YOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-8-4-29-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 25, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-8-4-29-7
4P W
September 25, 1970
SFC.:.RET/SENSII:I\'E EY?.` ONL1:
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
T}?.OM: W. a. Sxzyser
SUBJ:I"]C'I.: Your Meeting With Vice President Ky
BA C'KG ROUND
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Ky's Mood. Vice President Ky has become increasingly frustrated
this year, and as a result his normally temperamental and impulsive
tendencies have become especially acute. His most recent performance
in the McIntire episode is a case in point. After seeing Ambassador
Bunker on September 17 and saying that he would withhold any decision
on attending the October 3 rally until he talked with Bui Diem in Paris,
he went out of his way three days later to commit himself publicly to
attend the rally.
Ky's main source of frustration has been his deteriorating relation
1,hieu and his inability to make any impact as an independent political
figure. He has tried to generate opposition to Thieu, either private
or public, and. has failed. He has tried to develop his own power and
image (e. g. , in Cambodia) and been knocked down. He now sees that
his chances of running for President next year are rapidly vanishing,
and that he will probably not even be Thieu's candidate for Vice Pre-
sident. In this situation, he is increasingly moody, bitter, and ready
to seize any opportunity - at whatever risk - to get ahead.
Ky and Americans. While Icy was in power, he had good relations--AM
Americans particularly Ambassador Lodge and Phil fabib. Since
1967, however, he has become increasingly critical of the U. S. in private
and even in public. He believes that the lack of firm U. S. support made
him lose to Thieu in the 1967 power struggle. He blames Ambassador
Bunker and the State Department. His attitude toward President Nixon,
however, appears to be favorable. He also has always had good relations
with .American military.
"S)' CRET/SENSITIVE/EY'E`:` ONL
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T+'#~E 'J i~T rTIVI JE~i'1-- ONLY ?
Like many Vietnamese, Ky is intensely nationalistic. Though he appre-
ciates American support, he resents Vietnam's dependence bitterly. He
also probably resents our disposition to tell him and the South Vietnamese
in general what we think he and they should do. Like most Vietnamese
of Northern origin he tends naturally to be violent and volatile in his
reaction to such pressures, rather than reserved and calculating like
the Central Vietnamese. But he has learned over the past few years to
restrain himself briefly, and his outbursts thus take delayed, unpre-
dictable and indirect forms.
The Agnew Visit. We do not know what impression Ky was left with from
his last meeting with Vice President Agnew. Although it is not shown in
the memorandum of conversation, Agnew apparently did speak to Icy
privately and used the occasion to stress our desire for harmony and
unity between Ky and Thieu. Agnew' s staff say that Ky took this very
well, but on the following day lay made a point of changing the honors 25X1
ceremony so that American and Vietnamese medals were awarded
separately.
SECRET/SEN`;IITIVE/E-Y s:s ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-8-4-29-7
SEC: ET/SENSITIVE/.EYE=';' ONLY
I-LANDLINC,
Obviously, we will be in an extremely delicate situation. Ky may still
think his visit and speech will help us, the South Vietnamese and himself.
We have received one report, however, which suggests that he may
already have been dissuaded by 'ui Diem and Khoi, or at least has,
begun to have some doubts. 4"lut he does not want to say anything
until he gets on "Meet the Press" this Sunday, since he wants to make
the dramatic announcement himself.
It is thus unclear whether or not you will have to push him very hard or
whether you will be in a :tuation where you can simply put in some
expressions of appreciation for his change of mind. That remains to be
seen. It also remains to be seen whether Ky expects - as Bunker told
him - to be invited later. We rvil.l have to get word on that in Paris.
In either ca,-;e, it could probably be best for you to talk to Ky yourself,
or in a very small group. Ile is a proud man and we will not want to
make this any more difficult than necessary.
Talking Points: Ambassador r}unker has suggested some points, which
are included in the following list of things you may want to say:
Both the friends of Vietnam and the enemies oppose his visit.
.- The enemies because it will give them a chance to
rally and put on a public show. Galbraith says it is
the greatest thing that could have happened to the
Democratic Party. The hippies are preparing for
the biggest fun-felt since Cambodia.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYE`' ONLY
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"SEC.RET/SFN",ITIhI/EYE :"ONLY ! 4
The friends because they believe that the best way to
carry out the President's policy is to put Vietnam into
a lower key.
-- Moreover, McIntire is not a friend of the administration and
Ky will be used against President Nixon - not for him. McIntire
represents an extrembst group which is unpopular with most
Americans - including - atholic s.
-- In short, Ky would be making trouble for America and Viet-
nam rather than helping us, and he would also do himself no good
by being associated with such an extremist and isolated cause.
A LTE itNATIV ES
There are two things we can offer Icy:
-- A later vi+rff. This should be avoided if at all possible. Even
after e eflons he would create the kind of disturbances we want
to avoid, and create problems for the President. It would also
ixicrease his tendencies to run against Thieu. However, he has
already been offered this by Bunker, and it may be difficult for
you to back off in case Ky asks about it.
-- A chance to address the American people by other means.
The "Meet the Press" interview may serve that purpose, and
perhaps he could make any remarks he had in mind in the form
of an "open letter to the American people. "
I think we will need to leave it up to him how he decides to explain his
change of mind. None of the alternatives are as bad as a visit would
be, and we should let him save face gracefully. But we should get
some agreement on it, and also explain your meeting.
He could say the following:
-- That he changed his mind because the President had asked
him not to visit at this time. This would not be helpful, of course,
but he may want to say that.
/SEN I'T'IVE/7 YE" ONLY
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SEC r T/SENSITIVE/EYES. ONLY
-- That he changed his mind because he is coming later. That
would create the later problems for us which I cited above, but
he might expect it.
-- That he changed his mind because there is too much to do in
Paris. It is transparent, but he may want to do it that way.
-- That he changed his mind because he could reach more
Americans via "Meet the Press" and his open letter than he
would have reached by speaking in Washington. Also pretty
transparent, but good.
ECi':tET/SENSITIVE/EYT+ ONLY
WRS:bib 9/25/70
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/22: LOC-HAK-8-4-29-7