THE KHMER INSURGENT FACTIONS AND THE INFLUENCE OF PEKING, HANOI, AND MOSCOW THEREON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9
r. r-r I -
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
The Khmer Insurgent Factions and the Influence
Of Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow Thereon
Secret
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
20 July 1973
The Khmer Insurgent Factions and the Influence
Of-Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow Thereon
1. Most of the factionalism which exists within
the Khmer insurgency has centered--at least since
1970--around the question of Sihanouk's role in any
future realignment of political forces in Cambodia.
it is also clear that the relationship of Peking and
Hanoi to the insurgents is closely tied to their
view of Sihanouk and his potential future role.
2. The quantity and quality of our information
on the leadership, size and foreign orientation of
the various factions among the Khmer insurgents
leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, at the
time of Sihanouk's visit to Cambodia this past March,
there were three broad groupings in the insurgency:*
--The first group--and the most important--con-.
silts of hard-core Khmer Communists. It seems
reasonable to assume that these Communists have
closer ties to Hanoi than to Peking because,
of their longer standing direct contacts with
the North Vietnamese. Many of them have re-
ceived extensive political indoctrination and
military training in North Vietnam. But some
of these hard-core elements consider themselves
nationalists as well as Communists, and they
almost. certainly desire to maintain their in-
dependence from Vietnamese control.
--The second group, the Khmer Rouge, is made up
of those insurgents whose opposition to Sihanouk
predates his ouster in 1970.
'One result of the visit, of course, was to create
at least the appearance of greater unity among these
groups.
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--The third group,.. the Khmer Rumdoh,* is made -wo up of those insurgents ave consistently
called for Sihanouk's restoration to power in
Cambodia.
3. Most of the ordinary members of the latter
two groups probably are more leftist than Communist,
and undoubtedly have far less political clout than
the Khmer Communists. Hard-core.Communists play an
important, behind-the-scenes leadership role in both
of the other two factions, but do not control the
other two factions completely.. Despite their po-
litical differences, all these groups have been able
to work together well militarily. At the same. time,
their combat capabilities have been heavily dependent
on the Chinese for the provision of military aid and
on the North Vietnamese for its delivery and for other
forms of military support.
4. The Sihanouk complication has not been con-
fined to the in-country insurgency. An uneasy mar-
riage of political convenience has also been reflected
in the Peking-based "Royal Government of National
Union." The Khmer insurgents are ostensibly an arm
of that "government" and.its associated front group,
the "National United Front of Kampuchea." As such,
they supposedly are under the control of Sihanouk
and his nationalist-minded "prime minister," Penn
Nouth. But Khmer Communist interests in Peking--and
perhaps.Hanoi as well--most likely are represented
by leng Sary and his fellow Khmer Communist officials
in the Peking exile structure. We have no useful
evidence on the degree of influence which Peking ex-
ercises on leng Sary, Penn Nouth, and other Cambodian
exiles in Peking beyond the fact that superficially
at least these individuals support Sihanouk's poli-
cies. These policies, in turn, do appear closely
tied to Peking's interests.
5. As indicated above, the problem of faction-
alism appears to have been reduced--if only temporar-
ily and on the surface--by Sihanouk's recent visit to
The Cambodian word rumdoh means "liberation." "Khmer
Rumdoh" is the equivalent of "Khmer Liberation" (Move
ment).
-2-
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"liberated" areas in Cambodia. From all indications,
the central purposes behind. that undertaking seem to
have been to enhance the "legitimacy" of Sihanouk and
his "government" and to give Sihanouk and the Khmer
Communist leaders of the "resistance" the chance to
try to reconcile their differences. Upon his return
to Hanoi from Cambodia, Sihanouk claimed that both
of these objectives had been realized. With regard
to his political relations with insurgent leaders,
he emphasized that as a result of his discussions
with them they fully supported him as their "chief
of state." This endorsement, when added to those Si--
hanouk had already been given by Peking and Hanoi,
capped the efforts of the Chinese and North Vietnam-
ese to make Sihanouk the focal point on the communist
side in.any subsequent negotiations for a cease-fire
and a political settlement in Cambodia.
6. The public relations between Sihanouk and
the Khmer Communists remain cordial and cooperative.
In a press interview in Romania late last month, Si-
hanouk stated that the Khmer Communists had told him
that he would be chief of state "until the end of
his life." He also quoted Ieng.Sary as saying that
he, Sihanouk, was "the cement, the guarantee of the
union of the Cambodians." During the same interview,
Sihanouk made a deferential bow of his own toward the
Khmer Communists when he indicated that it was up to
them to decide whether or not there should be any
direct negotiations with the US.
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Hanoi's view
8. if Sihanouk. is hard for the Khmer Communists
to swallow, he also poses a difficult political prob-
lem for the North Vietnamese. Hanoi, like Peking, en-
dorses Sihanouk and his "government" as the sole
legitimate Cambodian political authority, but there
is good reason to believe that the North Vietnamese
stamp of approval is less. enthusiastic than the Chi-
nese. Whereas the Chinese would be happy to see Si-
hanouk restored to power because of their long and
close relationship with him, Hanoi is far more wary.
The North Vietnamese, like their clients among the
insurgents, recognize that Sihanouk contributes unique
and valuable assets to their side, but they are as.
aware as he is of their long history of mutual antip-
athy, and they have a healthy respect for his skills
as a broken-field political runner. Thus they are
happy to see him acting as the mouthpiece of the
insurgents, but they must view the prospect of his
return to Phnom Penh, even as a figurehead, with
some trepidation. We see no signs at present, how-
ever, that Hanoi is in any way seeking to block nego
tiations.by our side with Sihanouk. Wary as they are,
the North Vietnamese would apparently accept his par-
ticipation in a coalition so long as the role of the
insurgents under their influence was not drastically
circumscribed in the course of setting it up.
9. The fact that some elements within the in-.
surgency probably are equally opposed to the return
of Sihanouk and to Vietnamese Communist domination of
their movement and country, suggests certain oppor-
tunities for a Soviet role in influencing the outcome
in Cambodia. Moscow has maintained that a settlement
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should be arranged between the Phnom Penh government.
and the insurgents, and that Sihanouk--a friend of
the Chinese--should be kept out of the picture. In
view of the Soviet refusal to break diplomatic ties
with..Phnom Penh and.recognize Sihanouk's "government,"
it seems unlikely that the Soviets have developed
very much influence within the insurgency, except
possibly among its stronger nationalists who might
be seeking a counterweight to Peking or Hanoi.. There
is, in fact, no history of any significant Soviet
links with the Cambodian left-wing and no reliable
evidence of a separate Moscow-oriented group among
the insurgency.
10. Recently the Phnom Penh government has
sought--apparently with no success--to use the.So-
viets as intermediaries in making contact with the
insurgents. Moscow, meanwhile, has begun to pay
more attention to Sihanouk in its propaganda and on
the diplomatic front, probably sensing that Sihanouk's
position has been enhanced by recent developments.
At this juncture, is seems unlikely that the Soviets
will push negotiations very hard.. They will probably
realize that their ability to influence the situation
is limited, and will be satisfied with any outcome
in Cambodia that does not give the Chinese a totally
dominant position.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/03: LOC-HAK-558-20-1-9