STATUS OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 16, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
OSD Review Completed
pages 1-2 and 9-12
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
~~
~~.~.,~'v"~ ae A. ~A.NI~U ~' !`!R ~~. Ii"~.~~II~G ~~
~~~'~.~~.~?: ~G?hIl ~. klsaldrid~;a
~fCtt~ber lb, 1.9T0
~UiJ'~CT~ status Cf 'The Accelerated I~acificatian ~ampaigri
In, reeponse tc~ caur request for field cc~xx~.rxxents n~a the state: of the a.c-
celeraterl paci.Cica.tican campaign, CIA.. has produced a xxaerar~carartdumwhich
contain~t repa~rts frcarra the senior CTA rafficere iu the four military regions.
~Ta~a A ~. A sun,ary of their comments fellow.
h'li_litar~r Regic~r~ I. `T'he paciflc:atiQn program is xnovitxg srhee.d. slowly. Never
land is being provided for settlers, and reds are being opened to s.llovv
three settlers t+~ get their produce to arx~:arlcet. militarily, ecaexx-iy utait$ are
continuing to try tca push into the cvssts.l lv~wlands but w~lthcsut '?success.
~na.)'c-r lx~petu~s laelaind pacificaticsn i>:1~ ~. I .is re+crag~xitioxs cif the zxeed tc~ get
as r~xvch drape as passible iaefare additiotxal Ia~f'- troop vs+i,thtiravvals take
place.
:^utilltar~r kte~icnn II. There are .few signs ths.t the CVN's s.ccelearated
caxnfsaign is yielding ~nu,ch in they v~ay caf results. This ies particularlq dis-
tur'birag lecause the situation in four and laoss~ibly fiv+s of floe ll pravix~cee
ha.s regressed attnce last year. Tkaa~re has bc;en soxx~e progress; pa.cifica-
tiorz in 3?y,rala I~icxh has recently iaick.ed u.p becau:~e of the deployrr,.ent a.f
Korean troops into a pacification tale. The same rrga,y a~.lse~ be dcar~+e in
T'hu Yen l~arov~ince.
~~ilitar~l~egian III, 'I'~~~: GVN Baas pat taken advantage of the. diveraican
of gneatr-y forces intn f"s..r~~a~aocii.a to register additional pacificatian progrese9a.
'iJ'a,ripus oEfici~ls have pressed l..t. Cener'al "I'ri, the ,P~:.~ III cv:t~txa;~erzder,
tca take advantage crf the xrJititary lull b}~ pa~shing the accelerated ca,rx~paign,
latatt the past three rx~canths knave been: vws.sted in atterr:Fting to get the program
rran~rit~g. The perfarrx~+ance of the O~Y~`s various pacification assets con-
tinues to be spcatty anci x~--ecki,ocre.
1~ailitar~ Retgian IV'. Tta.e new I`4~R Ili" ce~a~~marxcler, ai~ibd by some recently
appaintect and more effective province. c.h#efs, harp been taking advantage
csf ttxe ~situatian tca push ttie pacification effort, ~Iawever, the +eznphasis is
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
-
ara extand$ng thes t~~'~'~ px~ea~e~,ce into reza7~inin~ Gozaarxxunf~t ~trc~xaghc~ld~
anther than on corx~olstd~ati~an end develt~pxx~er~t, The GV~t r~cet-tl~ e~t~.b-
lt~k~ed it;~elf ir- an area of .mien Haa ~'rovinee ~rrhlch canta4.xa~d owe ~g the
tar~e,~t rerm~.imin.~ can,centr~.ti,aza~ cif pc~pnlati,;an ~tlll. 'under V~ ~ar>otresl.
~# ~eri~aa af' #Ere ~~xpperrt ka~.a>se~ will alga be e~tatalii~k~ed in rez~aiexix~~ V~
base ar+~a~ thraau~hnut the delta.
+Ct~rnx~a:en-t. ~~ far rlurin th+~ acceler~.teci c~,rnpai~r>tent~ a~nrl the ~s~treely Ic~r~r
l~;vel of enesa~y xa~ilita~y aetic~~m cluxing JixlSr ~nr~ Au~u~t~ however. 3.t e~eexxa~
~l~sar that the GV~T'~ ~:ecelerateci c~rx~paiaa k>a~ not rerul,terl in a notice-
~.bly strox:'xe+:l
has been nn:ore in +~~t~.t~li~h+~c3 r~railitary~ an~~. paraxx?~ilitary ,prerlgr~,r~~ts~ r~,the~^
than in the newer Internal .e~curity and political f'ietd~.
~I.R4 refraart~ that ,A:arraha~~advx Gc~xlby and. ~=`r~~id~rat ".l`hieu axe F'uliy aware
-~~ these shaxt+~trrxains end axe con~ultin~ ta!~a rxaea~~atx~e~s to rev#talixe the
cta.rr~nt caxxa.pai~r~. 'Thieu hay x~t~t y'et annc~uncr~d ~, revi~~ed prograrr~, but
he wilt apparently extend the pragraarrz an additanx~al tlaaree rraanthe beyond
the ori;~in~.Y expix~.tian date cat ~;:5ctaber 3l.
JHH: V'~".RS: vbs la/i6I7a
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
R ~ ~ ~~
7 October 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Current Status of the Pacification Program in South 'V.~~ts~am
1. The .momentum i.n pacificatia: achieved during mast of ~.# ~~
has not been sustained this year. The s.owdawn has been the resutt os
numerous factors, including a decrease in areas available fos immew:w:~
expansion, the diversion.of national attention to other pressing prabier~is,
the. introduction of new and unfamiliar political and sacia-economic
objectives, a degree of apathy which accorr%panied the improved 5c;cU.rlty
situation, and in some ~.reas intensified anti-pacification efforts by she
er~emy.
2. The basic ,strategy of the 19?0 Pacification and Deve'.op:nent
"Plan differed from that of the preceding year by concentrating an con--
solidating GVN control rather than on rapid expansion into new terwi~ory.
The underlying purpose was to effect an attitudinal change in the l:opulation
from passive recognition of GVN,adm,inistrative control to active part=ci-
_ potion on the government's side in the political life of the country. ,The
. goal, originally set for the end of 1970 but later advanced to the end of
October, was to bring 90 percent of the people within the A and ~ ~e~.u:-i~y,j
development category, with the remainder upgraded to at least a C
category. To this end eight basic objectives were established: imp.: caving
security; neutralizing the VC infrastructure; perfecting the FSDF;
developing local administration; implementing the Chieu Hoi prograxx~.; '
impravina the life of war victims; establishing an effective information.
system.; and building prosperity.
3. Progress during the first phase of the 1970 plan (J'anu~:ry-M ..ne)
vtir~s spotty, and actual regression ?occurred in a number o'# prbvince:~,
.articularly in MR 2, M:,_eover, some of the recorded pragres~ cap ~~'
~,~.ributed to the absence of Corr.:nunist forces in the border prov;'_ :c.;s
rather than to GVN initia~.ives:, t~Vhen it became apparent that tr;~re w~~s
general. nation-wide letdown on the part of the GVN, Ambassado:rc~._-.,,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
convinced 1resident Thieu that measures had to.be taken to restore the
previous year's moixxentum and to meet projected .goals, Accordingly,
a program was decreed, on 13 June which called for a special pacification.
and development campaign that would run from. 1 July to 31 October.
The president directed that particular emphasis be placid on econorn.ic
and social development, which is the main focus of the special program.
In addition, the plan emphasized the People's Information program, active
participation by village and hamlet officials and PSDF in self-defense,
better coordinated activity and rrxutual support by Main Farce, FtF, PF,
PSDF and National Police, rapid conviction of VCI and early~judgnnent an
VC suspects to reduce the detention center population, and special training
far technical cadre at Vung Tau in order that they can assist in motivating
the people. '
4. According to the HES statistics shown below consistent, but
nat spectacular, progress has been made this year on a countrywide basis,
with the exception of the man.th of April when a slight r:;gression taok
place. It should be noted that the HES statistics axe most responsive to
the level of enemy activity. Thus, the relative quiet of the enemy xra.ilitary
forces since this past spring is the prime causapof the progress in 1870..
Significant intangibles such as the impact of terrorism and threats on
popular attitudes, enemy proselyting efforts and VC penetrations, are
not rn,easured by HES to any acceptable degree, even though they might
have decisive impact on long-run allied objectives:
l
1970
GVN (A, B, C)
Contested ~r3, E) VC
Population.
Jan
~
87. 9%
~ ,
8. 7%
1.4% ~
17, 642. 9
Feb
88, 5%
8. 2%
w
2. 2%
17, 636.4
.Mar
$9.7%
7, 5%
2, 0%
17, 723. 6
Apr
--
88. 9% ~
8, 3%
2. 0%
17, 758. l
May
8q, 7%
8. 1%
1.4%
17, 789. 7
Jun.
q l , 1 ?ju
7. 1 ?jo
1.4?j?
17, tiq 7. 3
Jul
q2: 4% ~ ~
6.0%
1. 1%
17, 923. 2
Aug
92, 8%
5, 5%
1. 0%
18, 014. 9
NOTE:
Each month, a certain portion of South Vietnam's population
cannot be evaulated, thus totals do not add to 100%.
.- 2 -.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 ' ~~~ l .C'a F 9
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
M ~ Fem.
5, bespite the onset of the special emphasis program, pacifi-
cation efforts improved only slightly, and the results sa far have been
xni.xed. xn June, the Phoenix program rxxet its monthly goal -af 1, 800...
neutralizations for the first time this year, dropped to 1, 6~6 in 3uly,
but increased sharply to 2, 603 in August. The HES security/development
scare for the A, B, and C-rated population moved from gl. 1 percent an
30 .Tune to 9.28 percent an 31 Augusta ,The A and B-rated. population
moved from 77. 1 percent to 7$. 5 percent in the same period, The
territorial farces continue to show improvement and are meeting their
strength goals, although performance remains uneven because of the
leadership problem. The PS]aF is not meeting its strength and training
goals,.'but its performance is gradually izxzpraving. The program to
expand the police is lagging, with a 31 July police strength of 88, 200
against a 1970 goal of 122, 000.
6, Political and socio-economic ratings are showing improvement
,primarily due to increased activities in village self-help programs and
refugee benefit .payments, The influx of aver 200, 000 ethnic Vietnamese
from, Cambodia has made dubious the 1970 goal of clearing all refugees.
from the rolls. Although Chieu Hoi results. are running some 15-20
percent behind last year due to the slower e~cpansian of the GVN presence
into the countryside, the number of defectors is still significant. The
People's Znformatian, program suffers froze poor rrzanagezr,.ent, low quality
cadre, and lack of funds, 'and is rated as poor in mast province s , Local
administration has been strengthened' this year by the holding of bath
local az~d national elections, the training of local officials, and the granting
of more autonomy. 'More than 95 percent of the hamlets and villages now
have elected governments and soiree 25, 000 local. officials had been trained
by the end of June.. Although distribution of land under the new land
reform program has barely begun, the framework is being e"'stablished.
Some 4,.000 officials are being trained, aerial surveys are being made,
and payment of rent by the tenants' is na danger required.
7, On the other hand, enthusiasm. far accelerated pacification
has bean at less than optimum. Ta some extent this can be attributed to
the fact that national and Ioca1 leaders have been preoccupied with such
things as student and veterans demonstrations, economic problems, the
30 August senatorial elections and the Cambodian problem. In some areas,
Ioc:.l officials have tended to give short shrift to calls far a greater effort
while enjoying the greater peace,: security, and prosperity that has arrived
in many parts of the country.
.. 3 .. .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 ~aJ?~~~-y~t+ 1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
$. Except in northern MR 3, the diversion of Communist assets
and interests to Cambodia last spring did not open up large areas of
South Vietnam for exploitation by the GV1V. The enemy forces utilized
in Carxzbodia were already deployed in Cambodia or in the areas close to
the Cambodian border, whiJ.e the VC anti-pacification forces.{local forces
and guerrillas) remained in place. Moreover, the Communists in several
provinces broke up their Main Force units into smaller components for
use in ahigh-priority, anti-pacification effort. Same areas i.n South
Vietnam suffered a decline in the GVN security posture due to the deploy-
ment of ~.RVN forces to Cambodia.
9. ~V'e queried our regional-officexs-in-charge (Danang, Nha
Trang, Bien Hoa, Can Tho) far their on=the=scene impressions of the
special pacification and development program. Their replies follow:
a. Military Region 1. The accelerated pacification pro-
gram was launched in MR I against a military backdrop that
already had enemy and allied farces pitted against each other
because of sizeable enemy efforts to push into lowlands. Here
the enemy took a severe beating on three separate occasions
in the last four months, with RF and PF playing a significant
and successful role each time. On the non-military scene, the
pacification program continues to move ahead, albeit at a
5lawer pace. An extensive land clearing program which is
riow some si.x months old continues to provide new land far
~ettlers and a number of roads are being opened up to aid these
~ew settlers get their products to markets and to give them
access to coastal areas for expanded fishing efforts. A major
impetus behind the haste in pacification efforts in MR 1 is
xecognition of the need to get as. much done as possible durin;
time remaining in which fairly sizeable nun:~bers of U. S, .
troops are available to help in the overall effort.
b. Military h'egion 2, `T'here are not many bright signs
that the government's intended acceleration of pacification is
yielding much in way of results in this region. This is par-
ticularly disturbing because the situation in four and possibly
five provinces has regressed from the progress made last
year. There has been some forward movement,. however.
An increase in pacification efforts in Binh Dinh Province has
resu.:ted from the deployment of RC?K forces into a pacification
mission. This was done primarily to offset the loss of U. S.
farces and to release ARVN units to the Highlands to cope with .
the NVA. The same may be done in Phu Yen Province. Among
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
~-i..lia?1~ ~
~ ~ ?~
other efforts .to improve security. in and around Dalat, the
AI~.VN 53rd Regi:~:ent of the 23rd Division has rr~aved into
the area to conduct search and patrol operations. In the
past two weeks ~9 enemy ~T.A have been reported by the' 53rd
which is a drastic improvement over the past performance
of th~.s mediocre .regiment,
c. Military Region 3. Available data suggests that in
MR 3 the GVN has not taken anything like a maximum
advantage of the situation created by the diversion of~VG
Main Farce units from this region. MR 3 should be a major
recipient of opportunities. provided by the fact that the pre-
ponderance of enemy Main Force strength in MR 3 moved
into Cambodia. Since June, enemy initiated activity through-
out MR.3 has. remained at a relatively low level with enemy
efforts directed primarily in support of local forces and
guerrilla operations .against Vietnamization and pacification
programs. GORDS, MR 3 and TI FFV have pressed Lt. General
Do Cao Tri, MR 3 Commander, to take advantage of the Lull
and move ahead with an accelerated pacification, campaign,
Three months appear to have been wasted in getting this
campaign off dead center, with some progress being shown
in September. Phung Hwang capacity to target the VCI
remains spotty with overall results mediocre. The territorial
forces account fox less than 20 percent of enemy casualties
and the leadership of R>"' appears weak and. there is a. lack of
aggressiveness. Some strides are being made in respect to
the PS.~.~F, but these are accampa.nied by much self-generated
ballyhoo. There is no noticeable improvement in the National
Folice effort in MR 3 except very recently in the field of
resources control, again as a result of IZ FFV pxessures. 7'he
National Police Field Forces (NPFF) remain virtually useless.
Since May, an appreciable part of the Special Felice. effort .has _
.been diverted to screening repatriates from Cambodia,, with a
lass of momentum. in the effort against the VCL Food denial
. programs and 4he cumulative effect of rome plowing appear to
have hurt the VC more in MR 3 than any other pacification
activities or programs.
d. Military Region 4. ~ Of ail the military regions, MR 4
has been taking the bast advantage of the current situation to
push its pacification effort. New and more affective province
chiefs were appointed in soma provinces, and the arrival of
Major General Ngo Quarig 'xruong as Region Commander
_~ 5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 a~ ~? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
~,
probably is. giving impetus to the GVN's accelerated campaign.
He is establishing fire support bases throughout the Delta to
harass the VC in their base areas anal to deny re-establishment
of VC secure areas ire the Future. An operation was started
30 September to clear the VC from. Three .Sisters' Mountains
and ARVN has already occupied two of seven mountains (Base
Area 400) and expects to occupy the third shortly, A marine
brigade is currently operating in lower An. Xuyen Province
against Base Area 4$2, and other operations .are planned against
Base Areas 494, 470 and in the U Minh Forest?against Base
Area 4$3. In Kien Hoa province, one of the old VC strongpoints,
a recent influx: of ralliers is cited as proof of pacification eforts
there. There were 772 raliiers in August and over 340 in
Septerxiber, xn. fact, Kien. Hoa has led the country for nine
'straight weeks in ralliers.
l4. President Thieu has the question of how to revitalize the
accelerated pacification program very much in mind, but as of note he
has not announced a revised program. His recent appointment of a.
new MR 2 CommGnder and several new province chiefs was directly
related to this problem. He is discussing the situation with Aml~assad:ar
Colby and presumably action will be taken to tackle the problem with
renewed vigor. It is probable that the current program. wi11 be extended
beyond the 31 Octob4r date.
,~ ~,r. ~-., ....__
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 ~' ,
R.aNDUM
NATICJNAL SECURITY GOUYCIL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
;~
MEMC7R.A.NDUIVI k` OR DR. KtSSIlVG ER.
FROM: John H. Holdxidge +.'
place. E
~ ..c
E~~' 4 ?
In xespanse to our request for field comments. on the .status of the, c?- w~;t
celerated pacification campaign, CIA has produced a memorandum which `r? j ?y,.
contains reports from the. senior CIA officers in the four military regions ~"'
~..
(Tab A). A summary of their comments follow. 1 a ,,j/f,/'~ f
i
Militar Re ion I. ''r++"7~`'" ' ' ;:,,,1,
y g' The pacification program is moving ahead slowly. New 3t
land is being provided for settlers, and xoads axe being opened to allow -
fhese settlers to get their produce to market. Militarily, enemy units arey``l) ~V
continuing to try to push into the coastal lowlands but without success. A ~;
maior irnoeEus behind. ~na~;f;r~t-;~,,, in 11Q~7 T ;o ,.e.,.....,;~.:..< ._c z~_ ___~ ~- ---?
~~~a l
Cam- 1Jr'>
~~~ ~~ ~
SUBJECT: Status Of The Accelerated k'acifica.tion Campaign ~: ~ ;~j ~tr!= ,
campaign is yielding much in the way of results. This is particularly. di,s-
tiurbing because the situation izi four and possibly five of the 11 provinces
has regressed since last year, There has been some. progress; pacifica-
tion in Binh Dinh has recently picked up because of the deployment of
Korean. troops into a pacification role. The same may also be done in
Phi;,,. Yen Province.
MilitaxX Region II. There are few signs that the GV1V's accelerated
Military Region III, The GVN has not taken advantage. of the diversion
of enemy forces into Cambodia to register additional gacification progress.
Various officials have pressed Lt. General Tri, the MR IST commander,
to take advantage of the military lull by pushing the accelerated campaign,
but the past three xxxonths have been wasted in attempting to get the program
moving. The performance of the GVN's various pacification assets con-
tinues to be spotty and mediocre.
Military Region IV. The netiv MR IV commander, airled by some recently
appointed and more effective province chiefs, has been .taking sdvantage
of the situation to push the pacification effort, However, the emphasis is
SECRET -
"?~ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
~~,~ding the GVN's presence into remaining Communist strongholds
~er than on consolidation and development. The GVN recently esta,b..
~~,hed itself in an area of Kien Hoa Province which contained one of the
~'-Xargest rerr~,ainin.g concentrations of population still under VC control.
A series af'fre support bases will ,also be established in rem.a}ning VC
base areas, throughout the delta. I
_`;
Comment. So far during the accelerated carxipaign, HES 1stat}sties
have continued to edge upward at about the same pace as during the first,
half of the year, In view of the field comments and~the`extremely low
level of enern.y military action during July. and' Av;gust, however, it seems
clear that the GVN's accelerated campaign has not. resulted in a notice
ably stronger pacification effort. What success the GVN has attained.
has been more in established military and pararxxilitary programs, rather
than in the newer internal security 'and political fields.
GJA reports that Ambassador Colby 'and President Thieu are fully ativare
of these shortcomings and are consulting on measures to revitalize the
current campaign, Thieu has not yet annov.nced a xevised program., but
he will apparently extend the prograrxi an additional three months beyond
the original expiration date of October 31,
SECRET
._~________r.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 4'
F
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
f - ~.
Secre?ar.y azr as sen you: ~, erria-ran . r~b~.-~,a.-~k~-~-w._
assesse nth.e~x~.~t-~a~~ts--crt-gaefieeatiah:---~he~~ajn'nts _ ~,_....Y.~=?
lam. ~~
j ..._-..._~ __-----, ___...__
were spotty. The major xeason~for this was that the GVN~s
s.ttention was diverted by other problems. .
Consolidation of security at the village level, a ms.jor
objective of the 1970 plan, is proceeding, although uridra-
rnatically. Improvement in arming and training the Peoples
Self Defense Farce, continues, and this farce now provides
the primary defense for over 2, 000 hamlets.
-- The only' pacification setback this year occurred in April,
largely because of a shift in Communists tactics as they
recognized the threat posed by pacification,
-- Neutralization of the VC infrastructure continues to be
mast effective against the lower levels,. and the overall
party organization remains viable. Additional efforts to
strengthen the police at. the local level and to improve the
selection and training of Phoenix advisors are underway,
--.The local security mission is increasingly being assumed
by.territorial forces and ARVN must concurrently assume the
mission of backing up the territorials as U. S, forces withdraw..
This aspect of Vietnam.ization is being stressed.
CCINFIDENTLA.L
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3 ,.-- .:-...._ .._ __._ - ~----y
ent. This -~~..
C}'} V`-Pt9-M~i-~-e~s+-neCt7`h7 _ 6 _. _ _
-- Although the majority of goals for the first si.x rrxonths
(as contained in the 1970 overall plan) were nat achieved,
progress is being registered in each o# the eight laasic
pacification pxagrams.. President Thieu has recognized
' the need to refocus attention an pacification and has
initiated an accelerated caxnpaigno
-- Weaknesses still exist in social and economic areas of refugee.
care, veterans affairs, in.flataon, and student unrest. These are
being addressed, although no quick 'solutions are foreseen.
actin L'a ~ ore ixriportant-factcrr~s thazi eziezriy efforts~i%~~.~-~~.i ~-~--
the current ,spa-tom. acificatinr,- T~,; ~ a ~. ~ .._~ _,__ _ _
review ox pacification. Whi]~e-~
also true that the-1E`ve f Viet
in the a at s n ~--ov-ar~:n~
?erxx~g ac
ven period.
voiced in: id's ~~~
~xue aver, the long xun~'~ ~,~ ~s
--
can cause a lat of fluctuation
-~ o re.#ars to the GVN's acCelEratpri C~,~ri~;.n., ~...,. ~- - -
-
elc
_
a
sport to you on~ie accelerated campaign shortly.
-
-, -.-_ .. ~r M l*1~J,i ~- YY a na.va~.s~cecl tY~e -fi
l
f
r conznzents;`~aricl"`w~.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-9-1-43-3