STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreign Ditum
TLEEF HOUE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
Ir-8
April 3, 1975
No. 0085/75
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No Dieaem Abroad
Background Uoe OnZU/ControZZed Diaaem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
15B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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SOVIET UNION . EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office cf Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Dirert.,rate of Intelligence. Comments dnd queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
April 4, 1975
Some Thoughts on the
.Increased Likelihood of Soviet
Military Intervention in the Middle East. . .
1
Romanian Nationalism: On the Increase . . . . . .
3
Katushev-Pato Meeting
5
Soviet Ccn,mercial
Visitor HighlightsDuring March . . . . . . . ,
7
PUBLICATION OF INTEREST
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Some Though - ts on the Increased Likelihood of
Soviet Military Intervention in the'Millie East
SNIE 30-1-75 Next Steps in the Middle East
states that the likelihood of limited Soviet inter-
vention is "now higher than during the October 1973
War, and would further increase as Arab battlefield
fortunes waned, particularly if a decisive Israeli
victory loomed or if Cairo or Damascus were threat-
ened." This judgment apparently rests on two assump-
tions: that there is now heightened Arab and Israeli
"intransigence" as compared to 1973 and that Moscow
may perceive the US as being less likely to come down
firmly on Israel's side.
Regarding the first assumption, intransigence
may be higher than at most times over the past year,
but certainly it is no greater than it was in the fall
of 1973. On the contrary, it is possible to argue
that the gap has been narrowed in the past 18 months.
In any casp, the degree of intransigence is
relevant to Moscow only insofar as it keeps the US
from mediating the dispute on its own and brings the
USSR into she picture, or makes further negotiat o.is
impossible. The first situation--essentially where
we are today--does present koscow with fresh oppor-
tunities, but not for armed intervention. Only the
absence of negotiations followed by war begets this
possibility.
Under the second assumption, the Soviets think
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There is also the question of how the USSR will
weigh the impact of events in lndo-China on future US
behavior. The Soviets may calculate that the US, with
increased sensitivity to the signals it is sending to
the world, will be more--not less--willing to take a
strong position if the Soviets were to :intervene in
the Middle East.
Finally, one must ask what, if any, lessons the
Soviets have drawn from their experience of the past
18 months. On the one hand, it is possible that the
Soviets have concluded that only their direct inter-
vention on the ground will enable them to avoid a
repetition of the post-October wa.:., syndrome. The
Soviets may think that forceful action on behalf of
the crabs will solidify their position with their
friends in the Arab world, win them new friends among
former enemies, and once and for all expose the US as
the foe of Arab interests.
On the other hand, the Soviets may think that the
lesson of the post-October war period is that no matter
how much the Soviets do for the Arabs--and in the Soviet
view they did much in October--they are likely to be
repaid with ingratitude. The Soviets may be less
disposed than in 1973 to the idea that they have an
obligation to save the Arabs from the consequences of
their follies, particularly with respect to Egypt.
Indeed, it is possible that as a consequence of their
unhappy experience of the past 18 months the Soviets
may believe that as long as Sadat is in power in Cairo,
their policy in Egypt will be on unfirm footing. If
this is true, Moscow could view an Israeli thrashing
of Egypt as a good thing, and would be more disinclined
than. before to take major risks with their own forces
in order to pull Sadat's chestnuts out of the fire.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 3, 1975
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Romanian Nationa. xn:
On the Increase
Romanian treatment of the 30th anniversary of
victory in World War II has taken on explicitly
nationalistic and anti-Soviet overtones that are.
sure to aruuse Moscow's ire.
Ceausescu filed the opening salvo in a speech
on March 28 (Staff Notes, March 31). The full
text is ne'o, available, and it reveals that Ceausescu
branded attampts to under-value the role of the
nation and to equate nationalism with anti-Communism
as "c:-)smopo~itanism." This charge will not sit well
with the Kremlin; "cosmopolitanism" is the doctrinal
opposite of nationalism and is used by Moscow to
condemn the ideology and politics of the-bourgeoisie.
Ceausescu added insult to injury by mocking
"some comrades" (read, the Soviets) who turn to Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and "even Stalin" for solutions to
practical local problems that they had never ad-
dressed. Ceausescu added that "these comrades" had
adopted policies damaging to Romania.
On March 30 the party newspaper took up the cud-
gels of nationalism by publishing a precedent-breaking
discussion of a Romanian-Russian convention signed
in April. 1877. Bucharest deliberately used id-.i in-
terpretation of history to highlight current diffi-
culties with Moscow and to imply that the Kremlin
should follow the Tsarist example. The Imperial
Russian Government, said the article, "obtained the
right to move its army into the Balkans," while
"respecting the rights of the Romanian state." More-
over, Russian Grand Duke Nikolai appealed to King
Carol I to join the battle with the Turks, while
keeping Romanian troops under national command. The
commentary lauds Romanian resistance to attempts by
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"great neighboring empires" to "dismember" the Ro-
manian nation, a clear reference, among other things,
to Soviet acquisition of Bessarabia and northern
Bukovina in 19 40 .
The Romanians have also published an article
arguing that Moldavia was never under Turkish rule,
thus implying that Bessarabia was never the Turks'
to ceda to Russia as they did in 1812.
The upsurge of nationalism reached its apex on
April 2 with the announcement that celebrations of
both the 1877 convention and the 375th anniversary
of Romanian national hero Michael the Brave's short-
lived unification of the country will coincide with
VE day. Centering the celebrations on May 9 reflects
Bucharest's resentment of Moscow's unwillingness to
recognize Romania's military contribution during the
final months of World War II. Army Chief-of-Staff
Colonel-General Coman told the US ambassador on April
2 that the Romanians resent the reluctance of the
Hungarians and "o Lhers"---again read the Soviets--to
acknowledge the loss of 150,000 Romanian lives in
the allied cause. Coman's remarks go far to explain
the egregious selr-serving character of an article
in Scinteia on March 28 that recalled the gratitude
of the friendly Hungarian people for "struggles waged
by the Romanian army, alongside the Soviet army" in
liberating Hungary.
The US embassy rpports that some of its sources
have indicated tl.at preparations for the 1877 cen-
tenary are already under way. Giren the current
nationalistic binge, however, Ceausescu may reveal
next month that the centenary celebrations will start
two years early.
On balance, the tone and substance of articles
and speeches in Bucharest strongly suggest that
Ceausescu believes that his brand of national Com-
munism will prove more attractive to Europeans than
that of Moscow. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Katushev-Pato Meeting
Pravda on March 28 published a bland announce-
ment that K. P. Katushev, secretary of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee, met with Otavio Pato, a member of
the Portuguese Communist Party Central Committee
Political Commission and Secretariat. The meeting,
according to Pravda, was held in an "atmosphere of
fraterxal friendship," and the participants "ex-
changed information on matters of interest" to the
two parities. V. S. Shaposhnikov, deputy chief of
the CPSU International Department, took part in the
meeting.
Despite Pravda's routine treatment, the meeting
was highly unusual on at least two counts. The for-
mula used to describe the meeting is traditionally
reserved for meetings with parties from the bloc
countries. In addition, Katushev is the party sec-
retary responsible for relations with ruling com-
munist parties; he does not meet with party delega-
tions from outside the bloc. If protocol had been
followed at the meeting with Pato, B. N. Ponomarev,
party secretary and chief of the Central Committee
department responsible for relations with non-ruling
communist parties, would have met with the Portuguese
delegation. Ponomarev's failures to meet with Pato
may be explained by an embassy report, still uncon-
firmed, that he is on leave, but this would not ex-
plain the choice of Katushev as a subst)',tute.
The Katushev-Pato meeting could indicate that
the Soviets intend to recognize the PCP as a ruling
party, but the risks inherent in conferring such
status at this time make this an unlikely explanation.
A ilausible but highly speculative explanation for
Katushev's role in the Patp talks is a rr rganization
of the Central Committee departments dealing with for-
eign affairs combining the Bloc and International
Departments.
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K. V. Rusakov was last identified publicly as
head of the Central Committee Bloc Department in
November 1968. Since 1972 he has been identified
as an adviser to Brezhnev. Recently acquired in-
formation on a seminar for SQviet foreign affairs
specialists identified D. B. Rakhmanin, as first
deputy chief of the International Department. Pre-
viously he had been associated with the Bloc De-
partment. Rusakov's transfer and Rakhmanin's new
position, if true, would suggest that the two de-
partments had been merged or, more unlikely, that
the Bloc Department had been abolished.
Changes in the Central Committee apparatus were
also rumored in 1973 when Petr Abrasimov, then am-
bassador to Paris, returned to Moscow to head an un-
identified Central Co.TMunittee department. His posi-
tion was never firmly identified, but evidence sug-
gests that he headed a department which probably
included Cadres Abrpad, the Exit Commission, and
possibly functions from some other departments.
Abrasimov's reassign.-nent to East Germany in March
raised questions about the organization of the Cen-
tral Committee apparatus and may support a recent
report that there will be a "new organization" with-
in the Central Committee apparatus to redefine the
departments' areas of responsibility. Whether the
Central Committee departments have been reorganized
is uncertain, but the apparatus is overdue for some
adjustment as there are at least five departments with-
out heads. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
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TIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED)
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Soviet Commercial Visitor
Highlights During March
About 106 Soviets were authorized to enter the
.United States for commercial purposes during the
month of March. The number is 20 percent lower than
in February,..but almost the same as that in March
of last year. Highlighting the list of arrivals
were two delegations headed by USSR ministers: A
group of power specialistsj, led by the minister of
heavy, power, and transport machine building, V. F.
Zhigalin, visited several US firms--including Brown
and Root, Westinghouse, and General Electric--to
study the construction of atomic power stations.
Minister of the gas industry, S. A. Orudzhev, was
the leader of a'second contingent, composed of gas
turbine specialists. This group met with General
Electric to discuss a contract under which GE would
provide its gas turbine technology to the gas min-
istry.
Other significant visits included:
--Two specialists in chromium alloys, ac-
companied by a State Committee for Sci-
ence and Technology official in charge
of metallurgical exchanges, visited the
Union Carbide Company.
--The RSFSR Minister of Light Industry,
Yevgeniy Kondratkov, led a group of
leather specialists for talks with the
Tenneco Chemical Company, which may
provide the USSR with the equipment for
a synthetic leather plant.
--A group of pulp and paper administrators
interested in US pulpstone manufacturing
technology toured several US paper mills
and discussed a pulpstone contract with
the Norton Company. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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PUBLICATION OF INTEREST
USSR Council of Ministers, A(CR) 75-12, UNCLASSIFIED,
March 1975. This up ated, wall chart includes members
of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, heads
of all-union and union republic ministries, chairmen
of state committees and other agencies associated
with the Council of Ministers,
republic councils of ministers.
74-34. Copies may be obtained
x6910.
April 3, 1975'
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and
It
from
chairmen of the
supersedes A(CR)
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