CONTINGENCY BUDGETS AND SALT II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-79-8-12-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/09: LOC-HAK-79-8-12-3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Contingency Budgets and SALT II
Attached at Tab A is Secretary Schlesinger's response to your request
for a supplementary budget proposal as a contingency in the event of the
failure of negotiations for a SALT II agreement.
With respect to this formal proposal, it should be noted that the recom-
mended program is substantially different from that outline proposal
which Schlesinger had previously given you (Tab B), in that the proposed
expenditures are much more modest. For example, the incremental
expenditures in FY-00 would be only $2.4 billion, in contrast to the $5.8
billion contained in his earlier estimate. The principle reasons for this
reduction are that there is no procurement of ALCM's., strategic SLCM'a,
or MX and little acceleration in the B-l program, in contrast to the earlier
estimate.
This latest Defense proposal is in many ways an unusual document,
especially when seen in the light of Defense's frequently expressed concerns
regarding the negotiation of a SALT II agreement which might in some
manner be disadvantageous to the U. S. What this proposed program
seems to indicate is that the U. S. would be able to live with a wider
gap between U. S. and Soviet strategic forces capabilities without a SALT
agreement than we could with a SALT agreement.
In the event we are not able to negotiate a SALT II agreement, we must
recognize that, at the absolute minimum, the Soviet Union would then
not reduce the numbers of its strategic delivery vehicles from the roughly
2,600 it now possesses to the 2,400 agreed upon in Vladivostok nor would
there be any restrictions on production or employment of the Backfire
aircraft. In addition, it would not be unrealistic to expect that the Soviet
Union would move toward an expanded strategic program at least of the
magnitude of the high NIE estimate -- substantially increasing numbers,
warheads, and throwweeight.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/09: LOC-HAK-79-8-12-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/09: LOC-HAK-79-8-12-3
The program proposed by Defense, on the other hand, does not contain
increased numbers of weapons, at least over the next several years. The
only numerical change recommended is in the number of warheads, this
through procurement of an additional 100 MM ill's. Other than that, the
major changes proposed in the strategic program represent only a modest
acceleration of already planned deployment.
In addition, many of the changes recommended appear to be completely
independent of whether or not a SALT II agreement is negotiated. Changes
in command and control, improvements in intelligence capability and modi-
fications in General Purpose Forces, if important, should be made
irrespective of the outcome offtWotiotions on SALT U. In fact, virtually
everything proposed in the Defense contingency program can be done under
a SALT II agreement just as well as in the absence of such an agreement.
Based on the Defense proposals, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
either that Defense's concerns over a disadvantageous SALT agreement
have been greatly overdrawn; that the current programs represent essentially
all that is needed under any circumstances and SALT II is therefore
basically a unfa al concession to the U, S. ; or that the proposed contingency
Defense program substantially understates what is ly required.
OMB has provided its comments on the contingency budget proposals
(Tab C). The OMB paper points out that only the continuation of MM Ill
MIRV production would affect near term capabilities and that the other
eleemente4lothe strategic proposals would improve capabilities only in
the 1980's. OMB also notes that the proposals for add-one in other
tegoriess, such as General Purpose Forces, command and controlland
intelligence, have little relevance to perceived strategic capabilities and
are likely to be resisted by Congress. OMB recommends a "zero budget
amendment" for 1976 and 1977, restoring proposed Trident and B-1
reductions and offsetting those increases with decreases in other programs.
OMB claims this would signal a shift of emphasis toward strategic systems
whiles remaining within fiscal totals.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/09: LOC-HAK-79-8-12-3