INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT SCENARIOS IN ANOTHER ARAB/ISRAELI WAR

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LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9
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RIPLIM
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S
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8
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January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
November 4, 2010
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8
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MEMO
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No Objection to Decla INI RMA T Li MEMORANDUM FORt FROM: St1BJECT! X331 THE PRESIDENT HENRY A. KISSING.R Intelligence Analysis of Conflict Scenarios in Another Arab/Israeli War or the past year, the Intelligence Community has been engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the. principal factors bearing on another Arab/Israeli war, The result has been reported in a National Iaetelli- gere Analytical Memorandum (HIAM) (lab A) which treats several possible scenarias of renewed hostilities. The -ae; or findings of the NIAM are sot forth in p*ge s t -17. In brief, the NIAM concluder that in any foreseeable conflict situation, Israel will have a clear military advantage. Large quantities of advanced weapons and other military equipment- -moist of which have been from US Inventories or production--plus new training, tactics wad organization Introduced since the October War have enabled Israel to improve its military posture in all areas. Moreover. Israel is continuously on a higher state of alert than eacisteed prior to October 1973, and will thereby be lose vulnerable to a surprise attack.. Tice most likely sequence of events in another conflict would be for Israel to preempt in anticipation of an in evitabte and imminent attack by the Arab*--as It did in June 1967. Whatever scenario ano0ar war might follow, the NIAM concludes that its cost La terms of casualties Will be very high for all sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by both Egypt and Syria, the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures in a rat-case scenario could run as high as 36, 000, about 6, 000 of whom weiuid be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered Z. 500 dead in October 1973. The Arabs, it Is estimated, would suffer about twice as many casualties. The estimated casualty figures are important in ' g No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 ECRELiGDS) ad to Impact more heavily on Israel because of the much amealler populaa n base. The NUJA thus reflects the Arab strategy of wising Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel hopes to avoid. The .NIAM cone ltade s that at present levels of mobilisation, Israel could contain simultaneous attacks from Egypt, Syria, Jordan sad Lebanon; after mobtliaeaa lion Israel could defend on three frosts while lauaaaching a major offensive on the fourth. It would probably knock out Syria first, n Uwe Its attention to Egypt. In the event it attacked first, Syria might initially gain a few kilometers. However, an Israeli offensive late, Syria would meet with determined resistance from well-outrouchod and. armed forces. On the Sinai front, Egypt might, at best, be able to reach the Mitts and Oidi posses but could, not hold them against a counterattaack. On the defense, Egypt could Inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli forces. la face of a well.exeeuted Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attri- tion. Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within two weeks and virtually destroy opposing armies in four weeks--but smuld suffer an estimated 38, 000 casualties. Under loss unfavorable, and more likely, circumstances. with Israel imposing its preferred military strategy and tactics, it could knock out opposing offensive capabilities in about ten days, although still suffer tg an estimated Z5, 000 casualties. Israel Is believed to have ample arms and munitions to fight without resupply for three to four weeks at the October 1973 levels of intensity. Other Arab forces can, and probably would, provide military support to Syria and Egypt as they have in past conflicts. But this would be only a marginal factor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up to one armored division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October 1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (perhaps from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking through Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were resolved, Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about the same as to October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably supply up to 100 combat aircraft. but this would have little effect on the outcome of the air battle, which Israel I. expected to win decisively. Egypt and Syria have Scud.8 and FROG-7 tactical missiles, with rouge* of 160 to 38 miles respectively, as well as some fighter-bombers which could be used against Israeli population centers. Their accuracy and SEC 'y (OI)S) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24 : LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 0 40 damage would not be great (probable civilian c*sus ies would be in the hundreds rather than thousands,) and such an attack would almost cer- talnIy produce severe Israeli retaliation. Israel has a much more powerful and accurate strategic strike capability, relying primarily on g'-4 and A-4 aircraft need, to a lesser latent, on the Jericho missile (260 mils range). It used this strategic bombing capability against Syrian economic and logistic targets in October 1973 and would probably do so even more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in renewed fighting. Israel sad Egypt have chemical warfare capabilities but there are no would use those in Soviet options for military intervention are limited essentially to defensive ace because of modest capabilities for rapid deployment to the trout of militarily effective forces (i. e. division strength and above), However, the USSR demonstrated to October 1973 its capability for large-scale military air and surface resupply of both the Syrian and Egyptian armies. This is likely in another conflict. ,Also, there is a precedent and a capability for direct Soviet involvement to air defeaseey by supplying and manking both aircraft and anti-aircraft emits. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly on the Syrian front, perhaps using a care of two airborne regiments, heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, A military element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point in the man defense, and could be in place within about tour days. The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft to also a possibility. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 'R f- Pur F4fcJJ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 V MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET JGDS) ACTION June 24, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY,' ;~' SUBJECT: National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum: Arab/Israeli Hostilities As you are aware, the Intelligence Community has been working for a considerable period of time on various studies connected with the possible resumption of hostilities in the Middle East. In the past few months, and particularly since the initiation of our reassessment, it has taken a com- prehensive look at the anticipated military development of another Arab/ Israeli war by thinking through various types of conflict scenarios. Its findings, which have been generally concurred by the USIB, have now been published as a National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM). This NIAM is a considerable improvement on the earlier one on the Sam e subject published last November. 25X1>5X1 the CIA, with our encouragement, have seen to it that the scenarios of a defensive, attrition-oriented war by the Arabs and of Soviet intervention have been examined thoroughly. In the past, both tended to be given the once-over-lightly, at best. The NIAM is attached at Tab I-A under cover of a suggested memorandum to the President which illuminates its more important findings. The entire NIAM is a highly professional piece of work dealing with a contingency of major importance to the US. The President may only wish to review the NIAM's major conclusions (p. 2-17) but it is worth reading in full, should time be available. RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I. APPROVE DISAPPROVE SECRET (GDS) 13YAUTII: RBOakley No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 W 4338 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 Secret NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTI CAL MEMORANDUM Arab-Israeli Hostilities Secret NIAM 35/36-2.75 13 June 1975 NP 1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 SECRET (GDS) MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT HENRY A. KISSINGER Intelligence Analys' of Conflict Scenarios in Anot er Arab/Israeli War Since the middle of last year, the Intelligence analyzing the principal factors included in, a another Arab/Israeli war. After several e produced a highly professional National In randurn (NIAM) studying the subject bro the scenarios of several possible conti sumption of hostilities. The major f ommunity has been the likely result of, her studies, it has now lligence Analytical Memo- ly and examining in detail ggencies should there be a re- dings of the NIAM are set forth in pages 2.17, but the entire study is worth reading should you have time. In brief, the NIAM concludes that in any foreseeable conflict situation, Israel will have the clear military advantage. Large quantities of advanced weapons and other,military equipment--most of which has been from US inventories or production- -plus new training, tactics and organization introduced since the October War have enabled Israel to improve its military, posture in all areas. Moreover, Israel is continuously on a higher state of alert than existed prior to October 1973, and will thereby be less vulnerable to a surprise attack. In fact, in the event of another conflict, the most likely course of events would be for Israel to preempt in anticipation of an inevitable and imminent attack by the Arabs--as it did in June 1967. Whatever scnario the course of another war might take, the NIAM concludes that its cost in terms of casualties will be very high for all sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by both Egypt and Syria, the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures in a worst-case scenalio could run as high as 36, 000, about 6, 000 (16%) of whom wouldd be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered 2, 500 dead SECRET (GDS) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 SECRET (GDS) in October 1973. The Arabs, it is estimated, would take about twi4e as many casualties by Israel. The estimated casualty figures ar important in that they tend to impact more heavily on Israel, le s so on the Arabs. The NIAM thus reflects the Arab strategy of m imiz- ing Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel is determined to avo'd. The NIAM concludes that, in the event it attacked first, S is might gain a few initial kilometers of Israeli counterattack/,Egypt owever, an Israeli offensive into Syria would meet with determisistance from well-entrenched and armed forces. On the Sinai iromight, at best, be able to reach the Milta and Gidi passes b ld not hold them against a counterattack. On the defense, Egypt could inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli forces. At present levels of mobili- zation, Israel could contain simultaneous attac's from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon; after mobilization Israe could defend on three fronts while launching a major offensive on e fourth. It would pro- bably knock out Syria first, then turn its tention to Egypt. In face of a well-executed Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attri- tion, Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within two weeks and virtually destroy op would suffer an estimated 38, 00 and more likely circumstances military strategy and tactics capabilities in about ten day, 225,000 casualties. Israel tions to fight for three t 1973 level of intensity. osing armies in four weeks--but casualties. Under less unfavorable, with Israel imposing its preferred it could knock out opposing offensive , although still suffering an estimated s believed to have ample arms and muni- ?our weeks without resupply at the October Other Arab forces c n, and probably would, provide military support to Syria and Egypt/a, s they have in past conflicts. But this would be only a marginal ctor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up to one armored' division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October 1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (possibly resulting from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking through Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were resolved:, Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about the same as in October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably supply up to 100 combat aircraft, but this would have little effect on the outcome of the air battle which Israel is expected to win decisively. 'EGRET (GDS) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9 SECRET (GDS) -3- Egypt and Syria have Scud-B and FROG-7 tactical, non-nuclear missiles with respective ranges of 160 to 38 miles, as well as some fighter-bombers which could be used against Israeli popu lation centers. Their accuracy and damage would not be grea (probable civilian casualties would be in the hundreds rather thousands,) and would almost certainly produce severe Isr retaliation. Israel has a much more powerful and accura tegic strike capability, relying primarily on F-4 and A but also possessing the Jericho missile (250 mile ran this strategic bombing capability against Syrian eco logistic targets in October 1973 and would probabl more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in ren Israel and Egypt have chemical warfare capabi are no indications either would use this in co han eli e stra- airc raft It used mic and do so even ed fighting. Soviet options for military interventi defensive action because of limited ment to the front of military effec, and above). However, the USS capability for large-scale mil and Egyptian armies. This are limited essentially to apabilities for rapid deploy- ive forces (i. e. division strength "demonstrated in October 1973 its ary air and resupply of both the Syrian very likely in another conflict. Also, there is a precedent and 9,/capability for direct Soviet involvement in air defense, supplying,,nd manning both aircraft and anti-aircraft units. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly on the Syrian front, perhaps using a core of two airborne regiments, heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. A military element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point in the Syrian defense, and could be in place within about four days. The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft is also a possibility. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/24: LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9