COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 10, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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rL
z;h;
Secret
Memorandum
Communist Intentions In The Current Campaign
In South Vietnam
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY,
PP. 25-27
Handle via Co mint Channels
Secret
1-4
10 April 1972
SC No. 06642/72
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DOWNORADINO AND
DR'OLARBIFICATJON
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COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Overview
PART I: THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
A. Headlines and Courage
B. Options and Opportunities
C. The Campaign's Objective:
A Watershed Military Victory
D. The Costs and the Risks
Page
1
E. High Stakes and High Strategy 9
PART II: BATTLE PLANS BY REGION
A. The Northern Part of South Vietnam 12
B. The Highlands 16
The Saigon Area 18
D. The Delta 20
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE CURRENT
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH 0-NR
Overview
The Vietnamese Communist Party's basic, overriding
objective has not changed for more than four decades.
Hanoi wants to gain political control over all of
Vietnam, i.e., to conquer South Vietnam. The major
campaign launched on 30 March is a virtually all-out
effort to bring the Communists much closer to achieving
that objective this year. In this campaign, the Com-
munists appear ready to expend a large number of lives
and great quantities of ordnance with little concern
for the future, i.e., without much regard for husband-
ing resources that would be needed in the next dry
season or the one after that.
Hanoi, in short, is playing this hand for the
highest stakes. As outlined below, it is shoving
most of its chips into this hand's pot. Such action
is perforce a major gamble, no matter how strong
Hanoi may consider its cards. If the North Viet-
namese win this hand--i.e., if the current Communist
campaign produces what comes to be considered in
South Vietnam or the United States as a major Com-
munist victory--Hanoi will have gone a long way.to
ward recouping its losses of the past four years and
a long way toward achieving its definition of winning
the game.
Note: This paper was prepared by the Central Intel-
ZZgence Agency and coordinated with the Defense In-
teZZigenee Agency.
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This memorandum focuses on Communist near term
tactical intentions in South Vietnam, assessing these
intentions region by region. It therefore does not
specifically address or discuss near term Communist
intentions in Laos or Cambodia. South Vietnam is of
course the main theater of combat and will clearly
be the focus of Hanoi's major efforts in the weeks
immediately ahead. In reading the paragraphs below,
however, it should not be forgotten that Hanoi will
use the residual forces it has in Laos and Cambodia
to exert what pressure they can to support Communist
efforts and further Hanoi's objectives in South Viet-
nam.
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The conduct and net political outcome of Hanoi's
current offensive campaign will be materially in-
fluenced by a subtle but profound change that has
gradually come over the Indochina struggle over the
past year or so. Hanoi, in a sense, is now in the
politico-psychological position the allies were in
during the second half of the nineteen sixties: It
is now the Communists who stand to lose if they are
not widely regarded as having won. This becomes even
more the case now that Hanoi has launched what is so
clearly an all-out effort, putting so many of its re-
maining chips unarguably and undisguisedly into this
pot.
The current offensive is not a "do or die" effort
in the sense that failure to win decisive victories
would necessarily spell a quick end to Hanoi's strug-
gle. Four decades of history give abundant witness
to the Communist Party leadership's tenacity and dogged
determination in the face of adversity. Should the
current Communist offensive come to be widely deemed
a failure in South Vietnam and the US, however, the
stakes involved in its initiation are such that Hanoi's
already existing problems would be compounded by or-
ders of magnitude. This would probably not produce
surrender and probably would not even produce early
acceptance of negotiation on essentially US/GVN terms.
But it would produce profound stresses within the top
levels of the Vietnamese Communist leadership and,
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almost certainly, a basic re-examination of Hanoi's
long term prospects and feasible strategies for their
pursuit.
Given the stakes involved, Hanoi's current offen-
sive effort will be as prolonged and intense as the
Communists can make it. There will undoubtedly be
peaks and valleys, sharp actions followed by respites
or lulls. Overall, however, the current phase of
struggle will last for many weeks and, with recycling,
will probably be extended until mid-summer or even
beyond. Its ultimate outcome is not inexorably fore-
ordained at this writing and hence cannot be predicted
with confidence or certainty. The long term results
of Hanoi's current major gamble will be determined by
what actually happens on the battlefields of South
Vietnam and, equally, on how what is happening comes
to be viewed and regarded by the people and govern-
ments of both South Vietnam and the United States.
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PART I: HANOI'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
A. Headlines and Courage
1. If Hanoi is to take over the South, it must
reverse a number of unfavorable trends. The decline
in popular support for the Communist cause and the
decline in locally based Communist forces has become
conspicuous during the last two years. One of the
principal objectives of the current Communist cam-
paign is to stop this decline in Communist vitality
within South Vietnam. The main force assault on gov-
ernment forces and positions is meant to give new
courage to all Communist cadre, fighters and com-
manders, and their sympathizers.
2. Moreover, Vietnamization had been proceeding
in an orderly fashion inside South Vietnam, steadily
eroding Communist strength and assets in populated
areas. Partly (but not entirely) because Communist
main forces have been fighting,in Laos and Cambodia,
the withdrawal of US forces from a direct ground com-
bat role has gone smoothly, and South Vietnamese
Army (ARVN) units and the territorial security forces
and local militia have assumed the burden of protect-
ing the country. Although they have moved with some
caution in order to keep their own losses down, ARVN
and the RF and PF have generally kept the initiative,
and this has given them new confidence. Conversely,
the confidence of the Communist side within South
Vietnam has been undermined. At a minimum, the cur-
rent Communist offensive is intended to reverse this
trend, by destroying the new confidence of the gov-
ernment's military and paramilitary forces. Ideally,
Hanoi wants to inflict shattering defeats against at
least some major GVN forces or units.
3. The Communists have always considered it es-
sential to destroy the cohesion of the anti-Communist
government in Saigon. They now hope at the least that
they will be able to inflict such punishment on the
government's forces and so impressively challenge
the government's control to some key populated areas
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that the GVN will lose its confidence and new dissen-
sion will arise among its ranks and within its lead-
ership.
4. Hanoi has also been deeply concerned as it
has seen world attention turn away from the Indochina
war. Since it has counted heavily on the pressure
of US public opinion to induce the US Government to
withdraw its support from Saigon, it is particularly
concerned that anti-war sentiment within the US no
longer appears very vigorous or politically potent.
Moreover, trends in South Vietnam have given some
weight to allied claims in Paris that the Communists
are not dealing from a position of strength in South
Vietnam. The new enemy offensive is meant to reverse
these trends as well, to incite new agitation by anti-
war elements in the US and to backstop Communist nego-
tiators in Paris.
B. Options and Opportunities
5. Given the decline in Communist local forces
and the adverse trends on the diplomatic and politi-
cal fronts,.the main-force option is practically the
only one remaining to Hanoi. Since the initial al-
lied incursions into Cambodia two years ago, the Com-
munists have been laying the groundwork for a return
to heavy main-force action in South Vietnam. They
have improved supply routes down through Laos and
into Cambodia. They have developed a new system of
base areas deeper in Cambodia. Last year, at heavy
cost, they fought off a major ground threat to their
essential Laotian routes. This year the Communists
have dealt major blows to Cambodian and Laotian gov-
ernment forces, in an effort to secure their rear
from attack as they adopt a more aggressive posture
against South Vietnam's borders. The enemy's heavy,
and effective use of artillery on the Plaine des Jarres
provided a preview of their recent tactics against the
line of South Vietnamese fire support bases on the
southern edge of the DMZ. In a similar way, their
strategy of inflicting heavy punishment on Cambodian
forces in last December's action along Cambodian Route
6 may provide a preview of what the Communists hope
to do to demoralize many South Vietnamese units.
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6. Because of the size of the stakes, because
of the pressing need to reverse so many adverse trends,
because the main-force option seems to be the only
one that holds out any promise of success, and be-
cause this will work only if heavy damage is done
to South Vietnamese defending forces, it seems clear
that the Communists are intent on launching heavy
assaults, even though these will inevitably entail
severe Communist losses. Hanoi is probably will-
ing to accept such losses because it also sees this
as a year of special opportunities. US withdrawals
have reduced the strength of all allied forces in
South Vietnam to the point where the Communists
feel much less concern for the safety of their sup-
ply routes and base areas in Laos and Cambodia.
Moreover, this is an election year in the United
States. For all these reasons, Hanoi regards this
as the year to try to demonstrate its clout on the
battlefield, to demonstrate to the US public and
to the world at large that the Communists are far
from a spent force in South Vietnam, and to make
clear that there is no end in sight to the war un-
less the allies are prepared to offer Hanoi real
hope of taking over control of the South, i.e., to
bargain on what are essentially Hanoi's terms.
C. The Campaign's Objective: A Watershed military
Victory
7. The Communists clearly hope their efforts will
produce what comes to be regarded as an over-all net
victory, so impressive that it will lead to a whole
series of new trends. At best, they hope to unravel
the fighting forces of South Vietnam, to sow such
dissension in the government establishment that it
begins to come apart at the seams, and to mortally
weaken US support for the anti-Communist effort in
Indochina, thus paving the way for a direct take-over
of the South. This may have been what Pham Van Dong
was talking about months ago when he told more than
one diplomatic contact that he expected to see funda-
mental changes in Vietnam by mid-1972. This is the
message, reminiscent of Tet 1968, that is now being
passed to Communist soldiers; they are being told
that this is to be the "last battle of the war."
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8. At a minimun, the Communists hope to get
some fundamental if less spectacular returns on
their investment basically reversing currently ad-
verse trends. They hope to take the initiative
and make the government's military forces more
self-protective, cautious, and defensive-minded,
vacating much of rural South Vietnam in order to
defend urban centers and other vital areas. Con-
__rrsely, Hanoi hopes to give new courage and new
freedom of movement to Viet Cong local forces.
Even if the main-force campaign fails to achieve
Hanoi's objectives, if it goes at all well the Com-
munists will be looking for a shift in psychology
and in local balances of power favorable to their
side. If the Communists again appear to many South
Vietnamese to be the invincible wave of the future,
if their local assets can be rebuilt and move about
with greater freedom, and if they can again draw
support from the local populace, they will probably
believe they have achieved a considerable victory.
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9. The Communists are prepared to accept heavy
personnel losses to their main forces this year,
partly because these losses can be replaced--
albeit at considerable cost and with a further
decline in troop quality--by drawing on the man-
power pool available within North Vietnam. It is
less clear, however, that they are willing to suf-
fer heavy losses among what remains of their local
force structure within South Vietnam. If their
campaign falls far short of its goals, as their
offensives in 1968 did, it would be even harder this
time to find replacements among southerners for these
losses. Decisions on how to employ remaining local
forces will therefore probably be made only after
the Communists get a clearer picture of the likely
outcome of the main-force campaign.
10. The Communists are also prepared to accept
political and propaganda setbacks as a result of their
use of more conventional invasion tactics. They are
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prepared to accept any stresses or strains the cur-
rent offensive may possibly produce in Hanoi's re-
lations with Moscow or Peking (though here we cau-
tion that the question of Moscow and Peking's posi-
tions with respect to this offensive is a complex
subject beyond the scope of this paper.) Further-
more, Hanoi's air defense preparations throughout
North Vietnam indicate that the Communists have
also anticipated and are prepared to accept a lim-
ited resumption of the bombing of southern North
Vietnam. Indeed, they may feel the costs of such
bombing may be at least partially offset by po-
litical or propaganda gains abroad.
11. What Hanoi has to fear more than these
concrete costs is the political cost of having to
settle on the battlefield for something that looks
like a failure, or even a result that cannot be
plausibly touted as a net success. If Communist
forces eventually must pull back from Quang Tri
city and Hue without capturing either, and if they
suffer very heavy losses in the sieges, it would
be widely interpreted in South Vietnam as a suc-
cess for the defending forces and failure for the
Communist side. If this happens, if the Communists
have not at least broken government control over
some important centers, if they have not driven
local security forces back to the towns and out of
much of the countryside, and most important, if
their actions have not resulted in some signifi-
cant political breakthrough in South Vietnam, it
will be considered a serious reverse for their side.
Given the trends that have characterized the situa-
tion up to today, Hanoi must be regarded as having
won its watershed victory or it will perforce suf-
fer a major and damaging psychological defeat with
profound political ramifications.
12. A clear defeat at the hands of South
Vietnam's defending forces might well produce an
agonizing reappraisal in Hanoi. There have been
many signs of disagreement on priorities and strat-
egies in North Vietnam for much of the past year,
and a clear defeat of the army now invading South
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Vietnam would call many recent decisions into ques-
tion. A less clear defeat or even an ambiguous net
result would also produce considerable anguish in
North Vietnam, but the North Vietnamese would retain
the capability and probably the will to return to the
battle another year.
E. High Stakes and High Strategy
13. With the local force war going badly
against them, the Communists have for the first
time turned to a relatively straightforward, con-
ventional invasion. Never before have the Communists
relied so heavily on invading divisions and so lightly
on in-country local forces. The new premium they are
putting on heavy artillery, tanks, and heavy anti-
aircraft weaponry indicate that
this
time they do
not mean to fade away quickly if
the
battle appears
to be going against them. This
time
they are much
more likely to fight for control
of
the lines of
communication that are needed to move their weaponry
and supplies, and also to fight for territory and
position, particularly at the northern end of South
Vietnam.
14. It seems highly likely that the Communists
hope to sustain heavy pressure simultaneously on
several fronts for as long as possible. Hanoi hopes
that with most of the US force gone, the South Viet-
namese will feel themselves spread thin and in danger
of being whipsawed, as they were in 1965. Over a
three-day period last week, the South Vietnamese
decided in rapid succession to send the 9th ARVN
Division from the delta to the northern end of the
country, to send the 21st ARVN Division north instead
of the 9th, and finally to send the 21st to northern
Military Region 3 rather than MR-1. This series of
decisions demonstrated graphically how difficult it
may be for the South Vietnamese to reinforce several
major theaters if they are threatened simultaneously.
Similarly, the Communists doubtless are also hoping
to confront the allied side with difficult choices
in allocating its air resources. The rapidity of the
allied buildup of air and naval power, however, may
have already exceeded Communist expectations.
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15. The Communists have already compounded the
reinforcement problems on the government side, merely
by maintaining a credible threat against Hue, Kontum,
and the area north of Saigon, while mounting an actual
heavy assault against Quang Tri Province. The mere
presence of strong enemy forces has been enough to
make it dangerous to send units from Hue to Quang
Tri city, or from Saigon to Kontum. It seems un-
likely that the Communists plan to expend their
supply stockpiles or their manpower resources
quickly. Instead, they are more likely to keep
the pressure on in each of South Vietnam's military
regions at least for at least the next several weeks.
16. As will be discussed in greater detail
in the region by region discussion that follows,
it appears likely that the Communists would ideally
want to seize and hold virtually all of Thua Thien
and Quang Tri provinces, including the cities of
Hue and Quang Tri. They very probably also hope to
seize and hold Kontum city and much of the surrounding
highlands. They often speak and think in terms of
maximum objectives, but they are realists, and they
probably recognize that in the final event they may
achieve a good deal less than this.
17. The Communists undoubtedly expect that
even if they fail to seize and hold Hue or wide
stretches of the highlands, their attacks in the
attempt will be devastating for South Vietnamese
morale. If they can get into some major cities,
the Communists can make expelling their forces a
very costly proposition--costly both to the allied
forces fighting them and to the.cities themselves.
18. The extent to which the Communists can
seize and how long they can hold key centers or
stretches of territory will depend, of course, on
how the battles go. As the course of the battle
becomes clearer, the Communist High Command will
decide how to proceed: whether to commit available
local forces in particular areas; whether to have
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the Provisional Revolutionary Government run up
the flag and claim to govern certain areas for a
period or indefinitely; or whether to take new
initiatives in the propaganda and diplomatic
fields.*
*For example, a quick caZZ for cease-fire if sig-
nificant tactical successes are achieved.
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PART II: BATTLE PLANS BY REGION
19. The Communists have always been able to
bring their greatest strength to bear on the northern
end of South Vietnam for the simple reason that this
area is closest to North Vietnam. In general, the
farther south one goes in South Vietnam, the less
serious is the threat from the North. Quang Tri
presently is most seriously threatened, Hue is next,
and Kontum third. Although the enemy has assembled
a powerful force north of Saigon, the supply routes
there are long and the defending forces relatively
strong. At the southern end of the country, the
enemy can cause considerable disruption, but, his
capabilities in Military Region IV are weaker than
elsewhere.
A. The Northern Part.of South Vietnam
20. The terrain of northern South Vietnam
gives the North Vietnamese Army both advantages
and disadvantages in its current campaign in the
coastal lowlands. Just south of Hue, a spur of
mountains extends to the sea. Thus, while the
terrain is fairly flat from the DMZ into Quang Tri
and Thua Thien provinces, land routes must wind
through some rugged hills to connect those prov-
inces with the rest of South Vietnam. In terms of
terrain alone then, these two provinces may be more
accessible from the North than from the South.
21. On the other hand, these same mountains
will soon shield the Quang Tri and Thua Thien coasts
from the Southwest Monsoon rains, and although flying
weather will get progressively worse by late May and
early June through much of the rest of South Viet-
nam, the weather will improve along this particular
short stretch of coast. In sum, the weather cuts
both ways. At the same time that it may be easier
to reinforce and resupply this area from the north,
it will also be easier for the allied side to bring
its expanded air power to bear.
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22. The Communists are probably prepared to
undergo prolonged assaults from the air if they
can secure control of this coast. Their initial
assaults into Quang Tri Province and their subseequent
deployments lend some substance to their bold words
about trying.to make this a "last battle." The
ferocity of the first artillery and ground assaults
were clearly a shock to the green and untried ele-
ments of the recently formed 3rd ARVN Division.
It appears that it was primarily the sheer volume
and accuracy of the artillery fire, rather than
ground force pressure that caused friendly forces
to withdraw from most of the fire support bases
along the southern edge of the DMZ.
23. Since their initial assaults, the North
Vietnamese have been,compelled to regroup, and
bring up equipment. They have been maneuvering
the equivalent of over two divisions toward the
South Vietnamese defensive positions along the Cua
Viet River. These forces include the 308th NVA
Division and the regiments controlled by the Com-
munists' B-5/70 Front. Trucks, heavy field guns,
anti-aircraft artillery, and possibly even surface-
to-air missiles have been detected converging on
the government's new lines. The presence of these
heavy weapons in the enemy's arsenal seems to im-
ply that they will try to stay and hold their ground
for an extended period rather than attack for two or
three weeks and then move off to safer terrain as
they have. often done in the past. They have, how-
ever, been taking considerable equipment losses,
particularly a large number of tanks.
24. At the same time this force of over two
divisions has been moving toward Quang Tri city
from the north, a third division, the 304th, has
been moving from west to east toward Quang Tri city.
It would appear that the enemy intends to send all
three divisions against Quang Tri city's defenses.
The latter includes the one regiment of the 3rd
ARVN Division that is still considered combat ef-
fective, and South Vietnamese Marine and Ranger
battalions recently sent as reinforcements from
the south. These forces are getting better air
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support than could be made available during the
initial assaults on the northern tier of fire
support bases when the weather was bad, but the
Communists will doubtless try to concentrate
their attacks during the intervals of cloudy
weather that are likely to occur this month.
25. The Communists probably cannot muster as
much heavy firepower for the next attacks as they
did during their initial assaults from across the
DMZ. For one thing, allied air attacks and their
extension above the DMZ are making it increasingly
difficult for the Communists to bring their heavier
equipment south. Thus the Communists will probably
have to rely more heavily this time on powerful in-
fantry assaults, protected from air attack, if pos-'
sible, by cloudy weather and by the anti-aircraft
weapons they have brought with them. Given the
size of the enemy forces the enemy can bring to
bear, repelling them will not be easy.
26. To the south of the Quang Tri theater, the
Communists' 324B Division has been edging east out
of the mountains to threaten Hue, much as the 304th
is putting pressure on Quang Tri. At the moment,
however, the 324B is the only major force threaten-
ing Hue. It is possible that it will mount strong
attacks against the defending 1st ARVN Division,
the best South Vietnam has to offer, but it seems
more likely that for the time being it will basi-
cally continue to put on enough pressure to make
the threat credible, tying down the lst ARVN Divi-
sion while the action proceeds to the north around
Quang Tri. The 324B's pressure will include heavy
probing, however, and if tactical opportunities de-
velop the Communists would certainly want to exploit
them to launch an attack on Hue simultaneously with
their renewed pressure against Quang Tri.
27. If the two divisions bearing on Quang Tri
city from the north and the one division moving in
from the west can seize and occupy that center and
destroy or scatter the defenders, then two of the
three divisions are likely to continue south to
No Foreign Dissern
SECRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
No Foreign Dissem
repeat the same general scheme of attack against Hue
in cooperation with the 324B. If the threats to the
south against Kontum and north of Saigon sufficiently
impede South Vietnamese reinforcement of Hue, and if
the Communists manage to seize Quang Tri, they may be
able to develop enough momentum to seize Hue, mainly
on the strength of their infantry. This would be
such a major setback for the South, involving as
it would the defeat of the government's most re-
spected division, that it would be well worth a
great cost in lives to the North Vietnamese. Whether
or not the Communists proved able to hold this ter-
ritory indefinitely, they could make it extremely
costly for the allied side to drive them out again.
Under such a scenario, civilian losses in.Hue and
Quang Tri cities would be particularly severe.
28. This is what the Communists probably hope
to do if all goes well for their side. But their
initial impact on the still-new 3rd ARVN Division
should not be taken as a clear indication of how
they will fare in future battles. The Communists
are now up against better quality troops in the
Rangers and 1st ARVN Division, and the South Viet-
namese have always fought more effectively when
they have been defending their homes and families.
Moreover, allied air power has now begun to inflict
a heavier toll. Even if the Communists fail to
achieve their maximum objectives, they are prob-
ably willing to continue to take substantial losses
from government counterattacks on the ground and
from allied air attacks, in order to throw a real
fright into the population of the cities and their
defenders.
29. If the Communists can put enough pressure
on Hue and Quang Tri city, and if they can do enough
damage to the government side farther south, they
may then decide to use some of their remaining local
forces, It is unlikely, however, that they will ac-
cept very heavy local force losses unless they think
they can seize the area, since it would otherwise be
almost impossible to rebuild their local apparatus.
?
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
No Foreign Dissem
?
B. The Highlands
30. The enemy has built the largest force it
has ever deployed in the highlands, over 40,000 men.
Although this force is impressive by virtue of its
size, it does not include high quality troops com-
parable to those of the 304th, the
308th, the
324B,
and the B-5/70 Front to the north.
In fact,
the
quality of this force is highly uncertain, partic-
ularly that of the 320th Division, which is the
main new addition to the enemy's highlands deploy-
ments this year. The 320th has been taking casualties
since it started through Laos and does not seem as
competent as some of the others. This division has
a history of taking substantial casualties in bat-
tles where the military return was slight and of
breaking contact when the going got rough.
31. So far, this force has not accomplished
much. It has been in the area for about two months,
and has been hit from the air by pre-emptive B-52
raids and on the ground by ARVN spoiling probes
and it may have been severely disrupted. Much of
this force has been edging toward Kontum city. It
clearly should have launched a powerful attack against
the city timed to precede the attacks across the
DMZ and add to the psychological impact of the as-
saults across the DMZ. The bulk of the force still
seems to be holding its fire and it clearly has
problems of some sort. Some elements have put
pressure on a few fire support bases on "Rocket
Ridge," north of Kontum city, but without success
and with heavy losses. Nothing has yet been heard
from the heavy enemy guns known to be in the area.
32. Whatever the enemy's difficulties may be,
it is clear that he intends to do a lot more with
this sizable force than he has so far. Enemy docu-
ments say that the Communists want to capture Kontum
city, Pleiku city, and much of the surrounding ter-
ritory. They want to overwhelm the not-very-highly-
respected ARVN forces there and seize Route 14 and
Route 19. The enemy would then like to push east
to the sea, destroying the government's control over
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
No Foreign Dissem
Binh Dinh Province, the most populous in the country.
Even if the Communists cannot impose their own con-
trol over this stretch of coast, if they could se-
verely damage the government's control they would
have cut the country in two, an objective of the
Communists since the early 1960s.
33. If the force now assembled in the Kontum
area could merely push into western Binh Dinh, it
could expect some help from the Communist 3rd Divi-
sion that operates in northern Binh Dinh and southern
Quang Ngai provinces. This is the area where the
Communists' local roots are three decades deep and
they still enjoy considerable popular sympathy. The
Communists might be willing to expose their local
forces to government counterfire here if they thought
this would help swing the balance in their favor.
34. If the enemy achieves his maximum objec-
tives in the highlands, and if he manages at the
same time to overrun Hue, he would then be able to
call on the strong local support still available in
Quang Nam Province and in Quang Ngai Province and
put heavy pressure on Da Nang. Control over the
whole northern half of the country would then be
within his grasp. This is probably the enemy's
ideal scenario for northern South Vietnam.
35. The Communists' opportunistic use of bad
flying weather to protect their advancing troops in
Quang Tri Province, however, also suggests the pos-
sibility that the highlands force may be waiting un-
til the weeks just before the onset of the Southwest
Monsoon, which could'begin in late May or early June.
Logistics problems would mount during the rainy sea-
son and it would be difficult to deploy large units,
but the strong assaults might be timed for shortly
before the rains, particularly if the Communists
hope, to capitalize on their heavy weapons. If the
Communists could capture Kontum city and the sur-
rounding district towns, it would be extremely dif-
ficult for the government side to bring air power
to bear in any effort to dig them out without de-
stroying the cities and towns. It would also be
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
No Foreign Dissem
difficult to send in a large relief force overland
to the highlands. It therefore seems entirely pos-
sible that by timing his attacks carefully with the
weather, the enemy still hopes to make his word good,
seize large portions of the highlands, and hold them
for months to come.
36. But just as the Communists may well be
stopped in their tracks before they get into Hue,
their unimpressive showing so,far in the highlands
suggests that they should have a hard time taking
Kontum city, let alone holding it or pushing east
to the sea.
37. The Communist local force may be. able to
mount some troublesome harassing actions in the south
of Military Region 2 in such centers as Dalat and
Ban Me Thuot, but the enemy is not believed to have
effective concentrations in these areas, and the
challenge to government control there is likely to
be limited. The same also holds true for much of
eastern Military Region 3, where the enemy is rela-
tively weak both locally and in terms of main force
strength.
C. The Saigon Area
38. Along the Cambodian border north of Saigon
the enemy has assembled three first-line divisions,
the 5th, 7th, and 9th, and during the last week he
has sent regiments from each of them into northern
Military Region 3. Moving down Route 13 through
Binh Long Province, the enemy has already captured
a district town, some fire support bases, and an air-
field. The threat to Binh Long and Phuoc Long
provinces, both sparsely populated and not very
heavily defended, is high. These provinces by their
nature, however, are not very lucrative targets for
the North Vietnamese.
39. Politically more important Tay Ninh Prov-
ince, home of the Cao Dai sect, and the provinces
closer to Saigon, on the other hand, are relatively
well defended. The South Vietnamese 25th, 18th, and
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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SJ UKJ I SYUKt;
No Foreign Dissem
?
5th divisions are now being reinforced by the 21st
Division from the delta, and the Regional and Popu-
lar Forces man many defensive positions between the
Cambodian border and the urban centers in Tay Ninh
and farther south. Any Communist drive in force
toward Tay Ninh city and points south would be ex-
tremely vulnerable to air attack until the monsoon
rains come, and thereafter large scale deployments
will be difficult. If the Communists do manage to
take some important centers in Military Region 3,
the government almost certainly has enough forces
nearby to push them back out and certainly enough
to limit their progress toward Saigon.
40. Because the government enjoys a more fa-
vorable local balance of forces than in the threat-
ened areas to the north, the prospects for keeping
the Communists at bay seem relatively good. The
enemy nevertheless clearly intends at the least
to maintain a credible threat, partly to prevent the
government from freely sending reinforcements farther
north. The move of the 21st Division from the delta
to MR-3 rather than farther north suggests that he
may be having some success. To make his threat seem
more menacing, the enemy probably intends to attempt
to send elements of the 5th, 7th, and 9th divisions
fairly deeply into Tay Ninh Province, and he may
well attempt to seize and hold parts of Binh Long
and Phuoc Long provinces. He probably also will
ask his more modest forces which operate in the
provinces surrounding Saigon. to conduct harassing
actions.
41. If government forces should be severely
discouraged by news of possible Communist successes
to the north, and if there were signs of growing
dissensions within the government, the enemy might
well revise his thinking and, accepting heavy losses,
try to drive hard against the government's superior
forces in the capital area. This involves a whole
series of "ifs," however, and at present the enemy's
intentions in Military Region 3 appear to be limited
to developing a credible main-force threat to the
northern three provinces of the region and mounting
some harassing actions closer to Saigon.
-19-
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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SECRET SPOKE
No Foreign Dissei
The Delta
42. As usual, the delta is receiving the lowest
priority from the Communists as a theater of main-
force operations. So far, the enemy is sending
four regiments and a division-level headquarters
(the lst NVA, now called the "Phuoc Long Front")
from its forces in Cambodia to help raise the threat
level in Military, Region 4. Clearly Hanoi intends
to rely primarily on the few forces it already has
in the region to do their best to tie down the gov-
ernment forces there and prevent their being used
as reinforcements farther north.
43. On the other hand, the departure of the
21st ARVN Division for MR-3 and the arrival of four
enemy regiments in or near the delta will improve
the enemy's force position in MR-4. With the 7th
and 9th ARVN divisions stretched thin, the Commu-
nists probably hope that the three understrength
Communist regiments that have been operating out
of the U Minh Forest and the four other regiments
scattered across the delta will be in a better po-
sition to try to overrun some major government mili-
tary positions and district towns. They are certain
to ask them to try.
-20-
No Foreign Dissem
SECRET SPOKE
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Secret
Secret
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C.
10
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/SPOKE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 11, 1972
URGENT INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Phil Odeen
SUBJECT: CIA Study on NVN Capabilities
CIA has prepared at your request an assessment of NVN's manpower
and logistics capabilities to conduct military operations over the next
three months. The summary judgement of CIA is that:
11. . . the Vietnamese Communists have the overall manpower
and.logistic capabilities necessary to sustain their offensive
activities for the next three months that is, to sustain major
main force activity in Military Regions (MRs) 1 and 2, heavy
main force probes in MR 3, and moderate harassment, prin-
cipally by fire, inMR 4. This judgement perforce ignores
several critical variables -- for example, the impact of Allied
counteroffensive operations or unusually heavy enemy supply
or manpower losses as a result of Allied air activity (which
are not postulated).
0
Manpower
NVN combat forces now in place are fully adequate to continue fighting
at current or expanded levels for the next three months. However, the
heavy losses the NVN has suffered in recent years have reduced the
quality of NVN soldiers -cadre and troops.
Over 120, 000 troops have been infiltrated south thus far this dry season,
surpassing total infiltration of any year except 1968 when half the 250, 000
infiltrated moved south in April-August after the intense fighting commenced.
An additional 28, 000 troops deployed into SVN in organized units from NVN,
Laos, and Cambodia. The infiltration has primarily been for the forces in
MR 1 and 2. The rather limited infiltration toward the areas farther south
places limits on the intensity and duration of NVA combat in MRs 3 and
especially 4.
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10
SECRET/SPOKE
Including forces in Cambodia and just above the DMZ (but excluding
the 325th) the NVA is estimated to have about 150, 000 combat and
administrative service troops now targetted on Vietnam compared with
about 170, 000 in 1968. VC forces are of course smaller than in 1968.
The assessment does not consider how many men may be added over the
next few months, but is says that conscription has been high in NVN
during the past year particularly in December and January. These men
will be ready to move south in May. Although the weather in South Laos
will deteriorate then, we must recall that 130, 000 troops infiltrated to
SVN between April and August 1968. Also, movement across the DMZ would
avoid the rainy season problems.
As a result of this infiltration, enemy combat strength in SVN and border
areas has increased over last year by about 27,000. The other 93, 000
were used to replace losses, to provide support and as a pool for later
replacement'of losses. The enemy OB was further increased by the
movement of an estimated 28, 000 troops across the DMZ and from Laos
and Cambodia.
Enemy OB (000)
Dec 1969 Dec 1970 Dec 1971 Apr 1972
0
VC NVA
SVN
130-150
85-95
80-90
115-130
Cambodia
--
20-25
25-30
30-35
Khmer Comm
-
10-20
15-30
15-30
PL/NVA
No Laos
35-40
30-35
40-45
40-45
So. Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40
25-35
CIA does not include some 35, 000 - 45, 000 of the infiltration personnel who
are considered to be "a stock of fillers to offset combat casualties" in the
OB figures, nor in computation of force ratios. Thus the enemy has already
provided replacements for casualties on the order of one-third of his OB.
Use of these fillers and additional infiltration and movement across the
DMZ would retain his combat strength in the face of what we would consider
devastating losses. Of course quality and morale would fall even if numerical
OB does not.
SECRETISPOKE
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SECRET/SPOKE
Combat Capability
As a result of increased enemy strength and U. S. withdrawals (and
failure of ARVN to get its combat units up to full strength), the main
force ratio has shown a significant decrease in all areas of SVN. The
ratio is about 2-1 in MR 1 and 2 and near parity in the most directly
threatened areas. The GVN has a more favorable force ratio in MR 3
(3.3-1) and 4 (4.6-1).
A major factor in NVA capabilities is the losses they are suffering
from prevention attacks, bombing, etc. The extent is unclear, but CIA
doubts if they have been as heavy as in past major campaigns given the
bad weather which restricts friendly air. By drawing on the filler pool
the enemy can retain his OB in the face of substantial losses.
Logistics
The enemy has made a major resupply effort this year and is in better
logistic shape than he was a year ago. The supply flow has been especially
heavy across the DMZ and thru Laos into the MRs 1 and 2.
Supply movements into Southern Laos and Cambodia have also been high
this year, probably at record levels. Thus the enemy's supply situation
is probably the best in years (since losing the Sihanoukville port). The
supply movements seems to emphasize arms and ammunition, perhaps
reflecting the adequacy of food from Cambodia. Thus the NVA apparently
has the needed stock close to the SVN border to wage a major effort in
the South. However, CIA does not believe supplies are adequate for major
combat in both MRs 3 and 4. A much more serious problem for the NVA
is the distribution of supplies to its forces within SVN, but the assessment
gives little attention to this problem which is the primary restraint in MR 4
and the coastal areas of MRs 2 and 3.
SECRET/SPOKE
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C ..
Memorandum
Handle via Comint Channels
North Vietnam's Manpower and Logistics Capabilities
for Carrying Out Offensive Military Operations in
South Vietnam During the Next Three Months
Secret
Secret
smsrfm
SC-07039/72
10 April 1972
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized
to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information within the
Government to which transmitted; its security must be maintained in ac-
cordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained,
unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIO
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
?
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SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 April 1972
NORTH VIETNAM'S MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES
FOR CARRYING OUT OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS
Introduction
1. This memorandum addresses the question of North Vietnam's
capabilities to continue the present Communist offensive in South Vietnam
during the next three months at current or accelerated levels. The discussion
concerns enemy capabilities as judged from historical experience and from
current signs of logistical and manpower readiness. It does not take explicit
account - in a quantitative way - of the possible impact on enemy behavior
of succesfully parrying his offensive efforts by Allied military actions or
disrupting his supply system by a greatly accelerated bombing interdiction
effort. Such factors obviously bear on this analysis, and have clearly been
operative in previous Communist main force actions.
2. The overall capabilities question is approached by examining
manpower, logistics, North Vietnam's general manpower reserves, infiltration
and the disposition of enemy forces, the magnitude of Hanoi's commitment
to current operations, and current Communist capabilities and by making
a brief comparison of enemy and friendly force ratios. After a general look,
these matters are assessed with specific reference to each of South Vietnam's
four military regions.
3. Our net judgment is that the Vietnamese Communists have the
overall manpower and logistic capabilities necessary to sustain their offensive
activities for the next three months -- that is, to sustain major main force
activity in Military Regions (MRs) I and 2, heavy main force probes in
MR 3, and moderate harassment, principally by fire, in MR 4. As indicated
above, this judgment perforce ignores several critical variables -- for
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency
in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency.
?
SECRET SPOKE
qAn-a -it- i vim
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SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
example, the impact of Allied counteroffensive operations or unusually
heavy enemy supply or manpower losses as a result of Allied air activity
(which are not postulated). It presupposes other variables, such as a pattern
of combat generally similar to that seen since 30 March, a pattern
incorporating lulls and respites even in periods of overall heavy pressure.
Finally, it is stressed that this memorandum deals with logistic and
manpower capabilities for a relatively brief time span (three months). It
does not address intentions or the possible political or psychological impact
on friendly or enemy forces of the outcome of key single engagements
or campaigns. Communist intentions are addressed in a separate,
complementary paper.
Conclusions
Manpower
4. The combat forces North Vietnam now has in place are adequate
to prosecute the war during the next three months at current or even slightly
higher levels of intensity, provided Communist loss levels do not rise
precipitously in the next few weeks. In MR 1 the enemy can continue
heavy fighting for about the next three months - given his short lines of
communication and enhanced firepower capability and the fact that the
weather is likely to remain good until September. The enemy's capability
is similar in MR 2, but by mid-May weather will become an increasingly
important factor. The intensity of fighting in the B-3 Front area will
undoubtedly be stepped up in the next few weeks, and on a manpower
basis alone it could be broadened to other areas of MR 2 over the next
two-three months. In MR 3 the enemy has the capability to increase
significantly the pressure against ARVN forces, especially in the border
provinces; and if the combat forces now along the border are committed
to combat, the enemy could expand deeper into MR 3, although expecting
to meet stiff and preponderant Allied resistance. The enemy's main force
capability in MR 4 is considerably less than in the other military regions,
and the best he can hope for probably is to tie down the GVN forces
there in a standoff defensive situation, although the Communists can raise
the level of harassment and terrorism.
Logistics
5. From a logistics standpoint, the North Vietnamese are in a much
better position now than they were a year ago. A heavy flow of supplies
this dry season has resulted in a buildup of stocks, particularly in or near
the northern half of South Vietnam. In MR 1 the Communists probably
SECRET SPOKE
Ce__~ i+Fyvc
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SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
?
have sufficient supplies nearby to sustain the present offensive for three
or more months. Continuing resupply during the remainder of the dry season
can be used to replenish stocks as they are consumed or destroyed. In
MR 2, heavy supply movements have accompanied the unprecedented
buildup of enemy troops in the B-3 Front area. The enemy can undoubtedly
launch a major offensive now and should be able to maintain a sufficient
flow of supplies to continue an offensive for several months. In MR 3 the
enemy probably has sufficient supplies on hand to sustain major
engagements in the border provinces and - depending on Allied resistance -
could gradually extend the scope of such operations to other areas of MR 3.
Logistics will continue to be a limiting factor in the region as a whole,
however. In MR 4, enemy forces probably can logistically support several
combat high points such as are now occurring as well as a more extensive
use of indirect fire attacks. But it is highly unlikely that the enemy could
sustain a major offensive in MR 4 over the next three months unless he
has some unusual success in landing supplies across the beaches.
Discussion
?
?
North Vietnam's Manpower Reserves
6. Hanoi has sufficient overall manpower reserves to continue the
Indochina war at current levels of intensity during the next three months.
It has a manpower pool of an estimated 1.3 million male civilians aged
15-39 who are fit for military service, approximately one-half million of
whom are in the 17-25 age bracket. North Vietnam can induct and train
up to 100,000 men per year without drawing down this reserve. While raw
manpower reserves thus pose no constraint to Hanoi during the next three
months, the high and persistent loss levels suffered by the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) have caused deterioration in the quality of North Vietnamese
soldiers -- both cadres and troops -- during the past several years. North
Vietnamese commanders in the field are faced with the problem of operating
on unfamiliar territory with greener troops and less experienced cadres than
in the past. There is no shortage of raw recruits, but it is doubtful that
experienced officers and NCO's are available in sufficient numbers for North
Vietnam to expand its present force structure in the next several months.
7. Conscription in North Vietnam appears to have been high over
the past year,(') and there are several good indications that a major callup
occurred during December 1971 and early January 1972. While this callup
1. Estimated at about 150,000 men.
SECRET SPOKE
Aanci 1-i t.A
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SECRET SPOKE
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immediately affects only North Vietnam's training base -- there is a three
to four month timcspan between induction and availability for assignment --
these troops could be intended as replacements for future combat losses.
Infiltration and Disposition of Forces
8. Hanoi appears to have made the maximum feasible commitment
to the war in South Vietnam this dry season - from the point of view
of infiltration and unit deployment. Thus far, Hanoi has dispatched about
120,000 infiltrators to the southern war zones. This compares with some
106,200 during the entire dry season last year (1970/71). The number of
new infiltration starts has been low in recent weeks, but the current
large-scale military action in South Vietnam may portend a resumption of
the infiltration flow toward the end of the current dry season -- perhaps
even extending into the early part of the rainy season.
9. Dry-season infiltration starts during 1970/71 and 1971/72, by
destination, are as follows:
1970/71 1971/72
(Sep-Jun) (Sep-early Apr)
GVN MRs 1 and 2
Tri-Thien-Hue 6,000 12,000
MR 5 14,200 16,000
B-3 Front 14,500 42,000
GVN MRs 3 and 4
and Cambodia
COSVN 45,000
Southern Laos 26,500 a/
106, 200
36,000
14,000
120,000
a. Including some units deployed for Lam
Son 719.
10. Clearly the most significant increments to total infiltration are
the 42,000 currently estimated for the B-3 Front (this figure includes the
NVA 320th Division), and the 12,000 in the Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH) area
SECRET SPOKE
SPnditiV,
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0 i is i i 0r'ir -
Sensitive
?
(which includes the 324B Division). The following tabulation shows the
estimated current infiltration flow, by order of battle (OB) area, and
indicates that on the order of 80,000 of the 120,000 infiltrators were headed
for South Vietnam, compared with 40,000 for southern Laos and Cambodia.
Thousands
Destination
Strength OB Area
Strc:r. ll,
Tri-Thien-Hue
2 MR 1
20
Reg ion
1
MP 5
16 C
B-3 Front
42 "MR 2
50
MR 3
5 a./
P 4
--
5
/
COSVN
M
36
a
Cambodia
26 a/
n Laos
the
14 - S
14
Southern Laos
r
ou
120
120
a. 'This breakdown is a rough illustrative
estimate.
It. We estimate that this year's infiltration has provided for an
expansion of the NVA combat OB in South Vietnam and Cambodia by
about 27,000 men, increasing the combat OB about 22,000 in South
Vietnam and providing for a 5,000-man increase to COSVN's concentration
of combat forces in Cambodia opposite GVN MR 3. The remaining 93,000
infiltrators have been used to expand the rear services system in southern
Laos and Cambodia and provide a stock of fillers to offset combat casualties.
12. A further expansion of the enemy OB in South Vietnam occurred
in late March and early April, when 28,000 more combat troops deployed
into the country in organic units from North Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia.(2) This increase, together with the 22,000 increment owing to
infiltration, raises the enemy's South Vietnam combat OB to about 120,000
men, as shown in the following tabulation:
2. These forces include the 304th and 308th Divisions from North Vietnam, elements
of the 2nd Division from southern Laos, and three regiments from Cambodia.
?
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?
Dec
1969
Dec
1970
Dec
1971
Apr
1972
VC/NVA
130-150
105-120,
105-120
145-165
South
Vietnam
a/
130-150
85-95
80-90
115-130
Cambodia
--
20-25
25-30
30-35
Khmer
Communists
N.A.
10-20
15-30
15-30
Pathet Lao/
NVA b/
55-65
60-70
70-85
65-80
Northern
Laos
35-40
30-35
40-45
40-45
Southern
Laos
20-25
30-35
30-40
25-35
a. Figures for South Vietnam include those NVA
forces located in southern North Vietnam between
Dong Hoi and the DMZ which are considered to be a
threat to South Vietnam. These forces numbered
13,000 in December 1969, 10,000 in December 1970,
12,000 in December 1971, and 20,000 in late March
1972. The latter 20,000 troops deployed to the
GVN along with 8,000 additional combat troops from
Cambodia and Laos between late March and early
April. The figure for South Vietnam for 1969 in-
cludes some forces actually stationed in Cambodia
but targeted against South Vietnam.
b. Including troops in air defense units.
The Magnitude of Hanoi's Commitment
13. The manpower indicators demonstrate the magnitude of North
Vietnam's current manpower commitment for the war in South Vietnam.
As a result of dry season infiltration, unit redeployments, and an earlier
expansion of the force structure in Laos, Hanoi now has reduced the number
of infantry divisions available within North Vietnam for home defense or
deployment elsewhere in Indochina to the lowest level of the war (including
early 1971 when Hanoi deployed four divisions to counter Operation
Lam Son 719). The tabulation below depicts these division dispositions.
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On a regimental basis, the some 15 regular infantry regiments(3) currently
remaining in North Vietnam (including both independent regiments and
those subordinate to divisions) reflect an even greater drawdown in North
Vietnam's mobile reserve than Hanoi's previous low point in the Tet 1968
period.
March 1968
April 1972
North
Division
Vietnam
Out-of-Country
Vietnam
Out--of-Country
304th
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
308th
X
South Vietnam
312th
X
Laos
316th
Laos
Laos
320th
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
324B
South Vietnam
South Vietnam
325th
South Vietnam
X
330th
X
X
350th
X
X
Total 4 5 3 6
14. A final measure of North Vietnam's commitment to the war in
South Vietnam this dry season is obtained by examining the number of
NVA combat and administrative services troops deployed out of country
since 196$, as shown in the tabulation below. Although the overall number
of forces out of country is greater than it was in 1968, because of increased
requirements in Cambodia and Laos, the number in South Vietnam is less
than in 1968.
3. Including six regiments subordinate to the 330th and 350th Infantry Divisions.
These two divisions have, for the past several years, been heavily involved in training
recruits as well as in their normal home defense role.
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o xs.. , 1. 0r%JZ
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?
Total /
South Vietnam b/
Cambodia
Laos 2/
a. Including combat and administrative serv-
ice personnel.
b. Including those NVA forces located in
North Vietnam between Dong Hoi and the DMZ
considered a threat to the GVN. These forces
numbered about 20,000 in December 1968, 13,000
in December 1969, 10,000 in December 1970, and
12,000 in December 1971. There were some
20,000 troops in the threat area in March
1972, but these all had deployed into northern
South Vietnam by 3 April.
C. Including personnel in air defense units.
Current Combat Capabilities - Enemy and Friendly
15. Hanoi's willingness to move an increasing proportion of its troops
outside North Vietnam has resulted in changes in the comparative
enemy-versus-friendly main force strengths in South Vietnam. As can be
seen by the following tabulation, GVN main forces enjoy a significantly
greater superiority in MRs 3 and 4 than in MRs 1 and 2 -- even with the
inclusion of all of COSVN's 5th, 7th, and 9th(4) Cambodia-based Divisions
in the MR 3 ratio, and Cambodia's Phuco Long Front in MR 4's ratio.
Main Force Ratios
(Allied to VC/NVA:) E/
1 April
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
Total
1968
2.4
3.3
3.9
2.4
2.9
1970
2.5
7.0
4.5
8.3
4.2
1972
1.9
2.1
3.3
4.6
2.8
a. The figures, based on CIA analysis, are a ratio of aggregate
maneuver battalion strength. They include US forces for 1988
and 1970 only, and in 1972 they include the?GVN's regional force
battalions. The ratios also include for 1972 the 320th, 324B,
308, and 304th NVA Divisions. The ARVN side of the ratio for
MRs 1 and 2 includes the planned deployment of the remaining
Marines and Airborne units out of the reserves but does not in-
clude other recent ARVN redeployments which would alter the
ratios somewhat. This effect, however, is offset to some degree
by the enemy and friendly losses thus far in the campaign.
?
4. Including also the 271st and 24th Independent NVA Regiments.
Dec
Dec
1969
Dec
1970
Dec
1971
Apr
1972
215
210
195
210
250
170
145
75
80
120
--
--
35
30
35
45
65
85
100
95
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?
?
16. Between 1970 and 1972 the Main Force Ratio for all military
regions shows a significant decrease as a result of US troop withdrawals
and the substantial augmentation of enemy main forces this dry season.
Furthermore, the initial impact of the enemy's current offensive in northern
MR I emphasizes the importance of Allied tactical air support to GVN
main forces in meeting major enemy actions. Very recent COMINT indicates
that elements of the NVA 325th Division have now moved south from
Hanoi to below Vinh. If this division continues to move south either in
a reserve status in the DMZ area or into the northern MR 1 fighting, the
force ratio for MR I will decline even further - closer to parity.
17. Another significant development impacting on the current fighting
and that of the next three months is the introduction by North Vietnam
of a very high level of firepower. To date, Hanoi has mobilized within
northern MR 1 its heaviest concentration of NVA firepower of the war.
For the first time, the NVA has within Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces
at least five artillery regiments - compared with a previous high of only
three. In addition, Hanoi has deployed into MR I elements of at least four
air defense regiments and major elements of an armor regiment. In MR 2
the enemy also has introduced what appears to be the largest concentration
of firepower in the B-3 Front area during the war - artillery plus air defense
and armor units. This dry season the use of armor also appears to have
extended down into MR 3 for the first time.
18. Not only has the enemy augmented the absolute number of guns
but, equally important, he has introduced into South Vietnam new weapons
with greater range and firepower. This includes 130-mm field guns, 152-mm
howitzers, and possibly 160-mm mortars. He also seems to be in the process
of deploying surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to South Vietnam for the first
time in the war. There are some indications the enemy may have intended
to support the offensive in MR I with aircraft, but to date he has refrained
from ground support operations and, in the face of the US air response,
has limited his offensive air activity.
19. To date, the level of VC/NVA losses from the current fighting
within South Vietnam is unclear. While they probably have been heavy
in MR 1, considering the number of enemy forces committed, casualties
apparently have not been relatively as high as in other periods of heavy
fighting during the last three years. For one thing, poor weather conditions
have restricted US/GVN tactical air operations - a major firepower
advantage for the South Vietnamese. Second, the enemy's initial attacks
in MR 1 were largely attacks by fire with only limited ground assaults,
thereby minimizing casualties.
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0 Current Military Re ion Assessment (5)
Militar Region I
?
?
20. A substantial portion of enemy main forces in MR I this dry
season is concentrated in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and now
is larger than any year during the war. To counter the present enemy major
offensive in the two northern provinces, friendly forces are relying heavily
on concentrated B-52 bombing support missions, tactical air, and main force
reinforcement from MRs 3 and 4.
5. In the analysis of enemy strategies presented to the Senior Review Group (SRG)
last April, it was indicated that if the enemy were intending to carry out a prolonged
offensive in 1972, his force structure would be approximately as follows (based on
the 1968 enemy deployment patterns):
MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 Cambodia
55,000' 33,000 27,000 20,000 45,000
At the present time, the enemy combat force (VC/NVA) is estimated to be deployed
roughly as follows (in round numbers)*:
MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 Cambodia
50,000+ 33,000+ 19,000 17,000 35,000
The April SRG study indicated that for the enemy to maintain a prolonged offensive
along 1968 lines, he would require an annual infiltration on the order of 250,000 to
300,000 (this total was based on an estimate of enemy losses throughout 1968). The
level of infiltration thus far in the current dry season -- approximately 120,000 -- is,
of course, far below that total. However, to this must be added the organic unit
redeployments which have taken place outside the infiltration channels -- on the order
of 30,000 combat troops to the war theater as a whole. Furthermore, in 1968 much
of the infiltration took place after the heavy fighting had commenced, rather than before.
Between April and August 1968, some 130,000 replacement troops were sent into South
Vietnam via the infiltration routes. It is not possible to judge whether Hanoi is preparing
such a massive infiltration activity at this time, but there are signs -- current recruitment
and maintenance of the infiltration pipeline -- that at least some more infiltration is
to come.
* DIA estimates are as follows:
MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 Cambodia
50,000+ 35,000- 10,000- 12,000- 30,000-
40,000 15,000 15,000 35,000
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21. The main force shield around the coastal lowlands which
depended on long-range and medium-range artillery (175-mm, 155-mm, and
105-mm), armor/infantry reaction forces, and Allied tactical air has been
penetrated by enemy main forces. This was primarily due to a curtailment
of Allied tactical air effectiveness owing to bad weather and the use of
SAMs as well as to massive enemy firepower directed from covert positions
during the initial stages of the offensive. The offensive may be approaching
a new phase after an extended lull in combat activity. The weather was
a decisive factor in the initial stages of offensive activity and probably will
be again for the second phase of the offensive. COMINT indicates that
elements of the 325th NVA Division have moved out of the Hanoi area
to a point south of Vinh. If the entire division moves into southern Quang
Binh Province or northern GVN MR 1, this will increase the enemy main
force threat to friendly forces operating in the area and the main force
ratio will approach parity.
22. Poised to meet the enemy's next move in northern MR I are
GVN main force units from the 1st and 3rd ARVN Divisions, the
Vietnamese Marine Corps Division, and a Ranger Division, with the 2nd
ARVN Division deployed further south. The North Vietnamese ability to
execute successful major assaults in northern MR 1 will depend on the
will of GVN main forces to stand and fight together with sustained and
effective Allied firepower. In any case, the North Vietnamese have the
capability from the standpoint of manpower to sustain a major offensive
in MR 1 for the next three months.
Military Re ion 2
23. Since January 1972 the enemy has dramatically increased his main
force structure in MR 2, primarily within Pleiku and Kontum Provinces.
The estimated current level of infiltration to the B-3 Front is approximately
42,000 men, with an additional 16,000 destined for VC MR 5 (which
includes the coastal lowlands of MR 2 and southern MR 1). Infiltration
to MR 2 is the highest recorded at any time during the war. Included in
the infiltration total is the deployment of one full division, the 320th, in
addition to filler and replacement personnel. Moreover, two regiments of
the NVA 2nd Division have been deployed into Kontum Province from
southern Laos. Rounding out the enemy manpower buildup has been the
unprecedented flow of war materiel to the central highlands. Although
130-mm field guns have not been detected in the area, heavy mortars and
medium-range artillery have been deployed to support enemy ground forces.
In addition, it is believed that antiaircraft artillery has been provided to
this area for the first time, representing a new threat to Allied tactical
air and helicopter support operations. Finally, reports have suggested that
the enemy plans to employ a significant armor force during offensive
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?
operations this dry season.t6> COMINT and forward air controller reports
have indicated that NVA tanks were deploying in the direction of the central
highlands from southern Laos.
24. Friendly main forces have assumed a defensive posture centered
around key fire support bases forming a main force shield supported by
B-52 bombing missions, Allied tactical air, medium-range artillery (155-mm
and 105-mm), and armor/infantry reaction forces designed to protect the
province capitals of Kontum and Pleiku Cities and key lines of
communication. The firepower balance currently is in favor of friendly
forces primarily as a result of Allied tactical air. However, as the wet season
approaches in the central highlands around the end of April, friendly
firepower assets will be reduced as bad weather affects the use of Allied
tactical air. Moreover, elements of the NVA 3rd Division have moved to
western Binh Dinh Province near Route 19 for purposes of interdicting
ARVN convoys moving from Qui Nhon City to Pleiku City.
25. It seems certain that there will be heavy fighting within the next
few weeks in the highlands, together with a resumption of the heavy fighting
in MR 1, resulting in a great loss of life to both sides. Given. the current
friendly main force shield supported by effective Allied firepower and
armor/infantry reaction forces, the GVN should be able to parry enemy
main forces this dry season, but it will be faced with the strongest enemy
total force structure in MR 2 since early 1968. The enemy's in-place
manpower position should permit him to sustain heavy combat action for
several months, barring decisive defeats at ARVN's hands in critical
engagements or serious manpower losses inflicted by Allied airpower.
Military Region 3
26. Current evidence suggests that the enemy is shifting in MR 3 to
main force warfare supported from Cambodia. The full manpower
commitment on the enemy's part will depend on the extent to which he
is able to reposition his main forces currently located in Cambodia. At
least two VC/NVA infantry divisions have recently moved into MR 3. In
addition, there are tenuous indications that the headquarters of COSVN's
Artillery Command also has moved from Cambodia into MR 3, suggesting
that some subordinate elements may soon follow.
27. The main weight of enemy attacks in MR 3 is undoubtedly yet
to come. Enemy casualty rates, already apparently high at Loc Ninh, do
not appear, however, to have reached a level which would curtail further
activity in the next three-month period, although for the enemy to enlarge
6. The dry season in the highlands of MR 2 usually begins in November and continues
through April.
0
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the scope of his offensive to include major targets throughout MR 3, an
increased manpower commitment would be required in that area.
Military Region 4
28. The VC/NVA's military posture is seriously eroded in MR 4 for
several reasons, including the Communists' disastrous military losses during
1968, the subsequent movement of GVN forces into VC villages, and, more
recently, improved ARVN aggressiveness. To offset this weakened military
position, in late 1971 the communists began activating a division command
echelon from under-strength units already within MR 4 and recently
infiltrated at least one new NVA infantry regiment into the Delta. In
addition, the Communists have recently shifted at least two infantry
regiments of the Phuoc Long Front in Cambodia to the border of GVN
Chau Doc Province.
29. Even with these forces, however, VC/NVA capabilities in MR 4
do not seem sufficient to pose a serious challenge to GVN military
dominance on, a large scale. Although there has been a recent upsurge in
VC/NVA harassing actions in MR 4, enemy losses there have thus far been
the lightest of all the military regions and can easily be sustained at this
level for the next three months, even with some increase in enemy-initiated
activity. It is unlikely that the enemy could sustain a major offensive in
the area over this period unless substantial numbers of ARVN combat troops
were dispatched to other military regions.
Logistics
30. The overall picture of enemy logistic activity during the past
several months matches that of his military manpower commitment. In
southern North Vietnam, stocks of ordnance, petroleum, and other war
materiel are at very high levels. Unusually heavy levels of resupply have
been detected in southern Laos and along the Cambodian and South
Vietnamese frontiers - particularly in the northern regions. Heavy supply
activity has also been detected across the DMZ since before the beginning
of the enemy offensive in MR 1. Communist forces in South Vietnam are
in a much more favorable logistics posture currently than at this same time
a year ago.
Supply Movements This Dry Season
Southern Laos
?
31. The Communists' annual dry season "General Transportation
Offensive" in southern Laos which got into high gear in early January has
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?
continued to the present.(?) Facilitated by a considerable road construction
effort and restructured logistic apparatus, large quantities of supplies have
been moved from North Vietnam through the Laotian Panhandle into
Cambodia and South Vietnam. A new road system has been built through
the central Laos Panhandle; more than 100 miles of new roads are being
constructed in northeastern Cambodia; new roads have been built through
the DMZ into South Vietnam; and a series of new roads is being built
south of the tri-border area, presumably to support troop deployments in
the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.
32. The level of logistic activity noted in the southernmost part of
the Laos Panhandle has been impressive. For example, as the "General
Transportation Offensive" began in January, Binh Tram 35 in the Ban Bac
area reportedly delivered some 3,500 short tons (an average of 113 short
tons per day -- STPD) of supplies during the month - probably the largest
monthly total ever detected moving that far south.(8 Besides these heavy
southward deliveries, large quantities of supplies also have been detected
moving eastward toward South Vietnam. Massive quantities of arms and
ammunition have been included in the detected supply deliveries. For
example, Binh Tram 45 shipped some 2,800 tons of ordnance to Binh
Tram 46 along the new central road system during February. The shipments
included virtually every category of weapon and ammunition known to be
in the North Vietnamese inventory and represent the largest monthly
shipment of munitions ever noted in COMINT in southern Laos. This high
level of activity along the central corridor has continued through March.
A summary report for the period 1-31 March indicated that around 5,000
tons of supplies had been shipped south by Binh Tram 45 near Muong
Nong. The deliveries included at least 1,900 tons of rice, 1,000 tons of
ordnance, and 1,100 tons of gasoline. The relatively large quantity of fuel
is sufficient to sustain a major transport effort in extreme southern Laos
and northern Cambodia into the wet season. In this connection, a 4 April
intercept indicated that the North Vietnamese intend to continue this year's
large-scale logistic campaign at least through April - the "highpoint" month
of the "General Transportation Offensive." The term "highpoint" may
indicate that the enemy plans to move more supplies during April than
in any of the previous months of the offensive.
?
7. The area has now entered the transitional weather phase preceding the rainy
southwest monsoon season which starts usually in May. Thus far, however, weather
has not yet affected the road system which remains in generally excellent condition.
8. Previous record levels of supply deliveries in the southern Panhandle were reached
during February and March 1970 when Binh Tram 35 reported receiving an average
of 107 STPD. Comparing the two, the 113 STPD figure for January 1972 represents
Binh Tram 35's deliveries further south (not receipts from the north) well before the
normal peak levels of activity in February-March.
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33. This heavy supply activity in the southern Panhandle has resulted
in supply throughput to South Vietnam and Cambodia this season being
considerably higher than that of last year at this time, and, second, has
allowed the Communists to augment their stockpiles of supplies, particularly
of arms and ammunition. The stockpiles close to combat zones take on
a particular significance as the wet season approaches. Throughput of arms
and ammunition will be able to continue at significant levels despite the
reduction in vehicle activity in the Laotian Panhandle necessitated by heavy
seasonal rains.
Throughput to Cambodia and the B-3 Front(9)
34. Available COMINT intercepts from the tri-border area have been
sufficient to provide a rough estimate of supply throughput to Cambodia
and the B-3 Front from October through March this dry season.(10) The
resulting flow estimate for shipments to Cambodia ranged from 3,300 tons
(18 STPD) to 5,200 tons (28 STPD). These deliveries comprised virtually
all arms, ammunition, and equipment. The B-3 Front estimate is 3,100 tons
(17 STPD) to. 5,100 tons (28 STPD), comprising about one-third food and
about 60% ordnance. The tabulation below summarizes the estimated
throughput.
To Cambodia
October 0
November 300
December 0-300 a/
January 1,400
February 1,600
March 0-1,600 a/
3,300-5,200
0
200
0-200 a/
1,100
1,800
0-1,800 a/
3,100-5,100
0
9. The relationship between these levels of resupply and the enemy's requirement
for sustained offensive action is presented in the section entitled "The Current Enemy
Logistics Situation in South Vietnam."
10. Because the number of days of shipping activity reflected in COMINT is relatively
small, supply flows were calculated using a short tons per day (gross. tonnages divided
by number of days) factor. The composition was derived by averaging shipments to
the B-3 Front which were identified by type. The estimate does not include rice moved
east on Route 19 in northern Cambodia.
- 15 -
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is
Supply Movements into GVN MR 1
Supply Flows from Laos
35. Since the beginning of the dry season the enemy has moved
substantial quantities of supplies from Laos into MR 1, probably on the
order of 3,000 tons. The heaviest supply movement apparently has occurred
along Route 9 where in mid-January - only days after the enemy's
"General Transportation Offensive" in southern Laos had begun -- sensors
indicated a surge in activity. Subsequently, during the period 17 January -
29 February, sensors detected more than 200 trucks moving east along
Route 9 into MR 1. Sensors continued to reflect a high level of activity
during March, which COMINT and collateral information indicated was
associated with supply flows and the movement of heavy artillery into
MR 1. The Communists also have moved large quantities of supplies into
MR 1 over Route 922. According to sensors, since the beginning of the
dry season nearly 300 trucks have moved east over this route. The enemy
also has made use of Routes 925 and 926, although only light to moderate
levels of truck traffic have been detected on these roads during February
and March.
Supply Flows Through the DMZ
36. The Communists have moved significant quantities of supplies
along Routes 103 and 120 across the DMZ to new Route 6086/608(11
for shipments farther south and east in MR 1. In late January, COMINT
revealed substantial deliveries of arms and ammunition to the lower
Panhandle of North Vietnam. COMINT reflected Rear Service units at Vinh
shipped large quantities of 130-mm artillery ammunition to the B-5 Front.
By mid-February, more than 3,500 rounds of this ammunition and 2,500
rounds of 122-mm ammunition had been moved to the DMZ area. Similar
large shipments of other types of ammunition probably were delivered to
the vicinity of the DMZ but were not detected in COMINT. In late February,
nearly 500 rounds of 130-mm ammunition were shipped south from Vinh
with a final destination of South Vietnam.
37. From February through mid-March, sensors indicated that
possibly as many as 100-200 trucks may have entered MR 1 on
Routes 103/120 out of the DMZ. It was not until mid-March, however,
that supplies could have been trucked directly across the DMZ and down
Route 6086/608 to as far south as the Route 9 junction, the main west
11. A year ago, enemy access across the DMZ into MR 1 was limited to foot and
pack trails. By late March, when the Communists began their offensive in MR 1, four
new roads had been built through the DMZ; the Route 6086/608 extensions of
Routes 103 and 120, an extension of Route 102, and an extension of Route 1006.
- 16 -
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to east road in MR 1.(12) Therefore, supplies shipped across the DMZ in
February and early March probably were portered eastward to combat forces
on the many foot and pack trails in the area. Since mid-March, sensors
have indicated a continued flow of truck traffic - possibly another 100
trucks -- moving south out of the DMZ on this road.
38. The North Vietnamese also have moved substantial amounts of
materiel across the DMZ along existing Route 1, although the exact amount
is unknown. Taking advantage of the poor flying weather over northern
MR 1, the North Vietnamese began shipping large quantities of supplies
in late March. On 1 April, rear service elements reported that transportation
forces had begun moving down Route 1, and, by 3 April, 130 vehicles
carrying cargo had moved south. Self-propelled artillery also was noted
moving south across the Ben Hai River. Finally, some supplies may have
entered MR 1 across the DMZ on two other new roads, Routes 102
and 1006. Photography of 29 March also revealed that Route 1006 was
sustaining truck traffic. Total supply movement across the DMZ is
conservatively estimated at 1,500-2,000 tons to the present time.
Current Enemy Logistics Situation in South Vietnam
Military Region 1
39. Because of their proximity to major supply arteries in Laos and
the DMZ, Communist forces in northern South Vietnam operate from a
close and relatively secure logistics base. They have received a substantial
increase in supply flows this year compared with a year ago and, in
conjunction with local procurement of supplies, are in a strong supply
position. Reports of resupply problems (13) in MR 1 have been limited
almost exclusively to. the coastal regions, and even in these areas the
Communists have made some improvements, especially in the Quang Da
Special Zone (Quang Nam Province). They appear logistically capable of
supporting major sustained operations in MR 1 over the next three months
and probably longer: the monsoon rains which affect other areas of South
Vietnam would have less influence on Communist operations in the north.
Supply problems in forward areas could affect the timing of some enemy
actions.
40. To date this dry season the Communists have throughput on the
order of 4,500-5,000 tons of supplies into MR 1 through Laos and across
0
12. Photography on 18 February showed that Route 6086/608 was motorable only
to its junction with Route 925 or about 13 miles north of its junction with Route 9.
Photography of 23 March indicated that the unfinished sections of Route 6086/608
had been completed and were carrying truck traffic to its junction with Route 9.
13. Since last summer, reports of enemy resupply problems throughout South Vietnam
have fallen sharply. While this may be partly a function of reduced reporting, it almost
certainly reflects an improved enemy logistic position.
SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
-7L,vita, 1 Oi. Vi11:,
Sensitive
40 the DMZ. Most of this total has been delivered to western Quang Tri since
January. Although the composition of these supplies is unknown, it is
estimated that food constitutes about 60% of the supplies while the rest
is weapons, equipment, and ammunition - 1,700-1,900 tons. (14)
Communist resupply requirements in MR 1 during all of 1968, a year which
included Tet and two other offensives, amounted to an average of 14 STPD
(consumption and ground losses). A similar expenditure rate, based on
stocks existing at the present time, would permit the Communists to sustain
a continued high level of combat for at least three months.(15) Throughput
subsequent to April could be used to replenish stocks.
Military Region 2
41. Substantial supply deliveries have accompanied the unprecedented
buildup of enemy troops in the B-3 Front area. COMINT has reflected
heavy shipments of ordnance, particularly crew-served artillery and
ammunition, into the area. There were complementary measures designed
to improve the logistics posture of units in the B-3 Front taken late last
year when the enemy shipped large volumes of foodstuffs from the coastal
regions or MR 1 to help satisfy the increased requirements of the augmented
troop strength. A VC cadre, captured on 15 March in Kontum Province,
stated that since early February the North Vietnamese had been transporting
food from B-3 Front rear areas to supply bases located near Kontum City
and that some 1,500 tons of rice had been distributed to battlefield units.
42. Between October 1971 and March 1972 an estimated 3,100-5,100
tons of supplies were delivered to the B-3 Front out of southern Laos. (16)
Weapons, ammunition, and equipment made up a little over half of this
total (1,800-2,950 tons). Because of the recent substantial buildup of
enemy forces and the concomitant upgrading of enemy arms, 1968 combat
levels would probably considerably understate current enemy requirements
for a major sustained engagement in the central highlands. Consequently,
the current estimate for weapons, ammunition, and equipment that would
be required to sustain offensive operations in this area is about 200 tons
per month, somewhat higher than the estimated 1968 average. Detected
shipments of ordnance to the B-3 Front are sufficient for sustained military
operations for several months with reserves available for stockpiling and
14. Given recent enemy attempts to maximize local production/procurement of
foodstuffs, this estimate probably is conservative.
15. IMA believes the current enemy expenditure rate to be considerably higher than
this (20-40 SPTD). Thus, based on this expenditure rate and not allowing for resupply,
the enemy would be capable of sustaining the offensive activity for one or two months.
16. Additional, possibly large, amounts of supplies have also moved to the B-3 Front
via Route 19 in northeast Cambodia.
SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
for cushioning the impact of losses resulting from air strikes. There could,
of course, be distribution problems, particularly in the forward areas. (17)
Southern South Vietnam
43. Between October 1971 and March 1972 the enemy probably
delivered about 3,300-5,200 tons of weapons, ammunition, and equipment
into Cambodia. As much as 2,200 tons of this amount went to meet
requirements in Cambodia itself; the residual of 1,100 to 3,000 tons was
available for satisfying requirements in GVN MRs 3 and 4. Minimum
resupply requirements in MRs 3 and 4 during that time period amounted
to about 700 tons. The remaining tonnage would be adequate to sustain
major operations in MR 3, but insufficient to meet the required amount
for both MRs 3 and 4. If the enemy has had some undetected success
in sea infiltration, adequate supplies might be available for both military
regions. The distribution and prepositioning of these stocks by a weakened
logistics infrastructure within MRs 3 and 4, however, continues to be an
impediment to major sustained military engagements.
Military Region 3
44. Following the Allied cross-border incursions in early summer of
1970, the Communists began to rebuild their rear support apparatus and
to expand their cross-border supply links to MRs 3 and 4. Beginning about
mid-1971, the VC/NVA logistic units had established new supply routes,
and some supplies were moving again from storage areas in Kampot and
Kompong Cham Provinces into new cache areas close to the Cambodia -
South Vietnam border. Despite several s oiling operations by ARVN to
disrupt these effort prisoner-of-war interrogations
clearly show that since last summer t 1s reoccupation and supply buildup
in former sanctuary areas has steadily gained momentum.
45. Within Cambodia, no serious threat to the Communist logistic
system currently supporting operations in MR 3 is expected over the next
several months. The Communists can be expected to maintain supply
deliveries from supply depots in Kratie, Chup, and Dambe to bases straddling
the MR 3 border. Following the ARVN withdrawal from Krek in February,
the tempo of enemy logistic activity surged dramatically as evidenced by
the large increase in detected nighttime movement of motor vehicles
between inland depots and the border. At the same time,
an increasing number of enemy caches near the border. Recent
17. DIA believes that approximately half as much tonnage has been delivered to the
B-3 Front and Cambodia. As in MR 1, DIA estimates that intensified combat operations
could be supported for one to two months. Further resupply would depend on the
enemy's ability to move additional supplies from Laos.
SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
25X1
25X1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
aJ1 IS L I arvri.L
Sensitive
?
seizure of enemy caches in MR 3 has provided additional evidence of
Communist success at stockpiling. Data are insufficient by which to quantify
the enemy's logistical position in MR 3, but our judgment is that over
the next three months the Communists will be capable of logistically
supporting major engagements in the border provinces and, if they choose,
gradually increasing the scale and intensity of harassing operations in other
areas of MR 3. Much could depend, however, on the success of Allied
countermeasures and the influence of the approaching wet season on
Communist abilities to prepositon supplies in forward areas. Overall, while
we credit the enemy with an improving logistic capability in MR 3, the
evidence suggests that he could not sustain a prolonged main force offensive
in that area.
Military Region 4
?
46. Enemy sanctuaries opposite MR 4 were not as severely disturbed
by the Allied incursions into Cambodia in 1970 as were those farther north.
Large amounts of ordnance were hurriedly relocated by the Communists
into Kampot Province (Cambodia) and parts of Kien Giang Province (South
Vietnam) to escape capture. However, it was not until September 1971
that information appeared indicating that the Communists intended to
reestablish supply channels from Cambodia into northern MR 4. By this
time, small-scale shipments of weapons and ammunition began to move by
sampan south along tributaries of the Mekong River. At about the same
time, another supply route leading into northern MR 4 was found. This
route was used to transport weapons and supplies originating from Chup
into the Mekong Delta. Since mid-1971, according to several informed
sources, resupply activity into southern MR 4 has been taking place using
both overland and seaborne routes. Communist forces in MR 4 may also
be meeting part of their resupply requirements from seaborne deliveries.
Although it is unlikely that any of the 14 attempts by steel-hulled trawlers
at supply infiltration this dry season were successful, recent reporting
indicates that some small quantities of supplies are being moved from
Cambodia into MR 4 via the Gulf of Siam. Reports of serious supply
shortages, endemic before mid-1971, have tapered off since then.
47. The enemy's supply situation at present should enable the
Communists to sustain several highpoints -- such as are now occurring --
and a commitment to the use of indirect fire attacks - mortar and rocket
shellings. However, major main force operations like those currently under
way in MR 1 and those expected in the B-3 Front seem unlikely.
SECRET SPOKE
Sensitive
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/07: LOC-HAK-559-30-17-0
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