PLANNING FOR LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-1-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 9, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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PLANNING FOR LAOS
1, Brief History of Military Developments in Laos (January
1268-September 1969)
A. The war in Laos has been, since 1963, one of posi-
tion and maneuver. Since the time of the Geneva Agreements,
Communists have controlled the northern provinces of Phong
Saly and Sam Neua, the Plain of Jars in central north Laos,
and the Ho Chi Minh trail area of southeastern Laos. The
Royal Lao Government (RLG) has, more or less, controlled
the remaining areas. The seesaw battles usually follow the
seasonal cycles of the monsoon.. In-the dry season the
North Vietnamese recover the areas they have lost to the
RLG during the previous rainy season. Within the past two
years the North Vietnamese have changed tactics. In the
1967/1968 dry season the Vietnamese took.a key strategic
town in north Laos. This military reversal left a demoral-
ized and disorganized Royal Lao Army (RLA). Faced with a
growing North. Vietnamese Army (NVA) troop presence, the RLG
became more concerned and the Meo irregulars undertook
various tactical moves in late 1968 which failed. By late
March 1969, the enemy had succeeded in.overrunning a number
of key defensive outposts and threatened the Meo base at
Long Tieng. Increased enemy troop concentration appeared
along the southwestern edges of the Plain of Jars and it
became clear that the enemy intended a major move.
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Gen Vang Pao mounted another spoiling operation to reduce
this pressure against the Long Tieng base, to blunt the
enemy buildup and to force him to withdraw back to his
bases in the Plain of Jars. In early May, the Meo captured
the town of Xieng Khouangville and 5,000 tons of enemy
supplies and ordnance. The enemy, nevertheless, continued
to press his offensive to the west and captured the neutralist-
held village of Muong Soui on 2.7 June. The North Vietnamese
appeared to be heading for the Route 7/13 junction at Sala
Phou Koun. Once this point was in his hands, the enemy
could advance north towards Luang Prabang and south towards
Vientiane City.
B. Vang Pao then planned another operation behind
the enemy forces to cut Route 7 and the enemy's supply lines
and to siphon off enemy troops from their drive to the west.
Vang Pao's irregulars met incredibly little r.esistence and,
for a variety of reasons (success of tactical: air. strikes,
overextended lines of communicattion,. unf.or..eca.sted rains,
and the audacity of Vang Pao's plan),. the enemy withdrew
across the plain in early September.. Vang_Pao occupied
the Plain of Jars for the first time since. 1961-1-.
G. From interrogation of enemy prisoners 25X1
the North Vietnamese 25X1
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intentions became somewhat clearer. Before Vang Pao's last
offensive the enemy had intended to consolidate his positions
along Route 7, wait for reinforcements, and then initiate
the second stage of his offensive against the Meo base at
Long Tieng and the Route 7/13 Junction. As early as 19 August,
preparations were being made in North Vietnam for troop
deployment to North Laos. By mid-September, we had learned
that some 12,000 NVA troops are now strung out along Route 7
in North Vietnam.. The first units have apparently begun
to enter Laos.
D. Enemy activity in south Laos remained unusually
quiet during the past twelve months with the exception of
the fall of a strategic RLA outpost,. Thateng., which is north
of the Bolovens Plateau.. This outpost fell- on 3 April 1969.
RLA and paramilitary forces seized the initiative in. the
summer and on 7 September occupied Muong Phine which marked
the deepest penetration to date (since the signing of the
Geneva Agreements) of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.. complex.
Although the enemy recaptured Muong Phine at the. end of
September, the paramilitary forces captured over.2.,000 tons
of enemy supplies and ordnance, and shepherded 2,300 refugees
back to RLG refugee centers.
E. An additional threat. which has developed in the past
year has been the construction of a road by the Chinese from
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Ban Batene on the China border to Muong Sai in Laos. This
road was developed apparently to link. up with the North
Vietnamese road from Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese Communists
currently have approximately 6,000 personnel composed of
engineers, coolie labor and armed security forces.
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ANNEX A
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 October 1969
SUBJECT: Possible New Developments in Laos
I. PATTERNS OF COMMUNIST ACTIONS UNTIL NOW
S
1. From the Laos settlement of 1962 through 1967 the
Communists acted with considerable restraint in Laos. If North
Vietnamese forces were not withdrawn as required by the Geneva
Accords, neither were they used to extend Communist control
beyond the lines of 1962. Indeed, by the end, of 1967, the
Communists had suffered a net loss of territory and a consider-
able loss of population in the annual cycles of offensive and
defensive actions. On the political side, the Communists con-
tinued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Agreements and
RLG forces take the offensive during the rainy season (May
to October) taking advantage of guerrilla tactics, air
support, and Cyst supply difficulties resulting from
their dependence on truck movements from North Vietnam;
the Communists normally resume offensive operations in
the dry season (November to April).
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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Annex A
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attendant arrangements which neutralized Laos and established
a tripartite government -- rightist, neutralists, and the
Communist Pathet Lao. These arrangements continued to be
honored in principle despite the fact that the PL vacated their
cabinet seats in April 1963 following the murder of a neutralist
minister in Vientiane. Souvanna, the "neutralist" Prime Minister
held these seats open and the PL's declared political aims
never excluded an eventual restoration of the tripartite arrange-
ments.
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2. The most reasonable explanation for this pattern of
Communist conduct seemed to be that Hanoi, which controls and
supports the Pathet Lao, did not wish to take actions in Laos
which might prejudice its priority effort in South Vietnam.
While it continued to invest the resources necessary to preserve
its territorial and political base in North Laos, it was re-
strained frm pushing too hard by concern over possible US
response -- particularly the chance of triggers US action
to block the vital infiltration corridor running through the
Laos Panhandle to South Vietnam.
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3. Since 1968, however, the Communists have been develop-
ing a tougher political and military line in Laos. In part
this has been a reaction to government encroachments on com-
munist centers of strength and the increasing scale and efficacy
of US air and other support. But it has also taken place within
the context of significant developments in the Vietnam situation
and in US attitudes toward Southeast Asia. The Communist may
now be moving to a new phase in their policy on Laos. We
examine the evidence for this below.
4. Recent Military Developments. During 1968, Pathet Lao/
North Vietnamese combat forces were increased by some 12,000
combat troops (9,000 NVA and 3,000 PL). This buildup was ac-
companied by a vigorous military campaign in January-June 1968
which administered a series of defeats to the RLG, adding up
to the worst government setback since the precarious days of
1961 and 1962. The psychological impact was considerable and
In late October 1968 our estimate of PL/NVA strength in
Laos was about 98,000 (51,000 PL and 47,000 NVA) compared
to about 72,000 the year before. Since then there has
been little change in total strength estimates. However,
better intelligence on the NVA 559th Orcup in the Laotian
panhandle, which is concerned primarily with support of
infiltration to South Vietnam, has added 10,000 troops to
the estimate of NVA strength in Laos, now held at 56,000.
This figure does not include the 12,000 NVA troops now
moving on Route 7 toward Laos.
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Annex A
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there was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the
Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military
action and push on to the Mekong. But this did not happen and
the rainy season was relatively quiet on both sides.
5. During 1968-69 the actual fighting in Laos has in-
creasingly been conducted by NVA troops on the C ist side
and US supported guerrillas (mainly yang Pao's Meo forces)
on the other, with the Pathet Lao and regular FAR troops slipping
more and more into peripheral roles. From November 1968 to May
1969 the military action alternated between Communist campaigns
which took site 36 (Na Khang) and other guerrilla positions
north of the Plaine des Jarres, and preemptive operations by
Vang Pao's guerrillas, including the occupation of Xieng
Khouangville where large Communist supply caches were captured.
In the end the Communists pressed their offensive and captured
Muong Soui on 27 June, a good month into the rainy season. It
appeared at the time that they might move on to the key junction
of routes 7 and 13 at Sala Phou Koun, and from there, press
north toward Luang Prabang, and south to take Vang Vieng in
northern Vientiane Province.
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6. Perhaps to the surprise of the Communists, Vang Pao
and his Meo guerrillas bounced back to launch a campaign into
the Plaine des Jarres on 23 August. By mid-September these
troops had taken the entire Plaine des Jarres, including
Khang Khay, the town long considered an important Communist
center, and had captured large caches of supplies. They had
again occupied the town of Xieng KhouazWille, and in the Ban
Ban area had out route 7, the main Communist supply route from
North Vietnam. These unprecedented conquests by yang Pao's
troops were conducted, however, against strangely quiet oppo-
sition. Although there was occasional resistance, in most
instances the towns occupied were abandoned and the three NVA
regiments in the area appeared to be holed up in mountain
stx'ongpoints.
7. It has been suggested that the North Vietnamese were
deliberately drawing Vang Pao's forces into a trap. We doubt
this, principally because of the large amounts of Communist
supplies exposed to capture. The price seems too high. While
we have no conclusive evidence, it seems more likely that heavier
than usual rains, very effective airstrikes, and the simple
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element of surprise were the main causes for the success. More-
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over there are indications that some Communist units were
suffering from illness, shortage of food and other supplies.
8. Nonetheless, we believe the Communists are preparing
for significant offensive action and that it is likely to come
shortly. Some 12,000 NVA troops, including possibly the entire
312th NVA Division, are estimated to be moving along route 7
in North Vietnam towards Laos and the Plains des Jams. The
movement is unprecedented in several respects. It is the
largest single NVA force ever to be moved into North Laos at
one time; it is entering Laos earlier (in relation to the dry
season) than normally; and it is the first large troop move-
meat known to enter northern Laos via route 7. Some evidence
suggests that the movement of these forces was planned before
Vang Pao's offensive, and therefore that Communist plans for
the coming dry season were relatively ambitious in any case
and not aimed merely at retrieving losses.
The 316th NVA Division, hitherto the main source for NVA
troops deployed in northern Laos, is based in Moc Chau
in North Vietnam; hence the troops moved over route 68
into Sam Neua province, usually on foot.
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9. Recent Political Moves. In the summer of 1968, the
Lao Communists began to develop a new line which would require
a reorganization of the tripartite Lao Government (the Provisional
Government of National Union) (PGNU) established in 1962. The
Communist statement of 22 July 1968 and subsequent elaborations
suggest that "current realities" require that Souvanna be
considered a rightist, rather than a neutralist, in the tripartite
formula. The Communists also labored to strengthen the credentials
of their own "Patriotic Neutralist Forces". At the same time
the Communists have been careful to reaffi= the overall validity
of the 1962 agreements; they clearly do not wish to open up
further international discussions on Laos -- at Paris or else-
where. In effect, they appear to be aiming at altering the
political content of the tripartite formula so as to obtain
control in Vientiane and doing this in a manner to avoid inter-
ference by the outside interests represented by the Geneva
conference.
10. On 23 June 1969, the same day the Communists attacked
Muong Soui, the NLHS Central Committee published a lengthy and
detailed account of the Communist version of the struggle in
Laos, and a bitter denunciation of the Souvanna government and
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the US. While it is more explicit than ever about "the current'
realities", its attack on the present PONU was so violent as to
suggest to some observers that the NLHS may be having second
thoughts about reconstituting it, and may instead be laying the
basis for creating their own provisional government in Laos.
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U. The evidence suggests a vigorous Communist military
campaign during the coming dry season in North Laos (November-
April). At a minimum, such a campaign would probably be designed
to regain lost territory in the Plaine des Jarres, reduce the
number of guerrilla sites, and strengthen the Communist hold on
the not too friendly population remaining in Pathet Lao areas.
Similar military efforts are likely in the south in the con-
tested areas of the Laotian Panhandle.
12. If the Communists confine themselves to such limited
military efforts, it is possible that their offensive could be
contained by RLG guerrilla and regular forces backed by strong
US air support. However, given the appearance of fresh NVA
troops, the battle exhaustion of Yang Pao's forces, and the
ineffectiveness of regular Lao troops, the Communists could
probably accomplish these objectives fairly early in the dry
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13. Their plans may call for more ambitious efforts to
set the stage for a new and more favorable settlement in Laos.
The Communists might still not wish to complicate the situation
by moving past the 1962 cease-fire lines to any substantial
extent. But even within these limits there is much ground to
recover. Moreover, the Communists would be equally interested
in the psychological effects on Vientiane, on the King in Luang
Prabang, and on the US.
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14. There are certain targets which may appear particularly
important to the Communists. Aside from. clearing the Plaine
des Jarres, the Communists may attempt to eliminate Vang Pao
as a serious military threat by taking his bases of Sam Thong
and Long Tieng in Xieng Khouang Province. They might also move
against Vang Vieng, the capital of the Souvanna neutralists,
and install their own "Patriotic Neutralists Forces" there.
This would buttress their claim that Souvanna and his neutralists
have become "rightists", and that the Patriotic Neutralists
Forces" should be recognized as the true neutralist representqtives.
15. If the Communists went beyond Vang Vieng, they could,
even without crossing the 1962 line, reach the Nam Lik River
some 50 miles north of Vientiane. At this point, or before,
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they might issue new calls to Souvanna or the King to stop the
US bombing in Laos. While continuing to denounce Souvanna,
they have given various marks of respect to the King. They
apparently hope that at the right time they can persuade him
to convoke a new conference composed solely of indigenous
Laotian elements. The aim would be to form a new coalition
to replace the present one. A certain amount of military
pressure around Luang Prabang might be used to "educate" the
King.
16. But how far the Communists move depends not only on
the resistance they encounter, but also on their reading of
the situation in Vietnam and on the US posture generally in SEA.
So far at least, Hanoi has kept its Laos policy subordinate to
its action in Vietnam; it has not permitted its military efforts
in Laos to exceed certain limits, nor has it tried to push the
political situation in Laos in ways that would be viewed
negatively by world opinion and thus prejudice its options in
South Vietnam, To destroy the "coalition" formula in Laos by
military action would greatly prejudice the application of a
similar formula in South Vietnam.
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17. But these considerations could be losing some weight.
The reduction in the NVA effort in South Vietnam may not only
permit greater military efforts in Laos, but Hanoi may also
consider that American distaste for involvement in Southeast
Asia is now so strong that a crisis in Laos would only add to
the pressures for the US to get out of both South Vietnam and
Laos, perhaps even in a precipitate manner without a face-saving
political settlement. If this is Hanoi's goal now, it might
also push a campaign in central and southern Laos to capture
the Mekong Valley towns. It might believe that this development
would so depress, dispirit, and disillusion the US public that
the pressures against the government to make peace at any price
in Vietnam would become compelling on the President.
18. On belarnce however we think the risks involved will
make Hanoi proceed with some caution. After all, the US bombing
in Laos has been growing, not diminishing, and Hanoi's situation
on the ground in South Vietnam is continuing to deteriorate.
Hanoi has been reducing its burden in South Vietnam for the past
year due in part at least to the cumulative strains of the war.
In this context it would seem adventurous to base major moves
in Laos on estimates about US reactions which might in the end
prove wrong and costly.
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19. Moreover, so long as the Cauuunists do not wish to
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break the situation wide open in Laos there is another danger
in excessive military action. The RLG is a rather fragile
vessel; its forces might crumble under pressure, panic could
easily grip Vientiane, and the RLG could fall apart as some
leaders left the country and others bickered over the proper.
course to cope with the crises. The Communists could find that
they bad produced an unwanted effect -- the collapse of Sou-
vannars cabinet and its replacement by a military "strong-man"
who Mould advocate direct US and That involvement to defend the
Mekong Valley.
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20. The Soviet role in all this is highly ambiguous. As
the leaders of the Communist movement they are more or less
obliged to support the objectives of Hanoi and the Pathet Lao.
At the same time the USSR shared responsibility for the formula
of a neutralist tripartite government, and Souvanna Phouma bad
Soviet approval as Prime Minister under this formula. To some
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extent, therefore, Soviet prestige requires preservation of the
formalities of the 1962 agreements. Beyond this the preservation
of a neutral Laos my offer a better vehicle for the promotion
of Soviet Influence in Southeast Asia than would be the case if
Laos were a totally Cc nunist state. On the other hand, it is
very doubtful that the Soviets could or would take effective
action to alter Hanoi's course in Laos, however awkward it might
be for the USSR, if Hanoi was determined upon it.
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21. The Chinese Communists have a physical presence in
northern Laos where their road building activities are a matter
of concern in connection with the insurgency in Thailand. This
presence may be viewed by Hanoi as having some deterrent value
against US intervention, but this seems marginal because the
Chinese are in regions remote from the centers of military
action. Short of an agreement between Hanoi and Peking to
coordinate efforts for intensified and protracted guerrilla war-
fare throughout Indochina and Thailand, we doubt that the
Chinese constitute an important factor in Hanoi's policy
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22. Hanoi mast also consider possible Thai reactions to
more aggressive Communist moves in Laos. Though Thailand has
all the ingredients to make it the peninsula's strongest power,
it does not have at this moment, and probably will not in the
foreseeable future, the military wherewithal to operate effectively
in Laos. It is probably because they have counted on the US
to use its own military power in Laos in case of need that the
Thai have done so little in support of their interests there.
Nevertheless, we doubt that Hanoi dismisses Thailand's potential
completely when considering its policy in Laos. North Vietnam
is still a small country and common sense would suggest not
becoming too provocative in too many directions at the same
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