PROBABLE REACTIONS OF VARIOUS PARTIES IF THE VIET CONG HEADQUARTERS (COSVN) IS STRUCK BY A U.S. B-52 RAID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-19-1-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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March 6, 1969
Honorable William F. Rogers
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A. K asingsr
Probable Rc .ctiOZL9 of Various Farties
i tb__ Viet (Zong Headquarters (COSVNN
3s Struck by a U. S. 33-5Z Raid
Attached for your ayes 014 is tho CIA analysis
ais ? ssad this x.boy ng.
Att chrO t
ARMY review
completed.
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6 March 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Probable Reactions of Various Parties if the Viet Cong
Headquarters (COSVN) is Struck by a U. S..B-52? Raid
ASSUMPTIONS
Within the next few days, a force of about 50 B-52's
bombard the Communist base area in which the Communists'
primary Field headquarters -- the Central Office for South
Vietnam (COSVN) -- is located. The strikes against COSVN
bit those portions of the. base areas involved which lie on the
Cambodian side. of the frontier as well as those portions lying
within South Vietnamese territory.
CONTENTS
1. Pertinent Background Factors
II. Probable Cambodian Reactions
III. Probable Vietnamese Communist Reactions
IV. Probable Soviet Reactions
V. Probable Chinese Reactions
VI. Probable World-Wide Reactions
VII. Probable South Vietnamese Reactions
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I. PERTINENT BACKGROUND FACTORS
1. The Physical Nature and Shifting Location of COSVN. The
Communists field command and control headquarters, COSVN, is
pinpoint components are spread
difficult to because it and its several-comp
or over a large area. Furthermore, the military high command -
-formerly referred to as COSVN's Military Affairs Section and now
called, simply Headquarters, South Vietnam -- is located in an area
near to, but separate from that generally inhabited by COSVN itself.
Both COSVN and its military component have been fixed numerous
times (usually by radio direction finding efforts) in the general Tay
Ninh Province/ Cambodian border area known as the "Fishhook."
The enemy's extensive use of split terminals, however, coupled with
his security practice of siting radio transmitters some distance from
the command units they serve, make it almost impossible to, pinpoint
the current location of either major headquarters with any great
degree of precision.
2. Over the past several months, both COSVN itself and its
subordinate Military Headquarters have generally stayed within the
areas outlined on the attached map. From 19 November 1968 through
4 March 1969, COSVN has ranged through an area approximately 19
kilometers long and 8 kilometers wide straddling both sides of the
Cambodian border. Precisely where within this area COSVN's major
components are now located, we do not know.. From 15 November 1968
through 4 March 1969, the Military Headquarters has generally ranged
through a roughly 6 by 18 kilometer border-straddling area slightly to ,
the west of COSVN proper. Again, we do not know just where within
this area the Military Head uarters is now located. Thus the chance
o oing major damage to either COSVN or its Military Headquarters
are ag y uncer ain...
3. The Relevant Cambodian Physical and Human Geography.
COSVN itself, together with the nearby (and probably associated)
Communist Base Area 352, is located in a sparsely populated border
area, though there are a few Cambodian villages in the vicinity as
well as Cambodian border security troops. The separate Military
Headquarters area (plus its nearby and probably associated Base
Area 353) begins only about six miles south of Mimot, a large Cam-
bodian plantation town, and Route No. 7, a?major Cambodian road
which runs through Mimot and leads to Snoul' and the northeast.
4. The Likelihood of the Fact of Such an Attack Becoming
Generally Known. There is practically no-chance that word of these
? attacks on Cambodian soil would not quickly become known around
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the world. The Communists would find ways to put out the new, if
Sihanouk did not do so first or-.if it did not leak from the allied side.
The U.S. could, of course, maintain that any bombs which fell on
Cambodia had been the result of navigational errors, but the weight
of the attack would make this a difficult position to sustain.
II. PROBABLE CAMBODIAN REACTIONS
5. Sihanouk appears presently inclined to warm up his
relations with the U. S. and to be responding positively to current
U.S. diplomatic initiatives. Hence these attacks would come at a
delicate juncture in U. S. -Cambodian relations. He might not want
to publicize the affair, but various factors (including personal "face")
will probably compel him to denounce the U. S. in shrill and strident
terms. Unless the U. S. gives him a public apology, he might even
then proceed to publish his private correspondence from President
Nixon and add duplicity to his list of specifications and charges
against the U. S.
III. PROBABLE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
6. Hanoi will almost certainly see to it that the attack becomes
public knowledg. It is too good a propaganda opportunity to let pass,
and it is a further means to obstruct any improvement in relations
between Washington and Phnom Penh.
7., However. aigJe_atta.ck, r_egr3les_s of_i . .ts effectiveness,
ma or se _
is unlikely to alter in an n nsee Hanoi's for conductin8
the war or the Paris talks. No doubt the Communists expect the U. S.
They must have undertaken the current "offensive" on the calculation
that there would be a risk of U. S. retaliation. Apparently, they have
been willing to accept these consequences in return for the potential
psychological and political gains of regaining the "initiative" and
demonstrating their ability to continue the fighting at high levels.
Indeed, they may even be trying to confront the U. S. with the dilemma
of retaliating in a major way and taking the adverse political pressures
engendered by "U. S. escalation" or of not retaliating and thus
exacerbating tensions between Saigon and Washington.
8. A single B-52 raid on COSVN, would not seem to Hanoi
a major retaliation, even, hough it involved an attack on their Cambodian
sanctuaries. The Communists would probab y suspend judgment on
w ether this represented a single episode, or the beginning of a new
American policy. If there were no further strikes against Cambodia,
Hanoi would judge that U. S. policy was constrained by concern for
in some ~vay._fo_~he...xP~,~mpos~pf r
to retaliate
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public reaction to widening the war or resuming attacks against the
North. On the ground, however, they might prudently move critical
facilities closer to major Cambodian population centers.
9. It is highly unlikely that a one-time strike against COSVN
would lead to the permanent breakdown of the Paris talks. If Sihanouk
mounted a major and sustained political offensive against- the U.S.,
Hanoi and the Front might feel obliged to stage a temporary walk out
to support him.
IV. PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS
10. - The Soviets could be expected to give full public support
to whatever line Hanoi chose to take. Privately, the Soviets would
probably advise Hanoi to exploit the U. S. move politically rather
than to risk renewed escalation. But we believe that Hanoi would
make its own decisions, and we further believe that Moscow would
support whatever decisions Hanoi made.
11. In private approaches to the U.S., the Soviets would
warn that the U. S. move would enlarge and prolong the war, and lead
to a breakdown of the negotiations at Paris. Moscow would also indicate
that the U. S. course prejudiced the climate for bilateral U. S. -USSR
exchanges on other matters of mutual interest. They would wag-_ that
the U. S. not only refrain from further acts of escalation but also make
some move at Paris to get the negotiations in motion. But they would
probably not undertake any threatening or diversionary move of their
own.
V. PROBABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
12. Peiping, like Moscow, will almost certainly soon be
apprised of the full extent of the postulated attacks, whether or not
they are publicized. Peiping will certainly join any denunciatory
chorus and. will probably urge Hanoi to riposte with increased military
pressure. Peiping will probably also use the fact of the attacks as an
argument in its continuing effort to persuade Hanoi to forswear the
"revisionist" road of political negotiations in favor of the "correct"
path of all-out struggle.
VI. PROBABLE WORLD-WIDE REACTIONS OF OTHER PARTIES`
13. When the full scope of the attacks becomes generally
known, there will probably be world-wide expressions of concern
over the prospect that the war is again escalating. The U. S. Govern-
ment will certainly be charged (at home and abroad) with unwarranted
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actions jeopardizing chances for peace, etc. , especially since it
would be difficult to demonstrate in a publicly convincing manner
that a major VC headquarters in Cambodia was the target of the
attacks. The longer term impact on world opinion will be determined
by the subsequent political and military actions of all parties involved
in the Vietnam struggle.
VII.. PROBABLE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REACTIONS
14. If the U. S. publicly announces or acknowledges that we
have struck some of the VC's Cambodian sanctuaries, general South
Vietnamese morale would be lifted. This lift, however, could soon
turn sour-(particularly in the face of continued Communist harass-
ment of population centers) if the belief spread that the U. S. was
offering sanctuary strikes as a substitute for retaliation against
North Vietnam.
if the U. S. does not retaliate at least with continuing attacks against
Cambodian sanctuaries.
15. In any event, the GVN's key leaders would presumably
be apprised of the full scope of the targets struck, and those made
witting would be gratified and heartened to see at least some key
Cambodian sanctuary areas lose their inviolate virginity. Given
the continuing Communist attacks on Saigon and other South Vietnamese
population centers, however, the GVN's'leaders would regard the
postulated attacks -- by themselves -- as an inadequate emotional
or political substitute for retaliation against North Vietnam. What-
ever be the facts of the matter, if President Thieu and his key
associates infer or conclude that these attacks are being offered as
a substitute for attacks against North Vietnam, their. always present
(even if sometimes latent) doubts about U. S. constancy and determination
will be increased. Such concerns were unquestionably fanned by the
most recent rocket attack against Saigon. If such attacks continue,
these concerns will loom very large in GVN leadership eyes, particularly
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