KREMLIN POLITICS: THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 26, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGEN
Intelligence Memorandum
Kremlin Politics: The Road to the Summit
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 May 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Kremlin Politics: The Road to the Summit
World events brought leadership politics in
the Soviet Union to a head last week and, as .is
rare, produced an immediate, visible outcome.
Brezhnev at a minimum gained some room to maneuver
in his pursuit of detente with the West and prob-
ably strengthened his personal position in the
process. Politburo member Shelest, the Ukrainian
party boss who had come to represent opposition
to Brezhnev's leadership and to the policy of
detente, suffered an important setback. Brezhnev,
in the two weeks before the summit, was able to
maintain the upper hand in the Kremlin and to
seize the opportunity offered by events to bring
to fruition a move he began against his opponents
last.year.
The course of events demonstrated, however,
the sensitivity of Brezhnev's position to foreign
developments, the reality and strength of the op-
position forces, and Brezhnev's defensiveness in
these circumstances. His triumph was built on
alliances with other elements, both the conserva-
tive military point of view represented by Defense
Minister Grechko and the political forces repre-
sented by Suslov. As a result, Brezhnev is prob-
ably to some extent beholden to both of these
elements.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the
Office of National Estimates.
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Vietnam: No Decision
1. The Soviet leaders first responded to Pres-
ident Nixon's Vietnam statement of 8 May by doing no
more than to keep preparations for the summit in
train and to leave their options open.
2. The Soviet statement on Vietnam issued on
11 May temporized. It committed Moscow to no course
of action, but left the impression that action might
be expected later if the crisis persisted. Foreign
Trade Minister Patolichev was received by President
Nixon the same day and responded to newsmen's ques-
tions about whether the summit was still on with,
"Was there any doubt?" Defense Minister Grechko
had left for Syria and Egypt on 10 May. Politburo
member Voronov left on 11 May with a Supreme Soviet
delegation for Warsaw. Meanwhile, the first moves
were made for a show of naval force in the Tonkin
Gulf.
Shelepin informed the Norwegian Trade Union Fed-
gendered by the Vietnam crisis." On 10 May,
resulted in the postponement by a week of the Bun-
destag vote, in spite of Soviet Ambassador Falin's
attempts in Bonn to correct the situation on 10
May. Frilin later claimed that his "mistake" on
9 May had been caused by "confusion in Moscow en-
on the Soviet West German treaty on 9 May had
3. The business-as-usual facade evidently
masked considerable indecision and debate in Moscow
on how to proceed. An apparent reversal of the
Soviet position on accepting a Bundestag resolution
seen circumstances." In the past Shelepin has
way, scheduled for 15-20 May, because of "unfore-
eration that he was postponing his visit to Nor-
been uneasy at being away from Moscow at times
of critical international developments.
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4. The difficulty of Brezhnev's position was
plain. Vietnam developments confronted him with a
dilemma: how to proceed with the summit while main-
taining the Soviet Union's image as defender of its
allies and the interests of international Communism.
He was the more uncomfortable because, at the same
moment, the West German treaties were in jeopardy.
Brezhnev's prestige was riding on these treaties to
an even greater degree than the summit; the treaties
had been a more evident focus of discontent amon
conservatives such as Shelest.
German Treaties Break the Jam?
5. The misgivings about detente which had
simmered all along in the leadership could only
have intensified sharply following President Nixon's
speech on 8 May. The evidence suggests that a show-
down of some sort within the leadership must have
threatened, or come to a head, by 15 May. The out-
come was a decision on Brezhnev's part to reaffirm
the commitment to hold the summit and to call the
central committee into session beforehand to en-
dorse Brezhnev's negotiating stance. This victory
for the detente forces doubtless paved the way for
Shelest's demotion. The significance of 15 May is
suggested by the fact that on that day, after a
month-long hiatus in press commentary on the summit,
Pravda printed brief TASS announcements of US prep-
arations for the trip. Lead articles in Izvestia
on 16 May and Pravda on 17 May explained and justi-
fied Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence, its
devotion to finding political solutions to inter-
national crises,, and the importance it attached to
developing relations with the US.
6. The decision was probably taken on or
about 15 May to call a central committee plenum for
19 May. Soviet Ambassador to Romania and central
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committee member Drozdenko returned from vacation
in the USSR to his post in Bucharest shortly before
14 May
,
wen ac to Moscow on urs ay, May.
7. Although these circumstances suggest that
the key decisions were made about the 15th, the ac-
tivities of the leaders during this period do not
suggest that a formal politburo meeting was held.
The fact that summit preparations were never halted
perhaps means that Brezhnev arranged to keep them
going, with concomitant press treatment, in informal
consultation with his colleagues in Moscow. Arrange-
ments for the plenum might have been handled in a
similar fashion.
8. Meanwhile, on 15 May the executive commit-
tee of the opposition Christian Democrats in West
Germany voted to support the all-Bundestag resolu-
tion. This action, despite some backing and fill-
ing in Bonn on the 16th, cleared the way for the
Bundestag to pass the Eastern treaties on 17 May.
Passage of the treaties could not but bolster
Brezhnev's position. It meant that the best moment
for an all-out challenge of Brezhnev had passed.
The Soviet leader may well have seized the oppor-
tunity provided to confirm the summit schedule and
to reinforce his own position.
9. Politburo members resident in Moscow and
those from out of town appeared at an anniversary
celebration for the Pioneers on Thursday, 18 May,
the usual day for politburo meetings. The only
members missing were Voronov
still in War
,
25X1 KGB chief Andropov.41 3.na agreement was presumably
reacnea y is group concerning the course of the
central committee plenum the next day. The plenum
heard a report by Brezhnev on the international
situation. It expressed full approval and endorse-
ment of its contents and the actions of the polit-
buro in carrying out the Soviet "peace program."
The plenum named Boris Ponomarev a candidate member
of the politburo. He is a long-time party secretary
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and chief of the central committee's international
department that helps form foreign policy and handles
relations with Communist parties outside the Soviet
bloc. The plenum also approved the appointment, an-
nounced 21 May, of Ukrainian first secretary Shelest
to the far less important post of USSR deputy pre-
mier. Only four days later Shelest's demotion was
completed when Ukranian Premier Shcherbitsky was
named to replace Shelest in Kiev.
10. Brezhnev had a fresh mandate on the summit
from his fellow politburo members and the central
committee. He also was able to deliver a blow
against his most outspoken critic on domestic and
foreign policy. Appearances suggest that throughout
this period he maintained the upper hand in Moscow
and kept just far enough ahead of his critics to
prevent his hand from being forced.
Brezhnev: Protective Reaction
11. Although Brezhnev was able to engineer a
favorable denouement to this pre-summit: drama, many
elements of the story illustrate the reactive nature
of his actions. His position had become sensitive
to events in other parts of the world, and it ap-
peared that for a time he could only manage to delay
decisions. His dependency on the course of events
abroad, of course, was a consequence of a lack of
full support at home.
T e recor does not
show dust when an ow t e pressures to take another
course made themselves felt, but clearly they did.
Wavering on how to handle the Bundestag resolution
on 9 May and the subsequent decision'not to ac-
knowledge it in writing, probably relayed to the
Germans on 18 May, reflect conservative pressures
and divided counsels. The strained justifications
for the summit that have been appearing in the press
and the doubting attitude expressed by Soviet au-
diences at public lectures indicate a vast reservoir
of skepticism about detente policies.
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12. The convening of the plenum reflected
Brezhnev's concern to protect his flanks. The No-
vember 1971 plenum had set the course for the sum-
mit, and another meeting was not required for this
purpose. Plenums are normally convened after im-
portant occasions to hear and approve the leader-
ship's interpretation of their outcome, although
Brezhnev has shown a desire in the past to pin down
collective endorsement of policies, particularly on
touchy topics such as Czechoslovakia in 1968. The
list of speakers on Brezhnev's report of 19 May
shows extraordinary care in selection. The list
was stacked with Brezhnev supporters, such as
Armenian party boss Aliyev, and political non-
entities, such as the presidents of the Ukrainian
and Kazakh science academies. Normally, Shelest
and other important regional leaders would have
spoken, as they did at the November plenum. And,
finally, for a leadership that has always practiced
the belief that the appearance of unity is a vital
necessity, the demotion of Shelest on the eve of
the President's visit was out of place. It suggests
the degree to which Brezhnev felt the pressure of
his critics and the need to use the opportii-ity to
undercut them.
13. In replacing Shelest with Shcherbitsky,
Brezhnev brings to culmination a process he started
at the 24th party congress in the spring of last
year. Then, he succeeded in having his protege
Shcherbitsky raised from candidate to full member-
ship on the politburo. Two Ukrainian leaders sitting
as full members on the politburo was a sharp break
with precedent and seemed to foreshadow the changes
subsequently made. Although Shelest, like others
who have been shunted aside, may be able to retain
his politburo status for some time, he is now but
one of eight other deputy chairmen of the Council
of Ministers--none of whom has politburo status--
and is outranked on the Council by Chairman Kosygiri
and two first deputy chairmen who are full members
of the politburo.
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Many Winners
14. Brezhnev did not emerge by any means as
the sole beneficiary. He seems to have accomplished
Shc;lest's demotion only in alliance with other
forces, which may thus have been able to enhance
their own standing. In procuring endorsement of
his detente policy and in weakening Shelest's posi-
tion, Brezhnev cultivated his relations with other
conservative ups, especially as reprnsentpd by
Grechko.
15. Another winner may be Suslov, senior party
ideologist and foreign affairs expert. Lonomarev
is probably Suslov's protege. Both of them report-
edly opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, strongly
pushed by Shelest, because of the opposition they
knew it would arouse among other Communist parties.
Suslov helped provide the ideological justification
for the new opening to West Germany in early 1969.
Thus, Ponomarev's promotion, although it would seem
to bolster the commitment to detente, does not add
to Brezhnev's personal strength. In fact, over the
years Suslov has served as a principal independent
power broker on the politburo and a defender of its
collective features.'
16. Finally, it should be noted that the pol-
icy of detente, reconfirmed at the plenum, was
espoused by Kosygin long before Brezhnev took it
over, and detente certainly continues to receive
his support. Reports and comments passed to the
West late last week about the essentially troika
nature of the Soviet side of the summit reflect
sensitivity to the positions of Kosygin and Presi-
dent Podgorny.
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