CURRENT EGYPTIAN/SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-16-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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lip lp
'DOS, NSA, OSD Reviews Completed.
THE. PI]SZDD. ITT HAS SM'ENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
23
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
January 10, 1975,
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJEC 'r Current Egyptian/Soviet Relations
Background to the Brezhnev Visit
For the past year, the relationship between Egypt and 'the Soviet Union
has ranged from correct to cold. Each country has seen reason, to re-
act against the policies of the other -- the Soviets, by withholding. arms
from Egypt which has continued-to pursue the US settlementintiativ.e
to the exclusion of the USSR; the Egyptians, by continuing to keep the
Soviets out of settlement efforts and by working against Soviet influence
in the Middle East. -Sadat took the position that the relationship could
not be .:,ornializcd c ..".=pt by Soviet _.grcement to meet Egyptian i,3.litary
needs, and that if Brezhnev wanted to discuss this -with him it would
have to be in Cairo (Sadat went to Moscow.-four times between 1970 and
1972, without a reciprocal. visit by the Soviet leader.) The, Soviets would
not agree to play the Egyptian game and refused both arms and a
Brezhnev visit.
Recently, however, and in part. because of mutual needs, both countries
have moved to improve the relationship. Fahmy has been to Moscow
twice during the past eight months, emerging from his last visit, in
November, with an agreement by Brezhnev to meet with Sadat in Egypt.
The advantages the Egyptians expected from a visit by Brezhnev would
have been the resumption of military supply, new agreements on assistance,
and the rescheduling of the massive debt owed by.Egypt for past Soviet
assistance, both military and economic.. For the Soviet. Union, 'a visit
by Brezhnev would have increased Soviet visibility and prestige in the
Arab world at a time when US settlement efforts, appeared to be faltering-_
and possibly lead to a weakening of Egypt's relationship with the West,
and. in particular, the US. Brezhnev would also presumably have hoped
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DECLAS -Date Impo
BYAUTH Henry A.
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ssible to Determine
Kissinger
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that the visit could result in the more substantial participation by
SECRET/CODEWORD (XGDS)
the Soviet Union in the. settlement process, perhaps at Geneva,
and the legitimization of a post-settlement Soviet r
East.
postponement of Brezhnev's trip would not in itself further damage
It maybe that their presence was requested in Moscow so that the
departed Cairo for meetings with Soviet leaders on December Z8.
visit. In late 'December, the Soviets asked for a high-level Egyptian
delegation to go to Moscow to discuss outstanding matters. Egyptian
Foreign Minister Fahmy and newly-appointed War Minister Gamasy
political reasons may have contributed to the deferral of Brezhnev's
a.visit three weeks in advance. Regardless of the degree of illness.
but not necessarily one so serious as to cause the postponement of
supports the credibility of Brezhnev's illness since December 26,
Now,. however, the..visit has been postponed. Available evidence .
the Egyptian/Soviet relationship.
necessary. to normalize matters -- and both are currently expressing
of the public and private remarks by both Egyptians and Soviets is
although contrived, as if to show that a visit by Brezhnev was not
MIG-23's) on Syria, Iraq and Libya, has apparently ended. The tone
Soviet interests, and of Egyptian coolness toward Moscow's retribution
of denying military supplies to Egypt while lavishing them (including
Egypt for pursuing the U. S. settlement initiative to the exclusion of
their bilateral relations. A. long period of Soviet. unhappiness with
that the two countries may have decided to enter a new phase of.
Nevertheless, _what we know of the Fahmy visit to Moscow: indicates
will produce a second-stage Egypt-Israel agreement.
risk a visit, at least not until it is clearer whether or not U.S. - efforts
of Soviet advisors expelled in 1972; immediate move to'Geneva) to
judged that the USSR could not obtain enough from Sadat (e. g., return
conduct of the settlement process continue. Thus -Brezhnev may have
view between Cairo and Moscow on US/Egyptian relations and the
An analysis of recent reports reflects that the basic differences of.
Implications of Fahmy Visit to Moscow
great satisfaction. with Fahmy's visit.
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w w.
mount in a matter of months, US influence and settlement hopes will
decline, and the USSR can envisage Egypt agreeing to major concessions
military arms issue and, possibly, of technical assistance matters
would suffice for the moment. With this enticement, which Egypt
so badly needed, they could afford to play safe and postpone further'
action (e. g. debt rescheduling, a Brezhnev visit) An the. hope that
time and events will work in their favor. If there is no Egyptian/
Israeli second-stage agreement, military and political tension will
In the end, the Soviets may have decided that a resolution of the
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in order to obtain greater military and political support.
The Arms Package
.Implications of the Arms Package
Military
in high performance jet squadrons,.. and Egyptian'MIG-Z3. pilots
capability of the. Egyptian army to sustain combat with Israel. In
...,aircraft alone, the deal constitutes an increase` of 25%n (from 16 to 20)
To an extent dependent upon the amount of equipment, ammunition and
weapons provided, this deal will upgrade the qualitative and quantitative
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will have an improved capability versus their Phantom---and Mirage
equipped Israeli counterparts. Perhaps most important, large-scale
missile deliveries, both- ground-to-air and anti-tank, would con-
siderably increase the Egyptian Army's ability to endure a comxibat,
environment against the heavy use by Israel of aircraft and mechanized
forces. Reports received thus far have not indicated any military
concessions Egypt may have given for a renewed Soviet arms' supply.
For Egypt and the Arab World, the arms package is politically important
no matter what the total amounts or delivery schedules may turn out
to be. This is the first such major agreement between Egypt and the
Soviet Union since the October War, and the arms agreement contains
some high-visibility items which Egypt has wanted for more than three
years but which the USSR heretofore refused *to supply (it was this refusal
which led Sadat to ask the Soviets to remove their military personnel
from Egypt in July ,1. 972.). IL has also been a point of considerable
concern-to the Egyptian Army, which has seen its capability. to fight
degraded while that of Israel has improved; moreover, Egyptian military
planners have had to endure the humility of inadequate supply while their
counterparts in Syria and Iraq have been the objects of Soviet generosity.
A resumed supply will remove some of the pressure Sadat has been
under from his military for -these reasons, and enhance confidence in
his leadership --? at least for the time being.
Whatever the political impact of the military agreement on Egypt and
the Arab World, the effect on Israel will be considerable when the details
'become -known-. - . The-Is-raeli.s will, be highly disturbed by its implications,
both for the potential upgrading of Egypt's military capability and for its
signalling. of a deepening commitment between Egypt and the USSR. This
must be expected to have an effect on Israel's attitude toward negotiations.
It will also have an effect on the urgency and vigor with which. Israel presses for a firm US commitment to deliver and finance new arms,
both in terms of sophisticated individual items and the entire multi-year
MATMON-B plan.
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SECRET/ CODEWORD (XGDS)-
The Impact on Negotiations
however, and the implication wasc7-ear tha nresent US settlement
.Conference, should resume its work as soon as possible." There was
no conun tment to, the immediate resumption of the Geneva talks,
visit to Moscow noted that both sides. "strongly believe that the Geneva
The joint Soviet-Egyptian statement issued at the end of Fahmy's
-ffnrt?:a have not been excluded.
"which'might be used to give them (USSR) a sense of being brought in"
Already Fahxny has told Ambassador Eilts he is thinking about scenarios
to the negotiating process. Already a new complication has been added
to the negotiating process on the Egyptian side although it probably can
be handled.
tisit -- the. arms package and the postponement itself.
--much public stress the Israeli Government decides to give in Israel.
_and abroad to the two most visible elements of the postponed Brezhnev
rgg_arded by Israel as a compensating factor.) Much depends upon how
-performance indicates that more military assistance from us might be
Sadat to continue indefinitely to deprive his army of new weapons.
However, we must expect it to be a live issue and find a means to deal
with--it where Israel's negotiating posture is concerned. (Past Israeli
deliberately exaggerated demand, since Israel could not logically expect
was no new.arms deal with the USSR. This may well have been a
Allon's list of Egyptian concessions for a second-stage Sinai agreement
Egyptian adherence to the step-by-step process. One of the, points in
Israeli attitudes toward negotiations will certainly stiffen, at least
tactically, because of the negative impact of the arms package, despite
the mitigating. factors. of Brezhnev cancelling his visit and continued:
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W
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/CODEWORI
INFORM. T,
January
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
V
74
SECRETARY KISSINGER
ROBERT Bq OAKLEY
Memorandum to the President on.
Egyptian/Soviet Relations
Attached is the memorandum for the President which you requested
on the subject of' Egyptian l5oviet 'relations following.the postponement
of Brezhrev's trip to Cairo and the visit by ;Fahm. and Gamas to
Moscow. It is based on 1. .number of .good `State reports.'
However,. . we are only in the preliminary analysis stage wit out
enough concrete facts to warrant hard-and-fast conclu6ions. 25X1
SECRET /CODEW OR D
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