THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EST)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
July 8, 2010
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 6, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0.pdf468.96 KB
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 ~N1 FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY FROM: TO, SECRET SENSIIIVL THE SITUATION ROOM fr DAVE GOMPERT FOR THE SECRETARY DEx AC GPS LDX PAGES fG? TTY CITE RELEASED BY: SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS%. TOHiX TOR: MORI PAGES 2-7 PER C03185024 ## ST - 9 &- UL61 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 6 April 1975 CENTRAL INTELLIrENCE Ar'.ENCY Directorate of Yntelliaence Tha Situation in Indochina (As of 1600 EST) SOUTH VIETNAM -Political' neyelo manta un ni q.lr rater 1. Thieu' s obvious intention to: a emain, in power has - pr?duced .mnnunting dissatisfaction in. both . ii .,,ttary_ and. civilian circles, but as.yet there is sic firm evidence of a serious move to force his ouster or resignation. ? ?'2. The reactions of Senate President Tran Van Lam may best reflect-the general political situation in the ? 'country. Lam conceded Saturday that his efforts to cer- ?euadi Thisu to step aside in favor of an "executive- council" headed by 4enera1 icy had failed. 14oreover, he admitted that despite what he felt was universal .dissatisfaction with Thieu, the President still had the trump cards and "he is playing them 'cooly . " Sone raeonle had been arrested on vague charges of coup plotting and others had lost their draft Jere :-nnents and, were beinc . -sent to the front lines. The labor force, including I government bureaucrats, ' is reluctant to speak out against Thisu in. the 'wake of rumors that Viet Cong anents are now. ? surfacing..to -spread confusion among the people. Military -men are equally. reluctant, fearing that any unsuccessful. coup would bring disgrace to them and revrisals against their families. Religious factions, especially the Catholics, do not want to take any action that would help the Communists, Thus,.in Lam's opinion, so long?; as Thisu retains the loyalty of a few high-level militry MORI PAGES 2-7 PER C03185024 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 34Communist.reaction to political "developments officers and the police, his removal from office will not.be an-easy task to engineer. Communist Reactions in South Vietnam has focused on US support to the Thieu government x so far, there has been no, reaction ' from either the Viet Cong' or 'North ? Vietnamese to' TPhie-a's speech. -Hanoi has been preoccupied criticizing the US evacuation of Vietnamese refugees and, Iorphans.? An article ? rticle in'the party daily Friday called the evacuations a: !shrewd and malicious plot" to force "our people to muntat$ also claim that a political solution could be arrived at following the departure . ,o resident ?'Thi'ett " ''' ,,r?_.. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 leave their native Ian a." premier ,ham van.-Dong in a radio broadcast Sunday charged that-the US-evacuation 4. Viet Cong commentary has focused more on develop ments in the, recently "liberated". areas of South Vietnam, claiming: that life is "returning to normal." The Com- and members of his clique. The Viet. Cong Kaye not identified who they would be willing to .. negotiate 'with In 'a new government or. who comprises Thieu's clique, although at a press conference in Saigon:. Satutdav, a Viet Cong spokesman claimed that the "number is not a big one. 1 i 6. The 21st Division commander is following his recently-adopted.tactic of maintaining a mobile blocking 25X1 I SECRET 3. The bulk of Communist-initiated milit ry.act$on ? continues in the form of shellinas of ~ government positions ? +a to Act On LeveJ.s %JPf ? in the northern and, central. provinces of the delta. .'t'he Dinh. Thuy airfield, ust outside. can The, -was ~it by seven rockets last night. No heavy' . offensive fiction was stounted by either side on April 6, but the Nor h. Vietna-' mess 4t Division is maintaining:pressure?on t e,South Vietnamese units defending Can Tho City. SEhSIiIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 N '' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 ing well so far, Government officials believe the'I division's, blocking role is effectively koeninq the) I Communists off balance, and this accounts for the . 7, A slight upswing' in optimism among regional --staff officers rests on the substantially increased Communists' failure thus far. to launch their expected' attacks against the city. large-scale offensive operations that could result' type of defense rather than committing his troops to in heavy casua~ties. This tactic appears to ho work- availability and effectiveness of air support. The delta .is now receiving at least 60 sorties of- strike aircraft dail , and. government units are no longer complaining that pilots are bombing, from high altitudes that preclude any degree of accuracy. 8. The re tonal commander has been strengthen- ing the defenses of Moc :Hoa in the northern delta and the South Vietnamese 9th Division units supported by armor and increased air support now have the military edge -on the battlefront that same, milits.ry leaders feel' Could be' the first big test of the resolve of Saigon's .forces.in the remaining third of the country. Status of Units Evacuated from' Northern Provinces 9, The commander of the South Vietnamese Marine. division evacuated from Da Nang is now regrouping the Unit atVung Tau along. the coast and has more than 5,000 marines. Of the three brigades that are being reassembled and rearmed, one is almost :full. strei qth., wall-equipped, and is considered combat ready. The other two brigades are at about. half strength and one of these should be operational by"Late next week. 10. The Marine commander has been.given trucks and artillery and will soon move the-operational bri< Bade to the:Marine Training Center outside Saigon for the purpose of bolstering the confidence of, the Donn- cation in the capital. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08 : LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 11. Parts ' of the. South Vietnamese, Airborne bri" gade that were brought out of the northern arovinoes have been resting and refitting at Long Binh. One battalion was sent on April 4 to reinforce government, units in the Phan Rang area.of Ninh Thuan Province.-' The government still is holding onto small pnci.aves at both Phan Rang and 'Phan Thiet, because-the North Vietnamese have been slow to occupy these weakly defended areas of southern Military Region '2. There have also been some reports that the Communists have not yet moved into Nha .Tsang in forcer' but Saigon's military presence there. is weak.' 12.' . Much, of the South Vietnamese 2nd' Viiliaion, S. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 which fled front Quaf'fs' Ngai and Quang Tin provinces in- Military Region 1, is now in ,Dinh Tuy ?-Province. The -division commander is attempting to reoranize 4,000 or so ,troops . but has encountered difficulties., Many of the soldiers have been reluctant to, turn, in their weapons, and some were involved in stealing and loot- ing in the- provincial capital of Ham Tan, a seacoast city.that has been deluged with military' personnel: ? and civilians arriving by.-boat from the northern pro- vinces. The 2nd Division'commander has managed to -subdue many of the unruly troops and has placed them aboard ships for several days to allow tempers to cool, .permit a screening and selection according to military :unit, and preclude any serious disorders when they are. shipped to various camps for reorganization into fight ing units. 'NORTH VIETNAM 'rransr2orts Flying into South Vietnam 413. Hanoi has bequ'7 .northern South Vietnam. 25X1 nine North Vietnamese aircraft* including an AN 2 1, an XL-14, an LI--2, and six helicopters flew into Phu Sal. 25X1'" airfield on April.6. Phu Deaf is. located Just south of Z Hue. The North Vietnamese had been flying helicopters into northern South Vietnam 'for several--weeks, but this ? E The stepped-up flight activity probably represents an effort by Hanoi to .move in addittonxl administrative personnel to stabilize the situation in the northern .provinces which they recently captured. ? -4-_ c- is the first tine,transports.have flown into the area. . c ? 25X1 No Objecti fashion from a 'position just southeast of Thnal "Totung. ? . Despite the loss of these outlying positions' most.of the 3rd Division ? still is well dug-in along the rimarl defense line protecting the army's main ammia itimn A"M" on to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 CAMBODIA The Tactical Situation 1, Increased Khmer Communist attacks today forced elements of the Cambodian Army's 3rd Division to abandon the town of Thnal Totung on !outs 4 west of Pochentong airport.* Significant amounts of ecsuipment ware left behind and several hundred government troops late missing. Other 3rd pivision units withdraw stn a more order' near the. airport and should be -able' to preve t any fur.1. Prey Veng last . night forced gov ?nm at?.auaita~ --abnr~dar~r ! an outlying position,, A small number of ,survivors from - ?. ; Neale Luong and Banamhave begun filtering into Prey Yang ? and Svay Rieng--now the only.two government--held towns ? ~; ; , east of the Mekong River.. 11 up.tineir attacks against the provincial-carital'of Kom- -pong Speu, on Route 4 southwest of-Phnom Penh nd th th a , et .situaion there' is becoming 'serious . Southeast of -Phnom ! Penh, ground attacks against the provincial capital of Evacuation Status Pochentong airport. Communist rocket-and artillery -attacks against the airport' slackened today.. s . . rty. o tha in support of government units north and northwest of more than fifty tactical misiairans +.^ Ali mo t f .9~- WW 4.'Wff4A.J6A. CL aircraft last night and the air force was ah a to 411. ?t .law vwaw~w..v wM T93.i. ? 'Unable to make any. :Further territorial . gains Aovera- , i!11 25X1. i'~ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 r 7~ "25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0 only 69 official members of the us Mission and 102' private US citizens remained in Phnom Penh. The evacuation.list, however, still includes over 600 third count nationals and Cambodians.. Ambassador Dean is stiff ll convinced that the situation in the capital* will unravel rapidly if large numbers of government officials and Cambodian employees of the US Mission begin leaving and that the lives of any remaining US officials would be eudazv erea. He' also nnacuiates that the relative lull in'-battlefield evacuati.of is not completed soon, trsa .. tinaa. exrrac tion:will have to be carried out under hostile fire. Political nevelepme~nte t 1 .. 5. Acting Cambodian Jan* Pres:Ldcpt','8Au'kh'AKT%0Y' Met an impassioned. plea for supplemental aid, Key said ment -to give in to Sihanouk' a 'demands and to invite the Prince back to Phnom Penh. Koyt envisioned tying the "invitation" to an agreement that Cocnptuinist forces would not enter Phnom Penh and would allow the cony-' tinued delivery of relief supplies to the capital. If supplemental aid is not forthcoming,' KQy said that him time to arranga..what in?offect would be an orderly s+urender.. Koy said that under present circumstances ? the' "best .feasible 'solutibn" wdul.d he `for tahe govern' unconditionally allowing insurgent rorces zu ws,uw& ~s?.s ~?= Penh. 1o warned.tho Congressional staffers that a has vanished. government officials now realize the severity og the situation, and that any hope of a.compromise sooLution ? M wwWV _v s . .Y to shock his.gueste but his comments also indicate that. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/08: LOC-HAK-559-25-4-0