ASSESSMENT OF NVA/VC INTENTIONS IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 4, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
V
04 June 1970
041130Z ZYH ZFF-6 ZFF-3
From: General Abrams, COMUSMACV, Saigon, Vietnam
DIA review
completed
To: General Wheeler, CJCS, Washington, D. C.
. Admiral McCain, CINCPAC
CONFIDENTIAL Section one of three MAC 7583 EYES ONLY
Info: LtGen Weyand
ZEM
Subject: Assessment of NVA/VC Intentions in Cambodia
1. During the past week an assessment has been prepared on NVA/VC
intentions in Cambodia as reflected in documents captured during the
cross-border operations. This assessment has been presented to
Ambassadors Bunker and Berger and is forwarded for your information.
2. "NVA/VC intentions in Cambodia as reflected in captured documents.
Following is an analysis of the content of several documents which have
been uncovered in the course of the Cambodian cross-border operations.
The documents are all dated prior to the commencement of the U. S.
incursions into Cambodia except for one which is undated. They express
very clearly the intentions of the NVA/VC with regard to Cambodia. In
summary, these intentions are: (1) to help Sihanouk establish his Royal
Government of National Union in Cambodia by establishing local communist
administration, (2) to work for the formation throughout Cambodia of a
pro-communist front organization, and (3) to bolster the local Cambodian
Guerrilla Forces (Khmer Rouge).
"Perhaps the best indication of exactly what the enemy intends comes
from captured documents, for they contain the NVA/VC's intentions in
their own words. In the course of the cross-border operations, approxi-
mately 5. 5 tons of enemy documents have been obtained so far. Many of
the documents have already provided important information.
to present an extremely accurate picture.
"The documents which are the subject of this analysis are the ones
dealing with NVA/VC intentions in Cambodia as expressed prior to the
cross-border operations. No documents on this subject have been found
of the calibre of COSVN Resolution No. 9. Rather, the evidence is a
compilation of many minor documents such as directives, memoranda,
notebooks, circulars, lesson plans, and letters. Combined, they appear
C05099176
EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
EYES ONLY - 2 -
"Generally, it can be said that after the change of the regimes in
Phnom Penh, the enemy became very concerned about carrying out, in
accordance with his timetable, his objectives in South Vietnam. In
order to ensure the favorable internal strategic position of his sanctuaries,
the enemy recognized that it would be necessary to either replace the Lon
Nol Regime with the more sympathetic Sihanouk in order to obtain the
status quo ante or at least to secure Cambodia east of the Mekong and to
harass the Lon Nol government to. such an extent that it would not be able
to put any pressure on the sanctuaries. This strategy, of course, discounts
the possibility of any ARVN/US incursions. In order to carry out this
strategy, it was necessary for the NVA/VC to intensify their military and
political activities in Cambodia.
"For the purpose of this analysis, the captured documents have been
categorized according to the following subject matters: (1) those that deal
with the establishment of Cambodian front groups and local communist
government administrations and with the bolstering of the role of the
Khmer Rouge, (2) those that deal with the role of the NVA/VC military
in the work, and (3) those that deal with fostering the spirit of unity between
the Vietnamese and Cambodians.
"First, those documents dealing with the methods the communists plan
to use to form pro-Sihanouk front committees and local governmental
administrations and to bolster the local insurgent forces will be examined.
"A six-page guide, which was undated and which is believed to have
been drafted by an agency subordinate to the political staff department of
Headquarters, SVNLA, was found in Kratie Province near Snoul by
elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The guide provides a
plan for the Organization of the National United Front of Cambodia at
hamlet and village level. The guide begins by explaining the characteristics
and mission of the Front committees: 'The Front committee will function
as a new administration to replace the present government. It will serve
as the leading organ of the working class and to those patriotic people who
wish to support Prince Sihanouk in his struggle against the Lon Nol clique
and the U. S. ; and to develop a tight friendship and solidarity with the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the South Vietnam Liberation
Army. ' Among the specific missions listed in the guide for the Front
committees are the tasks of overthrowing the Lon Nol Regime, improving
Khmer-Vietnamese solidarity against the Americans, organizing the
people in liberation associations such as youth's, women's, and old
people's groups, building up the local armed forces of the Cambodian
Liberation Army, and organizing other village and hamlet Front committees.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
EYES ONLY
Section two of three:
"The guide then outlines with great specificity the structure of the .
village and hamlet committees. The village committees are to be composed
of from five to seven members. The committee chairman is to be in charge
of general administration and political organization, and the vice chairman
is to be in charge of military and security affairs. The secretary is to
handle all informational problems, and other members are to manage
cultural affairs, education, Front organization activities, and civil health
matters. At hamlet level, the Front committees are to have from three
to five members, according to the guide.
"During the period before permanent regulations are promulgated,
the Front committee members are to be elected every six months.
Concerning the qualification necessary for those who wish to run for a
committee position, the guide says that the following criteria are necessary:
(1) the individual must have won the complete confidence of the village or
hamlet concerned, (2) he must have displayed a clear-cut attitude against
Lon Nol and in favor of Sihanouk, and (3) he must have displayed a favorable
attitude toward the Vietnamese people and the South Vietnam Liberation
Army, in the. resistance against the Americans. In addition, lower -echelon
committee members who are elected must be approved by the immediately
higher echelon committee.
"Another document pertaining to the formation of the Front was found
by the 1st Cavalry Division in the FISHHOOK base area of the Headquarters
of the SVNLA. The document, which is dated 1 May, is entitled 'Summary
of the Situation of 12 Villages in the Base Area.' The document is a report
which concerns political activities of an unidentified agency from 11 to 30
April. The report states that Phase One, which lasted from l l to 12 April,
consisted of political reorienting cadre and troops. Phase Two from 12 to
30 April concerned activating Cambodian Guerrilla Forces and establishing
an infrastructure. At the end of the period, the goal was to have local
Khmer Rouge administrations in five of the 12 villages which were the
subject of the report.
"A directive of the Military Affairs Party Committee of Headquarters
SVNLA, dated 27 March 1970, outlines a number of ways with which to
contact Cambodian officers. This document was found southeast of Snout.
in Krapie Province. It explains the technique for approaching Cambodian
officers to convince them to change their allegiance to Sihanouk. At the
conclusion the document reads, 'We should point out to them that their
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
1P 1P
EYES ONLY
duty is to save their country. It should also be pointed out to these
officers that we are ready to provide them with every assistance, including
cadre and armed forces.'
"An element of the U. S. 9th Infantry Division captured an NVA
soldier's notebook in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border. In
an entry dated 18 April, the soldier said that he was assigned to activate
guerrilla elements and to form the Cambodian National United Front in
certain named hamlets and villages in Kompong Chom Province, Cambodia.
He was also responsible for training guerrilla forces in his area.
"A review of the enemy's political activity was found in a report
uncovered in Kompong Chom Province, dated 19 April. The report
summarizes a meeting held by representatives of the base area security
committee of COSVN.
"The fact that the communists intended to increase controlled area,
to control the Vietnamese populace of Cambodia, and to use the'Mekong
as a possible LOC is expressed in the following section of the report:
'At present we are striving to expand our areas of activities and exercise
control in them. We now control an area stretching from Road 7 to the
vicinity of the Mekong River, and from Mimot to an area adjacent to the
Mekong River. This is an important base area. We had to establish a
base area of 60 kilometers in every direction in order to hold the 60 to
70, 000 people who have completely sided with Sihanouk. In addition, some
thousands of Vietnamese residents are now living along the bank of the
Mekong River. This Mekong area may fit the transportation, postal
communication, and signal communication strategy.'
"The second category of documents are those which deal with the
role of the NVA/VC military in carrying out the establishment of the Front.
A very detailed notebook of the Signal Office of the Military Staff Department
of Headquarters SVNLA was found in the Mimot area. The entry for
18 April states that NVA/VC cadre will head local forces companies
composed of Cambodian combatants. In addition, signal battalions were
to be organized by Headquarters SVNLA for the use of the revolutionary
movement. The signal battalions are to be used in all provinces, and
military regions. The notebook also contains a study of an unspecified
directive which relates that the immediate mission of the NVA/VC in
1970 is to support the local revolutionary movement, to consolidate base
areas, and to complete combat preparations for attacks on Cambodian
troops.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
1P
"Two documents, both of them notebooks, concern the activities
of the 141st Regiment, 7th NVA Division. One notebook captured in
Kratie Province states that the purpose of Campaign X in Cambodia
is to destroy the forces of Lon Nol. Areas which are occupied are to
be held until they are transferred to the Khmer Rouge. In addition,
the document says that all attacks should be conducted in close coordi-
nation with the establishment of the infrastructure. The second notebook,
which was captured in Kompong, Chain Province, also talks about
Campaign X. It states that the NVA troops are helping the Khmer people
develop a socialist country, but while doing so, they are creating a
situation advantageous for the liberation of South Vietnam.
"The final type of document to be examined today are those which
give guidelines to members of the NVA/VC for fostering Khmer-Vietnamese
solidarity. Headquarters SVNLA has adopted a ten-point code of conduct
to govern the conduct of North Vietnamese soldiers toward the local Khmer
populace. The code, which has been found in several captured documents,
is quite specific. For instance, it mentions proper conduct with regard
to monks, religious institutions, and Khmer women. It also covers the
necessity to pay for any damage and to compensate for all food.
"In the Mimot area, a Headquarters SVNLA regulation was found
entitled 'Battlefield Discipline for Troops Operating in Cambodia. ,; One
interesting section says, 'Do not reveal the presence of the SVNLA in
Cambodia. Do not carry documents. Do not speak Vietnamese while
in the presence of PW.'
"In summary, these documents are clearly indicative of the intentions
of the NVA/VC to foster a communist, pro-Sihanouk revolutionary move-
ment in Cambodia. The optimum goal would be to install a pro-communist
government in Cambodia to restore the status qu6 ante with regard to
sanctuaries and supply routes. This appears to be a long-range effort
consistent with the strategy of protracted conflict, for the NVA are
presently working at the lowest levels with much attention to detail to
build a popular base for Sihanouk much as they have attempted to do for
the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam.
"From the documents, it would appear that country-wide military
action will not occur in Cambodia until the Khmer Rouge have been
strengthened to the point where they would be able to effectively serve
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
as infrastructure cadre throughout Cambodia. Also, large-scale action
by the NVA prior to the solid establishment of the revolutionary movement
in Cambodia would prevent such military activity from having the aura of
a 'popular uprising, ' which is usually a critical element in NVA actions.
"Until this long-range goal can be accomplished, the NVA will
probably attempt to solidify their position east of the Mekong and to
secure a new line of communications from Laos on the Sekong-Mekong
Rivers. It is also likely that the Khmer Rouge will intnesify their
activities in those key areas where they are now located, especially in
the rice-rich Western Province of Battambang. "
We will continue to monitor and keep you informed.
EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11yy/04 : LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
.U L;i,)Jlw
0 1 r
SECRT 9' NO FOREIGN DISSLOM
SIGN:fZI:CANCB OF E1\'F'??'lY CAPTU :FD IN CM,i;ODIIA
1.
Preliminary Analysis
Headquarters, M(CV, has reported that the Combined
Documents Exploitation Center (CDEC) in Saigon hy.s received and
processed well over 2.8 mill:Lon pages (about 5.5 tons) of ener:ly
documents captured as a result of Allied operations in Cambodia.
bevera-l thousand more pages are in the pip l:i_ne from the field
to CDEC, and mnorc are being uncovered every day.
-~ The clocumcnts captured vary from complex operations
orders and financial plans to such ordinary items as per. sonal
letters. The more prevalent categories include operations orders;
cryptographic and signal materials; terrorist plans; medical,
logistic, personnel, and infiltration records; and political.,
personnel, and educational materials.
-?- Approximately 5,500 synopses of captured documents
have been received by this Agency. The vast majority were dis-
covered in or near Base Areas 352 and 353 in the Fishhook area,
the long---time location of COSVN headquarters elements. Most of
the other documents were captured in or near Base Areas 706 and
367 it, the Parrot's Beak region. The presence of such large
auan ti_ties at these capture sites attests to the use of these
Cambodian regions by the VC/,VW to support their war effort in
the Republic of Vietnam.
b. Significance
--- Documents screened thus far ind:icate that they will
make an important contribution to our tinders to ding of Hanoi's
mil.itery-political organization in the South. On the one hand,
they provide significant new information; on the other, they
provide comprehensive details or corroborate our judgments con-
cerning the wide scope of VC/NVA activities in Southeast Asia.
At least 20 per cent of the documents recovered thus
far are highly significant. Additional valuable documents will
undoubtedly be found as in-depth analysis is perforuieci.
SECREP E O FOR YGi'l` D7 a i3~i.l
po: S I~qi.' f
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
- [;4r a 4?:.,....-, . -
c. Spec ia.l?-Interest Documents
---- Examples of Some of the subjects covered by the
documents are:
of Viet?"aiu;
(1) North Vietnamese infiltration into the Republic
(2) The Communist rl11.l_!-L ry-.po.L:i't?ic'ai organization
and its policies in the Republic of Vietnam and Cambod!.a;
(3) Strengths and compos..Lti on of enemy units; and
(l~). `J'he Comnuri s"t; :Logis"1; ..crs sty ucture.
-- Examples of the:i.r, significance follow in succeeding
paragraphs.
d. x11:r1.ltrration
- Documents recovered in the Fishhook and Parrotls Doak
again make i-i; crystal clear that the -vrar in the Republic of Vietnam
constitutes nothing less than a North Vietnamese invasion --- despite
Hanoi's protestations that it is a Legitimate poi ulcer up_:-:i sing.
A diary captured in early May that was kept by a key
north Vietnamese military officer named. Mai Van Tung;, for example,
confirmed that the in "il_tra.tiion of NVA troops into the Republic
would intensify dr zn3 the period December 1969-July 1970 and
that it vrould. peak from February to April. I)ocumersts al. o point
up the prune role of North Vietnam in the wai in the South. Special
straggler recovery and replacement regiments (subordinate to a
COS VN headcluartors echelon and located in the Fishhook-Parr. ot's
Beak area in Cambodia) had the mission of making sure that any
troops delayed on the trek south were swiftly moved to the fight-
ing front; these units were also responsible for evacuating the
sick and wounded.. Mai. Van Tune recorded that during the first
three months of 1970 an a.11:f:i.:Ltrationn-ey.f-= l."i,s?ation processing
unit would receive up to 15 southbound infiltration groups and
1,000 convalescents being evacuated to the north. On 5 March
19'.(O, he noted, that more than )_,200 sick and- wounded vrou?d be
heading north from one area alone.
SECR1::. T NO FOIi? I_GiWT DIF"T,_ t 2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
e. Communist Political-military Organization/Policies
-~ Documen-tn have provided valuable insights into the
history, composition, function, organization, personalities, and
effectiveness of the widely dispersed COSVN organization, the so-
called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG),
and the VC/NVA military force structure.
_.. We now know, for example, that COSVN elements had
undertaken a phased turnover of certain functions to the PRG as,
part of a plan to turn the latter into a viable organization; for
its part,.the PRG is, to hold a series of well-publicized cabinet
meetings and conferences with sympathetic outsiders in an effort
to generate support. Rosters of high-ranking cadre attached to
the various elements of the Communist apparatus in the South as
well as finance and economy records give us a better idea of the
strength of key enemy military and political elements opposing the
South Vietnamese. They also contain specific guidance concerning
the imposition of "taxes" on the South Vietnamese and the "life-
and-death" necessity of food production to support the fighting
forces.
-- One of the most revealing documents outlines an
insurgency campaign in Cambodia. It noted the necessity of
establishing an organization to (1) destroy and replace the Lon Nol
government, (2) maintain good friendship between the Vietnamese
Communists and the Cambodians, and (3) to resist US forces.
Specific guidance included the establishment of a "Red" Cambodia,
the formation of "liberation organizations" among various elements
of the population down to the hamlet and village level, and the
expansion of the local Communist forces and "liberation areas"
where an infrastructure could be fostered. The document makes
it clear that the Communist infrastructure in Cambodia was not
considered effective and that Hanoi will control all efforts to
overthrow the new Cambodian government. The recent capture of
this document comes in the wake of the Cambodian claims of the
discovery of plans in the PRG Embassy in Phnom Penh calling for
the elimination of "rightists" in the Lon Nol government and even
Prince Sihanouk himself.' Also, documents the Cambodians report
that were seized from the North Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh
called for the eventual annexation of Cambodia to Communist
Vietnam (the PRG and North Vietnamese documents are not in US
intelligence possession).
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
Concerning strictly r,z:t:l.it::ax?y r~ratters in Cambodia., some
35 dot nent,,:; screened so far erpha.si zed the dor.iinant position of
COSVrN,: the necer:ssity of posi-t:i.o?n:i..ng co;rrsnan.i rtn-corztrc~:l and
logistics support el.cn!erri,, in Cafurbodia, and the crucial importance
of these elcnsents to fighting tu):i.ts in the Republic of Vietnam.
The VC/NVA's heavy reliance on Cambodian sanctuaries to support
the: war, especially in the F:i.sblrook and Parrot's BWa)..L areas, is
shown by the identification of spc-cial security and guax'c'! e.1 'cents
there and by the de to il_ed planning that has tal, e i pl a c:e to ensure
safety. Some of the documents contained orders and plans for - the
evacuation and cl3 spersa -. of military and logistics elements and
fac:tl:i.ties after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk and for passive air
defense measures to be employed by C0S\riV echelons. The adverse
impact of kilied cperatlons on enemy morale was also apparent.
'. Strengths and Composition of Enemy Units
Documents captured in Cambodia generally appear to be
more comprehensive thar) any taken in the Rrepub"-ic of V etna)r, s .nce
they contain data used for high--level planning. As :such, they w:i.11_
enable us to refine our enemy strength estimates for both fighting
and support units.
..w As previously noted, new enemy units have been identGif:Led
(straggler and recovery rc i ment~~) . Also, the strength and organiza?-
t:ion. of enemy force: , in areas such as the Western fi:i.ghla)ids can be
asses, sect and fol_l.owed with more precision. Documenta-r: y identifieat:i.on
of the manning anr' scope of support elements in Cambodia such as
hospitals, transj- _?tation facilities, and farming units should in
.time permit the first full-scale assessment of the enemy's over-all
effort in the sanctuary areas.
g. Enemy Lo istics Structure
So far, . the documents have been least informative about
the enemy logistic structure in Cca boiia and its day.-to-day operations.
Those that have referred to this subject have, however,
made it clear that an extensive logistics organization had been
estab.-Lished and that it was supporting the war in 2d, 3d, and 4--1?h
Corps. Concern for the safety of supply ca.chces, especially rice and
am i iunition, was. also cle~:x?, especially in view of tine growing enemy
fear of A11ied operations in Cambodia. An i nvento-ry of tra.nspor -at I.on
assets of a Cp{~`'i`i 511J~J-'d1_nate Rear Ser-:1.cc Staff Department the
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3
document vas captt'.:rc:d in the Parrot's 7 eak ..~ provide., a better
understanding of the extensive organization of primitive means of
transportation -- oxcarts, bicycles, sampans, etc., -??- in the
Mekong DeJ:t.a. More such _i.nforination may troll peradt the
quantification of the enemy's effort in this regard and thus
enable even more effective disruption of these logistics
opex at:ions.
-? As a w i nirnrm, enemy docurmrents captured in Cambodia
provide further evide nee of the Communists' re_.la.fce on that country
to support their war effort in the Republic of Vietnam.
This reliance takes almost every, form, Lq;., the
establishment of com.m nd--and-control elements; the supervision of
military and. subversive operationy in both countries, including
plans to overthrow the legitimate government; and the e >tabl shment
of an extensive rear services organization which performs such
functions as caring for the sick ana ,rounded; organ_i ring the flow
of supplies to combat units, maintaining storage conTlexcs and
performing economic, postal, and commnunications services. Although
not explicitly stated, the documents themselves make clear that the
enemy's use of Ca.mboli.a, especially the Parrot's Beak and the
Fishhook, has been essential to the continuation of the war in the
Republic of Vietnam.
.k, . f T4Ci _},q 1LD %~'2 ,T, 1
C - 5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/04: LOC-HAK-6-2-9-3