SURVEY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600080007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secref
MICROFILMED
Survey of Communist
Military Developments in Indochina
Secret
DIA review(s) completed.
April 10, 1975
Copy No. 57
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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA*
(This report covers the period
March 27 - April 9, 1975)
? The South Vietnamese lost Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang and
almost half of their combat forces in the hectic evacuation of the northern
coast.
? COSVN has now changed its policy and
that 1975 will be the year o decision. Recent North Vietnamese unit
deployments indicate that heavy fighting in MR 3 is imminent.
? The Khmer Communists are sending large numbers of reinforcements to
the Phnom Penh area and the capital's collapse appears imminent.
? A discussion of the status of the Cambodian government's combat
divisions is at Annex B.
This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Department of Defense.
Apra 10, 1975
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16. On the South Vietnamese side, hasty retreats, disintegration of discipline,
and continued Communist pressure led to the effective elimination of nearly all
of ARVN's combat forces in the northern two military regions. In addition to
the loss of almost all of the ARVN 23d Division and eight ranger groups in the
MR 2 highlands in mid-March, the South Vietnamese have now lost the ARVN
22d Division and most of the 3d Airborne Brigade in coastal MR 2. In MR 1,
four ranger groups - the 11th, 12th, 14th, and 15th - and four divisions - the
1st, 2d, 3d, and Marine -- also have been almost entirely lost. Of the more than
50,000 South Vietnamese main combat forces in MR 1, only about 16,000 were
evacuated from Da Nang before the Communists gained complete control of the
city and the region on March 29.
17. Of the troops successfully extracted from Da Nang, some 8,000 are
Marines, 4,000 are members of the ARVN 2d Division, and 2,000 belong to the
ARVN 3d Division. One of the Marine brigades - the 468th - is still intact and
has been sent to the Marine training center at Tu Duc to reequip and subsequently
provide security for Saigon. Another brigade - the 258th - is being reconstituted
from the other remaining elements and some recruits at Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy
Province, where the Marines have established their new headquarters. The
2d Division is being reorganized near Ham Tan, the capital of Binh Tuy Province
in eastern MR 3. The MR, 3 commander plans to deploy one regiment of the
division to Phan Rang in Ninh Thuan Province - now the northernmost capital
still under South Vietnamese control. The 1st and 3d Divisions will not be
reconstituted; instead its survivors will be used as replacements for other ARVN
units.
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18. The South Vietnamese are attempting to strengthen their tenuous hold
on Phan Rang by dispatching the 2d Airborne Brigade from Saigon. Reportedly,
it will be joined by several thousand survivors from the ARVN 2d and 22d Divisions
as soon as they can be reorganized into effective units.
19. In other troop movements, the South Vietnamese have realigned their
forces within MR 3. All but one regiment of the ARVN 25th Division have moved
out of Tay Ninh City to the southern Tay Ninh - northern Hau Nghia Province
area. Moreover, major elements of the 3d Armored Brigade have shifted eastward
to Long Khanh Province to meet the growing threat there. in late March, the
7th Regiment of the ARVN 5th Division rejoined the rest of the division in Binh
Duong Province by shifting east from southern Tay Ninh. In addition, the 48th
Regiment of the ARVN 18th Division returned from southern Tay Ninh to
Long Khanh Province, placing the entire division in this province. To partially offset
the departure of the 7th and 48th Regiments, the 32d Ranger Group, recently
withdrawn from An Loc in Binh Long Province, was sent to southern Tay Ninh.
Finally, the 12th Regiment of the ARVN 7th Division has been deployed from
from MR 4 in response to new acitivity in Long An Province in western MR 3.
20. As a result of the heavy losses suffered by the South Vietnamese over
the past two weeks, South Vietnam's main combat forces organized in active units
now number only 107,000 men. Another 86,000 troops are in territorial force
battalions, which raise South Vietnam's total regular combat forces to 193,000.
Communist regular combat forces in the south have increased to 237,000 as a
result of the infiltration of three strategic reserve divisions and air defense units.
This is the largest number of regular combat troops in the south ever and marks
the first time the Communists outnumber the government's combat forces.
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H. Combat Activity
24. The South Vietnamese lost the remainder of the northern coast during
the past two weeks, including the major population centers of Da Nang, Qui Nhon,
Tuy Hoa, and Nha Trang. The military installation at Cam Ranh also fell during
the period. The Communists now control the entire coast of South Vietnam north
of Phan Rang and have captured a total of 17 provinces in the south since the
beginning of the year. The South Vietnamese maintain tenuous holds on Phan Rang
and Phan Thiet - their last two provincial capitals in southern MR 2. In southern
South Vietnam, attention shifted to the southern and eastern parts of MR 3, where
Communist units launched heavy attacks against the capitals of Long An and Long
Khanh Provinces.
25X1 25. COSVN has issued new
instructions for future military activity. The instructions state that the Communists
now anticipate total victory in 1975. Initially, the Communists are to concentrate
on Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong Provinces, leading to the collapse or
defeat of the South Vietnamese government.
the Commu,,2ists plan to launch a three-pronged attack against Saigon itself.
26. The pressure on Phnom Penh's defenses is increasing, especially northwest
of the city and on the east bank of the Mekong. Moreover, KC forces reportedly
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have moved within 120-mm mortar and 75-mm recoilless rifle range of Pochentong
Airfield. They also have stopped up shellinL4s from rockets and 105-mm howitzers,
causing Increased damage to Khmer Air Force planes and facilities.
27. Southeast of Phnom Pen'!i, government units on the west bank of the
lassac River have given up ground in the face of increased Communist pressure.
Elements of FANK's 9th Division have taken over defense of Route I. Despite
this reinforcement, however, government troops are not expected to contain a
concentrated KC attack on Phnom Penh from the south.
28. The Communists continue to make Inroads south of the northern dike
in the northwest sector. The deteriorating situation in this area has prompted the
government to reorganize its command and control structure, but unless
reinforcements can be obtained to build up understrength combat units, degradation
of its defenses will continue. West of Prek Phnou, the Communists have penetrated
government defense lines. FANK forces halted the advance but have not been able
to close the gap. As a result, the KC now will be able to pressure government
positions along Route S.
29. Southwest of the capital the KC have forced the abandonment of several
positions on Route 4. A new defense is being set up in the vicinity of Ang Snoul.
The Communists have been increasing their pressure in this area and heavier attacks
are expected soon. On the east bank opposite Phnom Penh, KC attacks forced
the withdrawal of government units, apparently without orders. An extended stretch
of the Mekong now is held by the KC, who are in an improved position to rocket
the capital.
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35. Stocks of rice, petroleum, and ammunition continue to decline. The
following tables show Cambodian government stocks of the critical supplies in
Phnom Penh and comparative deliveries via the Mekong and airlift to the capital
in 1974 and 1975.
Critical Stocks in Phnom Penh
April 9, 19751
Stocks
(Metric Tons)
Days
of Supply
Daily Con-
sumption Rate
(Metric Tons)
Rice
6,400
10
645
Petroleum
4,400
14
327
Ammunition
5,200
12
433
Metric Tons
Jan 1-
Jan I -
Apr 9,
Apr 9,
1974'
1975
Mekong
Mekong
Total
181,100
18,050
52,800
Rice
84,300
6,750
21,900
Petroleum
48,700
5,300
9,500
Ammunition
48,100
6,000
21,400
1. Data concerning air deliveries for this period last year are not readily available, but it i.% ":timated that
deliveries by air accounted for no more than 10% of total imports for all of 1974.
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Almost 25,000 troops are in the five divisions, but only 17,000 are combat
personnel - troops in infantry and artillery battalions and armored personnel carrier
squadrons. The level of combat personnel is more than 50% below the authorized
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Declining troop strengths, increasing desertions, low morale, poor leadership,
and deteriorating equipment have brought the combat effectiveness of FANK's five
divisions to a critically low level. These divisions and the approximately 20,000
other combat troops in the capital area are not capable of sustaining the defense
of Phnom Penh much longer, and their cullarse appears imminent.
FANK's manpower level is declining as combat losses and numerous desertions
outpace the haphazard conscription program's ability to provide recruits. Manpower
losses from January 1 to April 1 for all FANK forces totaled 22,300, including
6,600 deserters. Attempts to fill out combat units by transferring headquarters
and support personnel to the front lines is proving unsuccessful, as have similar
attempts in the past. Out of the 10,000 desk soldiers planned to be assigned to
front-line combat units, only 3,200 to date have received specific orders. Because
the desertion rate is high among such troops, however, many of the 3,200 will
probably never report to their assigned units.
The problems of battle fatigue and the lack of pay combine to keep FANK
morale low. FANK units that have been in near-constant combat since January 1,
such as the 7th Division, have little will to fight anymore. Many FANK officers
lack the dynamism and imagination needed to be effective in combat. Those who
are capable are too often frustrated by senior officers. Divisiveness, indecision, and
delays ciracterize the FANK General Staff and often result in poorly planned,
uncoordinated operations.
Equipment . losses are also degrading FANK's combat effectiveness. For
example, of the five divisions' 70 armored personnel carriers (APCs) only 44 were
operational as of mid-March. Moreover, the pace of combat is wearing out these
vehicles faster than proper maintenance can be performed. They are not being
replaced, because US military aid funds have been used almost exclusively for the
purchase of ammunition. FANK has come to rely heavily on the APCs for quick
reaction to KC attacks. Their declining availability is seriously degrading FANK's
combat effectiveness.
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level. On the other hand, about 8,000 are headquarters and support personnel,
only 15% below the authorized level. Moreover, there are some overstrcngth
headquarters units, whereas not one combat unit is even at full strength. The
following table provides the strength of FANK's five divisions:
Strengths of FANK Divisions
Division
H.Q. and Support Personnel
Combat Personnel
Total Strength
Total
7,900
16,700
24,600
1st
1,700
3,300
5,000
2d
1,700
3,500
5,200
3d
1,500
4,700
6,200
7th
1,000
1,700
2,700
9th
2,000
3,500
5,500
The 7th Division is not combat effective. It bore the brunt of the KC offensive
northwest of the capital area in January and suffered extensive losses. One brigade
has been deactivated and the two remaining are severely understrength.
FANK's 1st Division, which defends the southern approaches to Phnom Penh,
is considered to be a marginally effective combat unit. Its foremost deficiency
is that it is seriously understrength and suffers from having a large number of
inexperienced recruits. As a result, the division is plagued by low morale, a high
desertion rate, and an unwillingness by the troops to maintain defensive positions.
The 2d Division defends the area southeast of Phnom Penh where there has
been little combat so far this year. It can be considered combat effective when
compared with other divisions, even though two of its brigades have erratic combat
records and are as capable of rapid retreat as they are of putting up stiff resistance.
FANK's 3d Division has fought well this year in defending the western
approaches to Phnom Penh, but it has lost a substantial number of experienced
company commanders, affecting operations adversely. Tht'se setbacks, as well as
constant combat since February, have sapped the enthusiasm and aggressiveness
of the 3d Division. Although still operating as an integral unit, its defensive lines
are stretched thin.
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The 9th Division can be considered combat effective, although it has never
been fully constituted nor fought as an integral unit. It has three brigades and
a large division headquarters but lacks its own support elements, having no APCs
or artillery. The division apparently has recently been assigned responsibility for
Route I southeast of Phnom Penh, where earlier in the year one of its brigades
was decisively defeated by attacking KC troops. In general, the brigades of the
9th Division have one of the poorest combat records of any to the FANK divisions.
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