LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-61-2-2-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 6, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION
653
SECRET (XGDS) February 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY
SUBJECT; Lebanese-Israeli Border Problems
The attached memo from William Colby and the Interagency Memorandum
deal with the threat of serious Israel-fedayeen fighting in South Lebanon.
They note that the present messy situation could develop into one which
would have "broader negative impact, especially on the prospects for
diplomatic movement concerning the Golan Heights and the Palestinians. "
This is a very real threat, which could become a very disruptive reality
within a few days time should Syrian President Asad and the PLO leader-
ship decide--as they did prior to Rabat--to work together to block our
negotiating strategy because they believe it offers them no hope. Without
strong Syrian support, it would be most unlikely that the PLO could
mount enough of an operation to disrupt negotiations.
My memoranda to you of January 15 and January 22 discuss this threat
in its Lebanese-Israeli and the Syrian aspects, respectively. They
include some suggestions on what practical, realistic measures the US
might consider to alleviate the threat posed by developments in South
Lebanon. The Strategy Paper prepared by NEA and NSC for your upcoming
trip to the Middle East also notes this problem and suggests practical
measures which you might take to deal with it, particularly in your talks
with the Israelis and Syrians, but perhaps also with the Egyptians and
Soviets.
XGDS - 1, 2, 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET (XGDS)_
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
30 January 1975
Office of the Director
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT . Intelligence Alert Memorandum: Possible Ramifications
of Serious Hostilities in Southern Lebanon
1. We are concerned that a resumption of serious Israeli-
fedayeen fighting in southern Lebanon will have a broader negative
impact, especially on the prospects for diplomatic movement concerning
the Golan Heights and the Palestinians.
2. It is not hard to imagine more extensive Syrian involvement
in the fighting and Damascus becoming much more obstinate in its over-
all Middle East negotiating strategy. Likewise a serious deteriora-
tion of the security situation on Israel's northern border would only
reinforce Tel Aviv's reluctance to take any meaningful steps toward
recognizing or dealing with the Palestinians. It would also confirm
Israeli suspicions about Syria's willingness ever to offer political
concessions or to hold to the terms of agreements already reached.
The fedayeen, moderates and extremists alike, are collectively
strengthened by any hostilities short of all-out war, and those
elements most strongly opposed to compromise benefit the most.
3. Attached is an Interagency Memorandum spelling out the
intelligence Community's concerns in more detail. It was drafted by
CIA and coordinated with DIA and State/INR.
4. All elements of the Intelligence Community are alerted to
the potential seriousness of this situation. It is being closely
monitored and new developments will be reported in current intelligence
publications and further Alert Memoranda, as appropriate.
Colby
rector
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SLCC 'Et
Possible Ramifications of Serious
Hostilities in Southern Lebanon
Secret
DC!/N!O 227-75
30 January 1975
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30 January 1975
POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF SERIOUS
HOSTILITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON*
Introduction
1. Prolonged hostilities in southern Lebanon on the scale
that occurred during mid-January have the potential to lead to
the introduction into Lebanon of greater numbers of Syrian weapons
and troops. This almost certainly would draw a strong.Israeli
military and political response. These developments, singly or
together, would threaten the stability of the Beirut government
and substantially increase the likelihood of major clashes among
the Lebanese, fedayeen, and Israeli forces. They might also
affect the peace settlement process.
2. The following is a summary of the military and political
ramifications for Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and the Palestinians
in the event of a recurrence of hostilities such as occurred
earlier this month. At that time, fedayeen attacks on Israeli
patrols in southern Lebanon prompted very heavy Israeli shelling
of suspected guerrilla units in Lebanese villages and led
to a brief foray into Lebanon by Israeli tanks.
Syria
3. Damascus has provided assistance to the fedayeen in
southern Lebanon to help protect Syria's flank, to stiffen fed-
ayeen resistance to Israeli military operations, and to make
counterterrorism more costly to the Israelis. Syria has done
nothing to discourage the fedayeen from mounting cross-border
raids on Israel from southern Lebanon. The Syrians probably see
some advantage in keeping tensions high along the Lebanese-Israeli
border so long as the fedayeen do not provoke the Israelis into
occupying southern Lebanon, attacking Syria, or breaking off
peace negotiations.
4. If Syria wished to increase tensions in southern Lebanon
it could introduce additional Syrian-controlled units of Saiqa, the
Palestine Liberation Army, or Fatah's Yarmuk Force into the area
T ie memorandum was prepare under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. It was drafted by CIA
and coordinated within DIA and State/INR.
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from Syria at any time. Damascus would deny responsibility for
military actions taken against Israel (or Lebanon) by these
,groups. In addition, although these forces are based primarily
in Syria, there is sufficient ambiguity about the number of their
forces in Lebanon at any one time that it is very difficult for
outsiders to document the movement of additional units into
Lebanon.
5. At the same time that it allowed or encouraged additional
Palestinian forces to enter Lebanon, Syria could provide them
with increased stocks of weapons and with more Syrian advisors.
Damascus has in the past provided the fedayeen, or allowed them
to use Syrian territory for the transit of, large amounts of
weapons, including anti-aircraft guns, a few armored personnel
carriers with anti-tank missiles, and hand-held SA-7 surface-to-
air missile.s.... In addition, Syrian troops have advised the Pales-
tinians in the use of these weapons and in general military tactics.
that there were at least 100 to 25X1
150 Syrian advisors in Lebanon in mid-January. They are located
both in the Palestinian refugee camps and at fedayeen training
bases in the south.
6. In the event of much heavier or prolonged fighting between
the fedayeen and the Israelis, Damascus could send more regular
Syrian forces into southern Lebanon. At first,-such a move would
be concealed and denied; later, in more serious circumstances,
acknowledged and defended. Syrian forces might bring with them
weapons heretofore used in Lebanon only in the northern Mount
Hermon area, particularly SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles, despite
Israeli warnings that such a move would not be tolerated.
7. If the Syrians took steps to become more directly involved
in the conflict between the fedayeen and the Israelis, they would
almost certainly also become much more obstinate in their overall
Middle East negotiating strategy. Damascus would be likely to
push harder for the reconvening of the Geneva peace talks, break
off participation in any step-by-step negotiations until the local-
ized conflict in southern Lebanon had ended, and threaten not to
renew the UNDOF mandate.
8. Syria would not allow its participation in the feday_een-
Israeli conflict in southern Lebanon to draw it into an attack
on Israeli forces in the Golan Heights. Damascus would take that
step only if convinced that the Israelis were preparing imminently
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to carry the fighting beyond southern Lebanon toward Syrian
positions in Syria or to occupy areas of Lebanon bordering on 25X1
Syria, or as part of a general Syrian offensive if all hope
for peace negotiations was lost.
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25X1
Lebanon
15. The Lebanese are both the most affected by and the least
able to control any escalation of fighting in southern Lebanon.
Beirut is concerned above all to avoid a direct confrontation
between Lebanese and fedayeen forces, then to avoid the introduc-
tion into Lebanon of a significant number of Syrian troops, and
finally to limit Israeli operations in pursuit of the fedayeen.
16. At a minimum, prolonged fighting between the fedayeen
and Israelis in southern Lebanon would fuel attacks on the
Lebanese government by its domestic critics, including the rep-
resentatives of southerners displaced by the fighting. It would
also increase the pressure on the Beirut government from Arab
governments, particularly the more radical ones eager to provide
military assistance to bolster Lebanon's ability to defend
against Israeli attack. These pressures, if buttressed by
embarrassing evidence of the Lebanese army's inability or reluct-
ance to defend Lebanon, could lead to a succession of weak,
ineffective governments or, in the extreme case, to the upset of
Lebanon's delicately balanced governmental system.
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17. Lebanese forces would seek to avoid the option of join-
ing into any military confrontation in southern Lebanon, whether
with the fedayeen, Israelis, or Syrians. A significant deteri-
oration of the security situation in Lebanon could ultimately
lead, however, to the resum tion of Lebanese-feda een fighting
such as occurred during Ma 1973. The capability and willingness
o the Lebanese army to engage in a showdown with the fedayeen
have diminished since 1973, with the result that a new out-
break of fighting would almost certainly be more destructive
than that of 1973, particularly in the urban areas.
Palestinians
19. Fedayeen forces in southern Lebanon have sufficient
mobility that an escalation of fighting will work to their polit-
ical benefit while carrying little risk of serious military set-
back. Although leaders of the several fedayeen organizations
are divided on whether to emphasize cross-border terrorism or
or more conventional military attacks on Israeli patrols, they
are collectively strengthened by any hostilities short of all-
out war. Widely publicized military action strengthened the
positions of these leaders with their Palestinian followers, and
wins them additional financial and military assistance from
the other Arabs. This assistance, although designed to
strengthen the Palestinians' ability to strike at Israel and
defend against Israeli attack, also strengthens their ability to
stand up to the Lebanese. The moderate Arab states offer this
aid for political reasons, and would be opposed to the fedayeen
using it to launch large-scale hostilities with the Israelis
or the fedayeen.
20. The most valuable result of hostilities in southern
Lebanon, so far as the relatively moderate fedayeen leaders
are concerned, is that it focuses international attention on
the Palestinian problem. `o long as the Israelis are pre-
occupied with the security _)f their northern border, the Pales-
tinians believe, they are 14ss likely to make concessions that
could facilitate the concluion of further peace agreements with
Syria or Egypt. This forcE-, the principal Arab states not only
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to remain mindful of Palestinian interests, but to emphasize to
the major powers that the Palestinians must play a central role
in any future peace negotiations or settlement.
21. Units of the radical fedayeen organizations that
cooperate in the Rejection Front would applaud a resumption of
serious fighting in southern Lebanon and would point to it as
evidence to support their claim that negotiations with Israel
are destined to fail. Radical elements would of course seek
to drag out any such fighting, and would seize every opportunity
to transform it into a resumption of general Arab-Israeli
hostilities.
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