HEROIN TASK FORCE MEETING, MONDAY, AUGUST 17, AT 3 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-7-5-29-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 15, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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On-file TREA, NSC,
HHS/HEW release
instructions apply
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CONFIDE TIA L I1 FORMATION
August 15, 070
MEMORANDUM FOR}R. KISSING ER
FROM: Helmet Sonnenfeldt
OSD, DEA Reviews
Completed
SUBJECT: Heroin Task Force Meeting, Monday, 1 agsaest 17, at 3 p. m.
In view of the apparent strong differences of opinion within the bureaucracy
on our goals and interests in Turkey, you requested the N orkiug Party
of the Task Force to prepare a memo setting out an agreed factual assess-
ment and alternative courses of action. This memo and a covering summary
are at Tab A. Or August 7, you sent the mew to all members of the Task
Force and suggested that it serve as the basis for the meeting (Tab B).
The last Task Force meeting was on Jaime 9, was chaired by Dr. Moynihan.,
and covered a variety of subjects other than Turkey (a sununary is at Tab C).
Your main purpose at the meeting. will be to reach agreement that we will
not apply sanctions to Turkey over the opium issue. In recent months,
Treasury has been attempting to hold up PL 480 programs for Turkey and
deesire& even stronger measures. It will also be important to secure the
agreement of all members that every effort should be made to prevent publicity
of our dealings with the Turks an this, so that unfortunate effects of the recent
extremely adverse Turkish reaction to public pressure can be reduced.
During the meeting, Treasury (Rosaid.eaa) will insist most strongly can o.sin25X1
economic sanctions, and will charge that we have been too soft on the Turks.
ef,ense will probably argue against any actions that might 25X1
make the Turks become uncooperative with respect to our military
activities in Turkey, State will argue that the Turks
are already taking helpful actions, and that they can be brought along further
without sanctions or massive financial incentives. 25X1
OSD & DOJ review complete
pages 1-3
Talking Point
It might be beet to begin the meeting by asking Ambassador Handley to
present an assessment of the current situation in Turkey.
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ID/ 0
~I or FOR FILE
RE.C'D FROM _-_-14__ OI! -_ ---
NO INDICATION OF ORIGI AYOR OR ADDRrSSIwi~'S
FOLLOW UP ACTION, DISTR, OR D1STRLUUTiON...-.-
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CONFIDENTIAL
Following that, turn to the Working- Part memorandum (T,;-b A) and refer
to come of the more important assessments in the memo:
_- that Turkey's illicit opium must be cut before more than marginal
success can be achieved in cuffing other sources of illegal opium traffic
(p. 11);
-- that the increased smuts of opium available from Afghanistaan
India, Iran, Pakistan and Thailand, or example, are entirely capable of
filling the gaps left by the elimination of illicit Turkish opium (p. 4);
-- that even if we got the Turks to plow under this year's fall planting
of poppy, we have no basis to conclude that there will be any redaction in
heroin imports into the US in the foreseeable future as a result (p. 11).
Turn to the question of our owtctives. Five alternative* are listed on
page 10. Before inviting discussion, you may wish to make the following
comments:
-- the first two goals listed appear wholly unrealistic since they would
require the Turkist actions inconsistent with the Government decree of July,
under which plantings were permitted at least through 1971 in four provinces;
-- it would seem sounder for as to concentrate our efforts on elilmting
the diversion of opium into illicit channels, through licensing (ouch a law may
be passed by the Parliament in November) and other control measures in
the way that the Indians seem to be able to control their opium production
(the largest in the world);
-.. admittedly it is somewhat aarti.cial to consider goals without
reference to meets. but it might be of use to see if the meeting could
reach a consensus on a goal, preferably one that would place prime stress
on eliminating ill sit diversion, and secondary emphasis on eliminating
production at some point, perhaps by 1972.
Reaching the issue of the proper as0he", to eemaploy, you might wish to make
the folinwing comments.
-- > would hope that we could rule out the so-called ' ~ stick' approach
(p. 12), since even the threat of sanctions would have very serious iasa lic a-
ticons for our foreign relations, miUtary interests in Turbey 25X1
(set forth in detail in Annex C ;
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-- the " stick/carrot" approach (p. 14) contains much of the same
difficulty, but compounds It by a rather transparent attempt to split
the military elements of the Taaerkist establishment from the civilian
elements -- dangerous effort unlikely to succeed;
it seems hard to distinguish between the .carrot approach (p. 13)
and the Last alteerna tive (p. IS), except that in the former we seem to be
offering more money and a slightly more friendly attitude;
-- the best approach seems to be one that would make it clear to the
TarWah Government that we are not going to let them off the busk. and that
we will keep up the pressure an them (but without the glare of publicity);
if they really need money to solve the collection and control problem, we
ought to offer it.
N?TEs The best solution under the circumst*fces of the meeting
would be agreement not to threaten sanctions and to allow the
situation to coig for several aerrmonths. This should be coupled
with agreement to of again in November. at which time we
will know whether the key licensing bill will be passed, how
effective the current crop collection process has been, and
it will also precede Prime moister Demireaal's scheduled
visit to Washington in December.
You may wish to rotor to the question of the us SMressional, is terest, and
the probability that legislation will be passed calling an the President to
suspend economic and military assistance with respect to any country he
determines has failed to take appropriate steeps to pr^tvent narcotics flow
(p. 6). You might suggest that the 'l orking Party could be used as the best
mechanism for arriving at an Administration po.itlenees such proposed
legislation.
Baia re closing the meeting, you might wish to instruct the V caking Party
to proper* a report on other steps we are or should be taking an the opium/
heroin question asides from Turkey. For wmuq lee, what are the plans for
UN actions, further actions in CC S, and efforts to prevent the opium sources
in 6 oouth A,,,Ia from filling the gaps we hope will, be left when the Turkish
sources dry up. Such a report from the V orrking Party, providing a context,
would be useful for reporting to the President the results of this meeting
on Trrkey.
A lust of expected participants is at Tab D.
ATaranm
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CONFIDENT,
LRY OF ?;R ING PARTY RX Bfi
our b"ic objective is to eliminate the illegal import of heroin into
the Us. We believe that a majority of the heroin (perhaps as much as 80%
that enters the US through France can be traced to illicit Turkish opium
Thus, we had met as our objective the elimination of poppy plaaafing in
Turkey -- that the planting this fall be the last.
However. the latest decree of the Turkish Government permits plaiting
through 1971 at least. On the positive side, the Turks have reduced the
number of provinces growing poppies from Z1 to 4 since 19117. and this
year the Government is raking intensive efforts for the first time to buy
up the entire crop to keep it out of illicit chamois. in previous years half
the crop was diverted, but this year we estimate the proportion will be sub-
stantially reduced.
Nevertheless, the amount diverted this year is sufficient to provide
enough heroin to meet at least a sul antial part of the US demand for one
year. In light of this. and Turkey's great importance as an illegal source
of opium. it is ea tromeely difficult to achieve arra n but mar inal success
in eeliminatint other sources from illicit traffic unless Twrke 's illicit traffic
t.
Production of Opium in developing countries in the Near fret, South
and Southeast Asia is in flux, and the increased amounts available are
entirely capable of filling the gaps left by the elimination of illicit Turkish
opium. Since we have been unsuccessful in achieving a sudden and dramatic
termination of Turkish opium production, there is considerable doubt whether
the enormous network of processors and smugglers could be flushed out
and suppressed in such a way are to have a significant impact on their ability
ve opearat eon. to many other opium sources. Therefore, even if thsrte
o More opium production is Turkey as of next year, we have no basis
Five alternative goals are listed on p. 10. Two put the Prime stress
on the elimination of Turkish opium production (legal and illegal), while
another two put the prime stress on of inating the diversion into illicit
channels or the legal opium crop. The fifth seeks an end to illegal opium
by 1973 by either of the two methods at the option of the Turks.
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tornative methods of attaining the chosen goal are set out
an pp. 12-16. The "stick,, approach would deny or substantially reduce
accession to Turkish AID requests, including the current request for wheat
under PL 480. The ?carrot, approach attempts to create a cooperative
atmosphere by eliminating unilateral US pressure. and by providing
substantial financial inducements to the Tutks. The third approach, the
"carrot/stick," combines bath Incentives and denials by first increasing
our support of Turkish military interests and almost sixltaneously
diminishing our assistance to other elements in Turkey. The final approach
is a continuation c*the present program (including an offer of up to $5
million).
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SECRET Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR
MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK
FORCE ON HEROIN
SUBJECT: Turkey and Illicit Opium
At my request the Chairman of the Working Party of our Task
Force has prepared the enclosed memorandum which considers
alternative goals and methods of implementation with respect
to our efforts to eliminate Turkey as a source of illicit opium.
In the light of recent developments, I think it would be desirable
to convene a meeting of the Task Force during the course of
next week. The Working Party's memorandum should serve as
the basis for our discussion, which should result in an agreed
course of action for the.coming months.
My office will be in contact with yours in order to work. out the
most convenient date and time for the meeting.
CONFI DEN TIA L
SECRET Attachment
Henry A. Kissinger
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WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HEROIN
Meeting of June 9, 1970, at 3 pm
The White House Task Force on Heroin met for 75 minutes in the
Roosevelt Room. The meeting was chaired, in Dr. Kissinger's absence,
by Dr. Moynihan; a list of participants is attached.
Surnmar Conclusions
1. The State Department will cable Embassy Ankara and request an
assessment of how the Turks are complying with their commitment
to buy up the entire current poppy harvest. In addition, Ambassador
Handley will be instructed to consult with Prime Minister Demirel to
reach agreement on the scope and nature of the expected Turkish announce-
ment at the CCMS meeting.
2. NATO countries should be advised of our strong interest in assuring that
the CCMS meeting on June 18 is productive, and that all contribute. No
mention will be made of the US-Turkish arrangements to those countries
not already informed.
3. As Chairman of the Task Force's Working Party, Mr. Schwartz will
prepare a list of areas in which we might apply pressure on the Turks;
this should include things we could do to the Turks, for the Turks, and
things we could withdraw from them.
Summary Record
At the Chairman's request, Mr. Richardson reviewed and brought up to
date the points in his memo of May'19. He concluded that the decision was
made to open a multilateral channel because that would enable the Turks
to move faster toward elimination of opium production than in response to
direct bilateral US pressure. The CCMS meeting is a vehicle to create a
forum for the Turks to announce further measures as well as to move toward
a wider international conference on the entire drug problem. Mr. Kleindienst
asked if this was considered the best approach solely because of the political
problems within Turkey. In response, Mr. Richardson said this was the
result of the very limited bilateral US pressure which could be used as
leverage with the Turks; to press harder would be counterproductive.
Also, the move to the multilateral would enable other countries to bring
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CONFIDENTIAL 2
pressure on the Turks, and would enable the Turks to be in the
company of others in taking its own steps.
After a brief discussion of the arrangements for the CCMS meeting,
the Chairman raised the question of the proposed world ban on ~ pium,
as outlined in Mr. Richardson's memorandum. Mr. Finch commented
that at this time there is really no effective substitute for opium, and
that there would be a host of domestic problems relating to such a
position (including the various state laws on the subject). Dr. Egeberg
expanded on these comments, noting that his preliminary soundings in
the medical community revealed very stiff opposition to any such
suggestion. Opium is used in twenty different medical preparations by
2-4 million people per year, and there is no effective substitute for its
pain-killing and euphoric qualities. The Chairman suggested that, while
it would be useful to raise the question generally in the CCMS meeting, it
probably would not be productive to take further soundings within the US
at this time. In discussion later in the meeting, Mr. Finch and Dr. Egeberg
agreed, and Mr. Finch said that HEW would provide medical advice to
Dr. Moynihan for the CCMS meeting.
Mr. Kleindienst emphasized that forceful action was needed with respect
to the Turks and other countries; that at the moment these countries
considered it in their interest not to eliminate production. Mr. Rossides
picked up this theme, noting the corruption in opium traffic in Turkey.
He referred to Secretary Kennedy's view that next year the AID program
for Turkey should be held up if there was not satisfactory improvement
in the situation. Following the Chairman's expression of concern that
the Turks might not in ,fact be collecting the entire poppy harvest,
Mr. Rossides suggested that the Defense Department consider working
closer with the Turkish military on the opium problem. Mr. Richardson
thought this suggestion was worth pursuing.
The Chairman referred to a recent conversation he had with the President
on the status of the heroin elimination efforts, and also noted that he was
unhappy with the apparent lack of vigor with which Ambassador Handley
was pursuing this matter. Mr. Kleindienst said we needed a very active
Ambassador in Ankara. Mr. Richardson said he was satisfied with the
Ambassador's performance, and that the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister both emphasized to him that the Ambassador had been persistent
on the opium question. Further, the Demirel Government would fall if
it appeared that he responded to direct US pressure on this. Mr. Kleindienst
asked if that assessment assumed that, if Demirel falls, the next govern-
ment would not be as friendly toward the US. Mr. Richardson said that
was correct, unless the generals take over.
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The Chairman asked Mr. Richardson to describe the commitment the
Turks have made to us. Mr. Richardson said it was not very clear:
at a minimum they will reduce the number of provinces for 1972 to
one; at a maximum, elimination in 1971; and the middle ground vaould
be reduction in 1971 to one province. They have been evasive, but
they promised some action at the CCMS meeting. (There was a brief
discussion of the degree of interest held by the other NATO countries,
and of the possibility of suggesting a survey of the narcotic problem
in the NATO armed forces.)
Mr. Kleindienst opined that the CCMS would not accomplish anything,
that the meeting would merely deplore the problem and agree to meet
again. Mr. Richardson reviewed the strategic importance to the US of
a strong Turkish ally, and the delicate political balance within Turkey.
Rhetorically, he asked whether Mr. Kleindienst had any alternative suggestions
as to how better to accomplish the task of eliminating the opium problem.
The Chairman concluded the meeting by summarizing the conclusions
noted above.
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4 Participants at Aagast 17 Heron Task Force Meetin
White Horse;
Mr. Krogh (for Mr. Ehrlichman)
Mr. Blaney* (for Dr. Moynihan)
Under R=cretary Johaion
Ambassador lndley
ty Assistant Secretary Martin B-t-
(A sting ,hairman of the ' orking Party)
Justice: The Attorney General
BNDD Director John ingersol
Uefenae; Admiral Mack
Mr. i34rtimo
Secretary Richardson
Mr. Helms
Treasury: A sistant w ecretary Rosaldes
Mr. Liddy
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