TROUBLES IN BINH DINH PROVINCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-8-1-11-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 2, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-11-9
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INFORMATION
SECRET/NO FOREIGN
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Troubles in Binh Dinh Province
September 2, 1970
In an annex to its daily Situation Report, CIA. reports some unfavorable
trends in Binh Dinh Province (Tab A). The senior U. S. advisor there
states that a continuing Communist campaign of subversion and
terrorism this summer has slowed, and, in some areas, reversed
progress in pacification. He concludes that an unfavorable psycholo-
gical climate has developed in several areas of the province, and
that GVN officials have not yet been able to adjust their tactics to the
enemy's terrorist campaign.
CIA notes that the general situation in Binh Dinh today is far better than
it was six years ago, and a good deal better than during the immediate
aftermath of the Tet offensive of 1968. In conventional military terms,
the GVN clearly has the upper hand. The Conununists, however, have
begun to achieve a measure of success by emphasizing a mix of political
subversion and terror tactics, and by staying away from conventional
attacks. This is especially true in the northeastern districts of the
province, where the Communists first established themselves more
than 30 years ago. Reporting from other districts indicates that spotty
GVN leadership and a lack of any real program other than maintaining
military security are contributing to the pacification slowdown.
Many district and provincial officials have expressed strong misgivings
about the withdrawal of anyaallied troops during the coming year. CIA
believes that some of these statements are probably overdrawn dli-
berately in order to keep U. S. forces in the province as long as possible,
but feels that there is substantial evidence from independent sources to
verify that the Communists are making a determined effort to reverse
pacification gains.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEEMV1
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-11-9
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-11-9
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM 2
President Thieu's replacement of the MR II Corranander is a sign that
Saigon recognizes the need for corrective action in Binh Dinh and other
provinces in the Region. The new Commander has been associated
with the GVN's pacification effort for several years, but it remains to
be seen whether he can galvanize and coordinate GVN assets in Binh
Dinh.
Comment. No province, of course, is typical of Vietnam as a -whole.
But, as one of the largest, Binh Dinah is important in its own right.
And it may well reflect the kinds of problems that are developing in
other provinces with an historically strong VietnCong presence,
Although few areas in South Vietnam have such a strong and long-
standing conununist tradition as does much of Binh Dinh.
It is also worth noting that this year's accelerated pacification
campaign was to emphasize political and economic aspects. It
seems clear from this report that the accelerated campaign has
yet to reach Binh Dinh.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
JHH:ME:bib 9/2/70
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-11-9