INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT SCENARIOS IN ANOTHER ARAB/ISRAELI WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Decla
INI RMA T Li
MEMORANDUM FORt
FROM:
St1BJECT!
X331
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSING.R
Intelligence Analysis of Conflict
Scenarios in Another Arab/Israeli
War
or the past year, the Intelligence Community has been engaged in a
comprehensive analysis of the. principal factors bearing on another
Arab/Israeli war, The result has been reported in a National Iaetelli-
gere Analytical Memorandum (HIAM) (lab A) which treats several
possible scenarias of renewed hostilities. The -ae; or findings of the
NIAM are sot forth in p*ge s t -17.
In brief, the NIAM concluder that in any foreseeable conflict situation,
Israel will have a clear military advantage. Large quantities of
advanced weapons and other military equipment- -moist of which have
been from US Inventories or production--plus new training, tactics
wad organization Introduced since the October War have enabled Israel
to improve its military posture in all areas. Moreover. Israel is
continuously on a higher state of alert than eacisteed prior to October 1973,
and will thereby be lose vulnerable to a surprise attack..
Tice most likely sequence of events in another conflict would be for
Israel to preempt in anticipation of an in evitabte and imminent attack
by the Arab*--as It did in June 1967. Whatever scenario ano0ar war
might follow, the NIAM concludes that its cost La terms of casualties
Will be very high for all sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by
both Egypt and Syria, the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures
in a rat-case scenario could run as high as 36, 000, about 6, 000 of
whom weiuid be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered Z. 500 dead
in October 1973. The Arabs, it Is estimated, would suffer about twice
as many casualties. The estimated casualty figures are important in
' g
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ECRELiGDS)
ad to Impact more heavily on Israel because of the much
amealler populaa n base. The NUJA thus reflects the Arab strategy
of wising Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel hopes to avoid.
The .NIAM cone ltade s that at present levels of mobilisation, Israel could
contain simultaneous attacks from Egypt, Syria, Jordan sad Lebanon;
after mobtliaeaa lion Israel could defend on three frosts while lauaaaching
a major offensive on the fourth. It would probably knock out Syria first,
n Uwe Its attention to Egypt. In the event it attacked first, Syria
might initially gain a few kilometers. However, an Israeli offensive
late, Syria would meet with determined resistance from well-outrouchod
and. armed forces. On the Sinai front, Egypt might, at best, be able
to reach the Mitts and Oidi posses but could, not hold them against a
counterattaack. On the defense, Egypt could Inflict heavy casualties on
the Israeli forces.
la face of a well.exeeuted Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attri-
tion. Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within
two weeks and virtually destroy opposing armies in four weeks--but
smuld suffer an estimated 38, 000 casualties. Under loss unfavorable,
and more likely, circumstances. with Israel imposing its preferred
military strategy and tactics, it could knock out opposing offensive
capabilities in about ten days, although still suffer tg an estimated
Z5, 000 casualties. Israel Is believed to have ample arms and munitions
to fight without resupply for three to four weeks at the October 1973
levels of intensity.
Other Arab forces can, and probably would, provide military support
to Syria and Egypt as they have in past conflicts. But this would be
only a marginal factor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up
to one armored division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October
1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (perhaps
from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking through
Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were resolved,
Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about the same as
to October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably supply up
to 100 combat aircraft. but this would have little effect on the outcome
of the air battle, which Israel I. expected to win decisively.
Egypt and Syria have Scud.8 and FROG-7 tactical missiles, with rouge*
of 160 to 38 miles respectively, as well as some fighter-bombers which
could be used against Israeli population centers. Their accuracy and
SEC 'y (OI)S)
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0 40
damage would not be great (probable civilian c*sus ies would be in the
hundreds rather than thousands,) and such an attack would almost cer-
talnIy produce severe Israeli retaliation. Israel has a much more
powerful and accurate strategic strike capability, relying primarily
on g'-4 and A-4 aircraft need, to a lesser latent, on the Jericho missile
(260 mils range). It used this strategic bombing capability against
Syrian economic and logistic targets in October 1973 and would probably
do so even more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in renewed fighting.
Israel sad Egypt have chemical warfare capabilities but there are no
would use those in
Soviet options for military intervention are limited essentially to
defensive ace because of modest capabilities for rapid deployment
to the trout of militarily effective forces (i. e. division strength and
above), However, the USSR demonstrated to October 1973 its capability
for large-scale military air and surface resupply of both the Syrian
and Egyptian armies. This is likely in another conflict. ,Also,
there is a precedent and a capability for direct Soviet involvement to
air defeaseey by supplying and manking both aircraft and anti-aircraft
emits. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly
on the Syrian front, perhaps using a care of two airborne regiments,
heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, A military
element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point
in the man defense, and could be in place within about tour days.
The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft to also a possibility.
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 'R f- Pur F4fcJJ
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V
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET JGDS) ACTION
June 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY,' ;~'
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Analytical
Memorandum: Arab/Israeli Hostilities
As you are aware, the Intelligence Community has been working for a
considerable period of time on various studies connected with the possible
resumption of hostilities in the Middle East. In the past few months, and
particularly since the initiation of our reassessment, it has taken a com-
prehensive look at the anticipated military development of another Arab/
Israeli war by thinking through various types of conflict scenarios. Its
findings, which have been generally concurred by the USIB, have now been
published as a National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM).
This NIAM is a considerable improvement on the earlier one on the Sam
e
subject published last November. 25X1>5X1
the CIA, with our encouragement, have seen to it that the scenarios of a
defensive, attrition-oriented war by the Arabs and of Soviet intervention
have been examined thoroughly. In the past, both tended to be given the
once-over-lightly, at best.
The NIAM is attached at Tab I-A under cover of a suggested memorandum
to the President which illuminates its more important findings. The entire
NIAM is a highly professional piece of work dealing with a contingency of
major importance to the US. The President may only wish to review the
NIAM's major conclusions (p. 2-17) but it is worth reading in full, should
time be available.
RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the Memorandum to the President
attached at Tab I.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
SECRET (GDS)
13YAUTII: RBOakley
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W 4338
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Secret
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ANALYTI CAL
MEMORANDUM
Arab-Israeli Hostilities
Secret
NIAM 35/36-2.75
13 June 1975
NP 1
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SECRET (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Intelligence Analys' of Conflict
Scenarios in Anot er Arab/Israeli War
Since the middle of last year, the Intelligence
analyzing the principal factors included in, a
another Arab/Israeli war. After several e
produced a highly professional National In
randurn (NIAM) studying the subject bro
the scenarios of several possible conti
sumption of hostilities. The major f
ommunity has been
the likely result of,
her studies, it has now
lligence Analytical Memo-
ly and examining in detail
ggencies should there be a re-
dings of the NIAM are set
forth in pages 2.17, but the entire study is worth reading should you
have time.
In brief, the NIAM concludes that in any foreseeable conflict situation,
Israel will have the clear military advantage. Large quantities of
advanced weapons and other,military equipment--most of which has
been from US inventories or production- -plus new training, tactics
and organization introduced since the October War have enabled Israel
to improve its military, posture in all areas. Moreover, Israel is
continuously on a higher state of alert than existed prior to October 1973,
and will thereby be less vulnerable to a surprise attack. In fact, in
the event of another conflict, the most likely course of events would
be for Israel to preempt in anticipation of an inevitable and imminent
attack by the Arabs--as it did in June 1967.
Whatever scnario the course of another war might take, the NIAM
concludes that its cost in terms of casualties will be very high for all
sides. In the event that Israel is opposed by both Egypt and Syria,
the NIAM estimates that Israeli casualty figures in a worst-case
scenalio could run as high as 36, 000, about 6, 000 (16%) of whom
wouldd be killed. By comparison, the Israelis suffered 2, 500 dead
SECRET (GDS)
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SECRET (GDS)
in October 1973. The Arabs, it is estimated, would take about twi4e
as many casualties by Israel. The estimated casualty figures ar
important in that they tend to impact more heavily on Israel, le s so
on the Arabs. The NIAM thus reflects the Arab strategy of m imiz-
ing Israeli casualties, a strategy Israel is determined to avo'd.
The NIAM concludes that, in the event it attacked first, S is might
gain a few initial kilometers of Israeli counterattack/,Egypt owever, an
Israeli offensive into Syria would meet with determisistance from
well-entrenched and armed forces. On the Sinai iromight,
at best, be able to reach the Milta and Gidi passes b ld not hold
them against a counterattack. On the defense, Egypt could inflict
heavy casualties on the Israeli forces. At present levels of mobili-
zation, Israel could contain simultaneous attac's from Egypt, Syria,
Jordan and Lebanon; after mobilization Israe could defend on three
fronts while launching a major offensive on e fourth. It would pro-
bably knock out Syria first, then turn its tention to Egypt.
In face of a well-executed Arab strategy of fall-back defense and attri-
tion, Israel could still knock out opposing offensive capabilities within
two weeks and virtually destroy op
would suffer an estimated 38, 00
and more likely circumstances
military strategy and tactics
capabilities in about ten day,
225,000 casualties. Israel
tions to fight for three t
1973 level of intensity.
osing armies in four weeks--but
casualties. Under less unfavorable,
with Israel imposing its preferred
it could knock out opposing offensive
, although still suffering an estimated
s believed to have ample arms and muni-
?our weeks without resupply at the October
Other Arab forces c n, and probably would, provide military support
to Syria and Egypt/a, s they have in past conflicts. But this would be
only a marginal ctor. It is estimated that Jordan would commit up
to one armored' division to fight inside Syria (about the same as October
1973), provided there was no third front along the Jordan River (possibly
resulting from an Israeli effort to outflank Syrian units by attacking
through Jordan.) Provided its political difficulties with Syria were
resolved:, Iraq would probably commit two armored divisions (about
the same as in October 1973). Iraq, Algeria and Libya would probably
supply up to 100 combat aircraft, but this would have little effect on
the outcome of the air battle which Israel is expected to win decisively.
'EGRET (GDS)
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SECRET (GDS) -3-
Egypt and Syria have Scud-B and FROG-7 tactical, non-nuclear
missiles with respective ranges of 160 to 38 miles, as well as
some fighter-bombers which could be used against Israeli popu
lation centers. Their accuracy and damage would not be grea
(probable civilian casualties would be in the hundreds rather
thousands,) and would almost certainly produce severe Isr
retaliation. Israel has a much more powerful and accura
tegic strike capability, relying primarily on F-4 and A
but also possessing the Jericho missile (250 mile ran
this strategic bombing capability against Syrian eco
logistic targets in October 1973 and would probabl
more heavily against both Egypt and Syria in ren
Israel and Egypt have chemical warfare capabi
are no indications either would use this in co
han
eli
e stra-
airc raft
It used
mic and
do so even
ed fighting.
Soviet options for military interventi
defensive action because of limited
ment to the front of military effec,
and above). However, the USS
capability for large-scale mil
and Egyptian armies. This
are limited essentially to
apabilities for rapid deploy-
ive forces (i. e. division strength
"demonstrated in October 1973 its
ary air and resupply of both the Syrian
very likely in another conflict. Also,
there is a precedent and 9,/capability for direct Soviet involvement
in air defense, supplying,,nd manning both aircraft and anti-aircraft
units. The USSR has the capability to provide such assistance rapidly
on the Syrian front, perhaps using a core of two airborne regiments,
heavily reinforced with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. A military
element of this sort could be used to establish a major strong point
in the Syrian defense, and could be in place within about four days.
The use of Soviet pilots and aircraft is also a possibility.
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