CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FRICTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-9-1-14-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/13: LOC-HAK-9-1-14-5 L--3-54--
MEMORANDUM V
State Dept. review
completed
SUBJECT: Cambodian-South Vietnamese Frictions
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. HoldridgeNO
MORI/CDF
C05137810
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Attached is a memorandum on this subject produced by CIA at our re-
quest with contributions from State. The main points follow:
..-At present Cambodian government leaders recognize that con-
tinuing ARVN support is necessary until the Cambodian Army can
demonstrate it can bear the brunt of the battle for Cambodia.
. --:The misbehavior of ARVN troops in Cambodia, clearly the main
present source of friction between the two countries, has revived and
intensified long-standing racial animosity. A steady stream of reports
and rumors about acts of looting, raping, killing, and extortion by ARVN
continue and senior Cambodian officials are prone to accept all such re-
ports as fact.
--Thus far frictions between Cambodians and South Vietnamese in-
hibit their military cooperation against Communists to only a limited
degree.
--Within their operating areas, ARVN personnel seem to lack respect
for either Cambodian authority or sensitivities, and there is little coor-
dination on either military or civil matters. On paper there is a joint
committee in Phnom Penh and liason teams assigned to the various Cam-
bodian provincial chiefs; in practice the Vietnamese seem uninterested
in making such institutions effective.
-..Although outrages against Cambodians by the VC/NVA, as well as
friction between Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, have been
reported, the general deportment of the VC/NVA has been better than
that of ARVN. In this respect, the ARVN presence, especially in heavily
populated areas, may not simply be a "tax" upon Cambodia-South Viet-
namese--cooperation, but actually counter-productive.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/13: LOC-HAK-9-1-14-5
 W __ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/13: LOC-HAK-9-1-14-5
0 ?
RET/ SENSITIV E
--On* of the most effective devices Lon Nol employed to obtain popu..
or the overthrow of Sihanouk was the campaign to get the
Vietnamese communists off Cambodian soil. Lora Noll* private conten-
tion that the South Vietnamese are the lesser of two evils has been
accepted only reluctantly by many of his supporters.
Net almost certainly has taken a much tougher line on the
ion operating in Cambodia because of his experiences 25X1
with ARVN forces.
. -Emotional elements of pride and animosity work against whatever
well-intentioned efforts are made by both Saigon and Phnom Penh to
reduce frictions arising from the presence of ARVN type in Cambodia.
However, it stems unlikely that these animosities will, vitally affect
South Vietnam's ability or willingness to support the Cambodian war
effort. Whatever misgivings it may have. Phnom Penh will have little
recourse but to ask for South Vietnamese support if the comet unists
seriously threaten major positions.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/01/13: LOC-HAK-9-1-14-5