ESTIMATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION MARCH 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00764R000600090007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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flONL ITUATXON
.141"1)?9P2
1, In the field of internationalpolicy, the year 3.95a was srked by
the attenpt of the USA to catch up with the USSR in Europe he
political and military 1140140, rOinfOroiag Its own Crimea fOrota* aiding the ,
rearmament of the free mistime*. Of Europe, including Turkey, oonetud
100440 treaty with japan, end organising security poets with JapanAustralia,
New Zeeland *ad the Philippinee. During the same year the MON attempted to
fortify its positions, initiate the conquest of an area in the Near
*doh, in the event of an armed conflict, oould serve 40 a gluts for
icel and strategic operations, and to consolidate its conquests in
aet. All these Soviet measures Simultaneously worked to Oeunterao
forts made by the 'MA and the Conn-tries in western Europe to achieve a
lame of power*
N. In early 1051 the interaationel interest in Europe focused on the
problem of western Germaisy,0 eontribution to the defense of the West, The
USSR made numerous diplomatic moves against this defense contribution. send-
1 of notes to the NSA and instigating 4 and Ozeohoalevakia
0
problem;
allure 48 they apparently rola
defense contribution less Urgent during the first six months o
believed that they would be 014 to avert the danger of rearmament
by the employment of other means. epecifteally, by bunching a prep
campaign against the peoples of western Europe, For this purpose they ob..
ilised the Communist parties in the iglest as well as all large international
organisations such as the World Federation of Labor, the World Peace Council,
the World Union of Democratic Youth. the International Democratic Federation
of women, the European Union of Laborers and similar Communist front organi-
sations. Signatures were colleeted throughout the world as 4 campaign *for
peaoen was direoted egainst both the remilitarisation of Germany and the
"aggressive" Atlantic Pact in general.
The Policy to rearm Oermenywas countered by the East. with the
hat Germany be reunited. This policy was expressed in Grotewhol's
dated 30 November 1950? end has since been given every possible
propaganda support. The Soviet Zone government attempted to create the
lulforeosioA that it was earnestly interested in the reunification of Germany
by democratic mesas, maintaining that rearmament in western Germany would
make reunification impossible and would create the danger of en internecine
cavil war. The spuriousness of this propaganda was proved, however, by
the progreesive sovietization of the East Zone of Germany as well as the
satellite countries,
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3 In the Satellites the 1383R tried to oonsoltdate its position by
extensive purges. Most sinittosnt among them was the arrest, in november
1951, of Rudolf Slanekl, powerfel secretary general of the Cmnwist Party
of Ceeohoslovskie, and a number of hie henchmen. Cl.tentis, tozaerCzech
foreign minister, had already been arrested several months earlier.
These purges are evidence that the Moeoow?impoeed reeime te viewed
Ointment even by members of the Communist parties. however, there
to believe that the Kremlin's rule is imperiled in the Satellite
though, in the event of an international conflict, the Soviets
able to trust the reliability of these couatries. There have
ions, particularly in Poland, that Ruseia has recently become
efficiency of persuading rather than forcing the Satellites and
Ce of policy from one of terror end force to one of persuasion
and* is in the offing.
the Par
lations
and 4
t involv
void,
the USSR made effort
Communist China, gr
d during the war in Korea,
nt in the conflict. The ileitis
en its close
nese *volunteers"
the sane time
an of armistice
aot&stions was suggested by the Soviets. It oannot be determined es yet
*ether the Soviets are serious in their efforts to obtain an armistice or
whether they merely seek a respite in order to be able to replenish Chinome
stockpiles with arms, ammunition, equipment aad eupplies or wish to exert
political pressure to attain their political goals,
The Somiet Union's opposition to a rehabilitated and rearmed Japan
as strong as its opposition to rearmament in western Germany. The
sty which was concluded with Jaren in San Francisco spelled a serious
teal defeat for the Soviets. In other reepeote, the USSR attempted to
to the peoples in A414 and Africa as a protagonist of their national
Thus, it exerts every possible effort to create difficulties for
rn powers in Tndo Chink, Malaya, BLUM' Indonesia, the Philippines,
East and, more recently, in liorth Africa. Russia warned the Arab
, end Israel not to aeoept the proposal of the three western. powers
Turkey for a joint Near Fest Commend. Sympathies were elso expressed for
a's action against the Aaglo-Iranian Oil Ce any end EGypt's demands for
abrogation of the laeloeEgyptian agreenents of 1936 and 1699.
II, The Situation in Early 1952.
1. Although the rearmanent progruit of the western World Is well under
way, western rurope, at present, is by no means able to withstand egression
from the East, The USA blames a number of countries in western Europe for
their tardiness in Tasking the necessary defense contributions and urges that
the rearmenent progrom be accelerated. The countries in 'mestere Europe, on
the other hand, fear that if they attempt to keep pace 'with the eaerican re-
armament effort thee would face ;rave economio troubles* particularly infla-
tion and its ooncometant ? xeoiel disturbaaces and increased radicalism.
Averell Merriman. U. special envoy, was appointed to neptiate a compromise.
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The position of NATO 11114 undh better in early 1962 than it had
been one year ago. Owing to General Sieenhower's energy muoh headway
wee made in the field of internal organization. The edmisaion to NATO
of Turkey and ereeoe as veil as the voiding of the reereament restrictions
*doh had been imposed upon 'tele- improved the situation of the vegtern
powers in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Their position sea also
improved outside NATO 'hen the USA concluded an arnseaid agreeeent with
regetlavia, thee making it a substantial factor in the western defense
system. It is problematical, however, ehether this factor elll remain cone
Stant. Tkannunent in Turkey appears to be matine satisfaotory progress.
A military mereement between the US and Spain is imminent. American air
baees in Morocoo are being continuously improved, and the new state of
Libya attained significance as a major western bastion in the Mediterranean
as a result of agreements signed with the VS, Great Britian and France.
2. Arab nationalism in the eiddle and Near East exploded in con-
flicts with the old colonial powers. Just as In South rapt ksia, the USSR
lent skillfel propagenda support to these clashes and attempted to assume
the role of a friend of these oountries. Althoueh the Islamic countries
ere not fertile soil for Communism, the attitude of the extreme national-
ists, who . arentaeeereeeeeeeeefUllyepoeetreted,by,MGe agents, produced
* situation - eh ia a positive for the rest as it is neeattio for the
West. In this respect the extreeso meet. All the skill of western diploe
meats and much sympathetic undereeanding of the problems of oriental count-
ries sad peoples will be needed to prevent the Neer East from joining the
Soviet camp under the cover of a policy of neutrality. It is scarcely
possible to exaggerate the seriousness of this danger.
3, Integration in western %rope? is still in the embryonic stage. The
partial economic iategration of the cool and steel industries under the aegis
of the Schuman Plan end the establishment of a European Arny as a first step
in politicel integration are making slaw proeress. Up to the present, it
has net been poseible to overcame the difficulties involved in the establish-
ment of political agencies with commend functions weer the European Army or
eoend ftaeaolal basis for this army. Although the Ohneemichenewegung
(Oounteme-out movement) subsided someehat, a persistent Soviet propaganda
mapaige made large groups in 'western Germany believe that there is but one
alternative, namely, the danger or rearmament end civil wax on the one hand
and reunifiottion of Germany on the other. Evidencle of the suooess of this
type propaganda is to be found in the travels of Pastor Niemeeller to Moscow
and of exeeetch Chancellor Wirth to East Berlin, as well as the establishment
at the Notgeneinscheft fuer den Prieden Huropas (Beergenoy Organization for
theltaiatenence of Peace in euxeps) which was organized by exeMenister of
the interior eeinemenn and !felon Wessel, Chairmen of the Center Party.
Theme are successes which the Soviets attained through propaganda designed
to blind the population in westere lermaey to the actual situation.
4, The tight for Fast Pala has meanwhile been carried on with all
mans of diplomacy, olitioel and eoonomic pressure, civil war mad propee
ganda. The conflict in 'Korea came almost to a standstill when the two
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Vartners reached a balance of their tomes. 3oth partners Showed interest
La the conclusion of an armistice,. However, this may only be 4 maneuver to
gain time. The DS governeent undoubtedly strives to terminate or, at may
rate, to localise the war, and probably prompted by the desire not to create
pecond Corsa, indicated a certain reserve when the Britiah and French
made requests for increased aserican aid aiest the Commumist mammy in
Made China, Burma and Malaya.
III. Estimate of the Situation.
1, Soviet Russia's policy afteror id War II has had both its summates
and failures. Ails the Soviets were able to win the Satellite countries
and China for the Eastern Bloc, they lost Yugoslavia, ehioh they had
already wen, were unable to enlist Greece and Turkey, suffered defeat when
they clamped the blockeje on Berlin, and failed to win the Blitzkrieg in
Urea. llowevor, their increseed political activities in the Far East and
Neer Beet were so successful that the Soviets hope they will be able to
reap the fruits of this policy without further effort.
The present Soviet foreign polioy may be considereda long term
policy. The 'situation in Kam obviously proved a surprise to the USSR
inasmuch as they BM theaseave4 faced with the immediate danger of a third
World, War. They have learned their leas:oe?, and well aware that their mili-
tary power would possibly suffice to obtain initial successes but not final
victory over the considerably superior economic aad armaaent potential of
the Meet, the Krealin seems to have restricted its goals aid postponed its
dates for the final etteinnent or its ends. Judging from the international
situation, there 14 little probability that the USSR will unleash an aggress-
ive war. This estimate is supported la:). the following reflections and observe.
tiones
The mentelity
political means to
In accordance with bl
that time is working
wvantually destroy its
*rim *high, under the burden o
sad accelerated.
nde to prefer
co.
le Soviet leaders believe
d capitalism must
of increasing economic
armament, are compounded
Although exercising complete command over the Satellite
countries in peace time, the Soviets =ant expect that,
in the event of Et long war and possible military successes
by the rest, they will face coneiderable difficulties of
all sorts in these countries. In 1952 Russia is believed
to be continuing its fight for time. Accordingly, the
Soviets will continue to conduct peace cappaigns to ea
courage people in the capitalistic countries to oppose
their mwarmaaearing" governments, spread hatred against
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4#115
a to bar the Wontmore and more from
ow discord maang western countries and
he media of 1MX0 and diplomatic propagaad,
o dissipate and retard the defensive power of
a there is no risk of b. 0
fliot,
td
believe could OD
of the West.
ved in
$ will not
otiona which
West will continue its prorn of interatton in urope
defense ystem and thus will induce the East to
o 4 Cold '19.r tactics to frustrate these
to indicate that the growing strength ass
icipatioa in the Europe Army will not be considered a
belli n 1952. Frequent procrastination aton e western pleaners
rate at oh reermament in weetern 7urope is procressing should
sober-minded atalin that it would be unrealletio for the oviets to
ttack y the atlantic Community.
rLtoei situations impsrUing peace could developif the tR should
olioy to an extreme which could not be reconciled with
statue of the western oountri s, particularly the tSA.
uld eive support to the rebels in ludo china and Southeast
Developnents in the Near Last, partioulerly Irmo would continuo in a
dtreotion favorable to the 'best. Ally political estimate nuat also take into
the tact that the international situation is still a powder barrel which
explede frcr. some unforseen and quite casual spark.
4. Sins* th westera powers are aware of these daagers, there is a
possibility, though only a small one, that they may again make another attempt
to aehleve at least some sort of political armistice tn the cold war between
last and, West through negotiations on the highest level. Rowever, the only
real chance of western success at swill negotiatione would be dependent on the
setUal strength of the Test, both political and military, which would convince
Vesoow that Soviet military aggression would be doomed to failure at the
beginning. Renoe, the nest must persist in its policy of improving its
balance vleatavis the Eastern Sloe with all means and at an accelerated speed
in Europe as well as Asia.
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