basically Hanoi and its Ehmer Communists, want to have :it both ways. As reflected in the guidance, they want to exploitany residual popularity Sihanouk might still enjoy (especially in the countryside). without, however, allowing him to build any independent support which cause's problems if and when he ever returns to Phnom Penh. This intercept tends to reiizforce our belief that Hanoi (supported by Peking) will not allow Sihanouk to return to Phnom Penh until it is clear that the mercurial Prince can be kept under tight control by a well,-entrenched Party apparatus. SECRET /SENSITIVE [CONTAINS CODEWORD] No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/08/30: LOC-HAK-558-15-4-2