COSVN DIRECTIVE ON COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-8-4-32-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 28, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/18: LOC-HAK-8-4-32-3
INFO' MATION
TiN0 FOREIGN DIS SEM September 28. 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR, KISSINGER
John H. Iioldridge
SUBJECT: COSVN Directive on Communist Political and
Diplomatic Offensive
C OSV N Directive
of August 28 dealing with Madame Binh's recent eight point proposal
in Paris.
the directive orders that the entire
Communist apparatus in South Vietnam be mobilized in support of
a political offensive. It orders the Communists to win over South
Vietnamese "middle classes, religious groups, intelligentsia, and
the bourgoisie" by convincing them that only the ouster of the pre-
sent regime in Saigon and a U.S. troop withdrawal stand in the way
of an end to the war. In this way, t:',OSVN declares, the Communists
will pave the way for the formation of a ''third force" -- presumably
non-Communist -- that is apt to come to terms with them.
As a starter, Madame Binh's speech is to be distributed to all Viet-
namese groups and individuals of consequence as well as to ',aigon
newspapers. Communist agents and sympathlizers are to promote
protest meetings and demon stristion s ; South Vietnamese soldiers are
to be urged through their families to desert.
Although the political front is emphasized, Communist military
forces are directed to mount coordinated attacks, particularly on
U.S. troops, on "every battleground." The directive warns the
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/18: LOC-HAK-8-4-32-3
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rank and file not to expect total victory from a diplomatic offensive
alone, but also not to underestimate the power of a political offensive
or to fail to coordinate other activity with it.
The directive also suggests that the Communist call for a total U.S.
withdrawal contains a good deal of flexibility. In relation to U.S.
withdrawals, the directive states that "if only part of the U.S. troops
are withdrawn...from South Vietnam by June 1971... those remaining
must stay within defined areas."
ument. The document generally seems quite credible. As we
noted In a previous memorandum on this subject, the number of
recently captured documents
dealing with Madam Binh's speech certainly indicate the beginning
of a significant Communist political offensive in South Vietnam and
the existence of just such a high level directive
We are less certain about the accuracy
regarding a U.S. withdrawal, but it is nevertheless an
interesting twist. It is ciuite plausible, of course, that the C.orrummists
are privately more flexible on this issue than Madame Sinh's recent
public proposal. Rather than agreeing to extend the withdrawal dead-
line an additional number of months, however, the directive indicate
that the Communists might offer a cease fire vis a via U.S. forces in
return for a U.S. regroupment in South Vietnam by the end of next
June, which underscores the importance to them of achieving some
progress on the withdrawal issue by that date. This is turn suggests
that ? should their political efforts fail to dislodge Thieu by that time --
they might try to play a strong hand in the South Vietnamese presi-
dential elections early next fall, hoping to use some type of withdrawal
agreement with the U.S. as psychological ammunition.
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The effort which the Communists evidentl
offensive indicates that It will be a major
intend to put into this political
art of their total strategy.
EC ; 1110 FOREIGN DISSEM
JHH:ME:bib 9/28/70
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/18: LOC-HAK-8-4-32-3
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