LIKELIHOOD OF COMMUNIST CLOSURE OF MEKONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-16-2-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 16, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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IP IP
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
319
?on-soic S January 16, 1975
i/A'INVAII7
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
6
v.,.;
FROM: KENNETH M. QUINN 61
i
SUBJECT: Likelihood of Communist Closure of Mekong
You have previously indicated an interest in whether the Communists had the
ability to interdict the Mekong River for a sufficiently long enough time
to interrupt our supply efforts. The Defense Department addressed this
subject (Tab B) and concluded that Khmer Communist forces are not
strong enough to accomplish this.
The intelligence community, at the request of Phil Habib, has also
studied this question. At Tab A is a copy of their memorandum. It
concludes that;
? Communists have clearly embarked on a major campaign to
interdict the Mekong.
? For the next 3 months or so they can not keep the river closed.
-- At present levels of combat and present levels of U.S. aid, the
fighting capabilities of FANK will deteriorate this spring. If that happens,
F.ANK's ability to keep the Mekong open will also decl-in-e.
The intelligence community is in the process of preparing a new NIE
on Cambodia which sEculd be completed some time in February. It will
examine further the military and political aspects of the Cambodian
situation as well as prospects for negotiations.
--Sgrwartr-T---6POKE XGDS
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Secret
,IGNI
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anuary 1975
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January 13,1915
CAMBODIA -- LIKELIHOOD OF COMMUNIST CLOSURE OF THE MEKONG*
REY. POINTS
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The Khmer Communists (KC) have clearly embarked on a
major campaign to interdict the Meking this dry sea-
son (i.e., now through June), in order to close
Phnom Penh's critical supply line.
-- Our best judgment is that for the next three months
or so the KC cannot keep the Mekong interdicted.
? - During this period, the Cambodian Army (BANK)
will be able to provide enough security for
the movement of those convoys essential to the
continued survival of the government.
- At present levels of combat and present levels
of US military aid, the fighting capabilities
of FANK will deteriorate this spring. If that
happens, FANK's ability to keep the Mekong open
will also decline.
* This memorandum was drafted by the Defense Intelligence Agency
and concurred in by the Central Intelligence :Agency, the Bureau
Of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the
representatives of the service intelligence agencies..
SECRET
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Khmer Communist Intentions
1. The KC have clearly embarked on a major effort to inter-
dict the Mekong this dry season (i.e., between now and the end of
June 1975). Several recently intercepted messages among top KC
leaders have in fact stated that closing the Mekong River is a
primary objective of the Communist military campaign this dry
season, and it is evident that present KC military actions are
tailored to this end. The insurgents now hold strong positions
along the river between Phnom Penh and the Cambodian border with
South Vietnam, and they are simultaneously conducting operations
against the capital's perimeter to keep FANK intervention forces
tied down in that area.
2. At:this point, the KC have committed about 10,000 troops
to the Mekong interdiction effort, more than in either of the,tWO-
previdus years. They have seized most of the banks on 'both sides'
of the river south of the GKR.'s :naval base at Neak Luong, and
strip 10 miles long on the west bank of the river north of the
naval base. They thus hold -- at the moment river banks:In
two key areas where the river narrows to about 500.,xpetert:, one
north and one south.of Neak Luong. During last year's dr!i, season,
the heaviest shellings against Phnom. Penh-bound convoys Occurred
at these locations. The KC are also planning, according toHinter-
cepted messages, to expand their holdings along the river:, and:
they intend. to try to capture Neak Luong itself. About A batal.,
lion:of FANK troops was sent to Neak Luong on January 12, 11,71thout
additional reinforcements, the FANK garrison would be hard-pressed
to hold the town.
3. Some recent KC messages have suggested that the KC /night
try to barricade the river -- a tactic attempted by the Communists
along the upper Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers during the last dry
season. (Although initially successful, these barricades were
knocked out in fairly short order by the Cambodian Navy and Air
Force.) Another recent KC message referred to plans for using
underwater and floating mines. The KC have not in the past used
mines on waterways. Assuming there are some available, the intro-
duction of mines would clearly increase the threat to shipping.
SECRET
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The Prospect
4. Khmer Communist intentions are thus clear. The real ques-
tion is to what extent the KC will succeed in interdicting the
Mekong through the remaining five months or so of the present dry
season.
5. The capability of FANK to keep open the Mekong
River depends on the government's willingness to divert units
presently committed to the defense of Phnom Penh. The KC thrust
against the capital's defenses which began on January 1 has now .
been contained. Although further insurgent attacks are probably
in the offing, FANK has some 40,000-45,000 troops around Phnom
Penh against about 20,000-25,000 KC troops. FANK should thus be -
able to shift some units south toward the Mekong choke points
and Neak Luong without seriously degrading the capital's security.
Moreover, the FANK should be able to move other troops fairly
rapidly from outlying provinces where insurgent initiatives have
been minimal. Both the Khmer Navy and Air Force have a good
capability to support these movements.
6. We believe that the FANK will, in the next few weeks,
begin a major push southward along the river from Phnom Penh, and
that at the same time the 7,000-8,000 troops at Neak Luong and
nearby locations along the river will hold onto the territory
they now control. We further believe that such actions will be
successful in resecuring the strategic narrows north of Neak Luong.
Once that area is secured, operations can be directed against the
KC positions in the lower Mekong south of Neak Luong. Here,
logistic problems and the terrain will make it difficult for FANK
to reestablish as much security as existed before this dry season.
From now through May, as the water level of the Mekong declines,
the KC will find it easier to attack shipping on the river. Never-
theless, the FANK should be able to strengthen security in the
area over what it is at present.
7. It is our best judgment that for the next three months or
so the KC cannot maintain a continuous interdiction of the Mekong.
At the same time, PANIC will be unable to restore security on the
river to the level which existed before this dry season, convoys
will face an increased threat, and on occasion critical supplies
may have to be airlifted into Phnom Penh.
SECRET
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The insurgents will have a greater opportunity to attack river
shipping, and air and naval support to the convoys will be even
more important than a year ago. The KO do not have to maintain
interdiction to make the Mekong as undependable as a-line of
supply. For example, it is difficult to assess how ship owners,
crew members, river pilots will react to the increased threat.
On balance, however, we believe that essential supplies will
continue to be shipped.
8. Weighing all these factors, we believe that FANK will
be able to provide enough security for the next three months or so
to assure the movement of those convoys essential to the continued.
survival of the country.
9. Beyond the next three months there is another considera-
tion that could play a larger role as the dry season progresses.
At present levels of combat and at present levels of US military
aid, the fighting capabilities of the FMK will deteriorate this
spring. If that happens, FANK's ability to keep the Mekong open
will also decline.
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
,(SECRET SPOKE ATTACHMENT) INFORMATION
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
December 17 1974
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
;WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
U.S. Response to Khmer Communist
Interdiction of the Mekong River
On November 11, you sent a memorandum (Tab C) to Major General
Wickham asking Defense to explore possible U.S. responses to an
interdiction of the Mekong River by the Khmer Communists. At Tab A
is Defense's reply to your request.
Their analysis includes the following key points:
-- It seems unlikely that the Communists will attempt a concerted
interdiction of the Mekong;
An attempted interdiction could probably not be Sustained to the
point of foicing the government's downfall. The reason for this is the
present relatively low state of ComMunist preparedness as well as
FANK's superior firepower and improved tactical air and naval support;
The most useful short term U.S. response to any interdiction
effort would be to ensure that stocka.ge levels of combat supplies are
adequately maintained. Defense is currently doing this within the tight
constraints of the budget for military assistance to Cambodia.
For the longer range, selected investment items will have to be
funded to ensure the maintenance of Cambodian LOC' s. To this end an
airlift self-sufficiency package which included 16 C-123K transports is
in the final stages of DOD review and approval. Other studies of
possible additions to the Cambodian naval forces are also being considered.
The DOD analysis, however, is partly contradicted by a December 17
assessment in the National Intelligence Bulletin (Tab B). This latter
item states that the Khmer Communists apparently intend to make a major
SECRET
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effort to interdict the Mekong River during the next few months. All
indications are that this will be the most concerted attempt since their.
spring 1973 effort.
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Cambodian army commanders are aware of the Communist intentions and
are sending reinforcements to this area. This will raise the government
troop strength along the river to over 8,000.
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IIP SE-4:41 Ili snmll'
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20301
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4-cc 064,
SECIASSIFFC
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Cambodian Assessment (U)
(C) In your memorandum of November 11, 1974, you suggested that it
might be useful to explore possible US responses to the threat of a
concentrated Khmer Communist (KC) interdiction effort on Cambodian
Lines of Communication (LOC).
Cs)While it is still too early to predict what actions the enemy
intends to follow during this dry season, Cambodian analysts agree
the KC will most probably continue their provincial strategy,- coupled
with rocket attacks against the capital and its airfield and attempt
the interdiction of the major LOCs such as the Mekong and Tonle Sap
Rivers and Routes 4 and 5. Although significant KC forces are avail-
able east of the Mekong, their commitment to a concerted interdiction
seems unlikely. The risk of a loss in these areas would far outweigh
the success achieved by interdicting the Mekong which in all likeli-
hood could not be sustained to the point of forcing the government
downfall. During the course of this wet season initiatives by govern-
ment armed forces (FANK) continually disrupted enemy plans. Consequently,
the enemy has had little opportunity to rest and refit or to conserve
Its manpower and ammunition. In comparison to last year the KC appear
less prepared both physically and psychologically. These factors,
together with the FANK 2:1 force advantage over the KC, its fire power
advantage, improved tactical air support and strong riverine forces,
limit the chances of any near-term KC success.
(S) On the other hand, FANK has also been unable to rest and refit
during the wet season. For example, while the 2d Division, which has
been committed to the Bassac Operation since August 21, has been able
to inflict serious losses on the enemy forces, the division is too
weak to exploit these opportunities. Other trends, however, indicate
favorable FANK progress. Along the Cambodian-South Vietnam border,
combined efforts of the FANK and the South Vietnamese have reduced the
vulnerability of Mekong convoys at that point while centralized commend
? of the Mekong. corridor under the Khmer Navy (MNK) has simplified control
and coordination for convoy security within Cambodia. The KAF has shown
steady improvement in the application of close air support and it should
be noted that this progress results from actions undertaken as a part of
the KAF Tactical Air Improvement Plan approved in Washington a year ago.
Classified by ASD/ISA
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m.lvarTrn ORDEN AU10MATICALLY DariCRADED
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-- -
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During the wet season which is just ending, KC forces were able to
Interdict Routes 4 and 5 at various times. However, once FANK responded
to the threat, the ?KC were unable to withstand government forces and
withdrew. Enemy personnel losses resulting from these operations are
believed to have been severe and are expected to have a deleterious
effect on KC efforts in this dry season.
(S) It would appear the most useful US response to KC interdiction
efforts would be to insure that present stockage levels in combat con-
sumables for FANK are adequately maintained. Within the limits of his
tightly constrained budget, Chief MEDTC has done and is doing exactly this.
Ammunition requirements for the first two quarters have been fully
funded, however the status of funding beyond this will remain vague
until Congress completes action on Foreign Assistance Bill for FY75.
For the longer range, selected investment and attrition items will have
to be funded to insure the continuity and maintenance of the Cambodian
LOCs. A KAF Airlift Self-sufficiency package, designed to make the
KAF self-sufficient in airlift capability by July 1975 is in the fins]
stages of DOD review and approval. It will provide the KAF an airlift
capability of 16 C-123K transports and should allow the phasing out of
the current civilian contract C-130 flights by July 1975. A second
area of concern has been the combat attrition of riverine craft. Since
January 1974 a total of 15 craft have been lost to enemy action. To
offset these losses, actions are underway by DOD to provide additional
riverine craft to MNK. Provision of additional craft is contingent on
having available funds, and the approval of Congress to implement the
transfer. If successful, these craft should be available for release
to Cambodia in February 1975. The key however, will continue to be
adequate funding of Cambodia MAP. It is appropriate to reiterate that
the purpose of these steps is to support a level of military parity
under which both sides can be brought to negotiate a settlement.
? 2
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